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leans was 70 cents per 100 pounds. Established inland rate was $1.80. Held, that inland proportion of the through rate could not lawfully be less than corresponding inland rate.-New York Bd. of Trade v. Pennsylvania Rd. Co. et al., (1891) 4 I. C. C. R. 447, 3 I. C. R. 417; order of Commission enforced, I. C. C. v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 52 Fed. Rep. 187, 57 Fed. Rep. 948; decree of lower courts reversed, Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. I. C. C., 162 U. S. 197, 16 Sup. Ct. R. 666, 40 L. Ed. 940.

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Lincoln, Kan., to Denver, Colo.

which the rate should be 26 cents; the third group to include stations between 100 and 190 miles from the terminal, from which the rate should be 29 cents; the fourth group to include all stations beyond 190 miles from the terminal, from which the rate should be 32 cents.-Milk Producers' Assn. v. Delaware, L. & W. Rd. Co. et al., (1897) 7 I. C. C. R. 92; Brockway_v. Ulster & D. Rd. Co. et al., (1898) 8 I. C. C. R. 21.

CABBAGE.

See "Perishable freight."

Charleston, S. C., to New York, N. Y.

1. Rate was 61 cents per barrel. Same rate was charged on potatoes. Held, that rate on cabbage should be one-fourth less than that on potatoes, or 46 cents per barrel.-Truck Farmers' Assn. v. Northeastern Rd. Co. et al., (1895) 6 I. C. C. R. 295; petition to enforce order of Commission denied, I. C. C. v. Northeastern Rd. Co., 74 Fed. Rep. 70, 83 Fed. Rep. 611.

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1. Proportion of through rate received 2. Rate on, in less than carloads, was by inland carrier for haul from New Or$1.25 per 100 pounds. Held, that the rate leans was 70 cents per 100 pounds. Estabwas not shown to be unreasonable.-Lin-lished inland rate was $1.25. Held, that coln Creamery v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., (1892) 5 I. C. C. R. 156, 3 I. C. R. 794.

BUTTERMILK.

Jersey City, N. J.,-Group rate.

1. Rate of 32 cents per 100 pounds from various stations in New York and Pennsylvania to Jersey City, held unlaw

ful; that at least four divisions of stations should be established, the first group to include stations within 40 miles from the New Jersey terminal, from which stations the rate should be 23 cents; the second group to include stations between 40 and 100 miles from such terminal, from

inland proportion of the through rate could not lawfully be less than corresponding inland rate.-New York Bd. of Trade v. Pennsylvania Rd. Co. et al., (1891) 4 I. C. C. R. 447, 3 I. C. R. 417; order of Commission enforced, I. C. C. 57 Fed. Rep. 948; decree of lower courts v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 52 Fed. Rep. 187, reversed, Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. I. C. C., 162 U. S. 197, 16 Sup. Ct. R. 666, 40 L. Ed.

940.

CANNED GOODS.

Dallas, Tex., from New Orleans, La.

1. Rate of 47 cents per 100 pounds, held not unlawful as compared with rate

of 35 cents from same point through Dallas to Kansas City, Mo.-Dallas Freight Bureau v. Texas & P. Ry. Co. et al., (1898) 8 L. C. C. R. 33.

Helena, Ga., from Cincinnati, O.

2. Carload rate of 58 cents per 100 pounds, held unreasonable; that such rate ought not to exceed rate of 56 cents from same point to Fitzgerald, Ga.-Davenport v. Southern Ry. Co. et al., (1906) 11 I. C. C. R. 650.

Helena, Ga., from Memphis, Tenn.

3. Carload rate of 54 cents per 100 pounds, held unreasonable; that such rate ought not to exceed rate of 52 cents from same point to Fitzgerald, Ga.-Davenport v. Southern Ry. Co. et al., (1906) 11 I. C. C. R. 650.

McRae, Ga., from Cincinnati, O.

4. Carload rate of 68 cents per 100 pounds, held unreasonable; that such rate ought not to exceed rate of 56 cents from same point to Fitzgerald, Ga.-Davenport v. Southern Ry. Co. et al., (1906) 11 I. C. C. R. 650.

McRae, Ga., from Memphis, Tenn.

5. Carload rate of 64 cents per 100 pounds, held unreasonable; that such rate ought not to exceed rate of 52 cents from same point to Fitzgerald, Ga.-Davenport v. Southern Ry. Co. et al., (1906) 11 I. C. C. R. 650.

CAPITAL ACCOUNT.

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DUTY OF CARRIER IN GENERAL, 1-5.
DIFFICULTY OF APPLYING FIXED
RULES, 6.

REASONABLE RULE OF DISTRIBUTION

AFFORDS NO JUST CAUSE FOR COM-
PLAINT, 7.

AGENT, CARRIER BOUND BY ACTS OR
REPRESENTATIONS OF, 8.
REGULAR CUSTOMERS OF

CARRIER.
PREFERENCE IN FAVOR OF, 9, 10.

REFUSAL OF SHIPPER TO ACCEPT CARS
BECAUSE OF ACCRUED CLAIM FOR
GRAIN ELEVATOR, DISCRIMINATION IN
DAMAGES, 11.
FAVOR OF, 12, 13.

SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF DISCRIMINA-
TION, 14-16.

Duty of carrier in general.

1. Every shipper is legally entitled to fair opportunity and treatment in the use of cars, and any discrimination which

As basis by which to readjust rates, see in substantial degree deprives shippers of "Rates,' 213.

CAR CLEARING HOUSE.

As remedy for car shortage, see "Car shortage."

CAR COMPANY.

Cars owned by, see "Cars," 24-31.
Not entitled to equal facilities for inter-
change of traffic, see "Carriers,'' 53.

CAR DISTRIBUTION.

IN GENERAL, 1-16.

JURISDICTION OF COMMISSION,
17, 18.

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RATING OF MINES, 24-27.

EMBARGO, 19, 20.

such use must be considered unjust, unless forced by justifying conditions.-Richmond Elevator Co. v. Pere Marquette R. Co., (1905) 10 I. C. C. R. 629.

2. It is the duty of a common carrier to provide adequate equipment for the business of its line; and if in time of special pressure some one must wait for cars, the annoyance must be distributed with all possible equality among all its customers.-Riddle, D. & Co. v. New York, L. E. & W. Rd. Co., (1888) 1 I. C. C. R. 594, 1 I. C. R. 787.

3. Where a carrier, by reason of causes beyond its control, is unable to furnish sufficient cars to accommodate all shippers along its line, it should endeavor to furnish what cars it has to all shippers in proportion to their shipments, upon a basis that is relatively and substantially

CONTRACTS RELATING TO DISTRI- just.-Riddle, D. & Co. v. Pittsburg & L.

BUTION, 21-23.

E. Rd. Co., (1888) 1 I. C. C. R. 374, 1 I.
C. R. 688.

4. It is the duty of a railroad company, | customers in the matter of distribution of in effecting coal-car distribution among cars.- -Riddle, D. & Co. v. N. Y., L. E. & mines located on and shipping coal over W. Rd. Co., (1888) 1 I. C. C. R. 594, 1 I. its line, not to discriminate or show any C. R. 787. undue favoritism.-United States v. West

Virginia N. R. Co. et al., (1903) 125 Fed.
Rep. 252; affirmed, 134 Fed. Rep. 198, 67
C. C. A. 220.

Refusal of shipper to accept cars because

of accrued claim for damages. 11. Where damages have accrued to a shipper because of discrimination in furnishing cars, such shipper has no right to demand a settlement of the claim as a condition precedent to the acceptance of cars tendered by the carrier in the regular course of business.-Gallogly & Firestine v. Cincinnati, H. & D. Ry. Co., (1905) 11 I. C. C. R. 1.

5. While the capacity of a shipper of coal may be greater than his allotment of cars, yet, where such is also the case with every other shipper similarly situated in the coal field, it is the duty of the railroad company, where the supply of coal cars is short, to prorate the supply on hand, without unjust discrimination, among all the shippers, including the ship-Grain elevator, discrimination in favor of. per in question.-United States v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., (1901) 109 Fed. Rep. 831.

Difficulty of applying fixed rules.

6. No exact rule can be laid down to govern the general distribution of cars between different localities and different species of traffic. Shippers must be reasonable in their demands and carriers diligent and honest in meeting those demands. In times of temporary car famine the carrier can only be required to do its best and to treat its patrons without undue preference. Hawkins v. Wheeling & L. E. Rd. Co., (1902) 9 I. C. C. R. 212.

Reasonable rule of distribution affords no just cause for complaint.

7. If a system of coal-car distribution applied by a railroad company in a given field is, under the circumstances and conditions peculiar to that field, a reasonable one, and fair to all, and is applied to all alike, no shipper has just cause for complaint.-United States v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., (1901) 109 Fed. Rep. 831.

Agent, carrier bound by acts or represen

tations of.

8. A carrier is bound by what its representative at a particular station says and does in the business of furnishing cars.Gallogly & Firestine v. Cincinnati, H. & D. Ry. Co., (1905) 11 I. C. C. R. 1.

Regular customers of carrier, preference in favor of.

9. It is unlawful ror a common carrier to refuse a shipment upon the ground that regular patrons desire to use all the facilities at hand, and to appropriate to the uses of the latter its entire available equipment.-Riddle, D. & Co. v. New York, L. E. & W. Rd. Co., (1888) 1 I. C. C. R. 594, 1 I. C. R. 787.

10. Regular customers of a carrier are entitled to no preference over occasional

12. With all the advantages which an elevator may prove as a home market to the community, and which may accrue to the railroad company from a large and constant shipper, it does not justify the agents of the line in so favoring such an establishment in the matter of facilities of transportation as to practically put other shippers out of business.-Eaton v. Cincinnati, H. & D. Ry. Co., (1906) 11 I. C. C.

R. 619.

13. The fact that an elevator company is at greater expense than a track shipper, and has its produce at all times in sight, cannot justify a railroad company in so distributing its cars as to practically put such track shipper out of business.-Eaton v. Cincinnati, H. & D. Ry. Co., (1906) 11 I. C. C. R. 619.

Specific instances of discrimination.

14. Defendant refused to furnish complainants with cars in which to ship grain from Leipsic, Ohio, to points in other states, while at the same time it furnished cars for like shipments to complainants' competitors. Held, that such refusal constituted unjust discrimination.-Gallogly & Firestine v. Cincinnati, H. & D. Ry. Co., (1905) 11 I. C. C. R. 1.

15. Defendant refused to furnish complainants with cars for shipment of coal while at the same time it furnished cars to complainants' competitors. Held, that such refusal subjected complainants to undue prejudice and disadvantage in violation of section 3 of the Act.-Glade Coal Co. v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co., (1904) 10 I. C. C. R. 226.

16. Between Dec. 16, 1902, and April 6, 1903, defendant refused to furnish complainant with cars for the shipment of cross ties, although, during such time, it furnished cars to other persons for the shipment of lumber, stone and many other articles of freight. It also supplied cars

in which cross ties were carried for its an embargo; and if through neglect to own use. Held, that such refusal was un- secure such information the shipper fails lawful under section 3 of the Act.-Paxton to obtain cars while cars are being furTie Co. v. Detroit Southern Rd. Co., (1905)|nished to other shippers who have obtained 10 I. C. C. R. 422. information, the carrier cannot be charged with unjust discrimination.—Riddle, D. & II. JURISDICTION OF COMMISSION. Co. v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co., (1888) 1 Authority to prohibit unjust discrimina- I. C. C. R. 608, 1 I. C. R. 778.

tion.

IV. CONTRACTS RELATING TO DIS

TRIBUTION.

17. While the Commission has no authority to require a carrier to furnish ears, it has authority to prohibit carriers Agreement that extra number of cars be from wrongfully discriminating between shippers in furnishing cars for transportation of interstate traffic.-Red Rock Fuel Co. v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co., (1905) 11 I. C. C. R. 438.

Authority to prescribe rule of distribution for future.

18. Section 3 of the Act prohibits the making or giving of any "undue or unreasonable preference or advantage. Section 15 of the Aet authorizes the Commission to determine and prescribe "what regulation or practice in respect to such transportation is just, fair and reasonable to be thereafter followed." Held, that the Commission had the power not only to deal with a complaint alleging unjust discrimination in the distribution of coal ears, but to prescribe for the future what rule should be followed in the distribution of such cars.-Railroad Com. of Ohio v. Wheeling & L. E. Rd. Co., (1907) 12 I. C. C. R. 398.

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19. Complainant alleged that defendant refused to furnish him with cars for shipment of grain from Holland, Ohio, while at the same time it furnished more than a fair proportion to complainant's competitor. The latter shipped largely to local points. Complainant desired to ship over eastern lines which, because of car short age, had established an embargo on grain. Held, that complainant was not subjected to unjust discrimination.-Parks v. Cincinnati & M. V. Rd. Co., (1904) 10 I. C. C.

allotted one mine in consideration that same rate be extended to more distant mine.

21. Because of physical conditions the cost of transporting coal from a particular coal field to points on the Atlantic coast was greater than the cost of transporting coal from an intermediate coal field to the same points. In order to equalize the advantage enjoyed by the intermediate field, the operators therein agreed that the rate from that field could be applied to the other field, provided they were allotted an The operators additional number of cars. of both fields agreed with the railroad company that 1500 cars should be so Held, that an operator in the allotted. field not sharing in the extra allotment was not thereby subjected to unjust discrimination.-United States v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., (1901) 109 Fed. Rep. 831. Agreement for particular method of distribution as bar to mandamus proceeding.

22. A railroad company contracted with certain coal operators along its line that the car supply furnished by it would be distributed pro rata, each shipper to receive that proportion of the total number of cars which the number of coke ovens

operated by him bore to the number mandamus, under section 23 of the Act, operated by all. On petition for writ of alleging that the railroad company was not distributing its cars in accordance with its contract, and that such action constituted discrimination, held, that the suit, in effect, was a proceeding to compel the performance of a private contract; that mandamus would not lie for the en forcement of mere private contractual obligations.-United States v. Norfolk & W. Duty of shipper to inform self as to end- Ry. Co., (1905) 138 Fed. Rep. 849; reing of embargo.

R. 47.

20. In the absence of a custom or course of business on the part of a carrier to notify shippers of the ending of embargoes upon its line, it is the duty of a shipper to inform himself as to ending of

versed, 143 Fed. Rep. 266.

23. A railroad company contracted with certain coal operators along its line that the coal-car supply furnished by it should be distributed pro rata, each operator to receive that proportion of the total num

it should appear that the tipple had suffered injury, or had been destroyed, the presumption would be that it would be repaired or replaced immediately, and the mine should be rated as if the tipple were intact.-United States v. West Virginia N. Rd. Co. et al., (1903) 125 Fed Rep. 252, 255; affirmed, 134 Fed. Rep. 198, 67 C. C.

ber of cars which the number of coke
ovens operated by him bore to the num-
ber operated by all. Held, that the agree-
ment was but an expression of opinion as
to what the parties considered an equi-
table distribution of cars; that the railroad
company was still required to so distribute
its cars as not to give any undue or un-
reasonable preference or advantage.-A. 220.
United States v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co.,
(1906) 143 Fed. Rep. 266, reversing 138
Fed. Rep. 849.

V. RATING OF MINES.
ELEMENTS TO BE CONSIDERED, 24.
CAPACITY OF MINE DEFINED, 25.
PRESUMPTION THAT DAMAGED TIPPLE
WILL BE REPAIRED OR REPLACED, 26.
PARTICULAR METHODS EMPLOYED, 27.
Elements to be considered.

Particular methods employed.

27. The rating of mines on defendant's line in the Fairmont district, W. Va., for coal-car distribution in times of car shortage, was computed about once a year. The actual coal shipment of each mine was taken from its shipments in the summer season when a full supply of cars was at hand, and when, if it had orders, it could, so far as car supply was concerned, 24. In reaching a basis for just distri- ship its full capacity. The shipments bebution of coal cars among mines located ing thus ascertained, defendant's inspector on and shipping coal over the line of a next ascertained by actual examination railroad company, it is necessary that an the physical capacity of the mine-that is, impartial and intelligent study of the the number of working places for miners, capacity of the different mines be made the capacity of its tipple, the sufficiency by competent and disinterested experts, of its appliances-and from these were whose duty it should be to examine the estimated what the possible output of the elements which determine the daily out- mine would be, if it could sell its whole put of the respective mines to share in output and was furnished with cars suffithe allotment. This involves an examina- cient to ship it. The actual shipments betion of the working places, the number of ing thus ascertained and the possible mine cars and their capacity, the switch capacity thus estimated, the rating was and tipple efficiency, the number and char-arrived at by an average, counting the acter of the mining machines in use, the hauling system and the power used, the number of miners and other employes, the mine openings, and the miners' houses. In examining the working places, consideration should be given to the thickness of the seam and other conditions peculiar to the different coal fields.-United States v. West Virginia N. Rd. Co. et al., (1903) 125 Fed. Rep. 252; affirmed, 134 Fed. Rep. 198, 67 C. C. A. 220.

Capacity of mine defined.

25. The capacity of a coal mine for purposes of car distribution is the amount of coal it is able to place in the railroad cars in a given time; and this will depend on its working places, the thickness of its coal seams, its switches, workmen, mine cars, and tipples, its general equipment, and its management.-United States v. West Virginia N. Rd. Co. et al., (1903) 125 Fed. Rep. 252, 256; affirmed, 134 Fed. Rep. 198, 67 C. C. A. 220.

Presumption that damaged tipple will be repaired or replaced.

26. If, during an inspection of a mine for the purpose of reaching a basis for coal-car distribution among several mines,

actual shipments as two units and the possible capacity as one. Complaint was made that this was unfair, in that actual shipments were given too great importance and the possible capacity of the mine too little, to the injury of new mines and to the advantage of those long established. Held, that no unfairness was apparent in the method of rating complained of.United States ex rel. Pitcairn Coal Co. v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., (1907) 154 Fed. Rep. 108.

VI. RULES OF DISTRIBUTION. APPORTIONMENT BASED ON THE ORDER ARBITRARY ALLOTMENT TO NEW AND

IN WHICH SHIPPERS APPLY, 28.

UNDEVELOPED MINES. 29.

ADDITIONAL ALLOTMENT TO ENCOUR-
AGE PROMPT UNLOADING, 30.
METHOD OF LOADING BY SHIPPER
GROUND FOR REFUSAL TO FURNISH
CARS, 31.

AS

WHEN REFUSAL JUSTIFIED, 32. DISTRIBUTION OF PRIVATE OR INDIVIDUAL CARS. FOREIGN-RAILWAY FUEL CARS, AND SYSTEM FUEL CARS IN GENERAL, 33, 34.

INDIVIDUAL CARS, 35, 36.

CONSUMERS' INDIVIDUAL CARS, 87.
RAILWAY FUEL CARS, 38-40.

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