lems and incorporation of corrections into the engine production line saves many dollars by avoiding a costly retrofit program. Our FY 73 Component Improvement Program will provide funds in the amount of $3.7 million to improve the TF-41 turbofan engine of the A-7 aircraft; $.9 million for the J-79 turbojet engine of the F- and RF-4 aircraft; $4.2 million for the J-85 turbojet engine of the T-38 and F-5 aircraft; $7.7 million for the TF-30 turbofan engine of the F- and FB-111; and $18.5 million for the F-100 turbofan engine of the F-15 aircraft. All design, development, fabrication, test, and evaluation conducted to qualify a new engine or to redesign an existing engine for increased performance is financed by R&D appropriations. This funding is used until the engine has passed its Military Qualification Test (MQT) and is approved for production. Engineering services and related effort required for the engine during the production phase and within the current performance envelope of the engine are funded from the aircraft procurement appropriation.

The contracts within the program are written on a calendar year basis similar to the procurement of production engines. Accordingly, most of our Component Improvement Program contracts will pay for work done during the 12-month period of calendar year 1973.

Question. General, on page 8 of your statement you express your concern for our reduced air defense capability and mention the elimination during fiscal year 1973 of a number of elements. This includes the transfer of active F-106 squadrons to the Air National Guard; the elimination of BOMARC squadrons; the phase out of several backup interceptor centers (BUIC); a reduced alert commitment; and a reduction in flying hours. Last year during the hearing before the Bomber Defense Subcommittee we were told that previous reductions, coupled with obsolescence, has seriously reduced the capability of our air defense system to the extent that its ability to perform its mission is questionable. With continued obsolescence, and further reductions in FY 1973, obviously the capability of our air defense system will be reduced even further. Is it now getting to the stage where it is so negligible that it is not cost effective to maintain the existing system?

Answer. I am concerned with the present state of our air defenses, but I would say that their contribution to deterrence is both substantial and cost effective. Even with the limitations that you mention we have a coherent and effective force that would preclude an enemy's assurance of success with respect to his desired objectives. If we did not have any defense radars or interceptors, we would have lost the capability to detect attackers until they were overhead, and once under attack, would have no way to effectively respond with defense weapons. Our present defense forces will continue to contribute to deterrence while we are building toward a modernized air defense force.

Question. The reasons for the reduction in our air defense capability need to be clarified for the purpose of the record. As I recall it, initially a portion of the reduction was made voluntarily by the Air Force to provide resources for modernization, and then later a more substantial amount of the reduction was directed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, either because of obsolescence or for reasons of economy. The point I am trying to make here is that these reductions were not dictated or compelled by this committee. Is this an accurate statement?

Answer. Sir, the earliest (1962) reductions in air defense were based on an increase in the ICBM threat and the declining Bomber threat. The Air Force did not concur in this Bomber projection. Later rationale for reductions in air defense stemmed from an OSD concept paper (1968) which called for a reduced but modernized force. Latest reductions as well as slips in modernization were for reasons of economy. With reference to your specific point, it is an accurate statement.

Question. As a matter of fact, a chart furnished us last year shows clearly that the prototype aircraft for which procurement funds are now being requested were a part of the design, development, test and engineering program and were to be used for category I and category II tests. In view of all these facts what is the justification for putting the aircraft in procurement funding this year? Answer. These prototypes, unlike other prototypes, will enter the operational inventory after being temporarily used for testing. Most of the 30,000 flying

hours, for which these aircraft are designed, will be used operationally. Therefore, procurement funds were deemed appropriate.

Question. The justification sheet for the FY 1973 AWACS program shows: (a) That it will be after November, 1972, at the earliest that the AWACS program will be allowed "to proceed into the next phase, Design, Development, Test and Engineering (DDT&E);

(b) that flight testing will not begin until March 1974; and

(c) that, as I have mentioned, the decision for full production is not scheduled before December, 1974.

In view of this, doesn't approval of production funds for these prototype aircraft violate the "fly before you buy" concept and introduce an unacceptable measure of concurrency into this program?

Answer. If the request to use procurement funds for the prototype aircraft was tied to a decision for full production, it would probably be a violation of the "fly before you buy" concept. In the case of AWACS, a full production decision is not planned until December 1974. The request for procurement funds simply reflects a judgment that this funding is appropriate since these aircraft will temporarily be used for test prior to entering the operational inventory.

Question. In any event, how can you justify seven test aircraft (two brassboard models plus five proposed test prototypes) for the AWACS program when, for example, the B-1 program only includes three test articles?

Answer. Only the two brassboard aircraft are comparable to the first three B-1 test articles. By the time Development, Test and Evaluation (DT&E) is completed, we will have involved seven B-1 test aircraft and six AWACS test aircraft. A recent decision to reconfigure the losing brassboard aircraft and use it as the first AWACS DT&E aircraft accounts for the reduction from seven to six. I will provide a chart which shows a comparison of test aircraft sequencing in the two programs.

Question. The Air Force is asking for seven AWACS research and test aircraft— or one-sixth of the entire proposed operational Yeet-long before the research development, test and engineering program is completed. The cost of these will total well over half a billion dollars. This seems to be an unbalanced program and I find it hard to justify the procurement funds requested so long in advance of the full production decision. What is your comment on this?

Answer. The AWACS test aircraft, unlike most other test aircraft, will become part of the operational inventory. Since the AWACS will be in the operational inventory for most its useful life (30,000 flying hours), we felt procurement funding to be appropriate. One-sixth is a large part of the total quantity, but it must be remembered that the total number is small. Utilizing the test aircraft in the operational inventory has helped keep the total to a minimum.

Question. Even your own statement, Mr. Secretary, says on page 45 that, based on extensive competitive radar flight testing beginning in March, the "Air Force will select the winning radar which will be used in the second phase of the program when the total system will be developed." You also say (page 46) that the $309.9 million in the FY 1973 procurement budget will be used to buy three test aircraft and AWACS peculiar operational and maintenance support equipment required for the test phase." Don't these statements suggest that these aircraft, if funded at all, should not be funded in the procurement account?

Answer. The quotes are accurate and do build a good case for using R&D instead of procurement funds. The reason for requesting procurement funds is that these aircraft will be used temporarily for test and then spend most of their useful life (30,000 flying hours) in the operational inventory.

Question. On page 46 of Secretary Seamans' statement it is said that our goal is "to achieve an initial operational capability in the mid-1790s." If the decision on full procurement is not to be made until the end of 1974, how can you hope to get an IOC in the mid-1970s?

Answer. The exact AWACS IOC is March 1977. By making a modest long lead release of production funds against a 30 month assembly time, this IOC can be met with a decision on full procurement in December 1974.

Question. What does the current Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) show as the initial operational capability date?

Answer. The current SAR, 31 December 71, shows an initial operational capability date of March 1977. This is also the current Air Force estimate.

Question. Would you know if the acceleration of the B-1 development program was considered in conjunction with the last minute decision to accelerate the ULMS program?

Answer. The B-1 program has been reviewed on several occasions to determine the necessity and practicability of accelerating the program. However, the Air Force has no knowledge that these reviews were directly related to the decision to accelerate the ULMS program. We feel that the program is currently structured to lead us to a sound production decision in time to replace the aging B-52 and to counter the Soviet threat in the 1980s and beyond.

Question. Is the Air Force following essentially the same approach in the Advanced Development Prototype program for the Lightweight Fighter and the V/STOL Transport as for the A-X?

Answer. In general, yes, but there are certain differences. As with the A-X, we intend to award contracts to two companies for each of these programs and each company will build two aircraft. In the case of the A-X, as you know, we are pursuing this program with every intention of producing the best aircraft for our future force structure. In the Lightweight Fighter we wish to take that technology now available and determine what maneuverability and performances we can get in a low-cost, lightweight, and high thrust-to-weight fighter. At the same time we wish to verify new flight control techniques, high lift devices, and aerodynamic concepts. The same holds true for the Medium STOL Transport. The Air Force is buying these aircraft from the contractors, and although operational configurations may eventually evolve, the Air Force will have no commitment to production. As a matter of fact, considerable additional engineering

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development will be required in both of these prototype programs before an operational configuration can evolve. The A-X will have a small amount of engineering development after the prototype phase to optimize the final production configuration. The competition we hope to inject in our advanced prototype programs centers around the areas of design excellence and technology goals. Competition will prevail in both, but the purpose and end objective are different. I believe, on balance, you could say our basic development approach is similar.

PREPARED QUESTION FROM SENATOR HUGHES

The CHAIRMAN. A question from Senator Hughes will be placed in the record.

(Question submitted by Senator Hughes. Answer supplied by the Department of the Air Force.)

Question. Since January 1, 1971, what have been the monthly totals of air attack sorties and the estimated ordnance tonnages dropped over each of the following countries by Air Force aircraft: South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia?

Answer. [Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. We thank all of you, gentlemen, very much. This completes the overall general hearings and we will be conferring with you on other matters.

Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m., the committee was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Thursday, February 24, 1972.)

MILITARY PROCUREMENT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1973

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 1972

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:05 a.m., in room 212, Old Senate Office Building, Hon. John C. Stennis (chairman).

Present: Senators Stennis (presiding), Symington, Cannon, McIntyre, Byrd, Jr., of Virginia, Smith, Thurmond, and Goldwater.

Also present: T. Edward Braswell, Jr., chief counsel and staff director; John T. Ticer, chief clerk; R. James Woolsey, general counsel; L. R. Garcia, Don C. Lynch, John A. Goldsmith, Charles Cromwell, George Foster, C. J. Conneely, and Edward B. Kenney, professional staff members; James Kendall, chief counsel, Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee; Ben Gilleas, director of investigations, Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee; and Fran Funk, staff aide.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OPENING STATEMENT

The CHAIRMAN. Our committee will please come to order.

The committee welcomes today the Honorable Robert F. Froehlke, Secretary of the Army, and Gen. W. C. Westmoreland, Chief of Staff of the Army, who will present the Army portion of the defense budget for fiscal year 1973.

The chair would observe that the Army authorization procurement request is $1.547 billion and $2.051 billion for R. & D. for a total of $3.598 billion.

The chair would also observe that in this bill the Safeguard account. is $1.1 billion or about 30 percent of the total request, with an additional $399 million being requested for Safeguard under military construction and family housing.

This is also the first time no helicopters are being requested for Army utilization. Total aircraft buy consists of 20 fixed-wing administrative aircraft and six VII-1N Presidential helicopters.

The committee wishes to thank both the Secretary and General Westmoreland for the advance submission of their statements which have been available to all members for a number of days. Gentlemen, that is a great help to the membership here and to the staff.. We appreciate your wonderful cooperation.

Both the Secretary and the Chief of Staff will read summaries and thereafter we will proceed with questions from the membership.

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