OUR MARITIME DEFENCES.

CHAPTER V.

To arrive at sound conclusions on any subject, it requires to be mastered in all its details; with that object in view I have read almost everything worth reading that has been printed during the last 200 years on manning our ships; but I fear I have wearied my readers by inviting them to consider with me even the substance of my research.

Although most writers have a hobby they love to ride, or a bugbear constantly alarming them, and though even Governments are not free from these proverbial failings, there is much to be learned from the records of the past. For instance, every student of history must be convinced. that any attempt to resort to the iniquitous and demoralising press-gang, as before observed, would be alike futile and dangerous. We must, therefore, banish that mode of raising men altogether from our thoughts. It was a project of an age of brute force, working wretchedly even then, and cannot now be re-introduced. While, however, opinions differ on numerous other projects, pronouncing some of them in their details worthy of adoption, and others crude and impracticable, there is one most important point on which all Governments and most writers appear to be agreed, and that is, the desirability, if not the necessity, of the Royal Navy acting in concert, or, at least, in harmony with the Mercantile Marine, so as to fill up the chasm existing between the two services, and

thus secure reserves from our only reliable resource.* We should never forget that the naval power of Great Britain is based upon her maritime resources, and that our merchant service must ever be our most trustworthy auxiliary in any lengthened war. In a word, it is the real source of our supremacy on the ocean, and all the best considered schemes I have mentioned proceeded on the basis of unity of Navy and mercantile service, although the proposed modes of effecting and preserving it have proved deficient.

Nevertheless, it is a remarkable fact that since 1852 all Governments have practically ignored it, except in attempting to derive from that source, under the recommendation of the Commission of 1859, a reserve of seamen who are periodically drilled on shore, but who seldom or never see a ship of war. This exclusive policy has for some years been fully exemplified in the "continuous service" system,† and by the establishment of training-ships devoted solely to the rearing of boys for the Royal Navy. No doubt these systems have worked very well in peace, but the Navy is maintained as a precaution for war.‡

If

* See " Suggestions for Improving the Character of our Merchant Seamen, and for Promoting an Efficient Naval Reserve," by Admiral the Hon. Sir F. W. Grey, published by Stanford, 1873. See also Lecture by Captain J. C. Wilson, R.N., of H.M.S. Thunderer, on the question, "Is the Merchant Service any Longer a Feeder to the Royal Navy ?" delivered at the Royal United Service Institution, January 17th, 1876, and the speeches and writings of various other high naval authorities.

The late Admiral Sir Charles Napier and Captain (now Admiral Sir B. J.) Sulivan on the one hand, and Mr. Howell, an intelligent warrant officer, on the other, as representatives of the two classes in the Navy, strongly objected to this system for the reasons named in their evidence before the Commission of 1859. See also an able speech delivered in the House of Commons by Sir Francis Baring on going into Committee on Naval Reserve Bill, Session 1859.

"It is a fact,” replied Captain Sulivan, to Question 2,114, Manning Commission, 1859, "that the continuous service, however perfect, cannot give you one man for war purposes."

we could ensure peace it would be dispensed with altogether. But in adopting this system we have lessened our power as a maritime nation; and by ignoring thus far our Mercantile Marine, which other nations justly envy, we have lowered our position down to their level. Indeed, some portions of their schemes we copy. Having but a limited maritime population, they are obliged to raise their Reserves from the mass of the people, by training some of them to be seamen; and when we rear "country lads" specially for the Navy, we only adopt a practice which in their case is a necessity.

History tells us how signally even such a warlike genius as Napoleon I. failed in this respect. I remember well a remark of the last Napoleon, at an interview I had with him in 1861. "I can build ships," he said, "but I cannot make sailors of my people as you do of yours." Yet we ignore the resources of the nation within our reach, and train seamen on shore to fight our battles in the hour of need, disregarding the fact that we have by far the largest Mercantile Marine in the world, and the most extensive means of training them afloat, both in seamanship and in the arts of naval warfare.

As I desire that what I state should be more record of facts than a political disquisition, I pass over, in the meantime, the questionable policy of practically ignoring, as a means of Manning the Navy, the existence of our Mercantile Marine, and invite my readers, before I propose a scheme of my own, to examine with me the cost to the nation of the system now adopted by the Navy. With this object in view, I have gone through the Navy

*"No human being could foretell with certainty what would be the experience of a future naval war as regards the value of ironclads and other ships of war; but of this they might be certain, that without an adequate body of well disciplined and intelligent and contented seamen no ships would be of much value." See an able speech delivered by Mr. Shaw-Lefevre in Committee on Navy Estimates, 10th April, 1876.

Estimates for 1876-77, consisting of 233 closely-printed folio pages. They have greatly increased in bulk since I had a seat in Parliament. It was then no easy matter to fathom their mysteries, but now they have swelled to such a bulk that I might say of them, as the late Lord Derby once said of Bradshaw's Railway Guide, "No doubt it is a very useful book, but I never could understand it."

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These estimates are replete with the most minute, but harassing details. Unfortunately, however, they appear to be very incomplete as regards the cost of particular departments. For instance, if any of my readers take the trouble to refer to vote 1, p. 7, of the Navy Estimates, Wages, &c., to Seamen," they will find that the wages, &c., this year of 7,000 boys (4,000 on service in the fleet, and 3,000 under instruction in training-ships) are put down at £70,268; and if he be an easy, good-natured person, and not very inquisitive, he might arrive at the conclusion that this is the cost of them, and that the Admiralty manage the business with great economy. Nor should I call him even a careless student of the estimates were he to do so, for no charge whatever is stated for their clothes and food; that is embodied in the general estimate, vote 2, viz., "Victuals and Clothing for Seamen and Marines."*

There are, however, members of the House of Com

*It is an old controversy how the Estimates ought to be made out. My friend, Mr. A. S. Ayrton, who is on a visit to me at present, considers that the present mode is preferable to any other, and having filled the office of Secretary to the Treasury, he ought to know; but, however great my respect for his abilities--and it is so great that I deeply regret his absence from Parliament-I differ from him on this point, and think that the Estimates might be so arranged as to show to the public what the Government require for the different departments under separate heads. For instance, as the wages for the 7,000 boys are given, why should an approximate estimate not be entered of the amount required for their food, clothing, &c., &c. Mr. Ayrton holds that "the Estimates

mons who are not satisfied unless they search to the bottom; and one of the number, Sir George Balfour, moved last year for a return "showing the estimated annual cost in detail of training boys in training-ships for the Royal Navy, with the total average cost of each boy while under training." And what does it show? Why, it shows that instead of £70,268 covering the cost of 7,000 of these boys, the annual cost of training only 3,000 of them amounts to somewhere about £174,400!* But at page 129 of the Estimates, vote 14, "Miscellaneous Services," there is a sum of £2,300 for “ expenses specially incurred for the boys" not included in this return, and no doubt there are a great many other items which ought to go to the debit of that account, although I cannot trace them.

Then, again, if we refer to page 20, vote 4, "Royal Naval Reserve, Wages, Allowances, Drill, &c.," we find a charge of £156,200, which the casual reader might consider was the annual cost of this force; and it is only in a note at page 22 that we ascertain the "total charge" to be £240,109.

I wish that some Member of Parliament would move, as in the case of training boys for the Navy, for the full details of this new service, as I feel convinced that this sum, however large, still falls short of representing the whole cost. I direct attention to this fact, for under the same vote, Reserves, page 20, A., there is a charge of

are made out for the purpose of checking the expenditure of money, not for showing the entire cost of branches of service, and that whenever this is required it must be moved for as a return of "cost of service." I think they might be made out so as to do both.

*The "total gross cost per annum of training each boy for the Royal Navy is £57 18s. 1d.," exclusive of " any proportion of the original cost of fitting the vessels for training-ships, and exclusive of the expense of raising the boys." See Parliamentary Paper, Navy (training-ships, boys), issued by the Admiralty, and ordered by the House of Commons to be printed, 2nd August, 1875.