Suit in equity by Charles S. Detrick, as Insurance Commissioner of the State of California, and others, against George B. Russell, as State Treasurer of the State of Nevada, and others. Defendants appeal from an order granting a preliminary injunction. Reversed. This is an appeal from an order of the court below granting a temporary injunetion. The effect of the injunction was to stay proceedings which had been begun in a state court of the state of Nevada. On November 4, 1926, the appellants, Matzdorf and wife, brought a suit in that court against the National Land Valley Guaranty Company, the National Land Insurance Company, and the Title & Trust Company of Nevada, all corporations of that state, and also against the state treasurer of the state of Nevada, for the cancellation of a note for $20,000, of date December 19, 1925, and the trust deed securing the same, made by the Matzdorfs in favor of the National Land Valley Guaranty Company, and by the latter assigned to the. National Land Insurance Company, on the ground that the note and trust deed were procured through fraudulent misrepresentations made by certain agents of the National Land Valley Guaranty Company. Upon the commencement of the suit, the state court appointed a receiver of the property of the two lastnamed corporations. On November 18, 1926, the receiver, under order of said court, took over the custody and control of all the assets in the state of Nevada belonging to said two corporations, but the order provided in terms that the authority of the receiver was to "include the exercise and control of any and all rights which said defendants may have under, by virtue of, or relative to the contract, note, mortgage, or trust deed involved in the action. Said note, mortgage, or trust deed, however, being subject, until the final determination of the action, to the custody of the state treasurer of the state of Nevada." On January 11, 1927, 19 similar actions were commenced in said state court against the same defendants, by others of the appellants herein, whose notes and securities given to the National Land Valley Guaranty Company had been assigned to the insur urer, both as an individual and as an officer of the state of Nevada, from surrendering any of said securities to any of his codefendants until the further order of the court. The insurance commissioner of California, with whom joined two policy holders, were the plaintiffs. The complaint alleged that the National Land Insurance Company of Nevada was organized with authority to issue policies on land values and receive premiums therefor; that it applied to the insurance commissioner of California for a license to issue its policies of insurance in that state, and represented to said commissioner that it had complied with the laws of Nevada by depositing securities with the secretary of state of that state, the same being the securities which are the subject of the present litigation; that, relying on such representation, the insurance commissioner granted such license to do business in and to issue policies in the state of California, and in pursuance thereof the said insurance. company issued various policies on land values in California to the amount of $1,000,000, and that in conducting said business it incurred in California a debt of $25,000, which is still unpaid. The complaint further alleged that the notes and securities issued by the individual appellants herein, Matzdorf and others, while they amounted in the aggregate to $205,000, had an actual value of not more than $115,000, and that the makers of said instruments now threaten to take steps to cancel all said notes and securities, and to require the state treasurer of Nevada to surrender the same for cancellation, although they were all well aware at the time thereof that the application of the insurance company to do business in California was based upon its representation to the insurance commissioner of that state that it had said securities on deposit in the office of the state treasurer of Nevada. The temporary injunction enjoined and restrained all the appellants herein from canceling any of the notes, mortgages, or securities described in the bill, and from taking any steps or proceedings looking to a cancellation of the same, until the further order of said district court. Subsequently the appellant Russell, as state treasurer of Nevada, was substituted for Malley, who held that office at the commencement of the proceedings. M. A. Diskin, Atty. Gen., of Nevada, for appellant Russell. Charles Lee Horsey, of Las Vegas, Nev. and Brown & Belford, and George S. Brown, all of Reno, Nev., for other appellants. 23 F.(2d) 175 U. S. Webb, Atty. Gen. of California, and John H. Riordan, Asst. Atty. Gen. of California (Lyon, Fleming & Robbins and David R. Rubin, all of Los Angeles, Cal., of counsel), for appellees. Before GILBERT, RUDKIN, and DIETRICH, Circuit Judges. court had thereby parted with possession and control over the same, and the order appointing the receiver, while it directed him to take possession and control of the properties of the two corporations, and gave him the exercise and control of any and all rights which they had in those instruments, ordered that, until the final determination of the suit, they should remain in the custody of the state treasurer. GILBERT, Circuit Judge (after stating the facts as above). (1) The appellants contend that the injunction order is violative of the settled rule that the tribunal where jurisdiction first attaches holds it to the exclusion of all other courts until its duty is fully performed and the jurisdiction involved is exhausted, and that, where a court of competent jurisdiction has taken proper-fined in its operation to instances where both ty into its possession through its officers, the property is withdrawn from the jurisdiction of all other courts, and the latter are without power to render any judgment which invades or disturbs the possession of the property while it is in the custody of the court which has seized it. The situation presented to the court below was this: The appellants here had suits pending in the state court, the purpose of which was to cancel notes and securities held by the insurance company, and which presented controversies wholly between the plaintiffs therein, who were the makers of those instruments, and the defendants therein, who were the payees and owners thereof. Subsequently the appellees brought a suit in the court below to assert the rights which they had in those notes and securities and to prevent the cancellation thereof. They had the right to bring an original suit for that purpose, for they were not parties to the suits in the state court, nor were their rights in litigation or represented therein. It is clear, we think, that the pendency of the suits in the state court to determine the validity of the securities and the rights of the parties in those controversies did not deprive the court below of jurisdiction to entertain a suit against those who were the parties plaintiff in those suits to determine the appellees' rights in and to the same securities, the latter suit not being one that disturbed the custody of property of which the state court had acquired jurisdiction. It would seem from the record that the securities were not in the actual custody of the state court. They had been deposited with the state treasurer, as required by law, to qualify the holder thereof to issue policies of insurance upon land values. The corporation defendants in the suits in the state 23 F.(2d)-12 "The rule that where the same matter is brought before courts of concurrent jurisdiction, the one first obtaining jurisdiction will retain it until the controversy is determined, to the entire exclusion of the other, and will maintain and protect its jurisdiction by an appropriate injunction, is con suits are substantially the same, that is to say, where there is substantial identity in the interests represented, in the rights asserted and in the purposes sought." Pacific Live Stock Co. v. Oregon Water Bd., 241 U. S. 440, 447, 36 S. Ct. 637, 641 (60 L. Ed. 1084). But, if it were conceded that the state court acquired, by its receivership, jurisdiction over the property, so as to withdraw it from the jurisdiction of a federal court in the same territory (Palmer v. Texas, 212 U. S. 118, 29 S. Ct. 230, 53 L. Ed. 435), it does not follow that the relief which the appellees seek in the court below is beyond the jurisdiction of that court, or will necessarily invade or disturb the jurisdiction of the state court. The court below had no right to abdicate its own jurisdiction. It had the power to hear and determine any question and grant any relief concerning interests in the property not conflicting with the possession, so long as the state court should retain possession. The objection on account of the receivership cannot prevail to prevent proceedings in the court below, so far as it can go without interfering with the receivership. Watson v. Jones, 15 Wall. 679, 20 L. Ed. 666; Mercantile Trust Co. v. Lamoille Val. R. Co., 16 Blatchf. 324, Fed. Cas. No. 9432. [2] The question remains whether the injunction was forbidden by section 265 of the Judicial Code (28 USCA § 379), which prohibits the issuance of a writ of injunetion by any court of the United States to stay proceedings in any court of a state, except in bankruptcy cases. The appellees contend that the present case is not governed by that section for the reason that the injunction runs not against the state court, but against the plaintiffs in the actions in that court. But violation of the section is not thus avoided. Essanay Film Co. v. Kane, 258 U. S. 358, 42 S. Ct. 318, 66 L. Ed. 658; Peck v. Jenness, 7 How. 612, 625, 12 L. Ed. 841. It is true that the prohibition of injunction is not universal in its scope. It does not forbid a federal court to enjoin attempts to impair its own jurisdiction by proceedings in a state court (French v. Hay, 22 Wall. 250, note, 22 L. Ed. 857), or to issue injunction where there is an entire lack of jurisdiction in the state court (Simon v. Southern Railway Co., 236 U. S. 115, 35 S. Ct. 255, 59 L. Ed. 492), or to enjoin the enforcement of a judgment subject to attack as having been obtained through fraud (Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U. S. 589, 12 S. Ct. 62, 35 L. Ed. 870), or a judgment, the enforcement of which would be contrary to recognized principles of equity and the standards of good conscience (Wells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor, 254 U. S. 175, 183, 41 S. Ct. 93, 65 L. Ed. 205); or to enforce an unconscionable judgment fraudulently obtained (Ex parte Simon, 208 U. S. 144, 28 S. Ct. 238, 52 L. Ed. 429). But the present case does not belong in the class of any of the recognized excерtions. It is an injunction against the plaintiffs in a state court, enjoining them against taking further steps in the prosecution of suits to cancel securities, and it is issued on behalf of plaintiffs in a federal court, not parties to the suits in the state court, to defeat cancellation of the securities and protect their own interest therein. We think the injunction comes clearly within the prohibition of section 265. Essanay Film Co. v. Kane, supra. The argument that, if the suits in the state court are permitted to be prosecuted to judgment before the suit in the federal court can be adjudicated, the latter adjudication will be made futile, is answered in Kline v. Burke Const. Co., 260 U. S. 226, 233, 43 S. Ct. 79, 67 L. Ed. 226, 24 A. L. R. 1077, where it is pointed out that the jurisdiction of a federal court, having been conferred by act of Congress, may be taken away in whole or in part by a later act of Congress, such as the prohibition of injunction expressed in section 265. But that section does not deprive a District Court of jurisdiction otherwise çonferred by the federal statutes. It merely goes to the question of equity in the particular case presented, leaving the court to determine whether the case is one in which injunctive relief is prohibited. Woodmen of the World v. O'Neill, 266 U. S. 292, 298, 45 S. Ct. 49, 69 L. Ed. 293; Smith v. Apple, 264 U. S. 274, 277, 44 S. Ct. 311, 68 L. Ed. 678. We hold that it is prohibited here. The injunction order is reversed. DONALDSON v. UNITED STATES. Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. December 2, 1927. No. 7027. 1. Poisons-Possession of unstamped drugs is not evidence of sale without registering by person required to register (Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act, § 1, as amended [26 USCA §§ 211, 691-695,704]). Possession of narcotic drugs in unstamped packages is not evidence of its unlawful sale without registering by a "person required to register," in violation of the first penal provi sion of Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act, § 1, as amended (26 USCA §§ 211, 691-695, 704; Comp. St. § 6287g). 2. Criminal law 323-Presumption of unlaw ful purchase from possession of unstamped drugs does not extend to venue, and purchase within jurisdiction of court must be shown (Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act, § 1, as amended [26 USCA §§ 211, 691-695, 704]). The presumption, from possession of morphine in unstamped package made prima facie evidence of unlawful purchase by Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act, § 1, as amended (26 USCA §§ 211, 691-695, 704; Comp. St. § 6287g), does not extend to venue, and purchase within the jurisdiction of the court must be proved in view of Const. art. 3, § 2, and Const. Amend. 6. In Error to the District Court of the United States for the District of Utah; Tillman D. Johnson, Judge. Criminal prosecution by the United States against James Donaldson. Judgment. of conviction, and defendant brings error. Reversed and remanded. Hutchinson & Hutchinson, of Salt Lake City, Utah, for plaintiff in error. Edward M. Morrissey, Asst. U. S. Atty., of Salt Lake City, Utah (Charles M. Morris, U. S. Atty., and J. K. Smith, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Salt Lake City, Utah, on the brief), for the United States. Before LEWIS, Circuit Judge, and POLLOCK and SCOTT, District Judges. LEWIS, Circuit Judge. [1] Plaintiff in error was convicted on the second and third counts of an indictment. The second count charged him with violation of the first section of the Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act as amended (26 USCA §§ 211, 691-695, 704; Comp. St. § 6287g), in that he was a dealer in narcotic drugs and had failed to pay the 23 F.(2d) 178 special tax and register as such dealer with the Collector of Internal Revenue, as the section required. Construing this section we held in O'Neill v. United States, 19 F. (2d) 322, that it defined dealers as being those classed either as wholesale dealers or retail dealers; the former on registration and payment of a tax of $12.00 per annum could sell the drug lawfully in the original stamped package and the latter on registration and payment of a tax of $6.00 per annum could sell from the original stamped package; and that where one is charged as a dealer with violation of the section, in that, he had failed to register and pay the tax, it must be shown that defendant sold the drug either in or from the original stamped package. Absent such proof he was not required to register and pay the special tax, -in fact he could not have registered and was not required to do so unless he intended to deal in the stamped drug. And so, we held that the presumption which the section attached to the possession of unstamped drugs could not be applied to this charge, failure of a dealer to register and pay the tax. The possession of unstamped drugs does not constitute proof that defendant had possession of, and dealt in, the stamped drugs. The proof in that case, as in this one, failed to show that defendant ever had possession of drugs in the original stamped packages. It only tended to show that on one occasion he had a package of unstamped drugs, and that did not constitute him a dealer, one who was required to register and pay the tax as charged in the second count. [2] The third count charged him with purchasing morphine, the same not being in the original stamped package or from the original stamped package, and he not having then and there obtained said drug from a registered dealer or physician on a prescription. There was no direct evidence of a purchase by defendant. The prosecution relied on the statutory presumption attached to possession by the section to sustain the charge of purchase of the unstamped package. There was no evidence tending to show that the alleged purchase was made within the court's jurisdiction, or where it was made or when. We held in Brightman v. United States, 7 F. (2d) 532, on this identical proposition, that the statutory presumption did not include the subject of venue, that there must be some proof that the crime charged was committed within the jurisdiction of the court, and without that proof the court could not assume it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the right to punish defendant and restrain him of his liberty. Certainly, the defendant was not required to furnish this proof or to show that he had committed the offense charged elsewhere. "Crimes are in their nature local and the jurisdiction of crimes is local." Judicial power is so limited. Article 3, § 2, of the Constitution and the Sixth Amendment. It was necessary to lay the venue in the indictment, that was done; and to prove it by direct or circumstantial evidence, that was not done. Hence, there was no proof from which it can be said the court had jurisdiction of the crime charged and power to punish defendant therefor. Furthermore, the court in one part of its instructions submitted the third count to the jury as charging a sale. It said: "In substance, it is an offense under this statute for any person not being registered. and not having paid the tax to sell narcotic drugs. So upon the third count of this indictment your inquiry will be whether or not the defendant in this case made a sale of this drug to the man McCarty as claimed by the government. If you shall find beyond a reasonable doubt that such a sale was made, the defendant would be guilty." This was followed, it is true, by a statement from the court that if the jury found that he had possession of the drug it might infer that he had unlawfully purchased it, but the court said nothing in that connection contrary to the views which it had already expressed, that the third count charged a sale. The first count of the indictment charged the defendant with unlawful possession of the same drug named in the second and third counts; but for some reason not disclosed by the record here that count was not submitted to the jury. The court submitted the case to the jury upon the second and third counts only, verdicts were returned only on those counts and sentences imposed on them. Reversed and remanded. given by court of its own motion properly declared law on subject. 8. Criminal law528-Confessions are restricted as evidence to individual defendants making them. In prosecution for robbery of mail, instruction that confessions are restricted as evidence to individual defendants making them held proper. MADIGAN et al. v. UNITED STATES.* Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. November 23, 1927. No. 7905. 1. Criminal law 59(2)-Accessories may be Indicted, tried, and convicted as principals (18 USCA § 550). Accessories either before or after the fact at common law are made principals by 18 USCA 9. Criminal law507(1)-Testimony of co$550, and may be indicted, tried, and convicted as such. 2. Post office 50-in prosecution for robbery of mail, case held for jury as to guilt of one defendant (18 USCA § 320). In prosecution for robbery of mail, under 18 USCA § 320, evidence held sufficient to take to jury question of guilt of defendant, who claimed ignorance as to intentions of codefend-. ants. 3. Post office 49(1)-There is presumption that guns pointed at custodian of mails in effecting robbery were loaded (18 USCA $320). In considering threatening use made of firearms and pointing them at custodian of mails, it is not necessary, in prosecution under 18 USCA § 320, for robbery of mails, to prove the guns were charged; presumption being that they were loaded until contrary is proved. 4. Post office 50-In prosecution for robbing mail, whether guns of defendants were loaded held for jury on conflicting evidence (18 USCA § 320). In prosecution, under 18 USCA § 320, for robbery of mail, testimony of one participant that guns were not loaded, opposed by contrary testimony, held to take to jury question whether such guns were loaded. 5. Post office 45-Robbery of mail is committed by putting custodian's life in jeopardy, when robbers' acts created well-grounded apprehension of danger to custodian's life in case he resisted (18 USCA § 320). Where robbery of mail has been committed by defendants, whose acts created in mind of custodian of mails well-grounded apprehension of danger to life in case of resistance, robbery was committed by putting his life in jeopardy, within 18 USCA § 320. 6. Post office45-That mail clerk assisted robbers in robbing mail held not to preclude conviction for robbery by putting custodian's life in jeopardy (18 USCA § 320). That one mail clerk assisted robbers will not prevent conviction, under 18 USCA $ 320, for robbing mail by putting custodian's life in jeopardy, notwithstanding he had immediate possession of mail, since he cast off official possession and duties when assisting in robbery leaving the other mail clerk in car the only person representing United States as custodian when robbers entered. 7. Criminal law 829(1)-Refusal of Instructions covered by instructions given held not error. Refusal of requested instructions in criminal prosecution held not error, where instructions Rehearing denied February 10, 1928. defendants testifying for state must be corroborated. In prosecution for robbing mail, instruction that jury should not accept testimony of codefendants testifying for state, unless it be corroborated by testimony of other witnesses, or by other facts and circumstances, held proper. 10. Criminal law 561 (3)-Evidence of defendant's good reputation may generate reasonable doubt in mind of juror. In prosecution for robbing mail, instruction that evidence of good reputation of defendant might generate reasonable doubt in mind of juror held proper. 11. Conspiracy47-Post office 49 (13)— Evidence held to support conviction for conspiracy to rob and robbing of mail (18 USCA § 320). In prosecution under 18 USCA $ 320, for robbing mail and for conspiracy to commit crimes defined by such section, evidence held sufficient to sustain conviction. In Error to the District Court of the United States for the District of Wyoming; T. Blake Kennedy, Judge. Jack W. Madigan and others were convicted of robbing mail, in violation of 18 USCA § 320, and of conspiring to commit the crimes defined therein, and they bring error. Affirmed. Arthur R. Morrison, of Denver, Colo., for plaintiff in error Madigan. F. W. James, of Salt Lake City, Utah (Richard O. Pearse, of Salt Lake City, Utah, on the brief), for plaintiffs in error Sourlokulos, Kearns, Kamariotis, and Theodore. Edward T. Lazear, of Cheyenne, Wyo., for plaintiff in error Barnett. Albert D. Walton, U. S. Atty., of Cheyenne, Wyo. (Clyde M. Watts, Asst. U. S. Atty., of Cheyenne, Wyo., on the brief), for the United States. Before LEWIS, Circuit Judge, and POLLOCK and SCOTT, District Judges. LEWIS, Circuit Judge. Shortly after 1 o'clock a. m. August 14, 1926, the west-bound mail train on the Union Pacific Railway stopped at the coal chute at Hanna, Wyo., and was there boarded by two men who concealed themselves in the storage mail car for |