ground. Nevertheless, there is no reason to say that it was improperly decided on the theory upon which the court rests it, or that a carriage of freight or passengers through one State in the course of a transportation between two points in another is not ex necessitate interstate commerce within the meaning of the Constitution. So far, however, as the powers of taxation of the State of the two termini are concerned, it must now be conceded that they have been specifically declared to extend to the intrastate part of the gross receipts from such a carriage without an invasion of the commercial clause of the Constitution.1

(3) C, in Vermont, to D, in Connecticut, through or across Massachusetts. This is plainly interstate commerce.2

(4) A, in Massachusetts, to C, in Vermont.

(5) C, in Vermont, to A, in Massachusetts.

There was never any question that the preceding two cases present instances of interstate commerce.3

(6) A, in Massachusetts, to C, in Vermont, or C, in Vermont, to A, in Massachusetts, passing over a Massachusetts railroad, A to B, situate wholly within Massachusetts. This case is presented in Norfolk & Western Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania, where the plaintiff in error was a corporation organized under the laws of both Virginia and West Virginia, with its road situate entirely within those States, but forming part of a through line starting in Pennsylvania and known as the Great Southern Despatch. court said, at page 119:

The

"That is to say, the business of the through line of railroad, of which the plaintiff in error forms a part or in which it is a link, consists, in a measure, of carrying passengers and freight into Pennsylvania from other States, and out of that State into other States. It certainly requires no citation of authorities to demonstrate that such business that is, the business of this through line of railroad is interstate commerce. That being true, it logically follows that any one of the roads forming a part of, or constituting a link in, that through line, is engaged in interstate commerce, since the business of each one of those roads serves to increase the volume of business done by that through line."

1 Lehigh Valley Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania, supra.

2 Reading Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania, 15 Wall. 232, 280; Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U. S. 230, 241.

3 Reading Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania, 15 Wall. 232, 280; Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U. S. 230, 241; Philadelphia & Southern Steamship Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326. 4 136 U. S. 114.

III.

STATE REGULATION OF INTERSTATE RATES OF FARE AND FREIGHT.

The question of regulation of interstate rates of fare and freight by a State first arose in the Granger Cases, so called, decided by the Supreme Court in 1876.1 The judges were divided in their opinions, Waite, C. J., Clifford, Miller, Bradley, Swayne, Davis, and Hunt, JJ., uniting as the majority of the court, and Field and Strong constituting the minority.

The first of the above cases, Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Railroad Co. v. Iowa,2 involved the constitutionality of an act of the legislature of Iowa, establishing "reasonable maximum rates of charges for the transportation of freight and passengers" over the different railroads in Iowa. The complainant in the case was the lessee of the Burlington and Missouri River Railroad, which was incorporated under the laws of Iowa, and wholly situate therein, although it was also engaged in interstate as well as intrastate commerce. The question in issue, among others, was whether such a statute was necessarily unconstitutional, as being in conflict with the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution and the powers conferred thereunder upon Congress. The court, upon this point, said:

"The objection that the statute complained of is void, because it amounts to a regulation of commerce among the States, has been sufficiently considered in the case of Munn v. Illinois [94 U. S. 113]. This road, like the warehouse in that case, is situated within the limits of a single State. Its business is carried on there, and its regulation is a matter of domestic concern. It is employed in State as well as in interstate commerce, and until Congress acts the State must be permitted to adopt such rules and regulations as may be necessary for the promotion of the general welfare of the people within its own jurisdiction, even though in so doing those without may be indirectly affected."

That is to say, the broad doctrine was here laid down, that until Congress acted the several States had plenary control over the

1 Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Railroad Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155; Peik v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co., 94 U. S. 164; Lawrence v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co., ib.; Chicago, Milwaukee, & St. Paul Railroad Co. v. Ackley, 94 U. S. 179; Winona & St. Peter Railroad Co. v. Blake, 94 U. S. 180; Southern Minnesota Railroad Co. v. Coleman, 94 U. S. 181; and Stone v. Wisconsin, 94 U. S. 181. 2 94 U. S. 155.

regulation of railroad rates and fares, whether the same concerned interstate commerce or State commerce only.

Peik v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co.,1 raised the question of the constitutionality of an act of the State of Wisconsin, fixing maximum rates of fare and freight. It was decided in the same manner upon the interstate commerce point as the preceding case. The railroad company here was incorporated under the laws of Wisconsin, and was engaged in interstate as well as intrastate commerce. The court said:

"As to the effect of the statute as a regulation of interstate commerce. The law is confined to State commerce, or such interstate commerce as directly affects the people of Wisconsin. Until Congress acts in reference to the relations of this company to interstate commerce, it is certainly within the power of Wisconsin to regulate its fares, etc., so far as they are of domestic concern. With the people of Wisconsin this company has domestic relations. Incidentally, this may reach beyond the State. But certainly, until Congress undertakes to legislate for those who are without the State, Wisconsin may provide for those within, even though it may indirectly affect those without."

And in another portion of the decision, the court, in defining the matter at issue, said:

"These suits present the single question of the power of the legislature of Wisconsin to provide by law for a maximum of charge to be made by the Chicago and Northwestern Railway Company for fare and freight upon the transportation of persons and property carried within the State, or taken up outside the State and brought within it, or taken up inside and carried without."

That is to say, the effect of the statute upon interstate commerce as well as State commerce was directly in issue, and one of the matters decided.

Chicago, Milwaukee, & St. Paul Railroad Co. v. Ackley,2 related to a Wisconsin railroad, and presented no new point. Winona & St. Peter Railroad Co. v. Blake,3 Southern Minnesota Railroad Co. v. Coleman, and Stone v. Wisconsin,5 were all cases of Minnesota corporations, and were decided on the same grounds as the foregoing.

6

The dissenting opinion in the Granger Cases did not discuss

the effect of the commercial clause of the Constitution, and therefore adds nothing to the present inquiry.

The Railroad Commission Cases, 1 decided in 1885, come next in order, but are inconclusive upon the question here, although they manifest no change as yet in the opinion of the court. These cases consist of Stone v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.2; Stone v. Illinois Central Railroad Co.3; and Stone v. New Orleans & Northeastern Railroad Co.1

Stone v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.5 related to an act of the State of Mississippi, providing for the regulation of freight and passenger rates on railroads in that State, and creating a commission to supervise the same. The company affected was the Mobile and Ohio Railroad Company, a corporation which had been organized under the laws of Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Kentucky, being the several States through whose territory the Company's road passed. The court, by Waite, C. J., concerning the Federal question, said:

"Every person, every corporation, everything within the territorial limits of a State, is, while there, subject to the constitutional authority of the State government. Clearly, under this rule, Mississippi may govern this corporation, as it does all domestic corporations in respect. to every act and everything within the State which is the lawful subject of State government. It may, beyond all question, by the settled rule. of decision in this court, regulate freights and fares for business done exclusively within the State, and it would seem to be a matter of domestic concern to prevent the company from discriminating against persons and places in Mississippi."

And again:

"The commission is, in express terms, prohibited by the act of March 15, 1884, from interfering with the charges of the company for the transportation of persons or property through Mississippi from one State to another. The statute makes no mention of persons or property taken up without the State and delivered within, nor of such as may be taken up within and carried without. As to this, the only limit on the power of the commissioners is the constitutional authority of the State over the subject. Precisely all that may be done, or all that may not be done, it is not easy to say in advance. The line between the exclusive power of Congress, and the general powers of the State in this particular, is not

1 116 U. S. 307.

2 116 U. S. 307.

8 116 U. S. 347.

4 116 U. S. 352.

5 116 U. S.

307.

everywhere distinctly marked, and it is always easier to determine when a case arises whether it falls on one side or the other, than to settle in advance the boundary, so that it may be in all respects strictly accurate. As yet the commissioners have done nothing. There is certainly much they may do in regulating charges within the State, which will not be in conflict with the Constitution of the United States. It is to be presumed they will always act within the limits of their constitutional authority. It will be time enough to consider what may be done to prevent it when they attempt to go beyond."

As will be at once seen, the case went off on questions other than the Federal question concerning the scope of the commercial clause of the Constitution; while the dissenting opinions of Field and Harlan, JJ., dealt with yet other aspects of the controversy.

Stone v. Illinois Central Railroad Co.,1 and Stone v. New Orleans & Northeastern Railroad Co.,2 involved no questions which are of importance to the present inquiry, and need not be considered under this head.

In 1886, Wabash, St. Louis, & Pacific Railway Co. v. Illinois,3 came before the Supreme Court, and in it the prior cases were carefully reviewed. The controversy arose over a statute of Illinois, providing a penalty for any railroad company charging or receiving, within that State, for transporting passengers or freight of the same class the same or a greater sum for any distance than it did for a longer. The defendant had made such discrimination in regard to goods transported from Peoria, Illinois, and Gilman, Illinois, to New York, charging more for the same class of goods carried from Gilman than from Peoria, although the former place was eighty-six miles nearer to New York. The Illinois act was held unconstitutional, so far as it applied to such commerce, notwithstanding that in its operation it was limited to that part of the voyage which lay within the State of Illinois. The court, by Miller, J., said:

"If the Illinois statute could be construed to apply exclusively to contracts for a carriage which begins and ends within the State, disconnected from a continuous transportation through or into other States, there does not seem to be any difficulty in holding it to be valid. For instance, a contract might be made to carry goods for a certain price from Cairo to Chicago, or from Chicago to Alton. The charges for these might be within the competency of the Illinois legislature to

1 116 U. S. 307.

2 116 U. S. 352.

3 118 U. S. 557.