or sum has been paid under protest or duress.500 No such suit or proceeding shall be begun before the expiration of six months from the date. of filing such claim unless the Commissioner renders a decision thereon within that time, nor after the expiration of five yars from the date of the payment of such tax, penalty, or sum, unless such suit or proceeding is begun within two years after the disallowance of the part of such claim to which such suit or proceeding relates. The Commissioner shall within 90 days after any such disallowance notify the taxpayer thereof by mail.

(b) This section shall not affect any proceeding in court instituted prior to the enactment of this Act.

566 (a) The cases set out in footnotes 566 (b)-(i), were decided before the Act of 1924 became effective. Prior acts made no reference to protest.

566 (b) Internal revenue taxes paid voluntarily cannot be recovered, and payments made with knowledge and without compulsion are voluntary. Payments are made involuntarily when made to avoid penalty__and interest threatened by the collector. Phila. v. Diehl (Col.), (1867) 5 Wall. 720; Erskine (Col.) v. Van Arsdale, (1872) 15 Wall. 75; Christie-Street Com. Co. v. U. S., (C. C., W. D. Mo. 1903) 126 Fed. 991; Chesebrough v. U. S., (1904) 192 U. S. 253; U. S. v. N. Y. & C. Mail S. S. Co., (1906) 200 U. S. 488; Armour v. Roberts (Col.), (C. C., W. D. Mo. 1907) 151 Fed. 846; Johnson & Johnson v. Herold (Col.), (C. C., D. N. J. 1907) 161 Fed. 593; Newhall v. Jordan (Col.), (C. C. A., Second Cir. 1908) 160 Fed. 661, affirming Id., (C. C., E. D. N. Y. 1906) 149 Fed. 586; Herold (Col.) v. Kahn, (C. C. A., Third Cir. 1908) 159 Fed. 608, affirming Id., (C. C., D. N. J. 1906) 147 Fed. 575; Beer v. Moffatt (Col.), (D. C., D. N. J. 1912) 192 Fed. 984; Merck v. Treat (Col.), (C. C. A., Second Cir. 1913) 202 Fed. 133; Abrast Realty Co. v. Maxwell (Col.), (C. C. A., Second Cir. 1914) 218 Fed. 457; Cambria Steel Co. v. McCoach, (D. C., E. D. Penn. 1915) 225 Fed. 278; Rutan v. Johnson & Johnson, (C. C. A., Third Cir. 1916) 231 Fed. 369; Edwards v. Chili Copper Co., (C. C. A., Second Cir. 1921) 273 Fed. 452; Proctor & Gamble Co. v. U. S., (D. C., S. D. Ohio 1922) 281 Fed. 1014.

566 (c) Where a taxpayer in making three payments of the same kind of tax during the year made formal protests on the ground that he was not liable for the tax, and there was no evidence as to whether the fourth payment was made under protest, it was presumed that the collector knew that the taxpayer was paying under protest, and such a payment was considered involuntary. Hecht v. Malley (Col.), (D. C., D. Mass. 1921) 276 Fed. 830.

566 (d) The law clearly is, unless a tax is paid under duress or compulsion and under protest made at the time of payment that it is being illegally exacted there can be no recovery." Vaughan v. Riordan (Col.), (D. C., W. D. N. Y. 1921) 280 Fed. 742.

566 (e) Where an executor voluntarily pays an estate tax on a testamentary gift to a library, which is exempt under the law, and the Commissioner arbitrarily applies such over-payment of tax against the protest of the executor to an alleged under-payment claimed on account of the failure of the executor to include certain other property in the decedent's estate, such tax is not paid voluntarily so as to defeat the ex

"SEC. 3228. [Amended by Sec. 1012, Act of 1924.] (a) All claims for the refunding or crediting of any internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty alleged to have been collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected must, except as provided in section 281 of the Revenue Act of 1924, be presented to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue567 within four years next after the payment of such tax, penalty, or sum.

"(b) Except as provided in section 281 of the Revenue Act of 1924, claims for credit or refund (other than claims in respect of taxes imposed by the Revenue Act of 1916, the Revenue Act of

ecutor's right to sue to recover the same. Vaughan v. Riordan (Col.), (D. C., W. D. N. Y. 1921) 280 Fed. 742.

566 (f) An action for the recovery of income and profits taxes illegally assessed and collected is not maintainable against a collector, if paid voluntarily, under no duress, and without protest. Coffey (Col.) et al. v. The Exchange Bank of Lennox, (C. C. A., Eighth Cir. 1924) 296 Fed. 807.

566 (g) In an action against a collector to recover estate taxes erroneously and illegally assessed and collected, the failure to allege that payment was made under duress makes the declaration demurrable. Dugan et al. v. Miles (Col.), (D. C., D. Md. 1921) 276 Fed. 401.

566 (h) A taxpayer paid his tax voluntarily and without protest, based on figures for which he alone was responsible. The collector received the payment but took no action to enforce collection. Later the taxpayer discovered that he erred in failure to take certain deductions. He was not permitted to file suit against the collector to recover the voluntary payment made under the Act of 1918. Section 252 of said Act merely authorized the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to refund taxes overpaid, regardless of whether paid under protest or duress, and had nothing to do with the Collector of Internal Revenue or with an action against him. Fox v. Edwards, (C. C. A., Second Cir. 1923) 287 Fed. 669.

566 (i) A written protest or notice is not required of a party when paying internal revenue taxes in order to entitle him to file suit for the recovery thereof. A verbal protest is sufficient. Wright v. Blakeslee (Col.), (1880) 101 U. S. 174.

567 Sec. 3228 R. S. renders it necessary to file claim for refund within two years after the cause of action accrues. The cause of action accrues when the tax is paid. Public Service Co. v. Herold (Col.), (D. C., D. N. J. 1915) 219 Fed. 301; Public Service Gas Co. et al. v. Herold, (D. C., D. N. J. 1915) 227 Fed. 496; Public Service Ry. Co. v. Herold, (C. C. A., Third Cir. 1916) 229 Fed. 902; Maryland Casualty Co. v. U. S. (1920) 251 U. S. 342 [Sec. 3228, prior to amendment by the Act of 1921, required the claim for refund to be presented to the Commissioner "within two years next after the cause of action accrued.'']

568 (a) Where the Commissioner compromises a civil or criminal case under 3229 R. S., by the acceptance of the tax and penalty, and the promise of no further action, such compromise is a bar against criminal prosecution. Rau v. U. S., (C. C. A., Second Cir. 1919) 260 Fed. 130.

1917, or the Revenue Act of 1918) which at the time of the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1921 were barred from allowance by the period of limitation then in existence, shall not be allowed."

SEC. 3229. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the advice and consent of the Secretary of the Treasury, may compromises any civil or criminal case arising under the Internal Revenue laws instead of commencing suit thereon; and, with the advice and consent of the said Secretary and the recommendation of the Attorney General, he may compromise any such case after a suit thereon has been commenced. Whenever a compromise is made in any case there shall be placed on file in the office of the Commissioner the opinion of the Solicitor of Internal Revenue, or of the officer acting as such, with his reasons therefor, with a statement of the amount of the tax assessed, the amount of additional tax or penalty imposed by law in consequence of the neglect or delinquency of the person against whom the tax is assessed, and the amount actually paid in accordance with the terms of the compromise.

SEC. 3466.569 Whenever any person indebted to the United States is insolvent, or whenever the estate of any deceased debtor, in the hands of the executors or administrators, is insufficient to pay all the debts due from the deceased, the debts due to the United States shall be first satisfied; and the priority hereby established shall extend as well to cases in which a debtor, not having sufficient property to pay all his debts, makes a voluntary assignment thereof, or in which the estate and effects of an absconding, concealed, or absent debtor are attached by process of law, as to cases in which an act of bankruptcy is committed.

SEC. 3467.569 Every executor, administrator, or assignee, or other person, who pays any debt due by the person or estate from whom or for which he acts, before he satisfies and pays the debts due to the United States from such person or estate, shall become answerable in his own person and estate for the debts so due to the United States, or for so much thereof as may remain due and unpaid.

SEC. 5f.570 The net proceeds of the partnership property shall be appropriated to the payment of the partnership debts, and the net proceeds of the individual estate of each partner to the payment of his individual debts. Should any surplus remain of the property of any partner after paying his individual debts, such surplus shall be added to the partnership assets and be applied to the payment of the partner

568 (b) A compromise with the government effected under the authority granted in Sec. 3229, R. S., is a complete defense against the recovery of a penalty. U. S. v. Chouteau, (1880) 102 U. S. 603.

568 (c) A compromise effected under the provisions of Sec. 3229, R. S., is as complete a discharge of an accused as a verdict of acquittal by a jury. Oliver v. U. S., (C. C. A., Fourth Cir. 1920) 267 Fed. 544.

569 (a) Where a partnership is bankrupt and the partners are individually bankrupt, and where under the partnership agreement a partner is entitled to 50% of the profits of the partnership but leaves his proportion of the profits in the partnership business with the result that no assets are held individually by him from which the U. S. can satisfy his individual income tax as a claim by the U. S. for his individual income taxes has priority over creditors of the partnership for partnership debts under Sec. 64a of the Bankruptcy Act and Secs. 3466 and 3467, R. S. In re Brezin and Schaefer, Bankrupts, (D. C., D. N. J. 1924) 297 Fed. 300.

569 (b) Under Sec. 64a of the Bankruptey Act, Secs. 3466 and 3467, R. S., taxes due the United States have priority over other claims, regardless of whether the claim of the U. S. therefor is presented within one year after the bankruptcy adjudication. In re Brezin and Schaefer, Bankrupts, C. D. C., D. N. J. 1924) 297 Fed. 300.

ship debts. Should any surplus of the partnership remain after paying the partnership debts, such surplus shall be added to the assets of the individual partners in the proportion of their respective interests in the partnership.

SEC. 57n.571 Claims shall not be proved against a bankrupt estate subsequent to one year after the adjudication; or if they are liquidated by litigation and the final judgment therein is ren

569 (c) The United States is given priority under Sec. 3466, R. S., for income taxes, over state and county taxes, due by an insolvent. U. S. v. San Juan County, Wash., (D. C., W. D. Wash. 1922) 280 Fed. 121.

570 Under Sec. 5f of the Bankruptcy Act, partnership property is required to be appropriated to the payment of partnership debts and individual property to the payment of individual debts. In each case the surplus, if any, is required to be applied to the payment of debts of the other. Under Sec. 64a, the trustee is required to pay all taxes legally due and owing by the bankrupt to the United States in advance of the payment of dividends to creditors. Under the Act of 1918, there is no tax against a partnership. Hence, federal income taxes owing by individuals composing the firm of a bankrupt partnership are not taxes legally due by the partnership, and do not have priority over claims of the creditors of the bankrupt partnership. In re Jones and Baker, (C. C. A., Second Cir. 1924) Fed. affirming Id., (D. C., S. D. N. Y. 1923)

Fed.

571 Sec. 57n of the Bankruptcy Act which provides that claims shall not be proved against a bankrupt estate subsequent to one year after adjudication, does not apply to claims of the United States for federal taxes. In re J. Menist Co., (C. C. A., Second Cir. 1924) 294 Fed. 532.

dered within thirty days before or after the expiration of such time, then within sixty days after the rendition of such judgment:

SEC. 64a.572 The court shall order the trustee to pay all taxes legally due and owing by the bankrupt to the United States, State, county, district, or municipality in advance of the pay

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Art. 1, Sec. 2, Cl. 3: Representatives and direct taxes3 shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers.

Art. 1, Sec. 7, Cl. 1: All bills for raising rev

572 (a) In bankruptcy proceedings the reasonable and necessary expenses of raising, preserving and distributing the funds have priority over federal income taxes. Act of 1918. In re Wyley Co., (D. C., W. D. Georgia 1923) 292 Fed. 900.

572 (b) In bankruptcy proceedings, taxes due the United States have no priority over taxes due the states. In re Wyley Co., (D. C., W. D. Georgia 1923) 292 Fed. 900.

572 (c) Federal taxes legally due against a bankrupt take precedence over wage claims against such bankrupt under Sec. 64 (a) of the Bankruptcy Act. In the matter of Essenkey Products Co., Bankrupt, (C. C. A., Seventh Cir. 1924) Fed.

572 (d) The collector of internal revenue of the proper district filed with the referee in Bankruptcy a claim for income taxes assessed against and alleged to be due by the bankrupt. The trustee contested the allowance of the same. The referee after hearing allowed a part and disallowed the balance of such claim under Sec. 64a of the Bankruptcy Act. No petition for review was filed by the government within the time allowed by the rules of court. Later the trustee on the order of the referee paid the collector the amount allowed, and the latter received and paid the same into the Treasury of the United States. The United States was bound thereby and was not entitled to have the order of the court below reversed. U. S. v. Hines, Trustee, (C. C. A., Eighth Cir. 1924) Fed.

572 (e) The government prior to the expiration of 1920 had no present provable claim for income taxes on income derived during said year, which the court would consider in receivership proceedings, the taxable year not having expired. Act of 1918. Penna. Cement Co. v. Bradley Const. Co., (D. C., S. D. N. Y. 1920) 274 Fed. 1003.

572 (f) Where the government filed proof of claim for unpaid income taxes imposed by the Act of 1913, the trustee in bankruptcy was not required to pay the tax and then file suit to recover under Sec. 3226, R. S. Sec. 64 (a) of the Bankruptcy Act is binding on the government because it is mentioned therein. thorizes the Bankruptcy Court to determine questions involving federal taxes due by a bankrupt. In re General Film Corp. and U. S. v. Kellogg, (C. C. A., Second Cir. 1921) 274 Fed. 903.

It au

572 (g) Where on petition by a receiver for instructions as to taxes due the U. S., the latter refuse to state prior to the due date of the tax whether they will claim an income tax on a sum of money received by the receivers, and refuse to consent to the adjudication of the question, the court cannot adjudicate such question. A receiver under such circumstances must pre

serve the assets of the receivership until the due date of the tax and until the tax liability is determined, in order to protect himself personally. Penn. Cement Co. v. Bradley Const. Co., (D. C., S. D. N. Y. 1920) 274 Fed. 1003.

573 (a) A tax upon income from realty or personalty is a direct tax, and, hence, unconstitutional unless apportioned among the several States. A tax upon income from municipal bonds is repugnant to the Constitution in that it taxes the power of a state or its instrumentality to borrow money--a necessary attribute of sovereignty. The tax imposed on the income from realty and personalty being unconstitutional because not apportioned, Secs. 27 to 37, inclusive, Act of 1894, were all void because they constituted one entire scheme of taxation. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., (1895) 158 U. S. 601, affirming Id., (1895) 157 U. S. 429, on rehearing.

573 (b) A decedent during his lifetime took out a number of insurance policies on his life, the last of which was taken out eighteen years before his death in 1919. Some of the policies were originally made payable to his estate and later assigned to his wife and daughter as beneficiaries, in some cases with and in others, without power of revocation. Other policies were originally made payable to his executors and later through arrangements with the companies were made payable to his daughter as beneficiary, without power of revocation. Still other policies originally named his wife and daughter as beneficiaries without power of revocation. The premiums in all cases were paid by the decedent. The policies in which the wife and or daughter were named as beneficiaries without power of revocation created an immediate absolute vested interest in them, and the policies in which they were named as beneficiaries with power of revocation, created an immediate vested interest in them, which was subject to being divested on the decedent's changing the beneficiary. This, however, was never done. The proceeds of these policies belonged to the beneficiaries at all times and were not a part of the estate of the decedent at any time. They were not subject to the estate tax imposed by the Act of 1919. Sec. 402 (f) which ineludes the proceeds of life insurance policies in excess of $40,000 receivable by beneficiaries, in the gross estate, is unconstitutional as taking property without due process of law and laying a direct tax without apportionment. Lewellyn (Col.) v. Frick, (D. C., W. D. Penn. 1924) 298 Fed. 803.

574 (a) Congress cannot do indirectly by taxation what it is prohibited by the constitution from doing directly; hence Sec. 1200 of the Act of 1918 which attempts to levy an excise tax of 10% on the “entire

posts, and excises,575 to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform576 throughout the United States.

net profits received or accrued for such year" to every person employing child labor is unconstitutional. The regulation of labor within the states is reserved to the states themselves. George v. Bailey (Col.), (D. C., W. D. N. C. 1921) 274 Fed. 639.

574 (b) The child labor tax levied by the Act of 1918 was unconstitutional as an attempt on the part of Congress to regulate the internal affairs of the States. It was not the purpose of the Act to raise revenue but to prohibit child labor. Bailey (Col.) v. Drexel Fur. Co., (1922) 259 U. S. 20, affirming Id., (D. C., W. D. N. C. 1921) 276 Fed. 452.

574 (c) Congress cannot, under the Constitution of the United States, impose an income tax upon the salary of a state judicial officer. Suit arose under Sec. 116, as amended, Act of 1865. Buffington (Col.) v. Day, (1871) 11 Wall. 113, citing Dobbins v. Erie Co., (1842) 16 Pet. 435, which held that a state cannot impose a tax upon a federal office.

574 (d) An unwarranted delegation of legislative authority was not made by the Act of 1913 because certain administrative powers to enforce the Act were conferred upon the Secretary of the Treasury. Brushaber v. U. P. R. R. Co., (1916) 240 U. s. 1.

574 (e) The Act of 1921 was not unconstitutional because it imposed an income tax on the income of a native citizen of the United States, who was a resident of and permanently domiciled in Mexico, and whose income was derived solely from personalty and realty with a fixed situs in Mexico. The power to lay an income tax on a citizen of the United States is not dependent upon the domicile of the citizen or the situs of the property which produces the income. The question of whether the Act of 1921 should be construed to impose an income tax on a native citizen of the United States, who was a resident of and permanently domiciled in Mexico, and whose income was derived solely from personalty and realty with a fixed situs in Mexico, was not before the court. Cook v. Tait (Col.), (1924) U. S. affirming Id., (D. C., D. Md. 1923) 286 Fed. 409.

575 (a) The income tax imposed by the Act of 1865 was not direct; but an excise or duty. Only dircet taxes are subject to apportionment under the Constitution and they comprehend capitation taxes and taxes on real estate only. Springer v. U. S., (1881) 102 U. S. 586.

575 (b) It was not the intent of the framers of the Constitution that a tax should be considered direct which could not be apportioned equitably. The income tax imposed by Sec. 120, as amended, Act of 1866, could not be apportioned equitably, therefore, it was not a direct tax, but a duty or excise." cific Ins. Co. v. Soule, (1869) 7 Wall. 433.

Pa

575 (c) The tax imposed by Sec. 38, Act of 1909, was not a direct tax on the franchise or the property of the corporation, but an excise on the privilege of doing business in a corporate capacity. Flint v. StoneTracy Co., (1911) 220 U. S. 107; U. S. v. Whitridge, et al., (1913) 231 U. S. 144, affirming Penn. Steel Co. v. N. Y. City Ry. Co., (C. C. A., Second Cir. 1912) 198 Fed. 774, and Id., (D. C., S. D. N. Y. 1912) 193 Fed. 286; Stratton's Independence, Ltd., v. Howbert (Col.), (1913) 231 U. S. 399, affirming Id., (C. C. A., Eighth Cir. 1914) 211 Fed. 1023 and Id., (D. C., D. Colo. 1912) 207 Fed. 419; Anderson (Col.) v. Morris & E.

Art. 1, Sec. 9. Cl. 4: No capitation or other direct tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census or enumeration herein before directed to be taken.

Art. 1, Sec. 9. Cl. 5: No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported577 from any State.

Ry. Co., (C. C. A., Second Cir. 1914) 216 Fed. 83; Nat'l Bank of Commerce v. Allen, (C. C. A., Eighth Cir. 1915) 223 Fed. 472; Phila. Traction Co. v. McCoach (Col:), (D. C., E. D. Penn. 1915) 224 Fed. 800; Blalock (Col.) v. Georgia Ry. & Electric Co., (C. C. A., Fifth Cir. 1915) 228 Fed. 296; Anderson (Col.) v. Forty-two Broadway, (1915) 239 U. S. 69; Biwabik Mining Co. v. U. S., (C. C. A., Sixth Cir. 1917) 242 Fed. 9; Hays (Col.) v. Gauley Mountain Coal Co., (1918) 247 U. S. 189; U. S. v. Oregon R. & Navigation Co., (C. C. A., Second Cir. 1918) 251 Fed. 211; Doyle (Col.) v. Mitchell Bros. Co., (1918) 247 U. S. 179; U. S. v. Phila. B. & W. Ry. Co., (D. C., E. D. Penn. 1920) 262 Fed. 188.

575 (d) The estate tax acts of 1916 and 1917 imposed an excise or duty and not a direct tax. The tax levied was on the privilege of transmitting property at death. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner (Col.), (1921) 256 U. S. 345, affirming Id., (D. C., S. D. N. Y. 1920) 263 Fed. 620; McElligott v. Kissam (Col.), (C. C. A., Second Cir. 1921) 275 Fed. 545; Schwab v. Doyle (Col.), (C. C. A., Sixth Cir. 1920) 269 Fed. 321; and Penn. Co. et al. v. Lederer (Col.), (D. C., E. D. Penn. 1921) 292 Fed. 629.

575 (e) Income and excess profits taxes imposed by the Acts of 1917 and 1918 do not come within the class of duties, imposts or excises, which are enumerated in Clause 1 of Sec. 8 of Art. I of the Constitution, and which are required to be uniform throughout the U. S. Porto Rico Coal Co. v. Edwards (Col.), (D. C., S. D. N. Y. 1921) 275 Fed. 104.

576 (a) The uniformity required by the Federal Constitution in the laying of excise taxes is a geographical uniformity. Flint v. Stone-Tracy Co., (1911) 220 U. S. 107; Camp Bird Ltd. v. Howbert (Col.), (C. C. A., Eighth Cir. 1918) 249 Fed. 27; N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co. v. U. S., (C. C. A., Second Cir. 1920) 269 Fed. 907.

576 (b) The uniformity required by Section 8, Art I, of the Federal Constitution is a geographical uniformity. LaBelle Iron Works v. U. S., (1921) 256 U. S. 377, 65 L. Ed. 604, affirming Id., (1920) 55 Ct. Cl. 462.

576 (c) The uniformity required by the constitution is a geographical uniformity; hence, the exemption of a part or all of the income of certain designated persons, classes, and corporations, did not render the Act of 1913 unconstitutional. Brushaber v. U. P. R. R. Co., (1916) 240 U. S. 1; Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., (1916) 240 U. S. 103.

576 (d) The tax imposed by Sec. 38, Act of 1909, which differentiated between certain classes of corporations and individuals by exempting some was "uniform" within the meaning of the Federal Constitution, that requirement being a geographical uniformity. Flint v. Stone-Tracy Co., (1911) 220 U. S. 107; Camp Bird Ltd. v. Howbert (Col.), (C. C. A., Eighth Cir. 1918) 249 Fed. 27; N. Y., N. H., & H. R. R. Co. v. U. S., (C. C. A., Second Cir. 1920) 269 Fed. 907.

578 (e) The rule of uniformity prescribed by the constitution is a territorial uniformity. Act of 1921. Bankers Trust Co. v. Edwards (Col.), (D. C., S. D. N. Y. 1923) 292 Fed. 793.

577 (a) The Act of 1913, which imposed a tax on income derived from all sources, was not invalid in so far as it imposed a tax upon income derived from the exportation to and sale of goods in foreign countries.

Art. 2, Sec. 1, Cl. 7: The President shall, at stated times, receive for his services, a compensation, which shall neither be increased or diminished during the period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that period any other emolument from the United States, or any of them.

Art. 3, Sec. 1: The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a compensation, which shall not be diminished578 during their continuance in office.

Amendment 4: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,579 shall not be violated, and no Warrants

The tax was not upon exports; the transaction was complete before the income arose for taxation. Peck & Co. Inc. v. Lowe (Col.), (1918) 247 U. S. 165, affirming Id., (D. C., S. D. N. Y. 1916) 234 Fed. 125.

577 (b) Congress has power to tax the net income of domestic corporations derived from their export business. National Paper & Type Co. v. Edwards (Col.), (D. C., S. D. N. Y. 1923) 292 Fed. 633.

578 The provision in Sec. 213, Act of 1918, requiring the salaries of Federal Judges to be included in taxable income is repugnant to Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Federal Constitution, in that it diminishes the salary of such judges during their continuance in office." Evans v. Gore (Col.), (1920) 253 U. S. 245, reversing Id., (D. C., W. D. Kentucky 1919) 262 Fed. 550, where the judge was appointed before the Act took effect; and Graham v. Miles (Col.), (D. C., D. Md. 1922) 284 Fed. 878, where the judge was appointed after the Act took effect.

579 The requirement of ordinary and reasonable returns under Sec. 38, Act of 1909, did not violate the unreasonable search and seizure provision of the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Flint v. StoneTracy Co., (1911) 220 U. S. 107.

580 (a) The retroactivity of the Act of 1913 to the date of the 16th Amendment did not render the act invalid. Brushaber v. U. P. R. R. Co., (1916) 240 U. S. 1; Tyee Realty Co. v. Anderson, (1916) 240 U. S. 115; Woods v. Lewellyn (Col.), (C. C. A., Third Cir. 1918) 252 Fed. 106.

580 (b) The tax imposed by Sec. 38, Act of 1909, did not take property "without due process of law." Flint v. Stone-Tracy Co., (1911) 220 U. S. 107.

580 (c) The limitation on the amount of interest deductible from gross income of corporations in the Act of 1913 did not render the Act wanting in "due process of law." Brushaber v. U. P. R. R. Co., (1916) 240 U. S. 1; Tyee Realty Co. v. Anderson, (1916) 240 U. S. 115.

580 (d) The limitation placed upon the amount of interest deductible under Sec. 38, Act of 1909, was not repugnant to the Constitution. Anderson (Col.) v. Fortytwo Broadway, (1915) 239 U. S. 69.

580 (e) The provision in the Act of 1913 limiting mining companies to a deduction of 5 per cent of the gross value at the mine of the output for exhaustion, wear, and tear of their property was not without due proc-ess of law," although other corporations and individuals were given a "reasonable allowance" therefor. Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., (1916) 240 U. S. 103.

580 (f) Section 207 of the Act of 1917 defining and limiting invested capital for income tax purposes is not so arbitrary and discriminatory as to be wanting in

shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Amendment 5: No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;580 nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

"due process of law." La Belle Iron Works v. U. S., (1921) 256 U. S. 377.

580 (g) Sec. 17, Act of 1870, construing certain sections of former acts to extend the tax to the year 1870, was valid, because it was not an attempt to exercise judicial power by construing a statute for the court; but it was a mode of continuing or reviving a tax which might have been supposed to have expired. It was within the legislative power of Congress to impose the tax retroactively. Stockdale (Col.) v. The Atlantic Ins. Co., (1874) 20 Wall. 323.

580 (h) The provisions in the Act of 1913 permitting deductions by individuals for the purpose of the normal tax but not for the additional tax, were not wanting in due process of law." Brushaber v. U. P. R. R.

Co., (1916) 240 U. S. 1.

580 (i) The provision of the Act of 1913 denying to persons the right to deduct personal, living, or family expenses, such as expenditures for rental and food, was not wanting in "due process of law," although persons who lived in their own houses or produced their own food were not required to return as income the value thereof, consumed as personal, living, or family expenses. Brushaber v. U. P. R. R. Co., (1916) 240 U. S. 1.

580 (j) The progressive rate features of the Act of 1913 were not wanting in "due process of law." Brushaber v. U. P. R. R. Co., (1916) 240 U. S. 1; Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., (1916) 240 U. S. 103; Tyee Realty Co. v. Anderson, (1916) 240 U. S. 115.

580 (k) The provision of Sec. 122, as amended, Act of 1866, authorizing the withholding of the tax from non-resident bondholders and stockholders was valid. Mich. Cent. R. R. Co. v. Slack (Col.), (1880) 100 U. S. 595.

580 (1) The provision of the Act of 1913 permitting a greater deduction by individuals at the head of a family as compared with single individuals was not wanting in due process of law." Brushaber v. U. P. R. R. Co., (1916) 240 U. S. 1.

580 (m) Sec. 9 (bis.), Act of 1866, requiring taxpayers to pay income tax based upon their income measured in legal tender currency was within the province of Congress. This merely prescribed a uniform basis of taxation. Pacific Ins. Co. v. Soule (1869) 7 Wall. 433.

580 (n) The provision in the Act of 1913 for collection at the source was not wanting in "due process of law." Brushaber v. U. P. R. R. Co., (1916) 240 U. S. 1.

580 (0) Even though a statute may operate oppressively upon some taxpayers, or even all, is no reason for the judicial department to declare the same void.'