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are not Bolshevists but exclusively Ukrainian partisans (nationalists, followers of Bandera and Melnik)". As a matter of fact, by July 10, 1943, the communiques of the UPA High Command showed the destruction of hundreds of Red partisan groups. By 1944 these areas were cleared entirely of Red partisans. We are told that the German failure to seize Stalingrade was attributable to increasing lack of supplies caused by severed lines of communication in the rear, Unaware of the situation in Ukraine, western journalists accepted the Sovietcreated myth that Bolshevik partisans were responsible for this. The true fact is that the frequent derailments of the main Lublin-Sarny-Kiev and the ZdolbrinwKoziatyn-Kiev railroads occurred in territory dominated by UPA.

Another significant fact is that, in their drive into Central Europe, the Soviets insured their rear by stationing approximately 2 million Soviet soldiers in Ukraine. Also human trophies are indispensable to the growth of any underground, and the UPA is certainly not without its impressive gallery. In May 1943 it ambushed and slew Gen. Viktor Lutze, chief of Hitler's SA and his entire staff on a road between Kovel and Brest-Litovsk. In February 1944 a UPA unit attacked in the vicinity of Kremianets the staff of General Vatutin, marshal of the Soviet Union, mortally wounding the general. In March 1947 the pro-Red Polish Vice Minister of War, Gen. Karol Swierczewski (the "General Walter' of the Spanish civil war) was slain by UPA fighters. The following year Lieutenant General Moskalenko, a high-ranking officer of the MVD, perished in Ukraine at the hands of UPA. On the basis of incomplete reports as of January 1, 1951, over 35,000 officers, both commissioned and noncommissioned, of the MGB and the MVD have been liquidated by UPA since 1945.

In the fall of 1947, when several UPA contingents entered the American zone of Germany, living proof was provided to dispel any doubts harbored by the free world about active Ukrainian resistance. During the war both German and Red propaganda sought to discredit UPA in the eyes of it own people, but the exploits of UPA destroyed the myth of Soviet invincibility and made it the symbol of struggle and hope for all the non-Russian peoples combating the imperialism of Germany and Russia. In Soviet eyes, before they were "remnants of Hitlerite agents"; now they are "paid agents of Wall Street and the Vatican." Whatever the Soviet characterization, the fearless men and women of UPA have been dangerous enough for a Zhukov to be sent from Berlin to Odessa in 1946; for a Kaganovich to be hurried to Ukraine in 1947; for a Svoboda to emphasize in the Czech parliament the danger of the "excellently trained and perfectly organizea UPA"; for the U. S. S. R. to enter into a military treaty with Poland and Czechoslovakia in May 1947 to wipe out UPA; for Tvorba, Communist organ in Czechoslovakia, to write in June 1948 that "small but exceedingly well-equipped and well-disciplined UPA units have again broken into Czechoslovakia"; for order No. 312 to be issued on December 30, 1949, over the signature of Lt. Gen. M. Kovalchuk, Minister of Security in Kiev, promising pardon to Ukrainian resisters, particularly thousands of youth following the "order of the American-British warmongers"; for Tass to report on November 23, 1950, that a new order has been introduced to award services in the campaign against "political bandits" in the Soviet Union.

These few examples explain why the Kremlin today waxes nervous and hypersensitive over possible American support of the anti-Soviet undergrounds. Of necessity devoted more to political propaganda than open military combat, UPA continues today to destroy MGB and MVD units; to infiltrate the Soviet Army, of which 42 percent is non-Russian; to aid peasant resistance against the collectivization program; and to disseminate anti-Soviet propaganda. In the fall of 1949 the Ministry of Soviet Armed Forces and of National Defense distributed among Soviet troops a pamphlet entitled "Guard Your Military Secrets,' urging them to be especially alert for "Ukrainian spies." In 1950 at least 28 Soviet generals, admirals, and other high officials were erased, many of whom, as Alexander Boychenko, leader in the Ukrainian Communist Party, and Lt. Gen. Porfiry Khandzibadze, a Georgian, were either connected with or secret members of the Ukrainian underground.

It was indeed a great loss to Ukrainian insurgence when on March 5, 1950, Lt. Gen. Taras Chuprynka, commander in chief of UPA, was killed by MGB troops. People everywhere familiar with his heroism mourned his death. In his letter of December 5, 1950, to Ukrainian organizations in Western Europe, Gen. Lucius D. Clay wrote: "I join you in your sorrow at the tragic death of General Chuprynka and in the confident hope that his loss will not have been in vain. Peoples who want to be free shall yet be free.” His position as commander in chief was taken by one of his closest aides, Col. Vasyl Koval; and,

contrary to the anxious hopes of the Kremlin, the movement continues with undiminished intensity. However, the prophetic words of General Chuprynka, conveyed to his troops in May 1945, will be always recalled: "The world has no peace as yet. The revolutionary movements of the oppressed peoples as well as the antagonism between the western democracies and the U. S. S. R. will increase."

THE MUTUAL SECURITY ACT OF 1951 AND UNDERGROUND SUPPORT

Through the remarkable and untiring efforts of Representatives Charles J. Kersten, of Wisconsin, provision was made in the Mutual Security Act of 1951 for the allocation of $100 million to care for escapees from Soviet-dominated lands and "to form such persons into elements of military forces supporting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or for other purposes." The interpretation placed on this provision by its sponsor embraces the formation of respective national military units attached to NATO and, second, assistance to the national liberation movements behind the iron curtain. On November 11, at a huge anti-Soviet rally in New York, the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America expressed publicly its support of this interpretation and defined it further. Shortly thereafter the Soviet Government, through Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Vishinsky, protested that this provision constitutes an aggressive act of intervention in the domestic affairs of Central and East European countries and requested that this matter be placed on the agenda of the U. N. Assembly for debate, where it now stands.

Most significant is the sensitive concern displayed by the Kremlin over this provision. It has good reason to be concerned. In this phase of cold war, support of the undergrounds can serve only to confuse, obstruct, weaken, and render psychologically uncertain any plans of further aggression contemplated by the Kremlin. And such aid can be effective both in Europe and Asia. In a possible hot war, our position will not be unlike that of the Germans in 1941, faced with millions of allies in the very back yard of the Kremlin. But these will be more natural allies for us, since their political ends are founded on our principles of political life. Containment is potentially suicidal, for it can give concrete form to the very thought of Lenin that "Someday we shall force the United States to spend itself into destruction," as he was reported to have said in 1924.

That the Kremlin should protest against an alleged intervention in the domestic affairs of others is indescribably grotesque, to say the least. By demanding a debate on this provision in the U. N., the Kremlin provides our delegation an excellent opportunity to review its long background of aggressive intervention in foreign states from the very inception of bolshevism 34 years ago. Moreover, aid given on application by certified underground representatives can scarcely be construed as intervention on our part in the domestic affairs of countries behind the iron curtain. In the short run, the Kersten amendment is to our advantage, for, as James Burnham, the brilliant political analyst, has said, "to keep even precariously alive a small detachment of the Ukrainian insurgent army is an unalloyed victory." In the long run, too, it is to our advantage. For if, as President Truman stated last March, "The issue in Korea is the survival of the principles on which we have built our countries; the principle of national independence and self-government is at stake there," indeed, how more applicable for our sure victory over Soviet Russian imperialism is this same issue to the shackled nations in the Soviet Empire.

OPPORTUNITIES IN THE KERSTEN AMENDMENT

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. The systematic and progressive implementation of the essential measures embodied in the Kersten amendment can be properly regarded as a realistic program for the elimination of the threat of war at its source. The liberal facilitation of item 1namely, the care of escapees- -can generate a force of attraction to countless defectors that may well exceed our most liberal expectations. We must not allow this opportunity to extend our publicized aid to all prospective escapees slip away from us. The evidences in the recent past and in the present of the sources of defection and bulk desertion must serve as guiding lessons for us in an operation that is

blessed with success at the very start. Although it occurred under circumstances of open war, the enormous mass desertions in Ukraine serve as overwhelming evidence of the great promise of this measure. As described by the German journalist, Erich Kern, in his book on the Dance of Death

The millions of Ukrainians, who by themselves could have turned the scales in the east, were not only being left unused but were actually being repulsed and disillusioned. * * * Police methods were replacing the great and splendid idea of the liberation of the east. In place of national independence and freedom, the bit was being drawn tighter.

The President's action this past Monday in allocating $4.3 million for the assistance of escapees was a momentous step and is to be highly commended. For it thoroughly dispels any illusion that the peoples behind the iron curtain are to be "left unused, repulsed, and disillusioned."

As concerns the second practical item, the formation of respective national units under their individual colors, gentlemen, it cannot be too strongly emphasized that its expedited realization will engender a tremendous paralyzing effect throughout Central and East Europe. Envision for yourselves separate divisions of Poles, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Slovaks, Czechs, Hungarians, Russians, and others, with their national flags and commands, symbolizing the great hope of national freedom and certain liberation for their shackled kinsmen back home. The result would be psychologically devastating to the quisling Communist rulers of their different homelands. It was most gratifying to note that the Honorable Mike Mansfield, as a delegate to the recent U. N. Assembly session, upheld this measure with the agreement that there was no reason "why these unfortunate people, who have risked everything to flee to freedom, should not be allowed to fight back against any effort to extend westward by force the very system they have escaped."

With reference to the third item on assistance to selected persons residing in Communist-occupied countries, I wish to submit for the record this published address on the anti-Soviet underground that I had the pleasure to present at the last convention of the All-American Conference To Combat Communism. May I submit, too, the text of a recent Georgetown University radio forum dealing with our fourth point on the national liberation movements in the captive areas?

Facing up to these facts, can one possibly regard my proposal for an increased allocation upward of $1 billion as inordinate? Surely the very opposite is nearer the truth. Yet this necessary adjustment would afford a developmental implementation of the Kersten amendment which, I do not hesitate to state, would in turn produce security results far surpassing those of higher-cost items in the program. instruments are devices for the full job. "We cannot," as Gen. J. Lawton Collins declared the other day, "do the job halfway. We must go all-out in the battle of ideas."

GREATER EMPHASIS ON KERSTEN AMENDMENT

Its

Senator GREEN. To sum it up, do I understand you are in favor of the bill we are considering?

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. I am in complete favor except that my proposal, in the event that there is any attempt here to cut down on the entire

amount for the Mutual Security Program, would be to consider a shift of emphasis on certain items in order to provide for the increased allocation of the funds for the Kersten amendment.

Senator GREEN. How long is this forum that you wish to put in? Dr. DOBRIANSKY. It appears in the Congressional Record. It is a 20-minute affair.

Senator GREEN. Could it be included by reference?

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. It may very well. It appeared in the Congressional Record of Thursday, February 21, 1952.

Senator GREEN. We will include a reference to it, anyway.
Have you any questions?

CHANCES OF WAR

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Dr. Dobriansky, with your careful attention and long attention to Central and Eastern Europe and her affairs, do you believe that war is approaching in Europe? By that I mean, are we moving toward war in Europe? That is a troublesome question, and it is a troublesome thing to think about. Perhaps I can put it another way and say, "Do you believe it is a fundamental of Russian policy to generate a third world war?”

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. No; I do not. In fact, I feel that the Politburo is operating thoroughly in line with the Russian policy of the past, being extremely cautious, being extremely patient.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Probing, probably?

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. And probing, and I feel very much, on the other hand, the precipitation of another Korea in certain incidental areas, possibly in southeast Asia, but, as for imminent war in Europe, Í don't believe that it is as imminent as many people might feel it to be. Senator HICKENLOOPER. Of course, the matter of imminence of war or the question of whether or not war is a basic pillar in Russian foreign policy at the moment is bound to have a considerable effect on the thinking of a great many people as to how extensive our preparations for war should be, or our preparations for defense, let us say. But I gather-I don't want to misunderstand this from your paper that you feel that there is great possiblity of internalDr. DOBRIANSKY. Dissension.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Dissension, uprising of one kind or another, behind the iron curtain.

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. That I do; not overt uprisings, however. In fact, the leaders of various undergrounds would not dare to stage any overt revolts.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. How can the forms be established without overt uprising in those countries, when the Communists have the machine guns and the newspapers and the radio and the railroads? How can you change over a government without overt uprising under those circumstances?

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. Well, in the immediate situation I certainly would be the last to say that, by providing all the necessary aid to these various elements behind the iron curtain, that in itself would bring about a collapse of the Soviet structure. Not at all. I don't think one can easily foresee that.

However, on the other hand, none of us is in a position to grasp the developments of history. As you know, many accidents do enter into history, and the results may be far beyond our expectations.

But what I do think, and my contention here is as stated in the formula, that we can begin to strengthen our own position not simply on a basis of military rearmament but more so perhaps on the basis of magnifying the known weaknesses within the Soviet Empire.

The best illustration of that, I think, was manifested this past winter. Why were the Soviets so sensitive? As I pointed out, there was more opposition, more denouncing on the part of Soviet authorities over this simple $100 million affair than anything else. They are aware of these many pockets of psychological paralysis throughout the area, so in a way, instead of having them keep us occupied in certain Koreas, either in Korea or in southeast Asia, it would seem to me that, if we begin to occupy them in their front yards, I think that can be achieved.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think I understand, or I think I got that impression of, your remarks. Manifestly, if they had free elections, they could change their political complexion as the people desire it. Dr. DOBRIANSKY. Of course.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But, when the dominant people have machine guns, it is pretty hard for overt acts to occur that would change it, at least soon.

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. Precisely. I certainly would not go on record to say that, simply by aiding these groups behind the iron curtain, therefore you have a guaranty that there will be any collapse of the system. On the contrary, that would depend on the amount of aid; that would depend, of course, on numerous other intervening developments that we, certainly, as human beings, cannot foresee at this

moment.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GREEN. Thank you, Doctor.

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. Thank you.

Senator GREEN. The next witness will be Mr. James Finucane.

STATEMENT OF JAMES FINUCANE,

ASSOCIATE SECRETARY,

NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR PREVENTION OF WAR

Mr. FINUCANE. Mr. Chairman, Senator Hickenlooper, my name is James Finucane. I am associate secretary of the National Council for Prevention of War.

Senator GREEN. Will you tell us a little bit about that council first? Mr. FINUCANE. The National Council for Prevention of War is a voluntary, nonprofit, educational organization organized in the District of Columbia in 1921. The executive secretary is Frederick J. Libby, who is very well known and has appeared before this committee many times. He was director of European relief for the Quakers after the First World War.

Some of our vice chairmen, for example, are Dr. Charles F. Boss, Jr., secretary of the Methodist Peace Commission; former Senator Capper was one of our vice chairmen. He has not been removed from our letterhead. This is an old letterhead dated 2 or 3 months back. Kermit Eby, former educational director of the CIO, now of the University of Chicago; Dr. E. Stanley Jones, a pretty well-known authority on Asia, particularly India; Msgr. Donald A. MacLean, of Catholic University; Father Furfey, from Catholic University; Dr. Samuel D. Marble, a college president; the Honorable Jeannette

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