fractory, to return to their former occupations, and the most solemn engagements were entered into for their security, and for an oblivion ofall the irregularities of which they had been guilty. It was resolved at last, as the surest and mostexpe. ditious method of terminating these fatal feuds, to induce the chiefs themselves, by promising liberal and advantageous terms, to lay down their arms, and yield obedience to the government. Charette, who headed the remainder of the Ven. deans, and Comartin, the principal leader of the Chouans, with several other chiefs of the insurgents, consented to a negotiation with the agents of government, in the commencement of February, 1795, and formally agreed, in the name of their respective parties, to deliver up their arms to the commissaries of the republic, and to demean themselves as true and obedient subjects to the constituted powers. This preliminary being settled, a solemn meeting was appointed between all the members of the convention, commissioned to ast in the neighbouring. departments, and all the heads of the insurgents. They met accord ingly, at the close of February, and as both parties were equally desirous of a reconciliation, there was not much difficulty in settling the

terms.

VOL. XXXVII,

These were highly favourable to the insurgents. On condition of their engaging to live in future in a peaceable subjection to the laws and ordinances decreed by the republican government, and to deliver up their arms and implements of war, they received not only the completest amnesty, but ample compensation for the damages done to their lands, and the devastations committed in their country by the military executions ordered against them by the late administration. Particular indulgences were granted to their chiefs, and no request was denied them that could reasonably be made.

In order to give the more solem. nity to this treaty, it was thought proper to conclude and sign it formally in the city of Nantes. To this purpose the conventional depu.. ties and the chiefs of the insurgents made a public entry, and were received with great honours, and every token of satisfaction, at the business they were about to accomplish. In the declaration, which was signed by Charette, and the other chiefs on this occasion, they apologized for their insurrection, by ascribing it to the tyranny exercised under the late rulers, and bound themselves by the strongest terms to be faithful to the French republic, and punctually to fulfil the conditions of the present treaty. In pursuance of this promise, they published an address to the people of La Vendée, pathetically advising them to submit to the convention, and laying before them the impru. dence and danger of resisting the established government of their country. These transactions took place on the third of March, 1795[F]

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In this general submission to the republic, one of the principal heads of the insurgents refused to consent: this was Stoffler, a man of a sin gularly bold and daring disposition, and who seemed inclined to persist in his opposition at all events. His bravery and conduct, on many difficult emergencies, had rendered him very popular in his party, and he retained many adherents; but after continuing some time in his refusal, finding that many of his people forsook him, he judged it prudent, in conjunction with several other chiefs, to comply with the terms offered him by government. He assigned as a motive for his delay, that he was desirous to ascertain the inclinations of the people of his party, with whom he was bound in honour to remain, till they had manifested their determination to accept of the conditions laid before them by the commissioners. As they were willing to embrace these, he thought it his duty to unite with them in submitting to the republic, and in promising a faithful observance of all the articles in the treaty. This sub. mission was dated the 20th of April. In this manner, the most danger. ous insurrection, that had yet hap pened in favour of the royal cause in France, was seemingly extin. guished. But many doubted the sincerity of those chiefs of the insurgents, who acted in the name of the Chouans. These had always been an unsettled assemblage of people, rude in their manners, and ill-connected in their movements, which were irregular and desultory. The authority of their leaders was precarious: every bold and enterprising individual was sure of fol. lowers. Hence they were con. tinually separating into divisions;

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which though acting on the same principles, had their particular chief. tains, who acted independently of each other, and were obeyed and respected according to the degree of success that attended them. was difficult, for this reason, to conclude any general agreement with such people. The principal officers, in the republican troops, that were stationed in those parts, and who, by long intercourse, were well acquainted with the dispo. sition of the insurgents, placed little reliance on their submission, and were of opinion, that the observ. ance of the treaty just concluded with them, would be of short duration. The motives for judging so unfavourably of their intentions were, that the number of dissidents from pacific measures, was not only considerable, but consisted of the most active and artful among the insurgents. As these men had not been able to prevent the conclusion of this treaty, they seemed resolved to procure its innraction, as soon as circumstances afforded any plausible pretence, or they could influence their party to be disgusted with it. To this end they disseminated reports of formidable preparations abroad to assist them, if they should again incline to resume their arms for the cause they had forsaken, with more precipitation than could be justified, and for which they would always be suspected to retain an irradicable predilection. Suspicions of this nature would never be removed from the minds of the republicans, with whom they could not expect to live on a footing of reciprocal confidence, and who certainly would treat them with lenity no longer than necessity compelled them to dissemble their real senti

As the mass of the insurgents were under the influence of their leaders, so the leaders themselves were under the influence of the intrigues of the French princes, and pecuniary aids and promises of the English mi. nistry. This matter, before suspect. ed, and generally believed, has lately been placed beyond all doubt, by the publication of the secret correspondence between Charette, Stofflet, Puisaye, and other Ven. dean chiefs; and the count of Provence, or claimant of the crown of France, and others; a publication which has all the characteristics of authenticity, though, perhaps, some letters may have been added to the genuine collection; or some al terations, perhaps, have been made in certain phrases, by the prejudices and party zeal of the editor. A constant correspondence was kept up between the royalists in La Vendée and Mr. Windham. The money with which they were supplied consisted at first, in false assignats, af. terwards in louis d'ors and guineas, and lastly, in English bank-notes; but the value of these last being known only to some French merchants, and so many risks attending their conversion into specie, they were discounted at a very great loss. This disadvantage being represented, the supplies were again remitted in gold, but, in the esti.

mation of the Vendean chiefs, al ways in too scanty quantities. It appears, that though Charette was induced to make peace with the republicans, neither he nor the other principal leaders were tired of the war, or in their hearts averse to its continuation. But their own men wished for peace: and thus the chiefs were obliged to give their consent to the moderate and reasonable conditions which were offered by the republicans.

The Vendean chiefs were after. wards accused of having violated many of the articles of the capitu. lation. This is not improbable; and the more probable, that they were stung with the severe re. proaches of the royalists most attach. ed to the Bourbon family, and, in their language, Lewis XVIII. and the count d'Artois for having con. sented to any sort of accommodation with the regicides. On the other hand, it was currently said at Paris, that the directory, mistrustful of the officers who had fallen into their hands, still detained many of them, notwithstanding the declaration of amnesty, am in close confinement. These mutual accusations may, both of them, have been well founded. It often happens, that opposite parties are both of them in the wrong.

It is to be observed, that there was no sincere and cordial good under. standing between Lewis XVIII. and the princes of the coalition, and particularly the court of London. The design of Lewis was, to make himself independent of the coali. tion; and to effectuate his restora. tion, through the instrumentality of England, without consulting, sin cerely, any other interests or views than his own. The conduct of that prince, in attempting to go to Toulon, when in our possession, gave great offence to ministry, who [F2]

never meant that he should go there; and were not a little surprised that he should act for himself, without receiving his instructions. So also did the count d'Artois, in coming without permission to this country. The count d'Avary, a confidential friend, and officer in the household of the count of Provence, Lewis XVIII. in a letter to the chevalier de Charette, dated at Verona, the sixth of September, 1796, says, "Endeavour to do away the bad effect of the apparent confidence reposed by the king (Lewis XVIII.) in the English." To many it appeared, that it was not the plan of the English ministry to trust any important expedition into the hands of Lewis XVIII.; but only to waste and destroy a part of France, by its own inhabitants: a conviction which rendered the English admini. stration odious not only to a great part of the loyalists, but to the other parties in France, and not a few of the friends of peace and humanity in all nations. It has been said that the insurgents in the western depart. ments of France, wanted only mili. tary stores and provisions; and that they were averse to the introduction of any formidable army of strangers, particularly of English. Time has not yet unfolded the motives which influenced the conduct of the British ministry: who, professing a desire to restore the French monarchy, in opposition to the existing powers, as well as a great majority of the French nation, nevertheless contributed only an insignificant force; and that too delayed beyond the time when it might have done the greatest service. It may be said, however, that even if no opposition had been made to the introduction of foreigners, on the part of the French, a powerful army might have ex. eited jealousy, roused national ani.

mosity, and, by effecting an unios of parties, consolidated, instead of subverting the republic.

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A question arises on this subject, how the Vendean party could be so easily revived, after being lulled into peace-after being reduced almost to total destruction? The solution of the problem is to be found in the money given to a number of needy and restless busy-bodies, who are always going and coming from London to Guernsey, and from thence to the French coast. said, that if a confidential friend speak with these persons in private, they will not scruple to declare their conviction, "that to effect a counter revolution, by means of the Catholic army, is impossible; but that, were they to speak the truth to the English ministry, they would wholly lose their confidence and favour." It is this weakness of listening to malcontents and refugees from a hostile country, so justly noted by Machiavel, in his Discourses on Livy, that was the great spring of .. our continued losses, and final defeat, in the American war. It is the same weakness that has produced many disasters, and that threatens finally a similar issue of affairs to this country, in the present.

There is no military man who is not perfectly sensible, that the sup. posed armies of sixty thousand men, and even upwards in La Vendée, cannot exist. They know what an immense quantity of provisions, military stores, horses, carriages, and other articles, are necessary to keep an army on foot, even for one sea. son; and they see plainly, that the poor Vendeans will fall a sacrifice in the end to the regular army of the republicans. But La Vendée has furnished some very satisfactory paragraphsinimperialand royal gazettes, which,

which, for the purposes of the day, have been thought sufficient.

Through the insinuations of Vendean chiefs above mentioned, a secret dissatisfaction was spread among the royalists, who had submitted, and a great majority of whom seemed well-disposed to rest contented with that situation of safety and tranquillity they had obtained; that they harboured no intentions to rise any more against the government, was apparent from their behaviour subsequently to the treaty, which was pacific, and conformable, in every respect, to the articles agreed on. Both the Vendeans and Chouans conducted themselves in the most satisfactory manner; the chiefs of the latter depo sited in the hands of Ruelle, a member of the convention deputed to treat with them, nearly a million of forged assignats, which had been distributed among them, as they said, from a squadron of British men of war on the coast of Brittany. Nor had the insurgents any real cause to be dissatisfied with the conditions of that treaty. It was stipulated, that eighty millions should be given to the people of La Vendée, to in. demnify them for their losses, and the devastation of their country; that ten millions should be granted to the chiefs of the insurgents, to enable them to pay debts they had contracted, and take up the bonds issued in their name during the in. surrection; that a body of two thou. sand men, in the pay of govern ment, should be placed under the command of Charette; that no requisitions should take place in La Vendée for the space of five years; that the Roman Catholic religion should be publicly exercised; and that nonjuring clergymen should be

permitted to return, and resume the possession of their family estates.

But notwithstanding these conces. sions, on the part of government, the attachment of the Vendeans to the royal cause led them into so intimate and continual a correspond-ence with the principal of the French emigrants in England, that it was at last discovered. Comartin, and others of the Chouan chiefs, were taken into custody, on the evidence of some letters that had been inter. cepted. About the close of May, the designs of the Chouans became manifest; they rose in arms, invested the town of Grandchamp with six thousand men; but a strong body of republicans came upon them by surprise at break of day, on the twen. ty-eighth, took several of their chiefs, and put the rest to flight."

In the mean time an armament was preparing in England to second the intended insurrection of the royalists in France. In the beginning of June it sailed to the southern coast of Brittany, under the command of sir John Borlase Warren. The insurgents were at that time assembled in great force in La Vendée; but, as they were not masters of any seaports where to make a landing, the squadron proceeded to the bay of Quiberon. Here a body of about three thousand men landed on the twentyseventh, and dispersed a small number of republicans that had made a shew of opposing them. They be. sieged and took a fort garrisoned by six hundred men, and prepared to march farther into the country. Multitudes flocked in from all parts, to whom vast quantities of arms were distributed; and it was expected, that an army might be formed, in a short time, capable of facing the republican troops in the neighbourhood. [F3]

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