certainly in our interest to see that they do receive some assistance. In the military assistance program which we have before this Congress, although we have no manpower commitment in Indonesia, we do have military assistance in order to build up their forces and to build up the partnership in that general area of the world. The CHAIRMAN. You didn't have any direct commitment to Vietnam but as far as commitment is concerned, as I see it Secretary LAIRD. That is true with Cambodia, Mr. Chairman, We do not have a treaty commitment to Cambodia. The CHAIRMAN. That is a good illustration. Of course, South Korea, there is a direct commitment there of a special kind. I remember there was a treaty just involving South Korea and the United States. Secretary LAIRD. That is right. The CHAIRMAN. So-called mutual defense. So that couldn't be used as an example. Japan has a special consideration. We promised Taiwan. Secretary LAIRD. The Republic of China on Taiwan is a special case. We have applied the Nixon doctrine to Korea. We are going forward with a modernization program as far as Korea is concerned and are turning over more responsibility, the ground responsibility, to the South Koreans. That is the reason we have been able to withdraw from Korea some 20,000 Americans. We have been applying the Nixon doctrine to Korea by building up a partnership, by building up our military assistance, by going forward with this 5-year modernization program, and this is much cheaper in the long run to the American taxpayer than maintaining those forces in Korea. The CHAIRMAN. Are the Koreans acceding to this? REDUCTION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN KOREA Secretary LAIRD. Yes, sir; they are accepting it but we are going to have some difficulties, Mr. Chairman, because the Congress has decided to reduce the military assistance to Korea. This reduction in the 1972 program will have an effect upon our program level. I am not sure how the bill will finally work out but it looks like a reduction will be made of perhaps some [deleted] million dollars in the military assistance program for Korea and the program that I had worked out with the Koreans will have to be altered. They understand we had to have congressional approval. In all of the discussions I have had, even at the regular yearly defense ministers meetings with the Koreans, I always make it very clear that these modernization programs are subject to the approval of the Congress and that Congress is a coequal branch of the Government. I personally feel that it is shortsighted on the part of the Congress to make these reductions in military assistance at this time. In the long run, it would be better, I believe, to maintain the military assistance level and decrease the direct American military involvement in those areas, but we have got to do a better job of explaining this situation, and we are going to try to do a better job when we appear before the congressional committees in support of our military assistance program this year. Senator BYRD. Could I interject on that general point: What do you regard as our commitment to Thailand? SEATO AGREEMENT Secretary LAIRD. As for the commitment to Thailand, it is somewhat different than the commitment which we have in Taiwan or Japan. The commitment in Thailand comes through the SEATO agreement. The SEATO agreement has a different implementation provision than the NATO agreement has. It is an agreement for the mutual security of Thailand in conjunction with the other signatories of that agreement. It is not a bilateral arrangement between the United States and Thailand, and it calls for the joint implementation of the treaty by the other nations that are also signatories to the SEATO agreement. Senator BYRD. It is the same as Vietnam, then? Secretary LAIRD. It is not the same as Vietnam, because the Vietnam commitment was a somewhat different commitment. I think that, I don't want to get into this argument necessarily, but Senator BYRD. I am not arguing, I am trying to find out. Secretary Laird (continuing). But there are some differences. The Vietnam investment was not based exclusively on the SEATO treaty. It also involved the Tonkin Gulf resolution. Senator BYRD. But most of the arguments made by Secretary Rusk-I heard him a dozen times-stated we were there because of SEATO. Secretary LAIRD. I disagree with that because I don't believe SEATO required you to be there. Senator BYRD. To get back to Thailand, it seems to me Secretary LAIRD. That is why I didn't want to get into the argument, because I do not believe the SEATO treaty is a basis for the presence in Vietnam. I believe you probably have to use the Tonkin Gulf resolution. Senator BYRD. Well, I am not clear though as to how extensive are our commitments to Thailand. It seems to me we have a moral obligation to Thailand greater than to almost any other country because they came to our defense, so to speak, when we were in a very difficult position, but I am not sure what our actual commitments are to Thailand. Secretary LAIRD. Our actual commitment is incorporated in the SEATO treaty and I would be glad to include in the record the provisions of the treaty that apply in this particular case. (The information follows:) Article 4 of the Southeast Asia Treaty states: "Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes". In addition to the United States, Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, The Philippines, Thailand and the United Kingdom are parties. Secretary LAIRD. I agree with you, Senator Byrd, that Thailand has itself gone beyond the provisions of the SEATO Treaty since. our involvement in Southeast Asia and has obligated itself to a somewhat larger extent than it would have had to obligate itself under the terms of the SEATO Treaty. For that reason I do feel we have a special relationship as far as Thailand is concerned. Senator BYRD. We have five bases in Thailand. PLAN FOR DEFENSE OF THAILAND Senator BYRD. Isn't there a contingency plan for the defense of Thailand which has been publicized as the commitment of the United States? Secretary LAIRD. There is such a contingency plan that is referred to as the so-called Toksin plan, but this is just a contingency plan. It has not been approved for implementation. It is a contingency plan, but it would require approval before it could be implemented. Senator BYRD. Thailand does present something of a special case, wouldn't you say? Would that be a fair statement? Secretary LAIRD. I would think that would be a very fair statement. Senator BYRD. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir; thank you, Senator. (Discussion off the record.) The CHAIRMAN. Put it on the record. It had to be based Secretary LAIRD. It has to be based on the vital national interests of the United States and the foremost pillars of the Nixon doctrine. are, of course, partnership and military strength. But the partnership element is where you have to have the desire of the country that is involved, and their desire is of foremost consideration. I would like, Mr. Chairman, if I could be permitted, to put these charts in the record. The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Secretary LAIRD. In this discussion. The CHAIRMAN. I wish you would put them in and the other country must have a desire and the willingness to try and hazard their own safety. Secretary LAIRD. That is correct. The CHAIRMAN. Before they can qualify. Secretary LAIRD. Yes. The CHAIRMAN. All right. You said 1964 was too late to apply the Nixon doctrine. Of course, 1965 was the year that the real combat units were sent in. What is your answer about that? (The charts follow:) |