These are facts of momentous importance to us as a nation, and worthy of the greatest consideration before we construct any ships to carry 81-ton guns. The more so when we know that the larger the vessel the more she is likely to fall a prey to torpedes or swift torpedo boat. Indeed, her size would cause her to be more susceptible to attack, and her slower speed would render it more difficult for her to get out of the way of an active enemy.

However secondary the expense when compared with safety, it should receive immediate consideration by our statesmen, as we are already heavily taxed for the cost of naval armaments, to, I fear, comparatively little purpose. One hundred of these craft, or one thousand Whitehead torpedoes, could be constructed at less cost than we have expended on our last floating citadel.

But let us consider the question in the aspect of humanity. It is true that the professed object of war is to "burn, sink, and destroy." In itself it was horrible enough in the days of our forefathers, but it has become much more horrible since science, which was meant to improve and elevate the human race, has been turned so largely to account for its destruction.

Civilised nations have, however, limited the use of wholesale means for destroying human life. To poison the wells of an enemy's country, or to throw red hot shot into their towns, have hitherto been denounced as the

clad can scarcely be overrated. The difficulty of hitting a moving target is well known to those who have tried to hit the running deer at Wimbledon; and the velocity of a torpedo boat running at 18 knots is over 30 feet per second. High speed also gives men confidence, by affording them a chance of returning safely from a necessarily dangerous expedition, and thus lessens the difficulty of finding men for such work,

Another important matter in such operations is silence, and this is secured in Messrs. Thornycroft and Co.'s boat by making the engines condensing, so that the puffing noise in the chimney, which is almost a distinguishing feature in the ordinary steam launch, is entirely done away with.

extremes of barbarity; and the application of other terrible instruments for destroying lives in mass, invented in our time (known as "infernal machines"), has been repudiated by all nations with indignation and scorn.

But wherein is the difference between such instruments and torpedoes? If the principle as applicable to the laws of humanity is sound in the one case, it is equally so in the other. Statesmen have always held that combatants should have a fair chance of displaying their bravery, or, at least, of defending their lives. Indeed, the open, stand-up fight has ever been considered one of the "glories of war." But while the use of torpedoes must put an end to the former mode of conducting maritime warfare, it may, happily, have the effect of repressing war which would then become so terrible that princes and statesmen, as well as nationalities, would hesitate long before they embarked in it.

How, indeed, could we order 600 men, for instance, to coop themselves up in a large armour-clad ship to be drowned like rats, without any chance or hope of defending themselves against the horrible ravages of such an infernal instrument as a torpedo? To attempt to enforce our orders might produce the most disastrous results. Our seamen are reluctant even now to enter for these ships, and the fate of the Captain and Vanguard has materially increased their reluctance; they much prefer a smart frigate, where their individual skill and bravery can be displayed to advantage; and were it not for the continuous service, I doubt if our armourclads could be manned in peace: how then would it be in war? But there are still other matters requiring consideration.

While we have been concentrating our forces in a necessarily limited number of huge floating batteries, we seem to have overlooked the fact that we had colonies and

largely increasing fleets of merchantmen to protect in the event of war.*

Such are a few of the reasons which led me to feel that though our naval expenditure of late years has been enormous, we are at present, all things considered, less prepared to meet the various contingencies of war which would arise than we ever were at any other period of our history.

Now that our merchant vessels traverse every sea, and that the most valuable portion of our mercantile commerce is conducted in steamers, we could no longer protect that commerce by means of convoys. We might, however, make arrangements in peace whereby a considerable portion of our merchantmen might protect themselves, and likewise render no mean assistance to the nation in the event of war. To that question I shall hereafter refer. But as our weakest point is a scarcity of seamen, I am anxious to consider that subject in all its bearings in preference to any other, especially as I am more familiar with it than with matters relating to the equipment of the Royal Navy.

At present we have, I understand, a sufficient number of men for the ordinary peace establishment, and by means of the six training-ships under the control of the Admiralty, and the continuous service system, that number, I am informed, can be maintained although with some difficulty, but at a much greater cost than appears to be necessary. Our reserves of seamen, however, fall far

* I dare say all merchant steamers of over twelve knots speed would trust to their heels and a couple of good chase guns in the case of war, but our eight knot merchant steamers and our sailing vessels would have to sail under a convoy of ships of war with a strong force of armed merchantmen as auxiliaries. We should also require squadrons to protect all narrows and great centres of trade, such as the Gut of Gibraltar, Suez Canal, St. Vincent, Hong Kong, English and Irish Channels, and have cruisers stationed at intervals along the usual great routes of

commerce.

short of what would be required in the event of war, and would barely suffice to man sufficient vessels for our first line of defence. Hitherto we have looked to the merchant service for our supplies, but that service could no longer render us the requisite aid. British seamen have become exceedingly scarce, so much so that large numbers of our merchantmen are now manned by foreigners, and even if the supply were ample, their ignorance of the routine duties of a man-of-war, and especially of gunnery, in these days when so much science and training have become necessary, would render them of little more value than landsmen during the first three or four months after they were embarked-a matter of no mean consideration, as any disaster to our ships on the first brush of war might prove irretrievable.

To obtain the requisite supplies of able seamen for our Merchant Service, so as to have at all times in that service, at a moderate cost, an ample supply of trained men for our defence, although it has been dealt with by numerous writers and speakers, and been considered by various Committees and a Royal Commission, is a problem which has not yet been solved. It seems easy of solution, but it is surrounded with difficulties, and the more I study the subject the more I feel my incompetence to overcome them.

Merchant seamen are not accustomed to men-of-war; they do not like to be subjected to the discipline necessary on board of such vessels, and they can generally find, apart from the remuneration, other occupations, on shore or afloat, more congenial to their tastes and habits. To render that service acceptable to them, and, at the same time, to qualify them for the duties they have to perform, a certain amount of preliminary training is absolutely essential, and herein arise various other difficulties. The nucleus is easy to be found in boys below the age of thirteen or fourteen, from parishes and industrial schools.

But our shipowners say that boys of that age are no good to them, and they ask, with much reason, "why should we be saddled with the expense of training such boys; for when they are good for anything, they leave to find other employment, either on shore, in the service of the State, or in vessels of other countries?" On the other hand, the Government asks, "Why should the public be taxed to train boys for the Merchant Service any more than for any other branch of trade, more especially as the Admiralty train all the boys that are required for the peace establishment of the Royal Navy?"

Such are a few of the difficulties to be encountered in any attempt to solve this important question. But as they are not insurmountable, I purpose examining the leading arguments which have been offered in Blue Books and in numerous speeches and pamphlets. Before doing so, it may, however, be desirable to briefly trace the history of manning ships during the last two centuries, both as regards the Royal Navy and the Merchant Service.