trains. The dispatcher might have sent an order to No. 4 by the first section of No. 3. Train No. 4 had the right of track.

Train Dispatcher Rogers was of the opinion that "each section of a train is not a train, but the orders should be issued to both sections. I consider both sections of No. 3 to be one train, and first section part of the train, and that No. 4 should wait for all sections for which signals were carried. A dispatcher should communicate with all sections of a train separately, but the opposing train should not necessarily have notice that there were two or more sections, under Rule 104."

Mr. A. Walcott, 53 years of age and 20 years service in operating department, was of the opinion that "in moving sections of a train all orders should be addressed to conductor and engineer of each section, and the opposite train notified by order of the number of sections they are to meet at meeting point. In running such a train as No. 4, I would have thought meeting an engine alone with signals, at Peru, that it was not all of No. 3. If they registered as first section of No. 3, I should have remained until the second section came."

Conductor G. W. Royce, aged 52, conductor for 22 years, said: "With signals given I should have thought it unsafe to leave Peru. Do not think order to No. 4 was explicit enough. Should have read: No. 4 meet sections 1 and 2 of No. 3 at Peru. Do not think No. 3 was complete until both sections arrived. Usually orders specify what sections we are to meet."

Edwin Court, engineer of 11 years' experience, said: "It is usual when meeting more than one section of a train, for the order to specify where they shall meet. I think No. 4 should have waited at Peru. If No. 4 had no orders when it reached Peru, it being a ruling train, would have gone on its own time whether No. 3 was there or not."

Fales Wood, locomotive engineer, 10 years' experience, 6 as fireman and 4 an engineer, said: "Rule 104 applies to trains run by telegraph. Each section of a train shall be regarded as a separate train. All orders given should be given to each conductor and engineer separately. If I had been in Mr. Fales' place, and received orders from Nos. 3 and 4 to meet at Peru, and on arriving at Peru found first section of 3 there carrying red signals, I should have considered it all my order expected me to meet. The time card would give me rights over the second section, as according to the time table rights of No. 3. I would have waited five minutes for variations of watches. According to Rule 104, movement of trains by telegraph, aud No. 4 having the right to the road, second section of No. 3 would have no right to avail itself of any special telegraph order given the first section. I would not regard that I was in any manner held for the second section if my orders did not embody more than train No. 3. Red signals mean that an engine following has the same time table rights as the first section, which in this case was not good against No. 4 on its own time and with right of track.

"The order at Turkey River made a definite meeting point for Nos. 3 and 4. No. 4 should have had the same order that was given to the second section of No. 3; but, having passed all telegraph stations on its original order, had no knowledge that the dispatcher had made a meeting point for them

with the second section of No. 3 at Peru. Am nephew of Engineer Fales, of No. 4, who was killed."

Rule 4 reads: "Special rules shall supersede general rules and be fully observed while in force."

These rules are all deemed important, and a strict observance of each and all of them is absolutely required. In all cases of doubt, take the safe course. Under the head of "movement of trains by telegraph" is found form "E," which is as follows:

nals

to

...

and Engineer: Run first section No..... and carry sigand engineer run second section No...... The leading train shall be considered the first section of the number of train named in the order, the second train the second section, and so on."

to

There appears to be no question under the rules, that when Nos. 3 and 4 were ordered by the train dispatcher by special telegraph order to meet at Peru, that they both became trains running under telegraph orders, and that all time card rights and track rights so far as each other was concerned were suspended until the dispatcher's order had been complied with and they had met at Peru.

The mooted question is, whether, under the rules, No. 4 ceased to be running under orders and had its time table rights and right of track restored after meeting the first section of No. 3 at Peru; and if that was the No. 3 that it was ordered by the dispatcher to meet at that station? There is no question but what the conductor and engineer of No. 4 knew that No. 3 was comprised of two sections, and Conductor Clark states in his testimony that the operator at Specht's Ferry advised him of that fact, and that he had a consultation in the cab with his engineer and fireman over the rules while waiting at Peru before the first section of No. 3 arrived, and that the conductor of the first section registered as "first section of No. 3," and gave the usual signals and carried the red flags indicating that there was another section following with the same rights.

The inquiry may be properly made here whether the first section of No. 3, running as it was on the telegraph orders and carrying the signals, did not give notice to the conductor and engineer of No. 4 that the section following was also a telegraph section and not a time card section?

Rule 104 says that "in moving train by special orders each section shall be taken and considered a separate and distinct train, etc. Did not a strict construction of this rule, taken by itself, make the first section of No. 3 the train No. 3 that No. 4 was to meet under its order at Peru? If it does not, was not the time card and track rights of No. 4 restored after meeting the "first section," and was it not entitled to go after waiting five minutes for a variation of watches, provided for in Rule 44? which reads: "No train having the right to the road must leave any station when by the time table it should meet a train of the same class until five minutes after its time," etc. A construction of Rule 104, however, in conjunction with form “E” materially modifies the understanding of the rule, as form "E" says, “The leading train shall be considered the first section of the number of trains in

the order." The number of the train in the order given to No. 4 was 3, and under this form could the first section of No. 3 be regarded as all of No. 3?

A modification of Rule 104, so as to read: "In moving trains by special orders, each section shall be taken and considered as separate and distinct and shall receive and run only under special orders addressed to its own conductor and engineer"; but the different sections shall together constitute but one train, would remove the ambiguity and conflict with form "E."

If, however, the conductor (Clark) of No. 4, while discussing the meaning of the rules on the cab of the engine, had kept in mind the concluding clause of Rule 4, "In all cases of doubt take the safe one," the accident would have been averted. Although the fact of the conductor and engineer of No. 4 starting their train and running it at the high rate of speed at which it was running when it struck, would indicate that there was no doubt in their minds of their right to go. It would seem that the rules might be further modified so as to provide that no change should be made in the meeting of trains or sections of trains without giving notice to all trains or sections of trains that may be affected by the change, and that no changes whatever should be made after all trains interested had passed beyond reach of the dispatcher. Rules regulating the running of trains should be definite and certain, and if possible should be so framed as to admit of but one interpretation.

STATE OF IOWA,

OFFICE OF RAILROAD COMMISSONERS,

DES MOINES, Iowa, October 20, 1887.

HION. WILLIAM LARRABEE, Governor of Iowa:

DEAR SIR-We again report to you another very serious accident, which occurred on the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Saul Railroad between Inwood, Iowa, and Canton, Dakota, on the morning of the 20th of September, which resulted in the death of three men, the engineer and fireman of the train following, and a man in the employ of the telegraph company who was asleep in the saloon of the forward train.

Freight train No. 12, C. H. Milliken, conductor, Jacob Hanson, engineer, going east, stopped at Inwood at about 4 o'clock Tuesday morning, September 20th to set out two cars. The station grounds at Inwood are on a grade of about sixteen feet to the mile, sloping mostly to the west, being on the summit between the Rock and Big Sioux rivers. The depot building is placed about one-third of the way from the east to the west end of the yard, and perhaps 500 feet from the point where the grade turns downward to the east. As the train came into the station ground it pulled up so that the entire train was east of the depot. Here it was stopped and the conductor asked the brakeman to set a brake and leave it on. This was done on the last car, next to the way car.

The conductor then passed along to near the middle of the train and gave the signal to the engineer to slack back so he could pull a pin and cut the train in two. The engineer slacked back, but before the conductor could pull the pin the engineer "pulled out the slack, and stopped right dead," and so tightened the coupling as to make it impossible for the conductor to remove the pin, and he again gave the signal to slack back sharp, which was done, giving the cars a severe blow. This time the pin was lifted out, and the engineer being signalled to go ahead, went on with the forward part of the train over the east switch in order to set the last two cars of this part of the train in on the side track. There was left on the main track the rear part of the train, consisting of nine cars and the caboose, eight cars loaded with grain, one empty, and in the caboose one passenger asleep.

While the head end of the train went forward over the east switch with the two brakemen on it to work the switch and brakes, the conductor went up the side track to where he was to leave the two empties, and threw over what is called the trap switch," so the cars could come in onto this side track. This was about 100 feet from the rear part of the train. After throwing the trap switch he turned toward the main track, “and saw the lights on his caboose;" he then walked back a short distance to see if two

cars standing there could be moved down a little, so his two could be put in. He walked around on the north side of these cars, bringing them between him and his train, came round on the south side and again" saw the lights of his train, and thought it was standing still, just as he left it." He then went to get the cars in over the trap switch, and as soon as they were backed in over the swith he pulled the pin ahead of the two cars, and signaled to go ahead. There was some little delay in starting (about one-half minute). Meantime he went to the trap-switch and threw it, and when he looked he saw that the rear part of his train was moving past, down the yard. He followed the cars as fast as he could run," but before he could come up with them they went beyond the west switch on to the grade where it is fifty foot to the mile, and got away from him. This was about 4 o'clock and 5 minutes, or 4 o'clock and 6 minutes.

As soon as the conductor, Milliken, found it impossible to catch his train, he hurried to the station house and aroused the day operator, and had him call Canton, hoping by chance the passenger train No. 2 might possibly be a few minutes late. But it was too late, as the train had left Canton two minutes before.

At this time, as nearly as can be ascertained, passenger train No. 2, going east, Josiah M. Morse, conductor, W. A. Plagg, engineer, Charles Dunbar, fireman, left Canton, Dakota. This was a mixed train, consisting of one car live stock, baggage car, two coaches and a sleeper, carrying some twenty-five passengers. Andrew Derrett, a line man was the only passenger in the

caboose of the runaway train, and probably never awakened.

At the point where these cars struck the passenger train the view ahead was limited by curves and trees. If the engineer and fireman of No. 2 saw the train coming at all they could have seen it but for a moment, as the accumulated speed of the freight train could not have been less than forty to fifty miles an hour, and the passenger train about twenty miles These three men, the engineer, fireman and telegraph man in the caboose were instantly killed, and when dug out from under the mass of wreckages piled upon them, were found jammed up against the head of the engine, the fireman, with his shovel in his hand, and the conductor, with his watch-chain lying across his hand, as though he had just been looking at the time. It so happened that the passenger train had just crossed the bridge over the Big Sioux river. The trains come together not over twenty rods east of the bridge. Had the passenger train been two or three seconds later, and the collision been on the bridge, the consequence might have been still more terrible. As it was, it seems almost miraculous that a passenger train could have met with such a collision without greater loss of life.

The station grounds are on the summit of the divide between the Big Sioux river and the Rock river. For a long while there was no station building here at this place. A short platform was all the accommodation offered to the public. This platform was perhaps 500 feet west of the actual apex or brow of the summit.

In 1885 a depot was built This was very near if not at the place where this platform was, and as said above about 500 feet from the point where