(4) All United States aid should be coordinated through a single independent Government agency with a bipartisan public advisory board and an interagency coordinating committee. The American Farm Bureau Federation opposes the extension of further economic or military aid not consistent with the above principles. We believe that economic aid should have greater emphasis compared to military aid than was indicated in the Mutual Security Act of 1951.

(NOTE. Previous resolutions not in conflict with the above resolutions are reaffirmed.)

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Technical assistance for economic and social development of friendly cooperating nations, which costs relatively little, solves fundamental problems, and engenders good will for the United States, should have great emphasis in our foreign relations. Programs should be directed toward increasing productivity and improving educational, medical, and other useful services to improve standards of living. Since most of the people in these countries derive their living primarily from agriculture, it is our peculiar responsibility to be concerned with such problems. Technical assistance should seek balanced economies to provide not only more food, but also more production generally as well as useful services. The fundamental thought in technical-assistance programs should be to share our knowledge so people may help themselves through their own human and natural resources. Insofar as possible, understanding farmers should be selected to direct such aid.

Direct technical assistance should maintain its identity as an American aid program to other countries within a coordinated foreign-assistance administration. Under a Federal grant-in-aid program, colleges and universities should be encouraged to assume responsibility for technical assistance in agreements with friendly cooperating countries.

INVESTMENT CAPITAL

There are vast opportunities for investment of United States capital abroad. The United States should arrange commercial treaties with countries, especially underdeveloped countries. The aim should be encouragement of better use of natural resources and suitable industrial projects by the use of private capital.

We urge international cooperation to encourage investment of private capital abroad in useful projects and support sound standards for safeguarding such investments. In general, United States investors should be assured that they are given treatment in foreign countries comparable to that which domestic investors have, and that it is reasonably comparable to the treatment given to foreign investors in the United States.

In planning this program, we recommend that due consideration be given to maintaining a proper balance between agricultural and industrial development in the participating countries. Expansion of industry in underdeveloped areas is essential in order to provide job opportunities, increase purchasing power, and raise the living standards of the population.

IMMIGRATION

United States immigration policy should be made to serve and support the over-all national policy on international relations. Study should be given to a substitution of selective immigration for our present quota basis. Persons should be admitted who have demonstrated ability to advance the general welfare and whose technical skills, techniques, and labor are needed to supplement our own, either by naturalization or by issuance of 2-year renewable visas revocable at all times for cause.

(NOTE. Previous resolutions not in conflict with the above resolutions are reaffirmed.)

BUILDING SECURITY THROUGH STRENGTH

Mr. KLINE. In the first place this is, of course, the heart of the matter of creating security. We are convinced that security for our kind of world and for the freedom to which we are dedicated depends in a very real way on the United States. What I mean is that there

is no other country in the world, nor any combination of other countries, which would currently undertake the job of defending liberty as we have known it, individual liberty, except as they join with the United States. This means that the United States must be successful, as a nation of free people, and we are convinced that this matter of incentives, of freedom of choice for the individual, depends upon our being able, in a time like this, on a continuing basis, to prevent further depreciation of the dollar by the simple means of balancing our Federal budget; or to say it precisely, we believe that our defense will be better accomplished if we get the maximum efficiency in domestic expenditures and if, further, we buy for ourselves that amount of defense which we are prepared to pay for without a deficit. A deficit, at this time, would simply mean that we would pay for it with new money and by cheapening all money income and savings.

The situation to which this is directed concerns, of course, not only Europe but the other countries who might cooperate with us. We have indicated that we sincerely believe in the efficacy of the technical assistance program, so-called.

REDEFINING OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Properly understood, this is a system of exporting know-how and assistance in making the know-how understood and usable, working it into the economic and political systems of the countries involved. As such it is not a very expensive program in money, and we are concerned lest there be an effort made, and a successful effort, to cover a great deal of what is actually aid, material things, in a program which is called technical assistance. We want to redefine technical assistance. We need a clear definition that it is the export of know-how and assistance in the development of usability for this know-how.

We have made several basic points with regard to the approach which makes sense for the United States, as we see it, and which we believe ought to be basic for consideration of the proposal which is before you. We think we ought to state clearly on the part of the United States the objectives and prerequisities of further aid, and extend it to countries on the basis of agreement that they are willing to meet these objectives.

Second, we think that we should undertake to help raise the living standards of those countries, and that the countries ought to agree to do the sort of thing which will enable their citizens actually to improve production per man and to get a firm base for improving their standards, for making progress and for being in a firm situation where they can have the will to defend, the economic base for defense, and then the military strength based firmly on the will and the economic base. We think this ought to be part of the agreements we make with the individual countries with regard to the use of any funds which we appropriate for the purposes of this proposal. We believe further that we should require the deposit of the counterpart funds arising from economic assistance to the credit of the United States so that we can accomplish the objectives which we have just stated.

IMPORTANCE OF DEFENSE SUPPORT

We believe further that what is called defense support is of greater importance than we are giving it, and that in the long run this may be more important-in fact, we believe it is more important-than the direct export of military end items.

I should like, in this connection, to point out that the basic situation in Europe is one where we should like to create, and where they certainly would like to have a continuing basis where they can hope to survive and to be free. Their greatest single lack is a lack of food. The question raised is, Are we able to furnish this food?

Since the war we have been exporting, in round figures, the product of 1 acre in 10. If we should discontinue this sort of export there will be great repercussions in the United States and the use of land for other crops than the export crops would vitally affect the supply and demand for all export farm commodities in the United States.

But this is a relatively minor proposition. The major proposition is in Europe. In Europe approximately one-third of the people, one person in three, lives on food imports. These imports they simply have to have. This is not a question of choice. They have to have it to live. They have to have a firm basis for these supplies before they can make firm commitments of any kind to anybody.

There are two major sources. They are behind the iron curtain and in the dollar area. I have some charts that I wish to present at this time, because they show clearly what has happened prewar versus the present in this problem of Europe's imported food supply.

The first chart is a chart which shows that there was a considerable import out of the Far East and that there was a trickle from the United States of soybeans, and that postwar the top chart is preWorld War II, the bottom is postwar there is a trickle out of the Far East and that the imports now come out of the United States.

The next one is rice, relatively unimportant in the European economy, but it shows in the top one very clearly that the imports came from the great old rice bowl before the war. They just don't come now. And so far as they can, the come from some place else.

The next one is cotton. Cotton imports before the war, you will note, came very considerably from Pakistan and they came from Egypt, and you will note that these imports to Europe have been very drastically reduced. Imports from the western area have been about stable.

What this means is that Europe is using less cotton because of the substitutes. But nevertheless there is a dramatic dependence here on imports from the United States, and in this instance in the year quoted here, which was 1950, they were 4.3 million bales.

The most dramatic is wheat. You will note a considerable export to Europe from Australia before the war, somewhat more from Argentina, a very large import from Canada, a trickle from the United States. Since the war, Australia's population is increasing and there was a trickle from Argentina. In the year we have shown, which is the average 1946-48, a considerable import. Argentina is actually on an import basis itself now. Canada increased 10 percent, a modest increase; the United States is up six-hundred-odd percent. This was 423,000,000 bushels in the average of these years the average import into Europe from the United States.