SEC. 402. (a) There are hereby authorized to be appropriated for each fiscal year beginning with the fiscal year ending June 30, 1966, such sums as the Congress may determine to enable the Surgeon General (1) to make grants to States and political subdivisions thereof and to private organizations and institutions (A) for the development of field testing and demonstration programs for the treatment of narcotic addiction, (B) for the development of specialized training programs or materials relating to the provision of public health services for the treatment of narcotic addiction, or the development of in-service training or short-term or refresher courses with respect to the provision of such services. (C) for training personnel to operate, supervise, and administer such services, and (D) for the conducting of surveys evaluating the adequacy of the programs for the treatment of narcotic addiction within the several States with a view to determining ways and means of improving, extending, and expanding such programs, and (2) to enter into jointly financed cooperative arrangements with State and local governments and public and private organizations and institutions with a view toward the developing, operating, staffing, and maintaining of treatment centers and facilities (including post-hospitalization treatment centers and facilities) for narcotic addicts within the States. (b) Payments under this section may be made in advance or by way of reimbursement, as determined by the Surgeon General, and shall be made on such conditions as the Surgeon General determines to be necessary to carry out the purposes of this title. Hon. JAMES O. EASTLAND, THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE TREASURY, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Reference is made to your request for the views of this Department on S. 2191, "To provide for the civil commitment of certain persons addicted to the use of narcotic drugs." On June 15, 1965, the Attorney General of the United States and the Secretary of the Treasury forwarded to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President of the Senate a draft bill entitled the "Narcotic Addict Rehabil itation Act of 1965". Subsequently, S. 2152, which incorporates the Administration's draft bill, was introduced and referred to your Committee. In view of the above, the Treasury Department recommends enactment of S. 2152 instead of S. 2191. The Department has been advised by the Bureau of the Budget that there is no objection from the standpoint of the Administration's program to the submission of this report to your Committee. Sincerely yours, [S. 2578, 89th Cong., 1st sess.] EDWIN F. RAINS, Acting General Counsel. A BILL To amend title 18, United States Code, with respect to the admissibility in evidence of confessions Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That (a) chapter 223, title 18, United States Code (relating to witnesses and evidence) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section: "3501. Admissibility of confessions "(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the District of Columbia, a confession made or given by a person who is a defendant therein, while such person was under arrest or other detention in the custody of any law-enforcement officer or law-enforcement agency, shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay in bringing such person before a commissioner or other officer empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against the laws of the United States or of the District of Columbia if such confession is otherwise admissible in evidence. "(b) No confession made or given by any person during or after his interrogation by any law-enforcement officer, while such person was under arrest or other detention in the custody of any law-enforcement officer or law-enforcement agency, may be received in evidence in any such criminal prosecution unless such person, before such interrogation, was (1) informed of the nature of the offense which he was believed to have committed, (2) advised that he was not required to make or give any statement and that any statement made or given by him during or after such interrogation might be used against him, and (3) accorded reasonable opportunity to retain and to consult with counsel. Nothing contained in this subsection shall bar the admission in evidence of any confession made or given voluntarily by any person to any other person without interrogation by anyone, or at any time at which the person who made or gave such confession was not under arrest or other detention. "(c) As used in this section, the term 'confession' means any confession of guilt of any criminal offense or any self-incriminating statement made or given orally or in writing." (b) The section analysis of that chapter is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new item: "3501. Admissibility of confessions." Hon. JAMES O. EASTLAND, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is in further reply to your request of February 21, 1963, for the views of the Judicial Conference of the United States on S. 1012, "To make voluntary admissions and confessions admissible in criminal proceedings and prosecutions in the courts of the United States and the District of Columbia." The proposed legislation provides that an admission or confession, determined by the district court to have been voluntary, shall be admissible in any criminal prosecution of the accused, notwithstanding the failure of law enforcement officials to comply with Rule 5(a). Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires that the accused be brought before a United States commissioner without unreasonable delay. The bill further provides that the trial court's determination as to voluntariness shall be binding upon the reviewing court if supported by substantial evidence. At its recent session on September 17 and 18 the Judicial Conference voted to disapprove S. 1012 and any similar bill. Proposals, such as this, avoid but do not solve the fundamental problem of what is an appropriate compliance with Rule 5(a), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Conference is of the view that the doctrine enunciated by the Supreme Court in such cases as McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) and Mallory v. United States, 345 U.S. 449 (1957), under which admissions and confessions obtained prior to an appearance before a United States commissioner may be excluded from evidence if delay in the appearance is unreasonable, should not be changed in the manner prescribed in this bill. Sincerely yours, WARREN OLNEY III, Director. Hon. JAMES O. EASTLAND, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C. DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is in response to your request for the views of the Department of Justice on S. 1012, a bill "To make voluntary admissions and confessions admissible in criminal proceedings and prosecutions in the courts of the United States and the District of Columbia." Under Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, an arrested person must be taken before a committing magistrate "without unnecessary delay." In Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, the Supreme Court unanimously concluded that in order to enforce Rule 5(a) adequately, it was neces sary to exclude from evidence in criminal prosecutions any incriminating statement made during a period of unlawful detention. The bill provides that a voluntary admission or confession would be admissible in any criminal proceeding in federal or District of Columbia courts, regardless of whether Rule 5(a) has been complied with. A finding by the trial court that a particular admission or confession was made voluntarily would be binding upon the reviewing court, if supported by substantial evidence. The function of the requirement of Rule 5(a) is to accord an arrested person, as quickly as possible, the rights conferred upon him by the provisions of Rules 5 (b) and (c) regarding retention of counsel, preliminary examinations, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the setting of bail. The exclusionary rule of Mallory provides a safeguard for these important rights, some of which are clearly required by the Constitution. It is the view of this Department that S. 1012 fails to provide adequate safeguards for according them to a person arrested on a criminal charge because it reverses the Mallory rule without offering any alternate means of insuring that such a person will be advised of his rights before being subjected to interrogation. This may, to all intents and purposes, result in their effective denial and raises constitutional doubts. Moreover, the bill would severely restrict the appellate courts in their supervision of the administration of federal criminal justice. By limiting their authority to review a finding as to the voluntary nature of a confession, the bill would greatly decrease the protection of basic rights which is now afforded accused persons. We would oppose such a limitation on the functions of federal appellate courts. In addition, we should point out that S. 1012 would apply to all federal courts throughout the United States, as well as to the courts in the District of Columbia. We are not aware that the Mallory decision has any significant effect outside the District of Columbia and we see no need for such sweeping legislation. If it is considered desirable to alter the application of the Mallory rule in the District of Columbia, we would suggest that any such legislation provide alternate means of insuring the protection of the rights of the accused. The Bureau of the Budget had advised that there is no objection to the submission of this report from the standpoint of the Administration's program. Sincerely yours, NICHOLAS deB. KATZENBACH, Senator MCCLELLAN. In preparation for hearings on these six bills, the staff, late in the last session of Congress, at my direction, sent copies of these measures to the attorneys general and the chief justices of the several States, to the chiefs of police in many of our cities, and to a number of crime commissions throughout the country. The purpose was to acquaint them with these proposals and to seek their advice and counsel with respect thereto; also to solicit their suggestions and recommendations regarding other aspects of law enforcement and areas where further legislation may be needed. Many have responded, and in due course, some of them will testify. Statements from others will be received and inserted in the record. Since scheduling these hearings, several interested individuals and representatives of organizations have requested an opportunity to testify. We shall undertake to accommodate many of these requests when future hearings are scheduled. I may also state for the record and as a matter of information that early this month, at the request of the Department of Justice, I introduced three additional bills which were referred to the Committee on the Judiciary and which are now pending before this subcommittee. These bills are not included and will not be covered by this present series of hearings. Hearings on them will be scheduled for a later date. In conclusion, I should like to say that the sponsors of these measures make no contention that their enactment will solve all of the crime problems with which we are confronted. They certainly do not provide the whole answer, but their enactment, we think, will be helpful. They serve as a basis for these hearings, for the reviewing of facts, and for the gathering of information that will be useful in determining what legislation is needed to strengthen law enforcement and to combat more effectively the menace of crime that endangers our security. Needless to say, we are not unequivocally committed to support these bills in their present form. They do need study, and it may very well be that revisions and modifications will be desirable. If alternate proposals should be developed that have greater merit, I shall certainly support them. Likewise, I shall support any amendments that may be offered which, in my judgment, improve any of these bills. But it is time for action. The need for legislation in this field is urgent. The responsibility for the enactment of adequate laws to protect society rests upon the Congress. Therefore, the subcommittee hopes to proceed expeditiously to the consideration of these and other measures that are intended to meet that responsibility. I understand that some of my colleagues on the committee have statements. Senator Ervin, you have a statement. Senator MCCLELLAN. Senator Ervin is recognized. Senator ERVIN. Mr. Chairman, allow me to commend you for calling these hearings and on the series of bills you have introduced for our consideration, designed to reduce crime. No problem more critically demands attention and action than the alarming increase in crime in this country. As the President observed in his recent message to the Congress on this subject Crime the fact of crime and the fear of crime-marks the life of every American. When we consider the staggering cost of crime in terms of dollars lost, of death, injury and suffering inflicted on thousands of victims, and of fear engendered in millions of law-abiding citizens, we must agree with the President that this rampant lawlessness can no longer be tolerated. It may be true that crime cannot be substantially eliminated until we are able to get at the root causes of criminal behavior-the social, economic and environmental factors which spawn unrest and lawlessness. This will admittedly take a long time, and require much hard and costly study. But that does not mean that there is nothing we can do now. The problem of increasing crime is intimately related to the effectiveness of law enforcement; and there is much that we can do in the way of giving law enforcement officials whatever additional tools they may need to enforce observance of the law and to apprehend and punish violators of the law. I believe the series of bills we shall consider at these hearings embody proposals that would go far toward achieving that purpose. Although I generally endorse all of your proposals to control crime, Mr. Chairman, I shall comment at this time only on S. 2578, which I joined you in sponsoring. That bill would change the so-called Mallory rule under which a voluntary and otherwise admissible confession must be excluded in Federal courts if it was obtained during a period of "unnecessary delay" in taking the accused person before a commissioner or judge in violation of rule 5 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.1 The Mallory rule has greatly concerned me since its inception. In addition to this present bill, I have introduced or sponsored similar legislation in previous Congresses. I have consistently maintainedand I am still convinced of it-that effective law enforcement in the District of Columbia and the other Federal districts will be severely hampered until legislation such as S. 2578 is enacted. The Mallory decision and the earlier case of McNabb v. United States (318 U.S. 332, 1943) abolished the rule of evidence respecting admissibility of confessions which previously had been followed in Federal Courts and which is still followed in reviewing State court decisions involving confessions. Under that rule, the sole test of admissibility of a confession was whether it was made voluntarily, and delay in presentment was only one of many factors to be considered on the issue of voluntariness. A confession could be ruled involuntary and inadmissible if found to be induced by delay in taking the suspect before a judge. But mere delay alone was not enough to invalidate a confession. Under the Mallory rule, a confession must be excluded if obtained during a period of unnecessary delay, despite the fact that it may have been given voluntarily and may be fully substantiated by the facts. This is both unsound and unreasonable. A voluntary confession of crime constitutes evidence of the highest credibility and of a nature usually easily verified. To exclude such evidence solely on the basis of the failure of a police officer to observe the mechanics of rule 5(a) is to subvert that rule to a purpose it does not inherently and logically have, and a purpose which Congress clearly did not have in mind when it promulgated the Criminal Rules. The Advisory Committee appointed by the Supreme Court to draft the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure inserted a "Mallory" provision in a preliminary draft of rule 5. However, Judge Alexander Holtzoff, who was a member as well as secretary of that Committee, has testified on numerous occasions that the Committee subsequently deleted the provision expressly for the reason that it felt it would impose too great a penalty for failure to comply with a mere procedural requirement and would visit that penalty on the public rather than on the guilty official. That is precisely what has occurred under the Mallory rule, Mr. Chairman. Self-confessed murderers and rapists are turned back on innocent society merely because of the often inadvertent failure of police officers to take them before a judge or magistrate without delay. To compound the injustice, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has interpreted the expression "without unnecessary delay" to mean, in effect, no delay at all. This means that in the 1 Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957). |