Entered at New York Post Office as Second Class Matter. FUNK & WAGNALLS COMPANY, 18 and 20 Astor Place, New York. The Reviews. POLITICAL. THE RUIN OF THE AMERICAN FARMER. WILLIAM MAITLAND. Nineteenth Century, London, November. S a means to pay off the expenses of the war and to reëstablish the credit of the country the American tariff was most effective; and we doubt if any party in any country can compare with the Republican party in the United States 'for the stupendous nature of the work it undertook, and the success which crowned its efforts. That the wonderful prosperity which followed the war should have been claimed by that party as the direct result of their policy was, perhaps, not unnatural. The majority of the Nation has, for more than twenty-five years, accepted this claim unquestioned. It is unnecessary to explain to English readers the folly of protection; but I would point out one of its inherent charac teristics: it can never be satisfied. Unprotected industries demand protection; those already protected find the everincreasing competition, both from within and without, curtailing their profits, and they clamor for higher duties. It is evident that it will finally be carried to a point where even the most ignorant and the most long-suffering must rebel. There has recently come upon the stage another, and practically an entire new factor in American politics—the American farmer. We have heard a great deal of the depression of English agriculture and the miserable condition of the English farmer, who has complained that he could not hold his own against American competition. Unfortunately this is too true. It would be some satisfaction if the American farmer had made the money which the Englishman has lost; but he has not. I have no hesitation in saying that the position of the English farmer to-day is immeasurably superior to that of his competitor in America. As regards the rent, the difference between them is more apparent than real. In bad years the English landlord has to take his share of the loss by making an abatement in rent. In the meantime the English farmer lives well, perhaps too well, all things considered; he pays only his fair share of taxation, and he pays his laborers rather under than over what may be considered fair wages, as gauged either by his own expenditure or by the wages paid in other industries. He does little or no work with his own hands. His wife and daughters are well educated and live in comfort, at the most superintending the dairy and the hen-house, and having a servant, or perhaps two, to do all the work of a wellappointed farmhouse. The American farmer pays no rent; but as a rule he pays a much worse thing-interest on his mortgage. Farmers are often unable to pay the interest when it is due; and too often it has to be added to the principal, and then wiped out by a further loan at a higher rate of interest. In bad seasons the American farmer has no landlord to share the loss with him. The American farmer certainly does not live well, unless a diet of salt pork and beans nearly all the year round can be called good living. This diet he shares with his workmen, who, as a rule, live with him. Meals are cooked by his wife and family, who also do all the washing, baking, etc., and hard as an American farmer works, the women of his family probably work even harder. He works with his men, and generally harder than any of them, for he has the impending mortgage ever before his eyes. The wages he has to pay are out of all proportion to his own expenditures, being necessarily regulated by the wages paid in protected industries in the neighboring towns, with a little added to induce the men to come into the dullness of the country. For everything he buys he has to pay a protected price. Ragged, or at least patched, he stands alone, the one unprotected man in America. While we have been wrangling over the question, it seems to have escaped our notice that Mr. Henry George's single-tax theory is in full operation in the United States, and still the millennium has not yet arrived. The whole of the taxation falls on the land, in other words, on the farmers who own the land, and the result is the impending insolvency of the whole of the agricultural classes throughout the country. Other classes, being protected, can afford to pay protected prices. The price the farmer gets for his product is not fixed by the cost of production in his own protected country, but by the price obtained for the surplus he has to export and sell in a foreign market, in competition with India, Australia, Canada, Russia, and every exporting country, thus nearly every year leaves him deeper in debt than the preceding year, while his land deteriorates for want of manure, until it is nearly worn out, and about ten bushels of wheat to the acre is considered a fair average as against over thirty in this country. The apathy and ignorance of the farming community in America are simply marvelous. It ought to be the most powerful, as it is the most numerous class. But they are now beginning to see that they cannot support all the rest of the community, and are getting anxious. Perhaps the most ignorant organization to which the dissatisfaction gave rise is the Farmers' Alliance. Its panacea for all the ills of the farmer is the free coinage of unlimited silver and the issue of paper money by the Government direct to the farmer, on security of his land and non-perishable products, at 2 per cent. interest. the The election of Mr. Cleveland, and the free, or at least freer, trade which will be thereby secured, is the only hope for the American farmer, and which can save him and the rest of the country from a great financial catastrophe, the like of which has never been experienced before in any country. THE A FRANCO-RUSSIAN ALLIANCE AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE IN THE LIGHT OF HISTORY. Deutsche Revue, Breslau, November. III. FEW months after Russia assumed the credit of staying Germany's hand, a cloud arose in the east which, at first no larger than a man's hand, soon overshadowed the whole horizon. It is certain that the uprising in Herzegovina was very unpalatable to Prince Gortschakoff, whose policy had been to undermine Turkey quietly, while Russia played the rôle of protector of the orthodox Christians. It is hardly conceivable that Russia had any part in the first uprising. Chancellor and Czar, and all the higher officials, were engaged in internal reorganization, and were most undesirous of staking anything on the issue of a war which must necessarily involve a great strain on the imperial finances. Austria's attitude was different. The cordial words which Emperor Francis Joseph addressed to his South Slavic subjects on his previous year's visit to Dalmatia, fell on good soil in the neighboring States, and created the impression that the double-headed eagle might be looked to for help if occasion should arise. In fact, the Austrian colors were waved by the insurgents, and Rodich, the Governor of Dalmatia, opposed no obstacle to the transport of arms or the passage of volunteers across the boundary; so that Austria's attitude towards the uprising can only be regarded as measurably friendly. Moreover, the Andrassy Note of December 30th, regarding necessary reforms, can only be explained on the ground that Austria wished to pose as the protector of the Christians of those Provinces; for no one familiar with the state of affairs could suppose that the Porte was friendly to the adoption of measures tending to the disruption of the Turkish Empire. The Note was then, practically, abeating the air, inasmuch as the Porte, by cunningly supporting it, removed all pretense for the interference of the Powers; but the absence of opposition only led to the enhancement of the insurgents' demands. Gradually the Russian view of the situation was changed. The Bulgarian Committee in Bucharest, in the beginning of March, sent twenty emissaries into the Donau-Vilayet (Danube country) to promote a rising there also. Panslavic agents came from St. Petersburg with large sums in support of the insurrection, and Gortschakoff told the English Ambassador that, however much he wished to maintain the integrity of the Turkish Empire, it was useless to oppose the irresistible: Turkey was incapable of carrying out the necessary reforms. The Chancellor (Gortschakoff), who feared nothing so much as the loss of his popularity, soon saw the necessity of action, and the Czar's journey to Ems came opportuneiv for a conference between the three Imperial Chancellors on the Berlin memo randum, the terms of which were admittedly formulated by Russia. It went beyond the Andrassy Note, above referred to, and deciared void Article 9 of the Treaty of Paris which provided for the non-interference of the Powers in the internal affairs of Turkey; but as England was not represented at the Conference, and declined to concur in its conclusions, it fell still-born. Immediately afterwards, the Russian policy on the Bosphorus sustained a severe defeat by the dethronement of Abdul Aziz (May 30th) and the promotion of Midhat Pasha, the most inveterate opponent of Russia, to the helm of the Turkish Ship of State. Servia and Montenegro declared war against the Porte, Russia was fired with Panslavic sentiment supported by orthodox zeal; then came the Bulgarian atrocities, and England's weak Ministry being paralyzed by Gladstone's attitude, the defeat of Servia was followed by Russia's ultimatum to the Porte (October 30th) calling a halt. In his Moscow speech of November 10th the Czar declared openly in favor of Russia's oppressed brethren, and a week later an Ukase was issued for the mobilization of six armee corps. Then came the remarkable conference of the Powers at Constantinople without participation of the Porte, in which a reform programme was drawn up, embodying terms as severe almost as could have followed a decisive victory. It was consequently bound to end in a fiasco, and render war inevitable. Most remarkable was the part played by Salisbury, who, hesitating between the desire to maintain the integrity of Turkey, and the equally strong desire to avert war by a friendly understanding with Russia, allowed himself to be seen arm in arm with Ignatieff, "the Father of Lies," the most hated man in the Mussulman world. And Salisbury, be it remembered, was then Secretary of State for India, with its 50,000,000 of Mahomedans. Austria bargained for her neutrality by the understanding that she should occupy Bosnia. France and Italy were passive; Italy was little interested, and France was in the dilemma that she must give up the Treaty of Paris, or oppose Russia, whose alliance she coveted. Bismarck behaved differently. The assertion that he promoted the insurrection was a Mephistophelian suggestion, born of French hate; but it is a fact that he encouraged the development of the conflict, now by masterly inactivity, and again by active participation; principally by the former, for others were setting the avalanche in motion; but he was always ready to give it a quiet shove. For example, he joined Salisbury on his way to Constantinople, and impressed on him that owing to the state of popular sentiment at home, Russia could not withdraw unless a golden bridge were provided for her, and that to maintain peace it would be necessary for England to support Russia. The Chancellor must have known, however, that England's support would only furnish Russia with a bridge for her forward march across the Pruth, that Turkey could not accept the terms proposed, and that the failure of the Conference left Russia the choice between a great political defeat and war. Lord Salisbury. ignorant of the state of affairs, played Bismarck's hand, thus enabling the German representative at the Conference to play an inconspicuous part. Again: the Roumanian Government, anxious to avoid war, consulted Bismarck, whose answer was so contorted and qualified that Demeter Bratiani, after reading it, exclaimed: Bismarck veut la guerre." Even at the last moment the scales in St. Petersburg were evenly balanced. the Czar was seeking a way out, when a slight pressure from the Wilhelmstrasse decided in favor of war. marck called the Russian Ambassador, Von Oubel, and said to him: "I understand that the Czar hesitates, but I know Russia, and I tell you he is lost if does not declare war." Bis We do not need follow the fortunes of the war which was hardly a European question until the Treaty of St. Stefano revived it. The excitement was strongest in England, where Lord Derby, one of the weakest Ministers that ever was placed at the head of foreign affairs, shrunk from ordering the English fleet to the Bosphorus. His successor was Lord Salisbury who had meantime been cured of his illusion. He received the Circular on April 1, and after a sharp glance over the terms of the Treaty, signified promptly that England would not consent to the enforcement of the terms. The country prepared for war with the greatest energy, English troops were shipped to Cyprus, and war was inevitable unless Russia gave way. Now Russia was in no condition to enter on another war. The opposition of the Turkish troops had been crushed, but the Russian troops, near as they were to Constantinople, were only 30,000 strong, and dependent for reinforcements mainly, and for supplies entirely, on the sea-route via Varna, which might at any moment be cut off by the English fleet, while a British Indian corps landing at Gallipoli had rendered the Russian advance impossible, or insured its certain defeat. Count Schouvaloff, the Ambassador at London, learning of the position of affairs, undertook the patriotic but thankless task of hurrying to St. Petersburg, and showing the Czar the necessity of yielding. He succeeded in his mission, and Alexander turned to the German Emperor to bridge him a way out of his difficulty. It was certainly not in the interest of Germany to avert war between France and England, but Emperor William was warmly disposed to mark his appreciation of Alexander's neutrality in 1866-7. But special reasons disposed Salisbury to come to a speedy understanding with Russia. Gladstone's weak policy in the East, had encouraged Russia to send an Ambassador to Shere Ali Khan to cement an Alliance between Russia and Afghanistan against England. This threatened danger, which seemed like the realization of the once ridiculed 'nightmare" of Russian invasion of India, prompted Salisbury to stick the Circular of April 1 in his pocket, and come to an understanding with Schouvaloff. This arrangement leaked out through an indiscretion, and has not inaptly been described as a surrender." THE THE THE series of events out of which sprang that new diplomatic situation, which there has been a tacit agreement to call-provisionally and for want of a better name-the Franco-Russian entente, attracted nowhere in Europe more attention than in Germany. This was natural, since the league of Central Europe, that formidable Dreibund, of which the German Empire is the core, is threatened with opposition by a Zweibund, concluded between its old enemy on the West and its former ally on the East. It has taken some time to discover the exact trend of German opinion in regard to this situation, because there have been formed on this subject two opinions diametrically opposite, which, by contradicting, correct each other. What gives a certain spice to this controversy is that it has been heightened by a violent polemic between the man who now holds power and him who cannot be consoled for having lost it. On the question of the Franco-Russian understanding, as on all German questions at the present moment, there are Caprivists and Bismarckians. The latter see in this understanding-the importance of which they exaggerate at pleasure, and the character of which they falsify-a crime on the part of the new Chancellor. The former are willing to admit only that there has been a fated encounter of two great historic currents, and, strongly disposed to depreciate the importance of that encounter, say that, since Cronstadt, nothing has been changed in Europe; there has been only one interview the more. 'I cannot undertake to give even a summary of all the arguments-rightly or wrongly so-called-put forward by the Caprivists and Bismarckians. The former, however, I think, have something to say which is more worthy of consideration than anything said by the latter. The supporters of Caprivi consider or feign to believe-that the Franco-Russian understanding is threatened by two grave perils, one of a political and religious kind, the other of an economic and military kind. 1. At the same time that the Government of the Republic made overtures to the head of the Orthodox Slav Church, it made its peace with the visible head of the Roman Catholic Church. It cannot be denied that this policy is, to a certain degree, contradictory. We cannot attach the slightest importance to the German or Italian calumnies, which insidiously confound the Republic of 1892 with that of 1849, but it is no slight matter that it is asked beyond the Rhine and beyond the Alps what the Sovereign Pontiff will do in case of war. If he openly take sides with France, and sacrifice the Orient to the Russians, he will break, not with Italy alone, but with Austria as well, and perhaps bring about a new schism in the bosom of the Roman Catholic Church. To abandon Roman Catholic interests in Poland, would, for Leo XIII. or his successor, be equivalent to a real desertion. On the other hand, if France, in order to further the interests of the Pope, uphold the rights of Roman Catholicism in the Orient, she will by that step lose the friendship of Russia. The Holy Sepulchre is a ground on which it is difficult for the two Nations to come to an understanding. The good-will of Russia, let us not forget, (and though it comes from Germany, the warning should not be despised), is to be kept exclusively at the price "of unconditional assistance to the Muscovite policy in the Orient." If the old friendship, dynastic and traditional, which united Russia and Prussia, has not stood the test of a Bulgarian outbreak, will the mercenary good-will which Russia now shows towards France be much more lasting, in the event of an occurrence like the Bulgarian incident? 2. To this opposition in the political interests of France and Russia are added the dangers which spring from the economic situation of the Russian people. In the year of the meeting at Cronstadt occurred in France the triumph of the Protectionist party. By instituting a sort of Continental blockade, France gave occasion for the formation of that great Zollverein of central Europe, which is the economic basis of the Triple Alliance. France has forced her old customers, Belgium, Spain and even Switzerland, to join hands with this ZollThe prophets of the party, however, console us for this diminution in our exports, by saying: We have Russia!" Now the Germans prove clearly that Russia cannot become a large buyer from France, first because the country of the Muscovites is far away, next because it is poor, and above all because it has never renounced its economic tendencies, amounting almost to prohibition of imports, verein. 66 even at the time of its greatest intimacy with Germany.' Nevertheless Germany demands, as compensation for lowering the duties on Russian cereals, naught but the reduction of duties on its metals and textile fabrics. France, on the other hand, if she concludes a commercial agreement with Russia, will demand a reduction of duties on French wines. Such a reduction would be the ruin of the vineyards of the Crimea, the Caucasus, and the Don, which are kept alive by protection only. From the difficulties encountered at the present moment in arranging the details of an agreement between the two Empires, it is easy to judge how delicate would be the task of our negotiators. Another proof of this is the failure (from a commercial point of view) of the French Exposition at Moscow. It is needless to say that the very partial success of the Russian loan in France gave, great pleasure in Germany. That "saving people," the French, only half emptied the stockings swollen with louis d'ors in favor of their allies, especially when the frightful Russian famine, in the autumn of 1891, caused doubts about Russia's solvency. This famine was a great triumph for our adversaries, who exaggerated its importance and saw in it, among other things, a revolutionary cataclysm for the Empire of the Czars. In what I have written I have not attempted to point out what seems to me exaggerated or inexact in the opinions expressed in Germany. I have confined myself to explaining certain arguments put forth beyond the Rhine. arguments which seem to me deserving of careful consideration in attempting to estimate the value of the understanding between France and Russia. ΚΕ THE DANISH CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT. Tilskueren, Copenhagen, November. II. LEIN said during the parliamentary debates of the Rigsdag 1885-1886: "We have seen, that there are dangers a misunderstood and misused right to issue Finance Bills without the consent of the people's representatives. This has led to abuses, and has created the notion that the other side may go beyond all reasonable bounds of opposition. A revision of the Constitution is therefore imperative. The difficulties arise at present from a misunderstanding and a misuse of the two paragraphs 25 and 49 as explained before; these must therefore be amended. Both sides, the Government and the Rigsdag, must recognize that they have erred and judged their opponents wrongly, and both must be willing to forgive. If the one party wants security against abuses from the other, it is but right that the latter also should have guaranties for the former's good faith.” The Opposition means to be fair and will act on these principles. The third point of conflict is the composition and election of the Rigsret. It will be necessary to remodel the Constitution, so that not only, as at present, the Folksthing shall have the power to impeach the Ministers, but that both Houses may enjoy that privilege. And the royal prerogative to pardon must be made to depend not only on the Folksthing, but upon that branch of the Rigsdag which raises the complaint. Such a remodeling recommends itself; and is in harmony with the theory of the most recent political and politico-economic doctrines. As it is of greatest consequence to get impartial, independent, and enlightened judges, therefore, it is proposed that no member of the Rigsret for the period of eight years, his term of office, and two years subsequent thereto, shall be promoted to, or removed from, any State office, or shall receive any royal mark of distinction, decoration, etc. It is also proposed, that any member of the Rigsdag chosen to be member of the Rigsret shall loose his seat in the Rigsdag and not be eligible for it for two years after the end of his term in the Rigsret. It shall, of course, be optional with the member whether to accept or refuse such an election, and he shall be properly paid during his term of office. A revision of the Constitution on such lines will remove the worst obstacles and do away with most of the consequences of our unfortunate Dualism. A Ministerial Government, supported by one House alone, will then be impossible, and no Provisional Government can be set up except by a coup de main. THE STRATEGIC SITUATION OF FRANCE IN THE WAR WHICH IS BOUND TO COME. A La Nouvelle Revue, Paris, November 1. STUDY of the events of late years and the examination of the resultant situation in Europe, lead necessarily to the conclusion that war is inevitable in no long time. The questions to be solved by this war are of enormous, indeed of capital, importance for all the States, and justify perfectly the words uttered by Prince Bismarck when his voice was still heard in the German Reichstag, where he said, that if the expected war breaks out, "it will be a ferocious war, a war of destruction, in comparison with which the war of 1870 was but child's play." In this war so near, so formidable in its proportions, and so big with consequences, what will be the strategic problem in France? The data on which the strategic problem of France is based comprise : 1. The geographical situation of Germany, of Austria, and of Italy; the shape of those countries with their national defenses and their artificial system of fortification; their population; their economic means, not only in the narrow sense of the financial situation at a given moment, but in the entire acceptation of that term; the spirit of the Nation and its mode of government; the military organization; the maximum number of troops that each of them can put in the field; finally, the conditions and the rapidity of moving and concentrating their troops. 2. The same data in regard to France and Russia. 3. An answer to the question how, in considering the two data first mentioned, the strategic problem ought to be studied from both sides. Let us take a glance at the first of these data, the geographical: In examining the geographical situation of a State from a strategical point of view, essentially important appears to be the question of how far from the frontiers is its capital, which is the centre and the vital core of governmental life. It is of importance, besides, to examine if this centre can, in case the enemy should get possession of it, be transferred to another town, and be counted among the resources, which, in such a case, would remain to continue the struggle. The occupation of Paris, for example, is not the occupation of the whole country, and more than two-thirds of France could still furnish a new centre with the means of continuing the war, either after the first reverses, or, in case it should be thought desirable to avoid decisive engagements. In this respect, the situation of the Powers belonging to the Triple Alliance appears less favorable than that of France. While, by reason of their central situation, the capitals of those States are considerably further from their frontiers than Paris is from the northern and eastern frontiers of France, nevertheless the continuance of the contest would be nearly impossible for the three Powers, if the capital of either of them were in possession of a victorious enemy. By advancing to the gates of Rome, an enemy would deprive the Italian Kingdom of nearly all its resources for keeping up a war, for the Kingdom of Italy would, in that case, have at its disposal the southern half of the peninsula only, that is to say, a country poor, both in population and economic re sources. As to Austria, which is but a conglomeration of different nationalities each of which has its separate interests, the occupation of Vienna by an enemy would be equivalent to the fall of its Government, if peace were not concluded at the moment of occupation. If the real and concrete centre should disappear, Hungary or Bohemia, even if they had the resources to continue the war, would carry it on each by itself and for itself and not for the abstract idea of the Empire of Austria. This is why the occupation of Vienna by an enemy, and even its approach to that capital, has always been irrevocably for Austria, as military history proves, a signal for the end of the war. Likewise the occupation of Berlin by an enemy would be decisive for the German Empire. The union of the German States reposes, it is true, on the solid base of national unity and a common language, as well as on the conviction that the strength of Germany has no foundation save this union of all. If you observe, however, that the bond which unites the different German States has not yet had time to harden, and that in each State the policy which is thought best to suit its particular interest, without regard to the interests of the other States, is still warmly advocated, you will not doubt that the abandonment to an enemy of Berlin, the real centre of German unity, as a consequence of reverses, would be likely to shatter this unity, and you will have to admit that the prolongation of a war after the capture of the capital of Germany is more than doubtful. In every aspect of the case, what I have just mentioned shows that the German Empire has but slight capacity for a prolonged and obstinate struggle with an enemy on its own territory; and imperatively requires, from the outset of a war, action as rapid and decisive as possible, and consequently, speaking generally, an offensive and not a defensive war. As to what relates to the other geographical conditions of Germany, it may be remarked that the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine has powerfully contributed to strengthen its line of natural defenses, and that this province, with the fortifications which have been erected there, render offensive operations on the part of France very difficult. At the same time, the possession of Strasbourg, and especially of Metz, puts Germany, from a strategic point of view, in the most favorable situation for offensive action against France. In the southeast of France, on the side of Italy, the natural barrier of the Alps increases the defensive strength for both Nations, inasmuch as it hinders offensive movements in general and makes them more than doubtful by armies of any considerable size. Moreover, the topographical conditions are particularly disadvantageous for offensive action on the part of Italy, since the declivities, on its side, are steep and difficult, while on the side of France they are more accessible and more favorable to the march of armies. Thus the geographical conditions, considered among the numerous elements to be taken into consideration in an endeavor to solve the strategic problem for France in the next war, show: (a) That the allied States of Central Europe are not well situated for a defensive, obstinate, and prolonged war, in the sense that the capture of the capital of any of them by an enemy would be decisive against that State. (6) That offensive, rapid, and decisive operations are indispensable for them. (c) That France can more easily than they prolong war, with the chances of being finally victorious, and that, although the invader should approach and even get possession of the capital, provided only that the French forces of the first and second lines be not too much disorganized. Consequently, the geographical data, in connection with the political conditions, are, so far as France is concerned, favorable to a defensive war. SOCIOLOGICAL. THE INSURRECTION OF WOMEN. J. B. BURY. Fortnightly Revue, London, November. II. HE champions of womanhood tremble, lest the romance of love should be banished from life and the world should be peopled with virgins. The world is not so easily turned upside down. The suggestion that the acquisition of political rights will make women careless of love, or indifferent to admiration, or non-sexual, shows only the blind, vague panic which seizes people when anything novel is proposed. The possession of votes will have no tendency to make many maidens "wither on the virgin thorn." Nor will the acquisition of political rights cause a new dwarf to spring up, to prevent their gathering, while they are young, the roses in the blue garden. The truth is that, in their eagerness to portray these alarming results, the champions of womanhood have forgotten what they said themselves about the eternal barriers of sex. That and all it implies will not be overthrown by suffrage and all that suffrage implies. The unchangeable differences between men and women, the unalterable peculiarities of a woman's organism-on which they so strongly insist-are an answer to their alarm that women will be converted into the likeness of inferior men. The same predictions and criticisms were made as to the effect of "higher education" and university life on women. It was foretold that the introduction of such a system would unsex women and make them into sham men. But it has done nothing of the kind; nature is too strong. And many of the opponents of women's suffrage are now supporters of women's education. We are threatened that the elevation of women to be the political peers of men will be a step to all sort of shocking license, possibly to the abolition of marriage and a state of communism. We are asked to believe that if women get votes their nature will, by some magic influence, which the vote certainly does exercise on men, be so strangely changed that they will strive to abolish an institution to which they are well known, as a class, to be devoted. The ordinary husband seems to feel that there is in a vote something uncanny which will come out as soon as it is wielded by a woman, something which would make his wife immediately take to smoking a pipe, indulge in "long" drinks at American bars, talk in mixed company on impossible subjects, or become the protectrice of some diva d'opérette. It is solemnly urged that political equality would mean the destruction of "the womanly ideals." Women would no longer be able to fulfill their "mission." They would cease to play the role of "ministering angels" or "gentle counsellors," who heal the wounds of humanity and refine and reform la bête humaine. And if a man cannot resist the temptation to mock at this high-sounding phraseology, he is called a cynic; and if a woman cannot help smiling at such disgusting bêtises, she is said to be unsexed. It is whispered that, worst of all, "the mystery of womanhood" would be desecrated. The male champion of "true women is usually more ardent in their cause than they are themselves; and the insurgents see the trivial text within the Psalter binding. They suspect that the motive which stirs him to such righteous indignation, such chivalrous devotion, is a secret fear that any change in the position of women would interfere with that sacred duty of wifely subjection which is so convenient, and the domestic comforts which are so agreeable, for the male sex; and that the faintest scent of danger in the distance has aroused those extravagant and grotesque apprehensions which we have been admiringly considering. Enough has been said respecting these objections urged indiscriminately against the liberation of women from their legal disabilities in regard to politics, and from their practical disabilities in regard to "male professions." We now come to an argument of far greater importance, touching the point on which, it seems to me, the whole question turns. This argument has been implied in some of those already discussed, and involves the same fallacy; but it lifts the controversy above the market place, and displays some sense of a main, an ecumenical issue. It is urged that the elevation or debasement of women to the condition of citizens possessing political rights would be a step toward uniformity, and would tend to diminish the variety of human types by assimilation of the sexes. Nothing could be more deplorable than a measure which would tend to arrest the development of individuality. But the contention denounces itself, even at the first glance, as absurd. The answer is the strength of the barrier of sex. The perpetual, insuperable, unassailable differences, organic and functional, biological and psychological, between men and women, are just the safeguards which may enable men, without scruple or apprehension, to make women their political peers. Women may safely be relieved from their political disabilities simply because they can never become men. Sex, set by nature between the two divisions of humanity, excludes uniformity. One fails to discern how Portia will become indistinguishable from Brutus because she has a seat in the Senate. The adversaries of women's suffrage, who at first tried to make it appear that sex is extravagantly strong, suddenly turn round and try to make it appear that sex is extravagantly weak. Looking at the matter without prejudice, the probable effect of women's suffrage would appear to be exactly opposite to that predicted by its opponents. Instead of producing uniformity, it would tend to produce greater variety of individu |