the C.P.P.A. did not form an independent political party representing the class interests of the farmers and industrial workers, the farmer-labor groups would join them and thus form the basis for a Farmer-Labor party campaign in the 1924 election. But the group in the C.P.P.A. favoring a Farmer-Labor party supported LaFollette's candidacy. Thereupon the Central Executive Committee of the Workers' party decided that the Workers' party should enter the campaign in its own name, nominate communist candidates, and conduct a communist campaign, since a campaign in the name of the Farmer-Labor party would unite only a relatively small part of the farmer-labor forces with the Workers' party, and, besides this, the Workers' party would be greatly handicapped in its agitation and propaganda and could not use the campaign for the direct upbuilding of its membership. The Workers' party then held a conference in Chicago on July 10, 1924, nominated William Z. Foster for president, and Benjamin Gitlow, of New York, for vice-president, and proceeded to carry on a campaign throughout the country in support of these candidates.

V

The rise and decline of the influence of the T.U.E.L. have reflected the esteem and disesteem with which trade unionists generally have regarded William Z. Foster. During the early part of the League's activity, Foster was in good repute with the organized labor movement. He had made a good record during the packing-house movement and the steel strike, and most unionists believed he had the welfare of the workers at heart; as a consequence, the League waxed strong, and its influence was widely felt. Later, however, when it became known that he was a communist, and especially after the "capture" of the FarmerLabor party convention of July 3-5, 1923, by the T.U.E.L. and the Workers' party, the majority of his friends and adherents in the trade-union movement turned against him, and the influence of the T.U.E.L. waned accordingly. At the present time Foster has few followers who are not communists. The small vote polled by the Workers' party in the 1924 presidential elec

tion is proof that the workers generally have not rallied to the support of the League's program. Although many trade unionists favor industrial unionism and an independent labor party, the two chief methods of action favored by the League, few desire communism as a final goal. In the opinion of the writer, the use Foster's enemies have made of the trade unionists' opposition to communism is the chief reason for the decline of the League's influence. Foster's enemies have taken advantage of this opposition in their attacks upon industrial unionism and independent political action, and have thereby obscured whatever merit these proposals may have.

The League stresses the numerical weakness of American labor; it tends to concentrate attention upon the weakness of labor in the steel industry, the packing industry, and the automobile industry, for example, and to ignore its great power in certain other industries. In comparing the strength of American labor with that of European labor, the League overlooks the greater effectiveness of many American labor organizations.

Foster believes that the American labor movement lacks idealism, since American workmen generally do not demand the overthrow of the present organization of society. Other labor leaders, however, do not agree with Foster on this point. John P. Frey, for instance, finds a strong sense of idealism among American workmen, although the ideals he discovers are consistent with a continuation of the capitalist system. He says that the ideals of American labor are not concerned merely with economic demands, but that we find ideals of brotherhood, of education, and of freedom, and assumes that these ideals may be achieved without overthrowing the present industrial system.3 Other labor leaders share this point of view.

One of the things upon which the League bases its plea for the overthrow of the present organization of society is the assumption that the class struggle is a true picture of the relations existing between the capitalist and the laborer. American labor generally, however, has not come to believe in the predominant importance of the reality of the class struggle. Before the League 8 International Molders' Journal, November, 1916.

can make much headway, a more profound cleavage between the capitalist class and the working class must develop.

Foster has argued that an organized militant minority can gain and retain control of a given union, and as proof cites the fact that in practice 1 per cent of the membership ordinarily controls the policy of a union. However, the question arises whether or not control by any given I per cent will be tolerated by the rank and file. It is probable that most of the radicals who have set up dual unions have not merely withdrawn from their former unions, but have been "frozen" out or expelled because the officials and the rank and file would not tolerate their actions. At any rate, militancy is not synonymous with ability and does not guarantee progress.

The T.U.E.L. expresses great dissatisfaction with the nonpartisan political policy which the American labor movement has followed for many years past. Although many labor leaders desire the formation of an independent labor party, it is apparent from the vote cast in the 1924 presidential election that the time is not yet fully ripe for the success of such a party. Most labor leaders believe that for actual accomplishments in the present, the non-partisan political policy is best. It is probable, however, that with the growth of unionism, the growing percentage of industrial workers in comparison with the total population, and the inability of American labor to remove legal and juridical handicaps through the old parties, labor leaders will accept the principle of independent working-class political action and endeavor to further the well-being of the workers through the use of a labor party.

The aspect of the League's program that makes the widest appeal among the workers is its insistence upon industrial unionism. The leaders of the labor movement rather generally accept the principles of craft unionism and combat the growth of sentiment for industrial unionism; but among the rank and file of the unions, industrial unionism makes a stronger appeal. The League lays great stress upon the necessity of solidarity and class consciousness among the workers. Foster would like to see craft consciousness eliminated and working-class solidarity

substituted for it. The American working class, however, does not appear ready to make general acceptance of industrial unionism. The principle of federation is found in the departments of the A.F. of L., in the movement for an alliance of the needle trades, and in certain other instances, but federation does not satisfy the demands of industrial unionists. Foster is correct in demanding industrial unionism through amalgamation of the existing craft unions, since experience with dual unionism shows that the mass of the workers will not flock to new, ready-made unions.

Foster seems to have forgotten his original premise that trade unionism is a growing thing, that the evolution of the ultimate goal requires time. He expects the unions to jump the big gap from craft consciousness to communism, and forgets that such a change must necessarily be one of gradual growth.

In embracing communism, Foster has not only laid himself and the League open to attack by the trade-union officials, but has made it possible for these officials to brand every man with any degree of dissatisfaction with the existing status of trade unionism a "red," and thus the red herring is drawn across the trail of amalgamation, industrial unionism, and a labor party, no matter how desirable these things may be. Foster has "subordinated trade union progress to communism." The net result of the T.U.E.L. propaganda has been to bring about more unity within the A.F. of L.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

EARL R. BECKNER

THE ATTACK UPON SECTION 15а OF THE

INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT

Section 15a of the Interstate Commerce Act as amended in 1920 contains two provisions which have been the center of much controversy. These provisions are commonly known as the Rule of Rate-Making and the Recapture Clause. The essence of the first is contained in the following quotation from the Act:

In the exercise of its power to prescribe just and reasonable rates the Commission shall initiate, modify, establish or adjust such rates so that carriers as a whole (or as a whole in each of such rate groups or territories as the Commission may from time to time designate) will, under honest, efficient and economical management and reasonable expenditures for maintenance of way, structures and equipment, earn an aggregate annual net railway operating income equal, as nearly as may be, to a fair return upon the aggregate value of the railway property of such carriers held for and used in the service of transportation: Provided, That the Commission shall have reasonable latitude to modify or adjust any particular rate which it may find to be unjust or unreasonable, and to prescribe different rates for different sections of the country.

Further details of the Rule of Rate-Making will be mentioned later.

The Recapture Clause provides that one-half of the excess income over 6 per cent of any carrier for any year shall be paid to the United States to be placed in a contingent fund administered by the Interstate Commerce Commission, from which loans may be made to carriers at 6 per cent interest upon adequate security, or from which equipment may be purchased to be leased to carriers. The other half of the excess earnings must be used by the carriers to establish a reserve fund from which interest, dividends, and rentals may be paid in years for which the net operating income is less than 6 per cent. When such reserve fund equals 5 per cent of the value of the railroad's property, the part of the excess income which the carrier is allowed to re