REASON FOR DELIVERY LAG IN PREVIOUS PROGRAMS AND NEED FOR ADDITIONAL FUNDS

Total obligational authority requested for military assistance under all titles is $5.35 billion. Mention of this large sum of money raises a very pertinent question as to whether the Department of Defense can efficiently obligate and expend the funds now available; whether, in fact, any new foreign military assistance authorization is needed for fiscal year 1953. The answer to this question hinges on expenditures, which in turn are closely related to deliveries of finished equipment. Deliveries have been substantial, but less than originally hoped for. Equipment in the fiscal year 1950 program was largely existing matériel excess to our own needs; thus initial deliveries got off to a fairly good start. The Korean conflict stopped the flow to Europe almost completely for a time. Then came the gap in production lead-time for heavy armament and aircraft. Despite these factors, and some disappointments in our production schedules-the inevitable bottlenecks which have to be broken-we have in the first 2 years of the program shipped more than 2% million tons of equipment. We are clearly now on an acceleration curve.

On the basis of production now under way, and the high-priority allocation established for NATO by the President, it is expected that our end-item deliveries will be able to keep in phase with the progress of European countries toward their 1952 force goals. This means that when we add the military assistance requirements of other parts of the world, we should approach $12 billion in total expenditures by the end of fiscal year 1953. Considerable acceleration will be required for the next 15 months. I believe, however, that apart from the spread of existing hostilities and the outbreak of any new ones, and barring any further unforeseen production difficulties, we will have the ability to make an effective use of the funds presently on hand and being requested. We therefore will need the obligational authority requested in the President's message if we are to accomplish the equipment deliveries which are required for the build-up of forces agreed to at Lisbon, as well as to obtain on schedule the long leadtime items. Present lead time on fighter aircraft is 18 to 22 months, and on bombers, 32 to 34 months.

IMPORTANCE OF DEFENSE PRODUCTION SUPPORT FOR EUROPE

In all that I have said thus far I have concentrated on the direct military assistance aspects of the program, because this is the part of the program which is primarily the business of the Department of Defense. I would like, however, to emphasize the desirability of certain forms of assistance not made up of military end items. Support for our allies in the amounts recommended in this program for purposes of financing imports of raw materials, machinery, and the like is essential if full use is to be made of their own productive capacity in the common defense effort. Furthermore, stimulation of their defense production through assistance of this type is one of the best methods of insuring that our allies will be able to pick up and carry the burden of maintenance of their forces themselves.

PROGRAMS FOR GERMANY, YUGOSLAVIA, AND SPAIN

Before I leave title I, I should like to mention three countries in Europe which are not members of NATO.

Western Germany will be tied in closely to NATO through the European Defense Community. German contingents will provide the most substantial single increment to the force build-up in 1953. In 1952 any requirement in the way of military assistance for the German forces will be for training equipment. But an eventual need for long lead-time matériel, especially aircraft, must be planned for. The military situation in Germany is quite different from that which other European countries faced at the start of their rearmament effort. On the debit side is a complete military matériel vacuumnot even obsolescent World War II equipment is available. Time will be required to develop German production capacity for such armaments. On the credit side, in addition to the available manpower which can in a relatively short time be developed into an effective fighting force, the German Government has already indicated a willingness to make a substantial contribution to the common effort. The German defense budget, at Western Germany's own request, has been developed upon recommendations from the Executive Bureau of the TCC based on the same standards as those used by the TCC in evaluating the capabilities of NATO member nations. There is no doubt that the German contribution will prove of tremendous assistance in strengthening the common defense.

Two other countries in Europe, although not members of NATO, nevertheless have an important present or potential contribution to make to the collective defense efforts of the west.

Yugoslavia is strategically located on the southern flank of Europe. In Yugoslavia there is a sizable force of tough and competent fighting men who are determined to resist any encroachment on their home territory. It is to our military interest to strengthen them by modernization of their matériel and provision of some essential logistic support.

Spain is the other country to which I refer. As is well known, we for a long time have been interested in Spain because of her strategic location. The means for initiating cooperative action with Spain were furnished by the Congress last year in the $100 million which was authorized for military, economic, and technical assistance. A program for using this authorization is well developed and in process of negotiation.

PROGRAM FOR GREECE AND TURKEY

Let me pass on now to title II, to Greece and Turkey, which I have already referred to as our newest partners in NATO. It was in these two countries that our first efforts at postwar military assistance were made. Since the program has been in effect longest in Greece and Turkey, these countries presumably give the best indication of future development elsewhere. We have enjoyed the most direct contact with the Greeks and Turks. Our military advisers still live with the Greek garrisons in the bare border hills as they did in the days of the Markos insurrection. In Turkey there is an equally close training relationship between the American mission and the armed forces.

Naturally we share the pride of these nations in the gallant conduct of their troops in Korea. The Greek battalion has been in combat for over a year. During that period it has had 88 men killed, 265 wounded, none missing, and only 1 captured.

The Turkish Brigade has impressed the entire United Nations order of battle with its aggressiveness in advancing under fire to close with the enemy at bayonet point. Casualties suffered represent 40 percent of the brigade's strength. The matériel programs for the armies of Greece and Turkey are past their peak now, on a funding basis. A large proportion of the fiscal year 1953 programs will be to maintain army equipment already funded for, and to increase their air capability. It is gratifying to see that a military assistance program does eventually taper off as the capital equipment is completed.

The two principal title III countries, on the military side, are Indochina and Formosa.

CONDITIONS IN INDOCHINA

Our military assistance program for Indochina during the past year reflects the great importance which this area-as well as all of southeast Asia-bears to the security interests of the free world. The strategic geographical position of the area, as well as the vitally important raw materials such as tin and rubber which it supplies, makes it important for us to maintain an effective support of the gallant effort which the French and the Associated States are making to hold the line in Indochina against Communist aggression in that area. The French have over 150,000 troops in Indochina, with large numbers of their best officers and noncommissioned personnel. Their losses have been heavy. The drain on their economy has been severe, with almost 35 percent of their entire defense budget being required to carry their effort.

Our shipments to Indochina have been increasing, and they have been made on a very high priority basis. As of February 1, a total of 106 ships had arrived in Indochina, carrying over 100,000 long tons of vital United States matériel and more than 150 amphibious craft. The French military have credited timely arrival of equipment with their ability to hold the Tonkin Delta area. The armies of the Associated States are growing and are now equipped in large part with our M-1 rifles, a tremendous contribution to their morale and effectiveness. We are proposing a substantial increase in military assistance to Indochina this year over what was requested in last year's bill. If the situation in Indochina can be cleared up, not only will Southeast Asia be stabilized but the French position in Europe-and thereby the entire NATO defenses-will be measurably improved.

PROGRAM FOR FORMOSA

In building up the Nationalist Chinese forces on Formosa, our objective is to insure the integrity of that island. The military assistance already provided has contributed to the political stability of Formosa and has improved the combat capability of the Nationalist forces. The ground troops are being completely reorganized along modern United States lines. Existing aircraft have been restored to operational condition, and the Navy is being improved. There is

still a great deal to be done on Formosa; in fact little more than a foundation has so far been laid. But progress is being made. The United States military and economic aid programs have been unusually well integrated to supplement each other in dealing with the unique situation of an island populated by only 7,000,000 people called upon to support a garrison of several hundred thousand defenders.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR LATIN AMERICA

The title IV program for military assistance to the other American republics would provide $62 million in fiscal year 1953 to supplement the $38 million appropriated last year. Our strategic interest in the area, as well as the neighborliness which we feel toward our LatinAmerican friends, underscores the importance of providing assistance to help them in the defense of our joint hemisphere. The modern matériel programed will help the Latin-American nations protect their territory as well as to maintain common lines of communication and base installations. During World War II we found it necessary to deploy 100,000 United States military personnel in Latin America. Under the regional defense arrangements now being negotiated, our neighbors will be prepared to assume the responsibility. By way of a dividend on our military assistance efforts in this area, the LatinAmerican contingents from Colombia have demonstrated fine fighting qualities in Korea and ready adaptability to our techniques and matériel. An officer of my staff recently returned from Korea has high praise for the Colombian Battalion, which was attached to his command. These troops first came up on the line at 2 o'clock in the morning. By 3 o'clock they were committed. They showed extraordinary coolness under fire, mopping up terrain pockets with such thoroughness that they left no enemy resistance behind them in their advance.

BASIC CONSIDERATIONS OF THE PROGRAM

These are some of the considerations underlying the request which we are making of the Congress for the authorization of additional military assistance during fiscal year 1953. But the one basic consideration that underlies this request and every other request for funds made by the Department of Defense is the security of the United States. The security of the United States is our first obligation. The Mutual Security Act provides for strengthening those defenses which are part of the protective system of the United States, just as our armed power is essential to the security of our friends and allies. The only alternative to mutual security is to attempt unilateral security. Taking that route the United States would have to deploy its manpower and its resources on a scale exceeding anything this country has seen since the latter phases of World War II. Even then we would have no guaranty of security. I hope that, by the enactment of this legislation, the Congress will make it possible for us to go forward with the job of building an effective defense structure for the security of the United States and of the free world. The job is, in my opinion, now well under way.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. We enjoyed your statement very much.

Come around, General Bradley.

STATEMENT OF GENERAL OF THE ARMY OMAR N. BRADLEY, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

General BRADLEY. Mr. Chairman and members of the committees, the Mutual Security Program is the keystone of the whole collective security effort of the free world. Without it, the time when we will reach a position of relative security is too far distant, and the risk is too great.

An explanation of the way the Joint Chiefs of Staff carry out their responsibilities for the Mutual Security Program may be of some benefit in evaluating its importance. It will indicate to you the extreme care the Department of Defense, and the three services, are taking to insure that our money is wisely spent.

The results of long-range planning are not always recognizable in the beginning of a program. It is a tribute to the wisdom and farsightedness of the Congress that in the face of a slowly developing program, you authorized and appropriated sufficient funds to start a program which is now beginning to pay off in material gains.

The people of the United States have waited to see the real results of the money which the Congress has appropriated. Now the aircraft, the ships, the guns are really starting on their way. More than 2,500,000 tons of military supplies have been shipped.

I should like to make one point clear. The tools of mutual security are military, economic and technical assistance use in varying combinations, where they will do the most good for collective security. For the United States to supply military equipment to a country whose citizens are unable economically speaking to maintain that equipment would, in my opinion, be a mistake.

P

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have two responsibilities in respect to the Mutual Security Program.

First, to provide strategic guidance for the military assistance portion of the program; and

PRIORITIES FOR ALLOCATION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Second, to establish within the cope of United States policy, principles of priorities for the allocation of finished equipment and ammunition.

Briefly, here is an outline of the steps as they were taken:

Last July, the Joints Chiefs of Staff developed a time schedule for foreign nations and the military assistance advisory groups in these countries, to present their requests and recommendations to the United States. They also published the criteria which would determine the types and maximum number of forces which we considered eligible for military aid. They also recommended the types of equipment that could or could not be included.

In general, the criteria require that

(1) Equipment for North Atlantic Treaty members would be. provided only for those forces required by that organization's defense plan and accepted by each country concerned as a definite commitment to the plan.

(2) Equipment for countries outside of NATO would be furnished only for the forces in being, or immediately mobilizable.