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34. If the real consideration of the offer were to secure speedy dispatch, it should have been open to all who could accept it, regardless of quantity.

35. An offer of a special discount made professedly on one ground in the published tariff can not, when that ground fails, be supported by referring it to some other and different ground.

36. A railroad company can not support a discount based on quantity of freight received by any one shipper, on the principles which are applied among merchants, whereby they give better prices in wholesale than in retail dealings. The cases are not analogous, since the naming of the quantity of freight that shall be compared to wholesale purchases must necessarily be altogether arbitrary, and the duty of impartial service which the company owes to the public will preclude special discriminations being determined by arbitrary tests.

37. The Providence and Worcester Railroad Company has one terminus on the river in Providence, and another across the river in East Providence; the one in Providence having been first constructed, and the other later, and for the convenience of the company. From the Providence terminus to points reached from both the distance is slightly the less. The company is not at liberty to make from Providence to such common points higher charges than from East Providence, in order to force the business to the latter terminus, and would be chargeable with unjust discrimination if it should do so. 38. The fact that a railroad company for many years has paid the charge for hauling freight from wharves to its station does not bind it to continue that practice, and if not bound by contract it may stop doing so at any time. The Traders and Travelers' Union v. The Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company et al. (1 I. C. C. Rep., 122.)

39. The Commission has no jurisdiction to compel railroad companies to make arrangements whereby commercial travelers or others will be allowed as passengers to take an extra allowance of baggage without extra charge, in consideration of some guaranty against liability.

40. The fact that contracts to that effect are outstanding will not give the Commission authority to compel their observance, the power to do so not having been conferred upon the Commission by statute.

Burton Stock-Car Company v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company et al. (1 I. C. C. Rep., 132.)

41. As the Burton Stock-Car Company does not use cars of railroad companies, or exchange cars in any manner, but rents them to the public for hire, the refusal of the defendants to pay the same mileage allowed on exchanges of cars between each other does not constitute unjust discrimination.

Ottinger v. The Southern Pacific Railroad Company. (1 I. C. C. Rep., 144.) 42. A complaint for unjust discrimination under the act to regulate commerce can not be made to embrace cases which occurred before the act was passed, even though they be similar to one which is complained of, and which arose afterwards.

43. The Commission has a certain discretion to receive and adjudge complaints made by parties who have no interest in the matter involved; but where "a railroad-ticket broker" complained that a party holding a ticket not transferable by its terms had been refused a permission of transfer which was given to another, and produced the affidavit of such party in proof of the fact, it was held that the party himself should complain, if anyone. 44. A prima facie case of unjust discrimination is not shown by the mere exhibition of two tickets for passage, one of which the railroad company has permitted to be transferred and the other not, when the two do not appear to be similar. Larrison v. The Chicago and Grand Trunk Railway Company; The Michigan Central Railroad Company v. The Same. (1 I. C. C. Rep., 147.)

45. Mileage tickets authorized by section 22 of the act to regulate commerce. 46. Authorization of mileage tickets does not relieve carriers from requirements of reasonableness and impartiality as to rates charged, which are prescribed by other sections of the act.

47. Special contract limiting liability of carrier in mileage tickets to commercial travelers will not justify a lower rate than is charged the public, when same terms are not offered to all who will not accept such special contracts.

48. Must be sold impartially.

Thatcher . The Delaware and Hudson Canal Company and others. (1 I. C. C. Rep., 152.)

49. The fact that railroad companies accept on through shipments from Chicago to Boston a certain sum as their share for the transportation of the freight

from Schenectady to Boston is no ground for compelling them to accept a like sum on local shipments from Schenectady to Boston when it appears that this would be a reduction below the rates made from intermediate stations to Boston, on the same line, and apparently under similar circumstances and conditions.

50. Any order compelling such acceptance would bring the rates charged into conflict with the fourth section of the act to regulate commerce, unless the roads should reduce the rates from the intermediate stations to the level of the rates made from Schenectady. But in the absence of either allegation or proof that the rates from such intermediate stations are excessive, the Commission could not require a reduction.

The Associated Wholesale Grocers of St. Louis v. The Missouri Pacific Railway Company. (1 I. C. C. Rep., 156.)

51. Mileage, excursion, and commutation passenger tickets are each issued for a different purpose, and the price for each kind is determined on special considerations. The charge made for one kind, therefore, does not determine what it will be admissible to charge for either of the others.

52. That $25 for a thousand-mile ticket is too much can not be inferred from the fact that excursion and commutation tickets are sold at rates which would make transportation upon them for a thousand miles less than $25.

53. Mileage tickets when issued must be sold impartially to all who apply for them and on the same terms.

The Boston and Albany Railroad Company v. The Boston and Lowell Railroad Company et al; The Vermont State Grange v. The Boston and Lowell Railroad Company et al. (1 I. C. C. Rep., 158.)

54. All companies forming a line for long-haul traffic are properly made defendants in petition charging violation of fourth section.

55. By the words "same line" a physical line is meant, not a mere business arrangement; and one piece of road may be part of several lines.

56. The fact that the tariff for the long-haul traffic is made by a fast-freight line does not justify a violation of the section.

57. The real and actual, not the possible, competition are the circumstances which should be considered when such greater charges are in question.

58. Under the circumstances stated, the fact that a line is long and circuitous, and is obliged to make concessions in its charges in order to share in traffic, will not make out the dissimilar circumstances and conditions indicated by the fourth section.

59. One may complain on public grounds, though having no personal interest. Jackson v. The St. Louis, Arkansas and Texas Railway Company. (11. C. C. Rep., 184.) 60. Petitioner complained of a certain rate as excessive. He also complained of unjust discrimination in respect to that rate. Defendant answered that its rate was not what petitioner supposed, but was a certain charge very much less, and also denied the alleged unjust discrimination. Petitioner did not further appear in the case, and did not respond at the hearing. Held, That it must be assumed on these facts that he was satisfied with the answer. Leonard v. The Union Pacific Railway Company. (1 I. C. C. Rep., 185.)

61. When issues of fact are made by the pleadings and no proofs are offered, no relief can be granted on such issues.

62. The complaint charged unjust discrimination in rates. The answer admitted the discrimination, denied that it was unjust, and assigned reasons for making it. On the case being brought to a hearing on the pleadings and submitted without evidence, it was held that, since it was impossible to say that there might not be facts to support the discrimination, the case must be dismissed, but without prejudice.

Keith et al. v. The Kentucky Central Railroad Company et al. (1 I. C. C. Rep., 189.) 63. A common carrier of live stock is subject to the legal duty to provide reasonable and proper facilities for receiving and discharging from its cars such live stock as is offered for transportation, free of all except the customary transportation charges. It does not fully discharge this duty by receiving on and discharging from its cars live stock at a depot access to which must be purchased.

64. A railroad company as carrier of live stock had undertaken to give to a stockyards company an exclusive right at one of its stations, and to require all stock at that station to be received and delivered on the platform of the chutes of that company; the company being authorized to charge lottage therefor. Complainants established by the track of the railroad company chutes of their own, through which they demanded the right of receiving

and delivering the stock of themselves and their customers. The conveniences furnished by them being suitable, it was held that their demand must be complied with.

65. Where suit is pending involving to some extent the question presented by petition to the Commission, the pendency thereof will not be deemed sufficient reason for the Commission declining to make an order, when it is seen that the judgment of the court when rendered will not necessarily cover the ground of the petition; but leave will be given either party to apply for a modification of the order should a modification be necessary to make it conform to the judgment when rendered.

Allen et al. v. The Louisville, New Albany and Chicago Railroad Company. (1 I. C. C. Rep., 199.)

66. Rates named by a carrier do not violate the fourth section when it appears that on its own line the charges are greater for the longer distance and the through charges by the shorter line are only made greater by the fact that the connecting road which has the shorter line makes higher rates than the connecting road which has the longer line.

67. Cases stated showing no violation of the long and short haul clause.

68. Where the purpose of a complaint is to compel a reduction of through rates from a Western point over several roads to a seaboard city, all the roads constituting the line should be parties.

Smith v. Northern Pacific Railroad Company. (1 I. C. C. Rep., 208.)

69. The sale of "land explorers' tickets" and "settlers' tickets" at less than the regular rates charged to passengers at the usual ticket offices, as practiced by the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, is unjust discrimination. 70. Discrimination in rates charged passengers who enjoy the same accommodations is not justified by proof that the carrier's present or future business will be thereby stimulated, or that the settlement of the country will be promoted, or that those receiving the more favorable rates are persons of small means, who are about to locate permanently in the Northwest. 71. The rule under which passenger transportation should be conducted requires absolute equality of payment from all persons enjoying the same accoinmodations.

72. When one makes complaint under the act to regulate commerce, and sets up a personal grievance which he fails to prove, the Commission may nevertheless, if a violation of law by the defendant appears, retain the case and take the necessary steps to bring such violations of law to an end.

The Boards of Trade Union of Farmington, Northfield, Faribault, and Owatonna v. The Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Company. (1 I. C. C. Rep., 215.) 73. Rates must not only be reasonable in themselves, but they should be so relatively reasonable as to protect communities and business against unjust discrimination.

74. When the same carrier operates parallel lines, and for any cause accepts low rates on one of them, it should provide sufficient corresponding advantages to the patrons of the other line to preserve the substantial equality contemplated by the statute.

75. Low charges upon one of two routes operated by the same carrier should not be made up by relatively high charges upon the other, when the result disastrously affects the business of communities situated upon the latter line.

In re Procedure in Cases at Issue. (1 I. C. C. Rep., 223.)

76. Proceeding to be in the simplest form consistent with reasonable certainty. No replication required. When facts are not agreed upon, depositions may be taken on notice, and the work should be entered upon immediately after answer. Assignments for hearing made on request of either party. Parties will be heard orally or upon briefs, as they prefer.

In re Procedure concerning Questions of Law. (1 I. C. C. Rep., 224.)

77. Dilatory proceedings considered objectionable, and a single speedy hearing desired in every case; all proper questions will then be entertained, whether jurisdictional or relating to the merits of the controversy.

In re Joint Tariffs and Schedules. (1 I. C. C. Rep., 225.)

78. Schedules of joint tariffs required to be filed with the Commission by section 6 of the act need not be duplicated by each company which unites in making them. On receipt of a written statement from each corporation acknowledging the authority of the association, committee, or other traffic combination to issue tariffs in its behalf, schedules filed by such association, etc., will be credited to each road in the organization which so requests.

The Manufacturers' and Jobbers' Union of Mankato v. The Minneapolis and St. Louis Railway Company and others. (1 I. C. C. Rep., 227.)

79. When, after trial, but before decision, the defendant concedes the relief sought, and reduces its tariff to the rates claimed by the petitioner, no order is madé or opinion announced by the Commission; a report of the facts is made to complete the record of the case.

Raymond v. Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Company. (1I. C. C. Rep., 230.) 80. Rates will not be declared unreasonable and unlawful under the first section of the act without other testimony than that afforded by comparison. 81. Rates and charges not unreasonably high of themselves can be so adjusted in their relations to each other as to give the undue preference and produce the unreasonable advantage which the third section of the act to regulate commerce makes unlawful.

82. If a railway company in establishing charges on different divisions and branches of its road so adjusts them as to divert trade and business to one locality which naturally, under an equitable adjustment of charges, would go to another, such preference is not excused by the fact that some of such charges are not entirely voluntary, but result from competition between carriers.

Evans v. The Oregon Railway and Navigation Company; Reed v. The Same Defendant. (1 I. C. C. Rep., 325.)

83. In determining what is a just and reasonable rate for a particular commodity (for example, wheat) the Commission will take into consideration the earnings and expenses of operating, rates charged upon the same commodity upon other roads as nearly similarly situated as may be, the diversities between the railroad in question and such other roads, the relative amount of through and local business, the proportion borne by the commodity in question to the remainder of the local traffic, the market value of the commodity and its gradual reduction, the reductions made by the carrier upon other articles which are consumed and necessarily required by the producers of the article in question, and all other circumstances affecting the traffic of itself and as related to other considerations entering into the charges of the carrier. C1. Upon the facts shown by the evidence in the present case: Held, That the rate on wheat from Walla Walla City to Portland should not exceed 234 cents per hundred pounds when transported by the defendant railroad for the remainder of the present grain season, extending to the 30th of June, 1888. W. O. Harwell, H. B. Montgomery, and J. W. Ponder, committee on transportation of the board of trade of Opelika, Ala., v. The Columbus and Western Railroad Company and the Western Railway of Alabama. (1 I. C. C. Rep., 236.) 85. The mere fact that a point is situated upon a navigable stream held not sufficient of itself to justify the lesser charge for a longer haul to such a point. 86. Competition by water, to be sufficient to justify an exception under section 4 of the act, should be actual, of controlling force, and in respect to traffic important in amount.

87. Discrimination under section 2, and prejudice and advantage under section 3, when water competition is brought forward as a justification, require the same measure of proof. 88. Parties affected are entitled to be notified in case a change in rates is asked. No order correcting the unjust discrimination now made, for want of proper parties and distinct allegations. Amendments allowed and revision of tariffs recommended to defendants.

89. Through rates and through bills of lading given on other commodities, and to other points similarly situated, should be given to Opelika on cotton, no excuse being shown for refusing same.

William H. Councill v. The Western and Atlantic Railroad Company. (1 I. C. C. Rep., 339.)

90. The Commission will not go into the question of money damages when the claim presented is in its nature an action of trespass, for the reason that defendant is constitutionally entitled to a trial by jury in such a case. 91. The Commission is not authorized to award the counsel and attorney's fees, which may be given by a court under the eighth section of the act. 92. Colored people may properly be assigned separate cars on equal terms.

Such a separation of the races does not create undue prejudice or unjust preference. 93. Complainant, a colored man, paid the same fare as other first-class passengers, and it was only fair dealing and common honesty that he should have the security and convenience of travel for which his money had been taken.

94. Colored people who buy first-class tickets must be furnished with accommodations equally safe and comfortable with other first-class passengers. The Commission finds that the car furnished complainant was only second-class in comforts for travel, and that he was thereby subjected to undue prejudice and unreasonable disadvantage in violation of the act to regulate commerce. Thomas J. Reynolds v. The Western New York and Pennsylvania Railway Company. (1 I. C. C. Rep., 347.)

95. A road being in the hands of a receiver, a complaint was instituted against the company owning it, and in the complaint the receivership was mentioned, but the company was stated as having come into possession of the road, and the receiver was erroneously called the president of the company. The petition was served on him, and an answer was filed by the company. Under the circumstances it was held proper to allow the petitioner to amend his complaint so as to show the existence of the receivership.

In the matter of the Express Companies. (1 I. C. C. Rep., 349.)

96. The mere fact that a common carrier does other business besides the transportation of passengers or property, or performs a further service than that of transportation in respect to the articles carried, held, not sufficient to exclude the carrier from the operation of the act, so far as applicable to its business. 97. The act to regulate commerce is highly remedial in purpose and scope, and should receive a liberal construction, with the object of making the beneficial result desired by Congress operative to the greatest available extent. 98 The relation of express companies to interstate commerce considered with the extent and method of their participation therein. The bringing them within the provisions of the act found practicable, and on some accounts, desirable.

99. Express business, conducted as a branch of the business of the railroad company, held to be subject to the act. 100. Express business, conducted by an independent organization, acquiring trans

portation rights by contract, held not to be described in the act with sufficient precision to warrant the Commission in taking jurisdiction thereof. Riddle, Dean & Co. v. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company. (1 I. C. C. Rep., 372.)

101. In deciding upon applications for the amendment of complaints the Commission acts upon the principles recognized in courts of justice. 102. An amendment which proposes to substitute for the original cause of complaint something quite distinct and different will not be allowed. If the party desires to make a new case, he should do so by a new complaint. Riddle, Dean & Co. v. The Pittsburgh and Lake Erie Railroad Company. (1 C. C. Rep., 374.) 103. Where according to its usual experience a railroad company has sufficient equipment to meet the demands upon it, and to move without unreasonable delay the freights offered, but by reason of unusual circumstances for which the company is not in fault, freights have accumulated to an exceptional extent, and are then offered in extraordinary quantities, the company is not chargeable with any violation of law because of its proving unable to respond at once to all calls, and to furnish cars as rapidly as shippers demand

them.

104. Nor does it violate any law by refusing to allow its cars to be sent off its line to distant points when the business offered on its own line keeps them fully occupied. 105. Where by reason of extraordinary circumstances a railroad company can not promptly meet all calls for cars, it should furnish them ratably and fairly to all shippers, in proportion to the freights offered by them respectively, until the emergency has passed, and it is again enabled to move promptly all the freights tendered.

106. Upon the facts in this case the charge of unjust discrimination as between shippers and also between different classes of traffic, is held not made out. Thomas J. Reynolds v. Western New York and Pennsylvania Railway Company, and G. Clinton Gardner, receiver of the Buffalo, New York and Philadelphia Railroad Company. (1 I. C. C. Rep., 393.)

107. Classification of railroad ties should correspond with that of other rough lumber. Raising of same from sixth to fifth class unjustifiable.

108. Rates established by a common carrier in order to keep upon its line material for which the road has use, or to keep the price low for its own advantage, can not be justified.

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