Solidarity Organization over which Peking hoped to win control. The Conference also established, as a subordinate body to the TriContinent Solidarity organization, a liberation committee with the expressed purpose of encouraging and giving all the necessary aid to national liberation movements, "particularly those in arms against imperialism."

The 27 Latin American Communist delegates to the Conference remained in Havana following the formal conclusion of the TriContinent Conference and unanimously agreed on the establishment of a Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO) with objects similar to those of the liberation committee mentioned above.

From even these brief extracts it is clear that the Conference constituted, among other things, a gross intervention into the internal affairs of this hemisphere. Those countries singled out as special targets were, understandably, particularly outraged and took the initiative in the OAS which resulted in the COAS resolution of February 2, condemning the Tri-Continent Conference for its aggressive and interventionist acts and resolutions.

Subsequently, the Latin American representatives in the U.N., as well as several Latin American governments on an individual basis, have condemned the Conference on the same grounds. Castro may well believe that the results of the Conference were favorable to him. We believe to the contrary: that his brazen, arrogant call for subversion and violent revolution has driven home to the free peoples of the hemisphere as never before the true nature of the CastroCommunist goals.

It may be argued that much of the Conference's stress on armed struggle and the violent overthrow of duly established governments was due to Soviet-Chicom competition within the Conference forum; in other words, that the deeds of the Soviets and of the Cubans will not match their words. This may be, though certainly not from any lack of desire on their parts to achieve the goals outlined in Havana. But, from a foreign policy viewpoint, we believe it must be assumed that there is some substance behind their words. The OAS countries are alert and prepared to counter any increased subversive efforts.

Chairman KENNEDY. You went into the conditions in Cuba that are leading many Cubans to leave, and I gather from your testimony that this is going to continue. You say, "Continue for the foreseeable future." Can you elaborate on that?

Mr. SAYRE. Mr. Chairman, I was in Cuba myself in the American Embassy in 1960, and at that time-rather, in 1959, and before Castro came into power-Cuba had one of the most prosperous economies in the hemisphere. It had one of the highest rates of literacy in the hemisphere. From the time Castro came to power the Cuban economy has gone downward, and there has been no perceptible improvement in the economy.

After 6 years of assistance from the Soviet Union at the rate of a million dollars a day, the Cuban economy still is not back to the level of economic productivity that it was in 1959.

Chairman KENNEDY. On that point-there has been a significant downward trend-this isn't being changed much?

Mr. SAYRE. I don't think the turnaround has been significant, and the Cuban economy is utterly dependent on economic assistance from the Soviet Union.

Chairman KENNEDY. What is the cost of sugar?

Mr. SAYRE. They are trying to maintain the world price of sugar at 22 cents per pound, probably, slightly more than the cost of production of sugar in Cuba because it is a natural product. We do not have figures on the actual cost of production of sugar in Cuba. Cuba has agreements with the Soviet Union which provide for a higher price of sugar-6 cents on the deliveries to the Soviet Union, but it is not clear that Cuba gets 6 cents because in the management of the economy the Soviet Union adjusts the price of products sent to Cuba to help compensate for the higher price of Cuban sugar.

Chairman KENNEDY. Can you give us any idea about the GNP of Cuba over the last 4 or 5 years? How it has fluctuated?

Mr. STEVENSON. I have seen estimates recently that there has been a rate of growth last year of 2 percent, but it is difficult to estimate. Chairman KENNEDY. I don't see why. I visited in Hong Kong and got estimates on Communist China. You people must have some close estimation on what has been happening in Cuba. We have it in regard to every other country in the world. We must have that kind of information. That is basic to some of the assumptions we are making about the internal situation.

Mr. STEVENSON. Our best estimate is 2 percent for 1965.
Chairman KENNEDY. What is the GNP?

Mr. STEVENSON. About $700 million.

Chairman KENNEDY. The gross national product?

Mr. STEVENSON. I'm sorry, that is the total trade. I would have to check that.

Mr. SAYRE. We can supply that figure for the record, Mr. Chairman (see appendix, exhibit 2).

Chairman KENNEDY. There are a number of different airlines flying into Cuba, is that correct?

Mr. SAYRE. Yes, sir.

Chairman KENNEDY. And one of the principal airlines that takes refugees out is the Spanish airline; is that correct?

Mr. STEVENSON. Iberia Airline is making one flight a week.

Chairman KENNEDY. What are the other airlines that are transporting refugees out of Cuba, and what is the volume of movement? Mr. STEVENSON. The Iberia Airline-once a week-on DC-8 jets. This has only been going on for a month.

Chairman KENNEDY. You are not suggesting, are you, that they have just been carrying out refugees?

Mr. STEVENSON. They have been carrying out recently something over a hundred passengers per week on the jets, mostly refugees. The other movement is by Cubana Airline to Mexico City and they have been running 2 flights a week, erratically, carrying out perhaps 100 refugees per week. It varies. Those are the only other flights other than the Refugee Airlift, which we operate.

Chairman KENNEDY. Can you give us some idea of the number of refugees that have gone into Spain and Central America? I would be interested in the last 2 years.

Mr. STEVENSON. I would think it was somewhere in the neighborhood of 500 per month who went to Spain in 1965-about 6,000 over the past 2 years. There are certainly 20,000 to 35,000 Cuban refugees in Spain at this time-many being Spanish citizens.

Chairman KENNEDY. Is Spain about the only European country receiving them?

Mr. STEVENSON. Yes.

Chairman KENNEDY. What is your estimate of refugees who have gone to Mexico?

Mr. STEVENSON. We did some calculations on that figure last year and it was running 300 a month to Mexico. Roughly, 3,000 per year. The overall average before the refugee airlift started was 900 a month moving to the United States from Spain and Mexico.

Chairman KENNEDY. Have you any idea as to how many stay in Mexico and how many go down to the other Central American countries?

Mr. STEVENSON. Most of them who have gone to Mexico in the last couple of years have come on to the United States. Very few have gone to other countries in Latin America and Ceneral America. Most of the North and South American countries have groups of Cuban exiles.

Chairman KENNEDY. What is the attitude of these countries on receiving these refugees?

Mr. STEVENSON. Recently, when we were arranging for the airlift, we asked the Council of the Organization of American States to consider the possibility of cooperating in this endeavor on two occasions. We have had one response from Costa Rica. Working through the Swiss Ambassador in Havana we were able to arrange for a flight of 106 persons. There are 400 to 500 Cuban exiles in Costa Rica. We are working with two other countries now who have shown an interest in similar arrangements, and we hope soon to arrange two more movements. I would estimate that several thousand, perhaps, can be moved.

Chairman KENNEDY. What kind of security measures are taken, if any, either by us or by the Organization of American States, in reviewing the background of refugees who leave Cuba?

Mr. SAYRE. Mr. Chairman, I believe I can supply you with information that will explain the whole procedure to you.

Chairman KENNEDY. In the memorandum of understanding-are there any considerations in regard to political prisioners?

Mr. SAYRE. Mr. Chairman, we were interested in basically two categories of persons coming out of Cuba. The first category was the one you mentioned in your statement, and we thoroughly agree with you on this-reunited families. The second one is the one you expressed a strong interest in-political prisoners.

We proposed to the Cuban Government that political prisoners get second priority status and that they be permitted to depart.

Chairman KENNEDY. Do you have an estimate on the number of political prisoners?

Mr. STEVENSON. Our estimates run from 18,000 to 30,000. I might add that we are trying to compile an index of the political prisoners in Miami in hopes that we might be able to crack the problem someday.

Mr. SAYRE. We continue to hope that the Castro regime will permit the second category of people to come to the United States. We are prepared to go ahead with an arrangement on that if he does agree, but he was not willing to put it in the memorandum of understanding, and we could not reach an agreement with him on this subject.

Chairman KENNEDY. What efforts are we making at the present time?

Mr. SAYRE. At the present moment we are not taking any initiative through the Swiss Embassy in Havana to make such an arrangement because the Castro regime has made quite clear to us that it will not agree to it.

Chairman KENNEDY. Did they give any reasons?

Mr. STEVENS. Essentially their position is that these people are not political prisoners but counterrevolutionaries, and by this definition they don't see any reason from their point of view that they should be given any special consideration.

I might say that the Swiss Ambassador in Havana is very much interested in this problem and is alert to making any approach that he can to push it.

Chairman KENNEDY. What has been the role of the Red Cross in these negotiations?

Mr. STEVENSON. We tried to suggest to them that the International Committee of the Red Cross would be a good agency for handling this whole refugee movement, but the Cuban Government said they did not wish it.

Chairman KENNEDY. You made a general comment in your testimony with regard to the present attitude of the Cuban Government as being

Mr. SAYRE. The present attitude of the Cuban Government?

Chairman KENNEDY. With respect to developing a list of people permitted to leave.

Mr. SAYRE. They have carried out all of the provisions of the understanding, and there has been no major difficulty on carrying out the precise provisions of the understanding that I am aware of.

Chairman KENNEDY. Do you know how they develop their list? Mr. STEVENSON. They receive applications and process them. There is no special system. The word is out, and if you want to leave you apply to the Department of Immigration down there.

Chairman KENNEDY. What is the timelag between submitting an application and departure?

Mr. STEVENSON. It varies. Some people have applied and got out quite readily, and others have applied early in the game and are still waiting. There is a fallout for which we have no explanation. Of course, in the beginning it was perhaps a month to 6 weeks. I think less than that. In the beginning perhaps 3 weeks to a month. Now it keeps getting longer-probably 6 weeks to 2 months. We don't know who has applied until they actually give us the list.

Chairman KENNEDY. From your conversations with the refugees who are coming to this country, would you give us some kind of profile on these people?

Mr. STEVENSON. By age group? Of course. compiled by the Cuban Refugee Center in Miami.

These figures were
Thirty-one percent.

I am glad to note that, in contrast to a predecessor bill which enumerated the crimes for which a state could wiretap and did not include gambling or larceny by use of the telephone, your proposed bill leaves it to the states to determine the crimes as to which interception or wire communication is authorized. Also, I am of the opinion that a Police Commissioner of a city having a certain minimum population should have the authority to make an application for a wiretap order. However, I would not regard it as a fatal defect if the police could obtain such assistance not only through the office of the local prosecutor but also through the office of the Attorney General or the Governor.

I believe the views which I expressed in my testimony before the Senate are applicable to a discussion of your present bill. For that reason, I do not feel that another personal appearance by me would serve any useful purpose at this time.

I enclose herein comments-some quite brief-with respect to the other bills which you sent me:

SENATE 2578

Subdivision (a) of this bill, applicable to federal prosecutions, provides that a confession otherwise admissible in evidence shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay in arraignment. It thus eliminates the McNabb-Mallory rule, which barred use of confessions obtained after undue delay in arraignment, even if voluntary. Since the McNabb-Mallory rule was based on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, not on any constitutional provision, and was held not to apply to the states, a statute eliminating the rule would have no direct effect on the states.

Subdivision (b) provides that a confession given by a person in custody after interrogation by a law enforcement officer may not be used in evidence unless he was "(1) informed of the nature of the offense which he was believed to have committed. (2) advised that he was not required to make or give any statement and that any statement made or given by him during or after such interrogation might be used against him, and (3) accorded reasonable opportunity to retain and to consult with counsel."

It is not clear whether the subdivision is intended to apply only to federal prosecutions or to state prosecutions as well. Generally, statutory provisions regulating the conduct of trials in federal courts have not applied to the states (and it is questionable whether Congress would have the authority to impose a limitation on the states' use of confessions unless such limitation is required by the due process clause), but since subdivision (a) of the proposed statute is specifically limited to "prosecutions brought by United States or by the District of Columbia," and subdivision (b) is not so limited, some ambiguity exists. Even if my doubts as to its application are unfounded, I am concerned that if this bill should be enacted, a pattern would be created which might be adopted by the various states including New York. These requirements would be unduly obstructive of law enforcement.

SENATE 2187

This bill makes it a felony for anyone to knowingly and willfully become or remain a member of the Mafia or of "any other organization having for one of its purposes the use of any interstate commerce facility in the commission of acts which are in violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any State, relating to gambling, extortion, blackmail, narcotics, prostitution, or labor racketeering."

The statute lists a number of factors, which may be considered by the jury, such as prior conviction for one of the enumerated crimes, financial contribution to the organization, gifts, loans, or providing bail bonds to a member of such organization, carrying out instructions from a member of the organization to do an act violative of state or federal criminal laws, or attending a meeting of the organization.

The obvious aim of the statute, to provide a basis for attack on organized crime by permitting the apprehension and imprisonment of persons involved in organized crime even if their guilt of a specific crime cannot be shown is laudatory. It is questionable, however, whether sufficient evidence to establish violation of the statute could be adduced in the absence of a showing that another crime had been committed.

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