Last year I reported to you that we had made some hard decisions with regard to development of certain strategic force programs, and that we would continue to keep this area under close review. In light of continued developments in the threat, we have decided this year to accelerate development of the Undersea Long-Range Missile System (ULMS), as well as moving forward with development of the B-1 bomber.

Undersea Long-Range Missile Systems (ULMS)

The continuing Soviet strategic offensive force buildup, with its long term implications, convinced us that we need to undertake a major new strategic initiative. This step must signal to the Soviets and our allies that we have the will and the resources to maintain sufficient strategic forces in the face of a growing Soviet threat. It would be diplomatically and politically unacceptable for the U.S. to allow the Soviets to achieve a large numerical superiority in both land-based and sea-based strategic missiles. Moreover, there would be an increasing military risk that future technological advances in conjunction with much larger numbers of Soviet strategic missiles, might offset the qualitative improvements we are planning for our land-based strategic forces.

I have carefully reviewed all alternatives for new strategic initiatives and have decided that acceleration of the ULMS program is the most appropriate alternative, since the at sea portion of our sea-based strategic forces has the best long term prospect for high pre-launch survivability. The Navy assures me that this acceleration will permit deployment of the first ULMS submarine in 1978, at least 2-3 years earlier than would have been the case in the regular program.

In reaching this decision, we considered a range of alternatives, including further modification to existing submarines and construction of additional submarines using the basic design for the latest POSEIDON submarines. We concluded that acceleration of the ULMS development program was the best possible course of action available for several reasons including:

First: The ULMS program is already underway as a major development program. It therefore does not involve disruption of ongoing programs which already have high priority, such as the POSEIDON conversions and construction of nuclear attack submarines.

Second: ULMS offers the best technical program currently available to provide future sea-based strategic force capability. It makes the greatest use of new submarine quieting technology, and is capable of carrying a larger ballistic missile than can be fitted

in existing submarines. The option to deploy this larger missile provides flexibility for increased range, and hence larger operating area at sea, or alternatively a capability to carry large, more advanced penetration payloads at less range, should this be desirable in the future.

Third: Deployment of ULMS, with a capability to carry a greater number of large missiles, means that a given nuclear payload can be deployed with fewer boats and crews.

Finally: The ULMS missile development program will permit an option to retrofit the shorter range ULMS I missile into POSEIDON submarines in the future, should that be desirable.

A total of $942 million is being requested for the ULMS program in FY 1973.

The ULMS program we are proposing will be discussed in further detail by other witnesses before the Congress. I am confident Congress will understand the need for accelerating the ULMS program, and will continue to provide this program the excellent support which it has received in the past.

The B-1 Strategic Bomber

The FY 1973 Budget includes $445 million to continue engineering development of the B-1 intercontinental bomber, intended to replace the aging B-52 fleet. The B-1 is being designed to improve capabilities over the B-52 through faster reaction, increased resistance to nuclear effects, shorter escape times, longer range, greater payload, higher speeds at both high and low altitudes, reduced infrared signatures, decreased radar cross sections, and greatly increased ECM capabilities. In total, these increased capabilities would enhance pre-launch survivability and penetration capabilities of the manned bomber force for the post 1980 time period.

The B-1 is being developed in such a manner as to minimize concurrency between development and production. In this respect, there will be about one year of flight testing on the prototypes before a production decision is necessary. This approach would permit us to have the B-1 operational in meaningful numbers by the early 1980's.

As Secretary Seamans indicated during his recent appearance before the Congress, the B-1 engineering development contract with North American Rockwell is a "Cost Plus Incentive Fee" contract with

no provision for a buy option. I want to emphasize that we will not commit the B-1 to production before performance requirements are demonstrated. The program provides for seven basic milestones, and was changed significantly last year when two test aircraft were eliminated and other adjustments made in the development program. The first flight is scheduled for April 1974.

Other Programs

As I noted last year, to enhance the prelaunch survivability of our current strategic bomber force against the Soviet submarinelaunched ballistic missile threat, alert aircraft are being dispersed over a greater number of bases, generally further inland than in the past. Nineteen satellite bases, each with austere facilities to support aircraft, will be in operation by the end of FY 1973. We are continuing to examine options for more extensive interior basing of this force, and other means to further improve prelaunch survivability against a broad range of potential threats the one of most concern being a postulated improvement to submarinelaunched ballistic missiles, which would decrease the warning time available to the bomber force.

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To improve the capability of the B-52 and FB-111 bomber force to penetrate improved defenses postulated for the latter half of this decade, we are requesting $314 million in FY 1973 to: (1) procure Short Range Attack Missiles (SRAM); and (2) modify 92 B-52 aircraft to carry SRAMS. In addition, we are requesting $49 million to continue development of the Subsonic Cruise Armed Decoy (SCAD) to counter projected improvements in Soviet area air defenses for the late 1970s. Both SRAM and SCAD will be compatible with the B-1.

SCAD, which is expected to have a range of several hundred miles, will simulate the radar characteristics of a bomber, thereby presenting many additional incoming objects that the Soviets must counter with area defenses. The SCAD is also being designed to accept, with minimum modifications, incorporation of a warhead with associated improved guidance and increased range. We presently plan to produce prototypes of key SCAD subsystems engines and avionics

to making a decision to produce the system.

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prior

The SRAM carries a nuclear warhead and travels at supersonic speed. It gives the attacking plane a capability to "stand off" from a target and avoid terminal anti-aircraft defenses, or the capability to suppress the defenses and penetrate to the target. After a favorable test program, the Air Force entered into full production

of the missile last year.

We are continuing the program to deploy MIRVs in our MINUTEMAN and POSEIDON missiles. We consider this program essential to preserve the credibility of U.S. deterrent forces when faced with the growing Soviet strategic threat. The MIRV program provides a number of small, independently-targetable warheads on a single missile. Should part of our missile force be unexpectedly and severely degraded by Soviet pre-emptive actions, the increased number of warheads provided by the remaining MIRV missiles will insure that we have enough warheads to attack essential soft urban/ industrial targets in the Soviet Union. At the same time, the MIRV program gives us increased confidence in our ability to penetrate Soviet ABM defenses, even if part of our missile force were destroyed.

Including MIRV, several major programs for the improvement and modernization of our land-based missile force are now underway, with a total funding requested of $837 million. The budget includes $415 million to procure a quantity of MINUTEMAN IIIs, toward a planning objective of 550 missiles. The force modernization program includes upgrading MINUTEMAN silos in order to reduce their vulnerability to nuclear blast and radiation effects. This upgrading program is coordinated with the replacement of MINUTEMAN I by MINUTEMAN III missiles to complete both the silo upgrading and MINUTEMAN III deployment programs efficiently.

In addition, our SAFEGUARD deployments will provide active defense of a part of our ICBM forces, and we are continuing prototype development of Hardsite Defense (HSD) to provide an option to protect our land based ballistic missiles against threats greater than those with which SAFEGUARD is designed to cope. I will discuss these programs and their relation to our overall planning in a later section.

We are continuing to convert POLARIS submarines to carry the POSEIDON MIRV missile. The POSEIDON development test program was completed in June 1970. Through February 1972, there have been 24 missiles fired from operational submarines. The Budget includes $751 million to convert more submarines, procure more missiles and provide long lead items for conversions planned next year. Funding for the POSEIDON submarine conversion program should be completed in FY 1974, with the exception of outfitting and post delivery costs.

One other important developmental effort that we are continuing in the strategic offensive area is the Advanced Ballistic Re-entry

Systems (ABRES) program. We plan to continue our investigations of several types of re-entry systems, and are requesting $104 million in FY 1973 for this effort. Dr. Foster will discuss the details of this program with you.

As I explained earlier in this chapter we seek reliable, flexible and survivable command and control systems. The growing threat from Soviet strategic forces makes early improvements to our national command and control system imperative. The most critical need is for a survivable, enduring command post. Over the years, we have concluded that the best solution to this problem for the foreseeable future is to go airborne with adequate command, control and communications facilities on board. Accordingly, we have decided to move ahead and request funds for procurement of new aircraft for this purpose.

Our current airborne command and control system is deficient in that it lacks capacity for added communications and data processing equipment. We need to improve the survivability of the system, and to provide the more secure communications needed for control and execution of the forces, the long endurance, the space for sufficient high level staff to support the National Command Authorities, and the space for the battle staff and equipments which provide the information needed in the critical decision-making process.

We

Earliest possible correction of deficiencies is essential. believe that by moving vigorously now we can greatly improve our command and control posture by early 1975. To achieve this goal, the first steps are to acquire aircraft with the size and endurance needed and to initiate acquisition of the new on-board facilities.

To perform the command and control job, a fleet of seven AABN CP aircraft is needed. We requested $119.8 million in our FY 1972 Supplemental request to purchase the first Boeing 747 aircraft and related electronics. We propose to purchase two more aircraft in FY 1973 and one additional aircraft in 1974 to achieve early correction of our deficiencies. The initial aircraft will provide some important improvements in our capability by 1973. Three of these first four aircraft will use the existing EC-135 electronic equipment and the fourth will be used for a special electromagnetic pulse test program and as a test bed for the development and operational testing of those new equipments which will be needed. By providing a larger, more capable aircraft, even with the present electronic equipment, we will be able to obtain greater endurance, more flexibility, capacity for larger battle staffs, and additional space to put improved communications and automatic data processing as it becomes available.