Soviets continue to improve their air defense systems by deploying an over-land Airborne Warning and Control System, or should they, as now projected, introduce advanced interceptors with an ability to locate, intercept, and fire on low flying bombers by the mid-tolate 70's, the United States may have to accelerate SCAD to insure that our B-52s will remain capable, for the rest of this decade, of reaching their targets.

The Soviets are continuing construction of their ballistic missile defenses around Moscow. These defenses include ballistic missile early warning (BMEW) radars, target acquisition and tracking radars, launch facilities and necessary command and control facilities.

There are four ABM-1 complexes at Moscow which provide 64 missiles on launchers. All four complexes are now operational.

From our assessments, we continue to be confident of the ability of POSEIDON and MINUTEMAN III to penetrate all known Soviet ABM defenses.

These assessments of the survivability and penetrability of U.S. strategic forces, of our ability to control those forces should deterrence fail, and the identification and pursuit of programs that can and will maintain our capabilities through the 70's, give me confidence that the United States will continue to have sufficient strategic nuclear forces to deter general war. This conclusion is valid provided that the improvement programs for existing forces, and new programs that will be discussed later, are approved and developed, and provided that we are not faced with a serious "technological surprise" on the part of the Soviet

Union.

The Peoples Republic of China

It is difficult to assess either the strategic nuclear threat posed by the Peoples Republic of China, or how that threat will evolve through the 1970's. This is true primarily because we lack complete information on the state of their ICBM development, the mix of strategic and theater nuclear delivery systems that may ultimately be deployed, and their development and production problems. The Chinese have not disclosed their strategic doctrine or their allocation of resources to ICBM development.

But this much is clear. The two Chinese space satellite launches during the last year and a half, and the approximately one dozen nuclear tests since 1964, indicate a fairly high degree

of sophistication in both missile and warhead development. The two space satellites were probably orbited using a multi-stage vehicle based on their IRBM, and therefore should be considered as part of China's progressive development of an ICBM. We have not as yet been able to confirm the initial flight testing of an ICBM, although a reduced-range testing of an ICBM system may already have occurred.

We cannot state with confidence just when China will have an ICBM capable of striking the continental United States, but it is estimated that deployment could not occur before 1975, with some 10-20 missiles being deployed by mid-1976.

The Chinese have no intercontinental heavy bomber force, and do not appear to be developing one.

The Chinese are known to be interested in nuclear-powered submarine technology, and probably have the capability to develop a prototype nuclear-powered attack submarine in the next several years as part of a program leading to development of a nuclearpowered, ballistic missile submarine. Neither nuclear-powered, ballistic missile submarines nor their associated missiles, however, are likely to be available until the last half of the decade.

We now turn to the threat posed by Soviet theater nuclear forces. Theater nuclear war is that which involves the use of theater nuclear weapons by or against U.S. forces or our allies, but does not include nuclear attack on the U.S. We seek to deter this type of conflict through the threat of the use of theater nuclear weapons and the capability for escalation.

Soviet theater nuclear forces include about 700 ballistic missile launchers (including medium and intermediate range missiles, as well as the SS-11 dual-purpose missile) and about 850 tactical surface-to-surface missile launchers assigned to their ground forces. In addition, their large medium bomber force of about 700 aircraft in long range aviation and 500 aircraft in naval aviation are capable of carrying nuclear weapons, as are approximately 1,100 light bomber and fighter bombers in the tactical air forces. Soviet naval forces, both surface and subsurface, also carry nuclear-capable missiles. There are also small numbers of the short range SHADDOCK and SCALEBOARD missiles.

A great many aircraft in the Soviet tactical air force possess a nuclear weapon delivery capability. In addition to the multi-purpose FISHBED (MIG-21) fighters, this total includes BREWER (YAK-28) and BEAGLE (IL-28) light bombers and FITTER (SU-7) fighter/ bombers, which appear to be the primary tactical air nuclear delivery vehicles.

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In theater nuclear capable naval forces, the Soviets have continued a steady buildup in their three western fleets surface and subsurface for operations against NATO navies, NATO sea lines of communication and coastal targets. These forces include their two ASW helicopter ships, as well as other major surface combatants, submarines and small patrol boats and submarine chasers equipped with possible nuclear capable surface-to-surface and/or surfaceto-air guided missiles.

The Peoples Republic of China

At the present time the theater nuclear strike capability of the Peoples Republic of China rests primarily in its small but growing fleet of TU-16/BADGER medium bombers. These aircraft can operate from numerous airfields in China, and can reach targets up to 1,650 nm away without refueling when carrying a normal payload.

The growth of the Chinese nuclear strike capability has been remarkable, given the short time it has been in existence and the formidable obstacles that had to be overcome.

In mid-1970, for example, the Chinese had a small number of TU-16s. However, series production will account for a substantial number by mid-1972.

China is now focusing on the development of liquid-fueled ICBM/IRBM systems develo There is some evidence that the Chinese are engaged in the deployment of solid fuel missiles, but there is no good basis for estimating specific dates for production or deployment. A few MR/IRBMs may have been deployed.

We expect to

see a modest force of MRBMS and IRBMS deployed this year.

Development of a regional nuclear capability would require an emphasis on IRBMS rather than MRBMs. Moreover, even though we regard Chinese theater nuclear capabilities as primarily deterrenceoriented, the range and warhead yield of the missile force and the expansion of the TU-16 fleet are significant. At present, the Chinese missile threat encompasses most cities and other area-type targets in South and East Asia and a substantial part of the USSR. We believe that the Chinese could begin deployment of an ICBM with a range of 3,000 nm or more, capable of striking all or most of the USSR, by 1975.

During the coming year we will be examining, in even greater depth than previously, the growing Chinese nuclear capability. These studies will be based on what we can learn about technical characteristics, deployment and plausible areas of intended use.

3. The Theater Conventional Threat

We have defined theater conventional warfare as that which occurs when the Soviet Union or the PRC are involved in direct conflict with the United States.

As I mentioned earlier, we would expect all Soviet Union forces to be used should a theater nuclear conflict occur, but in addition Soviet forces are fully capable of taking part in conventional conflicts, as well as in the projection of Soviet presence outside the immediate Eurasian continent.

Over the past year, we have seen Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces continue their growth both in quality and quantity. The Soviets now have about 160 divisions, 60% motorized rifle, 35% tank and 5% airborne. This total includes many divisions deployed along the USSR-Chinese border where a buildup has been underway for the past few years. However, Soviet divisions are appreciably smaller in personnel than their U.S. counterparts at full strength. The Soviets allocate a considerably smaller portion of their active military manpower to support functions than do we. They seem to rely upon quick mobilization of civilian resources for support.

Two new Soviet tanks probably are in production and will be entering the operational forces in large numbers in coming years.

Over the past several years, the Soviet Union has continued to build up its forces facing the PRC along the Sino-Soviet border. Despite this buildup, however, the capability of Soviet military forces opposite NATO has not been reduced. It is important to note that all of the Soviet divisions in East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia are still being maintained in a high state of readiness.

We believe there will be qualitative improvements in the general purpose land forces of the Warsaw Pact nations over the next decade, but we see no evidence to indicate any substantial changes in their contribution to overall Pact capabilities. Barring disruptive political developments, we believe the Soviets will continue to place emphasis on the quality of East European forces opposing NATO.

74-696 72 - pt. 2 - 4

A gradual buildup in the quality of tactical aviation will probably continue for the next few years. So far as we can determine, the force at the beginning of this year consisted of some 4,000 aircraft in combat units with about 1,800 more in training units. Approximately 2,000 aircraft at the present time are assigned to units that do not have a primary ground attack mission.

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As I reported last year the Soviets have developed several new aircraft which could satisfy their requirement to replace obsolescent ground attack fighters, light bombers, and improve their capability to shield ground forces from air attack. These new aircraft reflect a trend towards more versatile aircraft capable of carrying larger conventional payloads as well as nuclear weapons, in addition to providing improved air defense and reconnaissance capabilities. Most of the current tactical aircraft, such as FITTER, FISHBED, and BREWER, began to enter service in the early 60's to meet nuclear war requirements but due to range and payload limitations are poorly adapted to conventional war tasks. The variable geometry wing (VGW) FLOGGER, now entering the inventory has improvements in loiter time, range, low altitude capabilities and dispersal characteristics over the FISHBED. The FITTER B, a VGW version of the FITTER A offering improvements as a weapons delivery platform, is also now entering service. FLOGGER also has excellent capabilities as a fighter bomber. The FOXBAT should be in service in tactical aviation in 1973. A few are probably already operating in this role with the Soviet air contingent in Egypt. The introduction of these various systems should result in a smaller but more capable force with greater flexibility by the end of the decade.

Since 1958, the Soviets have put into operation in their Navy, eight classes of long-range surface combatants, five classes of submarines and three classes of patrol boats, all of which are missile-equipped. The Soviets have pursued a vigorous cruise missile research and development program which has resulted in the operational deployment of several different air-to-surface and surface-to-surface missiles.

The Soviet naval air force has not developed new aircraft to carry anti-ship air-to-surface missiles, but uses modified long and medium range bombers of long-range aviation. These aircraft are carried in the inventory of the naval air force.

In order to employ these anti-ship weapons systems effectively, the Soviets have developed a significant ocean surveillance capability. The Soviets have demonstrated in several exercises an ability to conduct a coordinated attack involving aircraft, surface ships and submarines against simulated U.S. surface combatants.