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The concept of a term of copyright extending for a period of years beyond the death of the author is basically sound. Under that pattern, substantially all of the works of an author fall into the public domain at one and the same time and become available for reproduction in compilations or other composite forms at that time. The system is more efficient and more equitable to authors and users than our present system. Presently it is essential to check the status of each work individually. Compilations or sets of an author's work cannot be produced until copyright on the last of them expires; unpublished works not registered for copyright are entitled to perpetual common law protection; works of an author which are still under copyright, compete with those of the same author which have fallen into the public domain.

However, if a single term of copyright extending for a period beyond the author's death were to be chosen for a new statute, it should be accompanied by a number of protective changes in the structure of our law.

(1) Both published and unpublished works should be embraced within the Federal system of copyright.

(2) Copyright should stem from creation without formalities.

(3) The copyright should be divisible so that an author may grant to a publisher the right to print and issue copies, to a producer the right to adapt a work for a play, to a motion picture company the right to produce a motion picture, and the right to a television producer to produce a television program, etc. These rights should be separate and fully enforceable so that they might be bargained for separately. The purchaser should, as a matter of law, be entitled only to those rights which are expressly bargained for and granted; all rights not expressly granted should be deemed reserved to the author. It should be necessary for these assignments to be in writing and to have been recorded in the Copyright Office.

(4) Although I do not believe that the statute should attempt to write contractual provisions into the law, I favor following the principle of establishing presumptions, as is done in the Uniform Sales Acts and of the Negotiable Instruments Laws. The copyright statute should set forth presumptions and consequences which flow from contracts and licenses wherein the intentions of the parties are not clearly expressed.

(5) The doctrine by which an employer becomes the "author" of a work is not only artificial but erroneous. Adequate provision can be made for shop rights or other employer privileges analogous to those recognized by our patent system. (6) Finally, the extension of the term of copyright to a period beyond the death of the author would require some provision for the disposition of the extended period. I suggest that the extended term should revert to the original author or his family.

In the alternative, the statute might provide that a person to whom rights in the extended term had been granted under a written contract could continue to exercise such rights if (a) the contract provided for the author's participation on an equitable basis in all of the earnings of the work, (b) if the contract had been fully performed, and (c) if the contract had been recorded in the Copyright Office within 90 days after its execution.

By Robert Gibbon

(The Curtis Publishing Company)

JOHN SCHULMAN.

JULY 20, 1960. source of this Company's While we have seen no

Problems relating to copyright renewal are the major interest in the proposed revision of the copyright law. injustice attributable to the confusion that surrounds this aspect of the law, it is our conviction that the doubt and uncerainty which now exist are an unnecessary burden on publishers, authors, agents and their lawyers.

Because of the importance of this problem, we have confined our comments, where possible, to issues relating to contributions to periodicals and composite works.

We concur with the prevailing thought that there are distinct advantages to statutory periods of copyright and renewal. These provide, among other benefits, an indication to the public of duration of copyright. The provision for registration as a requirement for the renewal term, if intelligently stated, pro

vides a possibility for early entry of much copyrighted material into public domain without jeopardizing the rights of parties who desire the longer period of exclusivity.

Reversion of ownership of rights, to protect an author from the effects of a hasty or inequitable bargain, is clearly anachronistic. No matter how precisely this can be shown to have been the intent behind much of the existing law, it clearly it not a part of the present day concepts. Possibly the author once did need protection from someone who might wrest from him the fruits of his creativity. However, the development of communication media, authors' agents and the current insatiable needs of publishers and producers make such protective efforts unnecessary and, indeed, cumbersome.

An author should have as much right as anyone else to alienate interests in his product, for whatever period they are within his control. Once he has transferred an interest, the transferee is entitled to protection under the law.

With respect to composite works, why shouldn't the proprietor have a right of renewal? To become a proprietor he has had to acquire all interests in the materials; but in all likelihood, at the time of renewal, his interests are quite limited. He has probably assigned some of the rights back to the author. Possibly he has disposed of some interests for the mutual benefit of the author and himself. By having held, at the time of original copyright, all interests in the material, he is the logical party to apply for renewal. His renewal should accrue to the benefit of all of the holders of interests in the copyrighted material, whatever those interests are and whoever the holders might be.

A renewal by the proprietor of material in a periodical or composite work, who obtained the original copyright, would serve to protect the interests of all of the holders of rights in any of the copyrighted material. However, there is no need to make this right of renewal exclusive in the proprietor. If he has ceased to exist or shows no interest in obtaining renewals, and this will not occur too frequently, the various holders of rights under the copyright should also have a right of renewal. Each such renewal would protect the rights of the person making the renewal and all rights that emanated from him or are derived from him. Without reversion of ownership to complicate the situation, such a plan creates no complexity or confusion. Each holder of a right or an interest knows that, to protect it for the renewal period, he must either apply for renewal himself or assure himself that one of his predecessors in interest has applied for renewal.

ROBERT GIBBON.

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OF MICHIGAN

2d Session

62629

COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION

APR 13 1931

MAIN READING ROOM

STUDIES

PREPARED FOR THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON

PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-SIXTH CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Res. 240

STUDIES 32-34

32. Protection of Works of Foreign Origin

33. Copyright in Government Publications

34. Copyright in Territories and Possessions of the
United States

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

UNITED STATES

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON: 1961

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman

ESTES KEFAUVER, Tennessee
OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina
THOMAS C. HENNINGS, JR., Missouri
JOHN L. MCCLELLAN, Arkansas
JOSEPH C. O'MAHONEY, Wyoming
SAM J. ERVIN, JR., North Carolina
JOHN A. CARROLL, Colorado

THOMAS J. DODD, Connecticut

PHILIP A. HART, Michigan

ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin
EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois
ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska
KENNETH B. KEATING, New York
NORRIS COTTON, New Hampshire

SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS

JOSEPH C. O'MAHONEY, Wyoming, Chairman

OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina
PHILIP A. HART. Michigan

ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin

ROBERT L. WRIGHT, Chief Counsel

JOHN C. STEDMAN, Associate Counsel
STEPHEN G. HAASER, Chief Clerk

The late Hon. Thomas C. Hennings, Jr., while a member of this committee, died on Sept. 13, 1960

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