nized crime, would be much aided by an interception authority. I am not that sure of the narcotics enforcement. It might be that they would be aided.

As the chairman probably knows, neither Narcotics nor Revenue have had the authority to intercept since approximately 1940. There has been a general prohibition against it in fairly clear terms so that we don't have any experience of our own to compare with the situation under this bill.

If State enforcement people think that it is a valuable tool, then I should see great advantages in providing that authority in the certain classes of the type that were discussed by them.

Senator MCCLELLAN. It seems to make sense when all State law enforcement officials-there might be an exception here and therebut overall they do, approve of such a bill and feel that such a tool would be quite useful to them.

Mr. ACHESON. That is right.

Senator MCCLELLAN. I assume, then, what you are saying is, you agree with the Attorney General, with proper guidelines and the proper safeguards?

Mr. ACHESON. That's right.

Senator MCCLELLAN. You think this very well might be worthy of enactment and would be not so much necessarily so in Federal law enforcement, but in law enforcement throughout the country, that it would be a substantial aid?

Mr. ACHESON. I think that's right, Mr. Chairman.

In the earlier hearings on the predecessor bill, I recall that Frank Hogan, the district attorney of New York County testified pretty extensively.

Senator MCCLELLAN. We expect to hear him in the course of these hearings.

Mr. ACHESON. As I recall it, most of the examples of cases that were made through information gained from wiretaps were narcotic cases, and I point that out only to say that perhaps in the Federal narcotics area the Federal Government might get more out of the authority than the Revenue Service would. But that is only a guess.

Senator MCCLELLAN. That would be useful. If it works, it would be useful. If it were passed, it would be useful to your Department? Mr. ACHESON. That's right, Mr. Chairman.

Now, on the Mallory bill, I don't have very much to add to the Attorney General's statement. I do think that the critics of police practices in this area, and I must say some of the enforcement people themselves, have made a mistake in arguing the case for or against the Mallory bill. There is a tendency to say that the crime rate would be changed in some significant way if the rule were changed.

Now, to me, I think it is important to alter some of the extreme interpretations of the Mallory rule to permit questioning after arrest. I say that because I think it is an important enforcement tool, an important tool in solving cases and preparing prosecutions.

Senator MCCLELLAN. You have been a district attorney.

Mr. ACHESON. That's right.

Senator MCCLELLAN. You have had the experience. Would you say, from your experience and overall general knowledge and observation, that often the interrogation after arrest actually benefits the

person arrested, if he is innocent? He is frequently able to clear up his case without formal charges being made against him.

Mr. ACHESON. That is absolutely right, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MCCLELLAN. In other words, if you were denied the right to interrogate, you would have a serious obstruction to law enforcement and to detection of crime, would you not?

Mr. ACHESON. That's right, no question about it.

Senator MCCLELLAN. As a result of such an obstruction, the innocent would often suffer.

Mr. ACHESON. I think both the public would suffer where the crime was not solved and the innocent would suffer because the charge was made prematurely.

Senator MCCLELLAN. Throughout the history of civilization, the practice of questioning people whom we take into custody, or before they are taken into custody-people who have been suspected of crimein questioning in the course of the investigation to ferret out the guilty party, and the method of questioning these practices stem from time immemorial. I cannot go along with this idea that you cannot question people and, if a suspect happens to make a statement that is self-incriminating, it cannot be used against him. It just does not make sense to me. I have had a little experience as a prosecuting attorney and I know that you may have a suspect, whom you think is a suspect. You question him, and you know very well, then you may find you have simply got the wrong man. Whereas, if you are not permitted to question him and he is advised he does not have to talk, or if he says anything we might use it against him, you better get a lawyer, you then might hold a fellow for a long period of time, might incarcerate him on the charges. He may make bond and maybe he does not. He might very well be incarcerated for a long time awaiting court action, when he is completely innocent. Whereas, if you had been permitted to pursue what has been the practice in the past, you would discover that innocence and he would long since have been released.

Mr. ACHESON. That's right.

Mr. Chairman, there are two particular points I would like to make in connection with the Mallory bill, if I may, both of which argue in favor of a legislative change of the prevailing view in the Federal

courts.

The first point is, I really don't think that we have a very serious quarrel with the Mallory decision of the Supreme Court. There was a a case in which the defendant was interrogated after arrest, held incommunicado for approximately 8 hours.

Now, I think the damage that has been done is the increasingly extreme and technical interpretation of that decision by the Federal appellate courts. It is that that I think we are really talking about when we are talking about a bill.

Senator MCCLELLAN. You are talking about the consequences that have flown from this decision?

Mr. ACHESON. That's right.

Senator MCCLELLAN. But I think we are talking about

Mr. ACHESON. We are talking about an increasing tendency to whittle down the interpretation-whittle it down to 30 minutes or 15 minutes of questioning, or that kind of thing, not the situation that was presented in the Mallory case itself.

My second point is that I think the partisans of this extreme interpretation of the Mallory rule, tend to think and to argue that if you are prepared to arrest a man you ought to be sufficiently, certain of his guilt that you are then prepared to charge him before a Commis

sioner.

It seems to me there is all the difference in the world being prepared to say a man is guilty of illegally entering a house, for example, and on the other hand, to say that he is guilty of burglary, grand larceny, petty larceny, murder, attempted rape-you don't know. And the real purpose of interrogation, even when you know you have got the right man, is to find out precisely what the crime is that you will charge him with and that opportunity may work to his benefit as well as to his disadvantage. If you don't have that opportunity, I think the tendency would be to charge the defendant with the most severe charge that the information will support. But if you have a little longer to sort it out, you can make a much more discriminating kind of charge.

Senator MCCLELLAN. Let me ask you this: based on your experience. previous experience as a U.S. district attorney and also in the position you now occupy,. do you not agree that this Mallory rule situation, as it now prevails, is very detrimental to law enforcement and that the situation must be cleared up, so that law enforcement officials, the public and everyone will know what their rights are and what they can do?

Mr. ACHESON. I think it is absolutely essential that there be a period. a carefully regulated opportunity to questioning following arrest. It is just essential.

Senator MCCLELLAN. That is right. Almost chaos prevails now with respect to law enforcement officials, and police officers as to what they can do: how far they can question.

Mr. ACHESON. It is different all over the country, Mr. Chairman. Senator MCCLELLAN. There is no uniformity.

Mr. ACHESON. No uniformity.

Senator MCCLELLAN. No one knows what his rights are. knows what is legal and how far they can go; is that not correct? Mr. ACHESON. That is correct.

Senator MCCLELLAN. One will give one interpretation in one jurisdiction, and another in another, and each individual officer is just left with his own judgment, almost, as to what to do or what he cannot do. Mr. ACHESON. That is pretty nearly the fact.

Senator MCCLELLAN. I think the Attorney General pointed out that there are five cases now pending in the Supreme Court which it is expected to act on soon, and the opinions in those cases may be helpful in clearing up the situation to some extent.

Mr. ACHESON. I don't know whether it would be helpful or harmful, but it will be very important.

Senator MCCLELLAN. I said maybe. As you point out, they may also be more harmful.

Mr. ACHESON. I certainly agree we won't really know what kind of legislation to try to write until those cases are decided.

Senator MCCLELLAN. But you do agree that as the situation is now, that it calls for legislative action?

Mr. ACHESON. It certainly does, no question about it.

Senator MCCLELLAN. So, if the Supreme Court clears it up and it does not call for legislation, very well. If it does not, you would recommend action?

Mr. ACHESON. I think we have got to see which fork the road takes. But some action is necessary.

Senator MCCLELLAN. I did not say you would recommend this action, but you would recommend some action? Mr. ACHESON. Absolutely.

Senator MCCLELLAN. All right, go ahead.

Mr. ACHESON. As to what particular action should be recommended, there are plenty of proposals. This bill is basically a sound proposal that works in the right direction, though it might incorporate a few more safeguards. On the other end of the spectrum, a more detailed proposal you have the American Law Institute draft and in between you have something more or less similar to the set of rules that the District of Columbia police are now operating under by administrative order.

Senator MCCLELLAN. By administrative order?

Mr. ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator MCCLELLAN. Have those rules been approved by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia?

Mr. ACHESON. They have not come up. They have not been tested in litigation.

Senator MCCLELLAN. From some of the decisions this circuit has handed down, I doubt whether they will be sustained, do you not? I mean, there is some reason to doubt it.

Mr. ACHESON. I would still mention them to the committee for the committee's consideration.

Senator MCCLELLAN. I understand. I am simply pointing it up. It looks as though legislation is almost imperative unless the Supreme Court clears it up in the pending decisions.

Mr. ACHESON. I think almost everyone agrees with that.
Senator MCCLELLAN. Very well.

Mr. ACHESON. That is all I have unless there are questions which the committee would like to direct to me.

Senator MCCLELLAN. I do not have any further questions on this Mafia bill. We all realize that it does present some constitutional questions, but I was hoping that it would serve as a vehicle here to give us an opportunity to develop any testimony that might throw light on conditions that prevail, and on how we might reach out to deal more effectively with the organized criminal element in this country. I think that we all agree such an element exists, an organized criminal element commonly referred to as Cosa Nostra or Mafia, and there is not any doubt in your mind that such organized syndicated crime exists?

Mr. ACHESON. Using those terms in their common acceptance, and meaning that it exists, no question about that, Mr. Chairman. I should think some of the evidence about associations and patterns of conduct and patterns of association that would be permitted under this bill might well be permitted under present Federal conspiracy

statutes.

Senator MCCLELLAN. As I said to the Attorney General this morning, assuming that we would conclude that this bill does not come

within the purview or the framework of the Constitution and that it would be an infringement of the provisions of the Constitution, how can we review the present existing conspiracy statutes and maybe strengthen them so as to give further leverage toward effective action against organized crime? I do not care how we do it. I just hope we will find the answer and do whatever we can do; go as far as we can go under the provisions of the Constitution. In other words, make a bill with whatever weapon possible.

Mr. ACHESON. I agree completely with the direction of that effort. Senator MCCLELLAN. Very well. I do not believe I have any other questions.

Senator Hruska, any questions?

Senator HRUSKA. There is one that I asked of the Attorney General. That was concerning the possibility of prosecution under State laws in the witness immunity bill. His answer as I remember it was that he would have no objection to such an amendment clarifying this point because that was the bill's intent. Are you in agreement?

Mr. ACHESON. That's my understanding, too. That is my understanding. I hate to cite cases from memory, but I think there was a Supreme Court case a year ago holding that a State immunity statute conferred Federal immunity and vice versa and had to as a constitutional matter.

Senator HRUSKA. Otherwise it would be self-defeating. It would put a man into a position where he does actually testify against himself

Mr. ACHESON. Where he is compelled without immunity.

Senator HRUSKA. That would be a simple matter to correct in the text of the bill, would it not?

Mr. ACHESON. Perhaps I can get the citation of that case and send it up, Senator. I think it would make it clearer.

Senator HRUSKA. If you can supply it for the record, that would be better.

Mr. ACHESON. Yes; I will.

(The information requested follows:)

The case referred to is Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52 (1964), in which the Supreme Court held that the constitutional privilege against selfincrimination protects a state witness against incrimination under federal as well as state law and a federal witness against incrimination under state as well as federal law. To implement this constitutional ruling the court noted that, in cases of testimony compelled under state immunity provisions, the Federal Government must be prohibited from making any use of the compelled testimony and its fruits. Under the Murphy decision the state immunity grant does not, however, provide an immunity from federal prosecution. Rather, the decision imposes limitations on the admissibility of evidence in any subsequent federal prosecution. See 378 U.S. at 78, note 18.

Senator MCCLELLAN. Senator Scott?

Senator SCOTT. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman. I know Mr. Acheson has contributed a good deal to public thinking about the Mallory rule and has been quoted on many occasions on this and I was very interested in hearing your views.

Mr. ACHESON. Thank you, Senator.

Senator MCCLELLAN. Does counsel have any questions?

Mr. PAISLEY. One question about this Mafia bill. Congress has passed a number of acts under the commerce clause to combat orga