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2 F.(2d) 1009

were stopped. There was still steerage way her starboard anchor, and, the fog lifting on the ship, and she was being assisted down at 5:40, she discovered she was too close the river by the ebb tide. All this time the to the shore and weighed anchor. The fog Southway was sounding fog signals on her was then thinning out. At about 6:15 or siren; the second officer, having gone on the 6:20 the Southway picked up the master bridge when the fog thickened, was sound- and proceeded on her voyage. During all ing the whistle, the lookout was at all times the navigation of the Southway from the in the stem, and when the fog thickened time of leaving Edgewater until after the the carpenter, under orders, went on the collision, the Southway was in charge of forecastle head and stood by the anchor. the pilot, who gave the orders for the engine The lookout was about 100 to 120 feet from movements and steering of the ship. the bridge and could barely be seen from the bridge. He could not see over the water for more than 50 feet.

At 5:20 those on the bridge and the lookout suddenly saw the Port Reading stakeboat loom up about 40 to 50 feet distant, and on the starboard bow, just under the bluff of the bow. The Southway struck the stakeboat, breaking her and the boats tied up at her loose, and causing them to go adrift; the Cape Brown fetching up on an iron buoy, and all of the boats being picked up by tugs. The steamer then brushed along the stakeboat, and struck in the center of the bow the Sarah A. Johnson, the boat next to port to the starboard boat of the first tier, causing the said Sarah A. Johnson, with her cargo and the captain's effects, to sink. The starboard side of the bow of the Southway, about 15 or 20 feet from the stem, came into contact with the starboard bow of the stakeboat, and the stem of the Southway came into contact with the Sarah A. Johnson, at about the middle of her bow. When the stakeboat was sighted, the orders were given to reverse the engines of the Southway; but they did not take effect at once, and the Southway was not under such control that the collision could be averted. The fog was thick, and the lookout, carpenter, and those on the bridge of the Southway were unable to see how many boats were in the flotilla.

After striking the Johnson, the Southway either backed away or the flotilla drifted away from her, and in a minute those on the Southway lost sight of the stakeboats and the flotilla. The Southway backed full speed astern for about three or four minutes, slowed down, stopped, and went ahead a little. She did not see the Port Reading stakeboat and the boats tied up at that stakeboat again. The Southway drifted down, and at 5:25 p. m. her propeller struck the Blue Line stakeboat No. 3 on the port bow, making a hole, and causing her to go adrift with the three boats tied up at her, and they were picked up by tugs. After going clear, the Southway at 5:30 dropped

At the time the Southway struck the Port Reading stakeboat, and from the time the fog thickened, the stakeboat was giving the proper fog signal with her bell, which was an old locomotive bell, and was placed on the port corner of the house aft, about 12 feet above the deck. When the Southway was about to strike the stakeboat, the captain dropped the bell rope and went to the starboard side, saw the steamer strike the stakeboat's corner, go by, and strike the Johnson.

The Sarah A. Johnson had a bell located aft, and her captain had been ringing it, giving the proper fog signal, until a few minutes before the collision, when the captain of the Johnson went forward to look at his lines, which does not excuse her. The stakeboat was then giving the fog signal with her bell, and he relied on that signal. He jumped on the next boat when the Johnson was struck and saved himself. The H. F. Allen had a bell, and her captain had been for some time, and was at the time of the collision, giving the proper fog signal

with the bell.

The

The Gibson, Cape Brown, Westmoreland, Harold, and Mamie O'Neill did not have bells, but were before and at the time of the collision making noises with hammers on various metal utensils. Blue Line stakeboat No. 3 was equipped with a bell, and was giving the proper fog signal at the time she was struck by the Southway, and had been giving such signal from the time the fog thickened. The stakeboats and the barges tied up to them were without motive power and could do nothing to prevent the collision.

[1] The Southway was without fault in getting under way at Edgewater, because I believe the testimony of the pilot and officers of the Southway that there was only a haze at that time, and in my opinion the heavy fog was blown in by the southeast wind; but the Southway was in fault, in that she was not sufficiently under control to prevent the collision when the respective stakeboats were sighted. The Southway was at fault in not anchoring when it be

came impossible for her to see a boat at a sufficient distance to navigate with safety. The Haven (C. C. A.) 277 F. 957; The Camden (D. C.) 283 F. 326; The Tug Walter Franks (C. C. A.) 1924 A. M. C. 827, 299 F. 319. The stakeboats had been located at the same places for some time, and their location should have been known to the pilot, and as the Southway was attempting to find her way to the anchorage, she should have used care to avoid striking the boats she could have reasonably expected to find anchored there, and she is therefore at fault.

[2] Article 15, subdivision (d), of the Inland (Pilot) Rules (Comp. St. § 7888) provides as follows: "(d) A vessel when at anchor shall, at intervals, of not more than one minute, ring the bell rapidly for about five seconds." This rule was not obeyed by the Sarah A. Johnson, Gibson, Cape Brown, Westmoreland, Harold, and Mamie O'Neill, all of whom, except the Johnson, were making noises of other kinds, which in volume of sound, in addition to the bells which were being rung, should have apprised the Southway, if the proper attention was being given by her to signals.

But still the requirement is specific, and I cannot disregard it, nor can I say that their failure to obey the rule did not contribute to the collision. The Cohocton (D. C.) 1923 A. M. C. 737, 299 F. 316; The Watuppa (C. C. A.) 283 F. 8. And therefore, as to the libelants whose boats failed to obey the rule, but half damages, with half costs, can be awarded against the Southway; while as to the libelants whose boats obeyed the rule, and gave the proper fog signal, full damages, with costs, are awarded, and all petitions filed by Williams

Bros. Cardiff, Limited, against the Port Reading Railroad Company are dismissed, with costs to the respondent impleaded against the petitioner.

Libelants claimed that, inasmuch as the stakeboat was giving the proper signal, they were relieved from the obligation to give the required signal; but this claim cannot be sustained, because the larger the flotilla the greater the necessity for each boat to give the signal, in order to notify any approaching vessel of the number of boats to be avoided, lest by but one boat giving the signal the approaching vessel bé misled, and in avoiding one come in contact with the

others.

The form of signal given by the boats which did not give the bell signal was not the signal for a vessel at anchor, but one which is required to be given by boats lying at the ends of piers. The Port Reading stakeboat was giving the proper signal, and she is without fault as to any libelant or petitioner. The Blue Line stakeboat No. 3, was giving the proper signal, and is without fault as to any libelant or petitioner.

The injuries to the plates of the Southway were caused when she struck the Port Reading stakeboat, and not when she struck the Sarah A. Johnson, and were caused solely by the fault of the Southway in not being under control, so that the collision could be avoided, and in not anchoring when the fog became too thick for navigation, and no recovery can be had by the Southway against any of the respondents in the two crosslibels for such injuries, or any others alleged in her cross-libels, which should be dismissed, with costs.

A decree or decrees may be entered in accordance with this opinion, with the usual order or orders of reference.

MEMORANDUM DECISIONS

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BERNET, CRAFT & KAUFFMAN MILLING CO., Appellant, v. PUSSY WILLOW COMPANY, Inc., Appellee. (Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia. Submitted November 14, 1924. Decided December 1, 1924.) No. 1685. Paul Bakewell, of St. Louis, Mo., and H. A. Coombs, of Washington, D. C., for appellant. H. V. Briesen and Louis Alexander, both of New York City, for appellee.

PER CURIAM. This appeal is from the

decision of the Commissioner of Patents in a trade-mark opposition, refusing registration to appellant company of a trade-mark for selfrising wheat flour. The mark consists of the words "Pussy Willow," accompanied by some sprays of pussy willow. The opposition is based entirely upon the use of opposer's corporate name, the registration of which is prohibited by section 5 of the Trade-Mark Act of 1905. The decision of the Commissioner is affirmed on the authority of Asbestone Co. v. Philip Carey Mfg. Co., 41 App. D. C. 507.

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Frank H. BOGDA, Appellant, v. John B. OLSON, Appellee. (Court of Appeals of District of Columbia. Submitted November 13, 1924. Decided January 5, 1925.) No. 1681. A. L. Morsell, of Milwaukee, Wis., for appellant. L. C. Wheeler, of Milwaukee, Wis., and A. V. Cushman and J. J. Darby, both of Washington, D. C., for appellee. Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, and ROBB and VAN ORSDEL, Associate Justices.

The

PER CURIAM. Appeal from concurrent decisions of the Patent Office tribunals in an interference proceeding involving an invention covering drinking fountains for stock. opinion of the Examiner of Interferences contains a full and very careful discussion of every phase of the evidence. The Examiners in Chief likewise have thoroughly and satisfactorily considered this evidence, as has the Assistant Commissioner. We have examined the record, in the light of the briefs, oral arguments, and decisions of the Patent Office, and, being convinced of the correctness of the conclusion reached, and that further discussion is unnecessary, affirm the decision appealed from.

3

John F. BRENNAN, Appellant, v. Charles C. STEEL and Thomas H. Lynn, Appellees. John F. BRENNAN, Appellant, v. Charles C. STEEL and Thomas H. Lynn, Appellees. (Court of Appeals of District of Columbia. Submitted November 14, 1924. Decided January 5, 1925.) Nos. 1688, 1689. Melville Church, C. L. Sturtevant, E. G. Mason and Herbert H. Porter, all of Washington, D. C., for appellant. J. H. Milans and C. T. Milans, both of Washington, D. C., for appellees. Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, and ROBB and VAN ORSDEL, Associate Justices.

PER CURIAM. These are appeals from decisions of the First Assistant Commissioner of Patents, affirming decisions of the Board of Examiners in Chief, awarding priority to Steel and Lynn. The invention relates to a tire carrier for automobiles and a design of that carrier. The evidence in these cases has been very fully reviewed by the Patent Office tribunals, and, having considered it in the light of the briefs and oral argument, we have concluded that Steel and Lynn are entitled to the award of priority. For the reasons fully set forth in the opinion of the Assistant Commisisoner and of the Board, we affirm the deAffirmed. cision in each case.

4

Alexander E. KEITH, John Erickson, and Charles J. Erickson, Appellants, v. Edmund LAND, Appellee. (Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia. Submitted November 13, 1924. Decided December 1, 1924.) No. 1679. C. C. Bulkley, W. A. Scott, and C. M. Candy, all of Chicago, Ill., and C. D. Davis, of Washington, D. C., for appellants. G. A. Yanochowski, of Chicago, Ill., for appellee.

PER CURIAM. This appeal is from the decision of the Commissioner of Patents, awarding priority of invention to appellee, Land. The decision is based upon a motion by appellee for judgment, on the ground that appellants, having delayed four years after the grant of the patent in issue to Land before presenting the claims and seeking an interference, are guilty of laches, and therefore estopped from claiming the invention. In the absence of any satisfactory reason for delay, the decision of the Commissioner of Patents is affirmed, on the authority of Chapman v. Wintroath, 252 U. S. 126, 40 S. Ct. 234, 64 L. Ed. 491; In re Fritts, 45 App. D. C. 211; Webster Electric Co. v. Splitdorf Electrical Co., 264 U. S. 463, 44 S. Ct. 342, 68 L. Ed. 792.

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James R. ROSE, Appellant, v. Roy H. BROWNLEE and Roy H. Uhlinger, Appellees. (Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia. Decided DeSubmitted November 14, 1924. cember 1, 1924.) No. 1684. J. B. Hall, of Cleveland, Ohio, for appellant. C. M. Clarke, of Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellees.

PER CURIAM. By the concurring decisions of the three tribunals of the Patent Office, appellees were awarded priority of invention over appellant Rose. The invention consists of heating gas to be used with oxygen in metal cutting and welding. Appellant is the junior party by over three years. This point, however, is of little importance, since the case turns upon the question of originality of invention. Only issues of fact are involved, and from an examination of the record we find no reason to disturb the findings of the various tribunals of the Patent Office. The decision of the Commissioner of Patents is affirmed.

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PER CURIAM. This appeal is from the decision of the Commissioner of Patents, awarding priority of invention to appellee, Holslag, for an apparatus and method of arc welding with alternating current. The case turns entirely upon questions of fact. The record consists of about 1,850 printed pages. The three tribunals of the Patent Office, in most elaborate opinions, have concurred in awarding priority to Holslag. After a careful examination of the evidence, and review of the analysis thereof in the opinions of the tribunals below, we are convinced that a proper conclusion has been reached. The decision of the Commissioner of Patents is therefore affirmed.

plaintiff's inquiries could not change the actual situation, unless on the theory of an estoppel; and plainly there could be no estoppel by answer to plaintiff's question, when plaintiff's only action in the matter had been finished before it made the inquiry. The decree of the court below, dismissing the bill, is affirmed.

3

Pliney BLACKKETTER, Plaintiff in Error, v. UNITED STATES of America. (Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. May 1, 1924.) No. 6663. In Error to the District Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota. D. A. McVeety, of Minneapolis, Minn., for plaintiff in error. Lafayette French, Jr., U. S. Attorney, of St. Paul, Minn.

PER CURIAM. Writ of error docketed and dismissed, without costs to either party in this court, on motion of defendant in error, under rule 16.

2

BAYER CO. v. AMERICAN SHIPBUILDING CO. et al. (Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit. December 2, 1924.) No. 4082. Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern Division of the Northern District of Ohio; D. C. Westenhaver, Judge. Chas. E. Brock and Hull, Brock & West, all of Cleveland, Ohio, for appellant. Kelley, David & Cottrell, of Cleveland, Ohio, for American Shipbuilding Co. Fay, Oberlin & Fay, Jesse B. Fay, and Horace B. Fay, all of Cleveland, Ohio, for Douglas Brews. Before DENISON, MACK, and DONAHUE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. The defendant Shipbuilding Company had a written license from the defendant patentee to use the invention for a specified purpose. It proceeded to use the invention for a purpose which might or might not be within its license, according to the true construction. It notified the patentee, who approved, and accepted royalty thereon. While this course of business was continuing, the plaintiff took an exclusive license under the same patent, but expressly subject to the defendant's existing rights. Plaintiff did not know the extent of these rights, except as shown by the written license, and at that time made no inquiry. Some months later it did inquire from the patentee and from the defendant whether defendant had any other rights under the patent, and both replied in the negative. Claiming that defendant company's continued use in the broader sense was not within its written license, properly construed, the plaintiff brought this infringement suit, and joined the patentee as defendant. Defendant company's rights, as against the patentee, to continue the use in question, cannot be doubted. It is not important whether their mutual conduct was a construction of their ambiguous contract, or whether it was the granting of a further and oral license. Plaintiff's license was expressly subject to the defendant company's rights, whatever they were. The answers which both defendants made to the

4

Tom D. BOYDSTON, as Trustee, etc., et al., Appellants, v. CONTINENTAL & COMMERCIAL TRUST & SAVINGS BANK et al. (Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. May 8, 1924.) No. 6554. Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Oklahoma. See, also, 298 F. 31. George S. Ramsey, of Muskogee, Okl., and Edgar A. De Meules, and Harry Fair, both of Tulsa, Okl., for appellants. Henry Russell Platt, of Chicago, Ill., J. F. Sharp, of Oklahoma City, Okl., Charles L. Powell, of Chicago, Ill., Gibson & Hull, of Muskogee, Okl., and Bryan, Williams & Cave, of St. Louis, Mo., for appellees.

PER CURIAM. Appeal dismissed, at costs of appellants, on motion of appellants, etc.

5

BRADLEY LEAD & ZINC CO., Appellant, v. J. S. MULLEN et al. (Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. March 13, 1924.) No. 6621. Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Missouri. Hiram Bradley, for appellant. George V. Farris, of Joplin, Mo., for appellees.

PER CURIAM, Appeal docketed and dismissed, with costs, per stipulation of parties,

6

BROKERAGE TRANSFER

in Error

CO., Inc., Plaintiff (defendant below), v. MARYLAND DREDGING & CONTRACTING CO., Defendant in Error (plaintiff below). (Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. November 17, 1924.) No. 95. In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. Davis, Wagner, Heater & Holton, of New York City (A. L. Davis, of New York City, of counsel), for plaintiff in error. S. Selig, of New York City, for defendant in error. Before HOUGH and MANTON, Circuit Judges, and LEARNED HAND, District Judge.

PER CURIAM. Judgment affirmed, with

costs.

1

2 F.(2d)

R. N. BROWN, Plaintiff in Error, v. UNITED STATES. (Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. June 10, 1924.) No. 6708. In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Oklahoma. William Pfeiffer, of Oklahoma City, Okl., for plaintiff in error. W. A. Maurer, U. S. Atty., of Oklahoma City, Okl.

PER CURIAM. Writ of error docketed and dismissed, without costs to either party in this court, on motion of defendant in error, under rule 16.

2

Jack N. CASAVIS, Plaintiff in Error, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant in Error. (Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. October 14, 1924.) No. 52. In Error to the District

Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. Stephen B. Vreeland and Furman, Thayer & Vreeland, all of New York City, for plaintiff in error. William Hayward, U. S. Atty., of New York City (Elmer H. Lemon, Sp. Asst. U. S. Atty., of Middleton, N. Y., of counsel), for the United States. Before ROGERS, HOUGH and MANTON, Circuit Judges.

Mo., for appellant. Robert Stone, of Topeka, Kan., E. H. Gamble, of Kansas City, Mo., and Eugene S. Quinton, and Beryl R. Johnson, both of Topeka, Kan., for appellee.

PER CURIAM. Order of continuance vacated and set aside, and appeal dismissed, with costs, on motion of appellee.

6

DULUTH, WINNIPEG & PACIFIC RAILWAY CO., Appellant, v. Suomi KOSKI, as Administratrix, etc. (Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. October 6, 1924.) No. 6657. Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota. H. V. Mercer, Andrew N. Johnson, and Hecpellant. M. H. McMahon, Paul S. McMahon, tor Baxter, all of Minneapolis, Minn., for apand J. William Rahja, all of Virginia, Minn., for appellee.

PER CURIAM. Appeal dismissed, without costs to either party in this court, per stipulation of parties.

7

Willoughby DYE, Trustee, etc., Appellant, v. MACEDONIA STATE BANK OF MACE

PER CURIAM. Writ of error dismissed in DONIA, Iowa. (Circuit Court of Appeals,

open court.

artiorari denied

is 6 21 to 28, Laxed

645

3

Max G. COHEN, as Trustee, etc., Plaintiff Appellee, v. A. SHAPIRO & SON, Inc., Defendant-Appellant. (Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. October 20, 1924.) No. 31. Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. David Haar, of New York City, for plaintiff-respondent. Barnett E. Kopelman, of New York City (Joseph G. M. Browne, of New York City, of counsel), for defendant-appellant. Before ROGERS, HOUGH, and MANTON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. Decree affirmed.

Noah CROOKS, Collector, etc., Appellant, v. Edwin W. ZEA, Trustee, etc. (Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. October 9, 1924.) No. 6843. Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Missouri. C. C. Madison, U. S. Atty., of

Kansas City, Mo., for appellant. Arthur Miller, Maurice H. Winger, and P. E. Reeder, all of Kansas City, Mo., for appellee.

PER CURIAM. Cause docketed and appeal dismissed, without costs to either party in this court, on motion of appellant and stipulation of parties.

5

DENVER MUD CHEMICAL CO., Appellant, V. GERMICIDE COMPANY. (Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. June 16, 1924.) No. 6599. Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Missouri. Pierre R. Porter, of Kansas City,

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Eighth Circuit. October 6, 1924.) No. 6227.

Appeal from the District Court of the United

States for the Southern District of Iowa. George S. Wright and Addison G. Kistle, both of Council Bluffs, Iowa, for appellant. D. L. Ross and Tinley, Mitchell, Ross & Mitchell, all of Council Bluffs, Iowa, for appellee.

PER CURIAM. Appeal dismissed, without prejudice, on motion of appellant.

8

ERIE RAILROAD COMPANY, Plaintiff in Error (defendant below), v. James A. MacKAY, Jr., Defendant in Error (plaintiff below). (Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. November 21, 1924.) No. 83. In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. Edward V. Conwell, of New York City, for plaintiff in error. Sydney A. Syme, of Mt. Vernon, N. Y., for defendant in error. Before HOUGH and MANTON, Circuit Judges, and LEARNED HAND, District Judge. PER CURIAM. Judgment affirmed, with costs. cert denied 26 #

4.

227

695Ed:15 of 421.

T. A. EVANS, Plaintiff in Error, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant in Error. (Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit. December 1, 1924.) No. 4101. In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Tennessee; J. W. Ross, Judge. Certiorari denied, 45 S. Ct. 231, 69 L. Ed. -. D. B. Sweeney and H. D. Hughey, both of Memphis, Tenn., for plaintiff in error. S. E. Murray, U. S. Atty., and W. H. Fisher and A. A. Hornsby, Asst. U. S. Attys., all of Memphis, Tenn. Before DENISON, MACK, and DONAHUE, Circuit Judges.

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