Opinion of the Court 467 U. S. Morrison-Knudsen Construction Co. v. Director, OWCP, 461 U. S. 624, 636 (1983); Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Director, OWCP, 449 U. S. 268, 282, and n. 24 (1980); see also 2A A. Larson, Law of Workmen's Compensation § 72.31(c) (1982). In the case of the LHWCA, §4(a)(b) and § 5(a) codify the compromise at the heart of workers' compensation. relevant portions of these provisions read as follows: The "SEC. 4. (a) Every employer shall be liable for and shall secure the payment to his employees of the compensation payable under sections 7, 8, 9. In the case of an employer who is a subcontractor, the contractor shall be liable for and shall secure the payment of such compensation to employees of the subcontractor unless the subcontractor has secured such payment. "(b) Compensation shall be payable irrespective of "SEC. 5. (a) The liability of an employer prescribed in 86 The current case stems from an ambiguity in the wording of these sections. It is unclear how §5(a)'s grant of immunity applies to the contractors mentioned in §4(a). This interpretative question divides into two distinct inquiries. First, does § 5(a)'s grant of immunity ever extend to general contractors? And second, if § 5(a) can extend to general contractors, what must a contractor do to qualify for §5(a)'s immunity? We will consider these questions in turn. The language of § 5(a)'s grant of immunity does not effortlessly embrace contractors. Section 5(a) speaks in terms of "an employer" and, at least as far as the employees of subcontractors are concerned, a general contractor does not act as an employer. 8 A few courts have accepted a literal reading of the language of §5(a) and analogous state immunity provisions. For instance, in Fiore v. Royal Painting Co., 398 So. 2d 863, 865 (1981), a Florida appellate court concluded: "Only the actual employer. . . may get under the immunity umbrella of [33 U. S. C.] § 905." Similarly, in interpreting an almost identical provision of New York workers' compensation law, the New York Court of Appeals has reasoned that tort immunity should not apply to contractors because "[t]he word "employee" denotes a contractual relationship'” and a contractor never is contractually bound to the employees of a subcontractor. Sweezey v. Arc Electrical Construction Co., 295 N. Y. 306, 310-311, 67 N. E. 2d 369, 370–371 (1946) (quoting Passarelli Columbia Engineering and Contracting Co., 270 N. Y. 68, 75, 200 N. E. 583, 585 (1936)). The more widely held view, however, is that the term "employer" as used in § 5(a) has a statutory definition somewhat broader than that word's ordinary meaning. The majority of courts considering the issue, including the Court of Appeals in this case, have concluded that §5(a)'s tort immunity can extend to general contractors, at least when the contractor has fulfilled its responsibilities to secure compensation for subcontractor employees in accordance with the requirements of § 4(a). See, e. g., Johnson v. Bechtel Associates Professional Corp., supra, at 302, 717 F. 2d, at 581; Thomas v. George Hyman Construction Co., 173 F. Supp. 381, 383 8 1922 N. Y. Laws, ch. 615, § 56; see H. R. Rep. No. 1190, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1926) (“The [LHWCA] follows in the main the New York State compensation law. . ."). (DC 1959); DiNicola v. George Hyman Construction Co., 407 A. 2d 670, 674 (D. C. 1979).9 In choosing between these conflicting interpretations of § 5(a), we are predisposed in favor of the majority view that tort immunity should extend to contractors. This position is presumptively the better view because it is more consistent with the compromise underlying the LHWCA. The reward for securing compensation and assuming strict liability for worker-related injuries has traditionally been immunity from tort liability. See supra, at 931-932. "Since the general contractor is [by the operation of provisions like §4(a) of the LHWCA], in effect, made the employer for the purposes of the compensation statute, it is obvious that he should enjoy the regular immunity of an employer from third-party suit when the facts are such that he could be made liable for compensation." 2A Larson, supra, §72.31(a), at 14-112. Our only difficulty in adopting the majority view is that it requires a slightly strained reading of the word "employer." As we have repeatedly admonished courts faced with technical questions arising under the LHWCA, "the wisest course is to adhere closely to what Congress has written." Rodriguez v. Compass Shipping Co., 451 U. S. 596, 617 (1981); see Director, OWCP v. Rasmussen, 440 U. S. 29, 47 (1979). Absent convincing evidence of contrary congressional intent, we are reluctant to depart from this sound canon of statutory construction. However, upon reviewing the use of the term “employer" elsewhere in the Act, we find ample evidence to infer that Congress intended the term "employer" to include general contractors as well as direct employers. The second sentence of §4(a) provides that "unless the subcontractor has secured [worker's] compensation," the contractor "shall secure the payment of such compensation." 9 'As discussed below, courts have differed as to what it means for a general contractor to secure compensation in accordance with § 4(a). See infra, at 936-940. This section clearly assumes that contractors have the capacity to secure compensation for subcontractor employees. Securing compensation is a term of art in this area of law. Under the LHWCA, compensation can be secured only through the procedures outlined in §32(a) of the LHWCA. See supra, at 928. However, §32(a) speaks only of insurance being secured by an "employer." 33 U. S. C. § 932(a). Because the LHWCA requires that contractors secure compensation for subcontractor employees under certain circumstances, the term "employer" as used in § 32(a) must be read to encompass general contractors. Similarly, under § 4(a), contractors are made liable for payment of "compensation payable under sections 7, 8, and 9." These three sections refer exclusively to employers' making payments; they contain no references to contractors. See 33 U. S. C. §§ 907(a), 908(f). For purposes of these sections as well, contractors would appear to qualify as statutory employers. Further evidence that contractors can be employers under the LHWCA is found in §33(b), which governs the assignment of an injured worker's right to recover damages from third parties to the worker's "employer." 33 U. S. C. § 933(b); see Rodriguez v. Compass Shipping Co., supra. It is difficult to believe that Congress did not intend for contractors making compensation payments under § 4(a) to receive assignments under §33(b) or that Congress wanted the assignment to run to a worker's actual employer, who may never have secured any compensation insurance. Accordingly, it seems highly probable that "employer" as used in § 33(b) also covers contractors. Finally, there are the enforcement provisions of § 38 of the Act, 33 U. S. C. § 938. It is generally assumed that contractors who fail to comply with the requirements of § 4(a) may be liable for § 38's criminal penalties. App. 263-265, 299. This assumption seems reasonable, for, if contractors are not covered by $38, then the LHWCA contains no apparent mechanism for enforcing the second sentence of § 4(a). But, once again, §38 refers only to "[a]ny employer required to secure the payment of compensation under this Act." If contractors are truly liable under $38, then contractors must be considered statutory employers. From the foregoing examples, it is clear that Congress must have meant for the term "employer" in other sections of the LHWCA to include contractors. 10 It is reasonable to infer that Congress intended the term "employer" to have that same broad meaning in § 5(a). This is particularly so inasmuch as granting tort immunity to contractors that comply with 84(a) is consistent with the quid pro quo underlying workers' compensation statutes. For both of these reasons, we adopt the majority view that general contractors can be embraced by the term "employer" as used in § 5(a). B Having concluded that § 5(a) can cover general contractors, we now consider the conditions under which contractors may qualify for § 5(a)'s immunity. The Court of Appeals took the view that to qualify for § 5(a)'s grant of immunity, "WMATA must first require its subcontractors to purchase the insurance. It is only by providing compensation insurance when the subcontractors fail to do so that WMATA obtains immunity as a statutory employer." 230 U. S. App. D. C., at 303, 717 F. 2d, at 582 (emphasis in original). This view 10 In Probst v. Southern Stevedoring Co., 379 F. 2d 763, 767 (1967), the Fifth Circuit characterized a contractor's duty to secure compensation for subcontractor employees as "secondary, guaranty-like liability." See also Johnson v. Bechtel Associates Professional Corp., 230 U. S. App. D. C. 297, 305, 717 F. 2d 574, 582 (1983). This characterization is apt to the extent that general contractors do not have to secure compensation for these workers "unless the subcontractor" fails to provide insurance. 33 U. S. C. § 904(a). However, this description of a contractor's duty in no way diminishes the fact that, once a statutory obligation to secure compensation attaches, the contractor must qualify as an "employer" under §§ 7, 8(f), 32(a), 33(b), and 38 in order for its obligation to make any sense under the Act. |