senting to the brother that he was purchasing for plaintiff. Defendant refused to convey to plaintiff, although the latter tendered full compensation. Held, defendant is constructive trustee for plaintiff. Haight v. Pearson, 39 Pac. Rep. 479 (Utah).

A sound case. By means of his fraudulent representations, defendant caused plaintiff damage, a tort, for which equity will allow specific reparation. It would seem that the stress put by the court upon the confidential relations between lawyer and client was unnecessary. The fact that the conveyance was procured by fraud makes it needless to consider what effect the Statute of Frauds would have upon such an oral understanding between principal and agent. Onson v. Cown, 22 Wis. 329. Cipperly v. Cipperly, 4 Thomp. & C. 342 accord. See also Lombard v. Cowham, 34 Wis. 486.

TRUSTS PRINCIPAL AND AGENT FOLLOWING TRUST FUNDS. · Defendant's intestate had been the New York agent of plaintiffs, buying and selling goods for them. Interest was charged on the balances against whichever party happened to be the debtor, and settlements were made semi-annually. At the last settlement before deceased's death plaintiffs had been indebted to him, but had since remitted drafts discharging the debt and leaving a balance due them; and the avails of the drafts remitted after the indebtedness had been discharged could be distinctly traced into deceased's bank account. Held, plaintiffs can prevail against deceased's general creditors on the principle that "where the principal can trace his property into the hands of his agent, he may follow and reclaim it." "Because deceased was plaintiffs' agent, the property received by him became impressed with a trust character." Roca v. Byrne et al., 39 N. E. Rep. 812 (N. Y.).

The court seems to have entirely disregarded the fact that "interest was paid on the balances." The payment of interest, it is submitted, shows conclusively that the deceased received the money as debtor, and not as trustee. "If a man pays interest for money, he must be entitled to the use of it." Ex parte, Broad, 13 Q. B. D. 740.

CIL.

TRUSTS STATUTE OF FRAUDS PAROL AGREEMENT TO HOLD IN TRUST. Plaintiff conveyed land to the defendant, his sister, without consideration, and in reliance on her parol promise to hold in trust for him. Plaintiff brought action for reconveyance. Held, that the case fell within the Statute of Frauds, and that the plaintiff was not entitled to reconveyance. Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 32 N. Y. Sup. 390. See NOTES. WILLS REVOCATION SECOND CODICIL - INTENTION TO REVOKE FIRST CODI- After testator had made his will and a first codicil, his wife died. He then made a second codicil, nowhere referring to the first, but only to the will. By this codicil he appointed the same executors which he had by the first codicil, gave legacies of the same sums to the same persons, gave the same directions as to his place of burial and a monument for himself, and devised an India shawl again to his sister-in-law, as he had done in the first codicil. But he made a gift of £400 to Mary Alridge, whereas by the first codicil he had bequeathed her £200. He also omitted a revocation of a gift of jewelry and other articles to his wife, and the subsequent gift of £5,000 to his sister, Julia Stainforth, and substituted for it a direction to the trustees to set aside £5,000 out of the residue for such sister. In all other respects the language of the second codicil was identical with the first. Held, testator intended to revoke the first codicil and substitute for it the second, and that probate should go of the will and second codicil only. Chichester et al. v. Quatrefuges et al., 11 The Times Law Rep. 328.

The case is interesting as showing how a probate judge looks entirely at the intention of the deceased to find out what documents he or she meant to operate as his or her will. The court says that extrinsic evidence may be freely made use of; but, as there is none, the instruments show on their face the intention of the testator merely to repeat the first codicil by the second, the strong points being, the fact that he referred only to the will in the second codicil, and (apart from the change in the amount of the legacy to the nurse effected after the second codicil had been engrossed) the codicil expressed only the legal effect of the first, having regard to the fact of the supervening death of the testator's wife, and the fact that the specific legacies of sums of money and articles were identical in both. There would seem here to be sufficient evidence to maintain the construction of the court as to the testator's intention. The Wills Act (1 Vic. c. 26, $20) says nothing in regard to what will or codicil, being duly executed, will revoke a former one, and consequently it has now become settled that no express revocation is necessary, but that a revocation by implication is sufficient. It was on this ground that the court proceeded in the principal case, following Jenner v. Ffinch, 5 P. D. 106, and Demosey v. Lawson, 2 P. D. 98.

REVIEWS.

THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I. By Sir Frederick Pollock and Frederick William Maitland. Cambridge, England: At the University Press. 1895. 2 vols. 8vo.

This work, awaited with eager anticipation by all interested in legal history, came to hand so recently that the examination that its great merits demand must be postponed to a later number of the Review. There is only opportunity here to remark that the distinguished authors have thrown a flood of light upon the darkest period of English law, the two centuries following the Norman Conquest, and have been singularly successful in giving the result of their investigation in a form to excite and hold the interest of the reader.

NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. By Joel Prentiss Bishop, LL.D. Fourth Edition, Vol. I., General and Elementary. Chicago: T. H. Flood & Co. 1895. 8vo. pp. xxvi, 921.

It is always pleasant to get a new volume from Mr. Bishop's pen, even if it is only a new edition. This book has novelty of form, at least. A large part of it has been entirely rewritten, not with any change of sense, but to make the meaning clearer and the language more concise.

His series of works upon the Criminal Law is probably Mr. Bishop's chief contribution to legal learning; and most lawyers will recognize the singular value of it. The subject had enlisted the best efforts of such lawyers of genius as Coke, Hale, Hawkins, Foster, and East; yet Bishop found it a congeries of imperfectly related doctrines, and has left it a science.

a

The ability of our author rightly to deduce legal principles, and the difference between his methods and those of the ordinary compiler of text-books, is strikingly shown in § 220, in the chapter on Extradition, where the phrase "fleeing from justice " is discussed. In the third edition the paragraph stood thus: "Hence it seems that if one commits a crime in a State in which he is not personally present,- as in various circumstances he may, there is no means by which he can be transferred, against his will, to the place of its commission to be tried, question not, probably, judicially determined." In the present edition the words in italics are omitted, and two recent cases are cited in support of the proposition. A still later case may be remembered as having caused considerable discussion, State v. Hall, 20 S. E. 729 (see 8 HARVARD LAW REVIEW, 494). Mr. Bishop, it would seem, nowhere cites two earlier cases to the same effect, -Jones v. Leonard, 50 la. 106, and Hartman v. Aveline, 63 Ind. 344. Both cases were decided in 1878, two years before the date of the third edition.

Another important case which seems to be omitted is Castro v. Reg., 6 App. Cas. 229. The omission of it is the more remarkable, because it fully supports our author's vigorous attack upon the doctrine of People v. Liscomb ($ 458, note 1). One cannot assert too positively that the case is nowhere cited, because there is no Table of Cases for this volume, a serious defect, though of course the table will appear in the second volume when it is issued.

But assuming the worst to be true, and that these and perhaps other important cases have been overlooked, Mr. Bishop, while occasionally omitting an authority, is far more accurate, useful, and trustworthy than most writers who point with pride to the fact that their book cites every decided case on the subject.

No law book to-day ought to omit references to the National Series of Reporters. Without discussing their intrinsic value, its wide use among lawyers renders such a course proper. It is a serious defect in this volume that there seems not to be a reference to that series; even the Federal Reporter is neglected. J. H. B.

ADOPTION ANd Amendment OF CONSTITUTIONS IN EUROPE AND AMERICA. By Charles Borgeaud. Translated by Charles D. Hazen, Professor of History in Smith College, with an Introduction by John M. Vincent, Associate of the Johns Hopkins University. New York and London: Macmillan & Co. 1895. pp. xxi, 353. Price, $2.00.

It is a good thing thus to present to our people a translation of Dr. Borgeaud's accurate and valuable treatise, ouvrage couronné par la faculté de droit de Paris, Prix Rossi, 1892. The Introduction states that "the co-operation of the author has been freely given in bringing up to date the changes which have taken place since 1892." "The Origin, Growth, and Character of Written Constitutions" is considered in fortythree pages. "Royal Charters and Constitutional Compacts: I. The German Group; II. The Latin-Scandinavian Group," in eighty-two pages. "Democratic Constitutions: I. United States of America; II. France; III. Switzerland," in two hundred pages. And there is interesting matter in a "Preface" and a "Conclusion."

Dr. Borgeaud's constitutional writings rank among the most careful, the best-informed, and the most instructive for American readers that are to be found anywhere. This translation seems to be generally good. It is odd, however, to see the famous "Council of Revision" of the first New York Constitution filtering back into English as the Committee on Amendments," through Dr. Borgeaud's accurate enough "Comité de révision." An American translator should not have repeated Dr. Borgeaud's slip in citing the case of Woods's Appeal from 75 Penn. State Records. And when Dr. Borgeaud says that "la jurisprudence des faits" has vindicated a certain opinion, "the course of events" seems but a faint equivalent for the striking phrase of the original.

SELECT PLEAS IN THE COURT OF ADMIRALTY.

Vol. I.

Being Vol. VI. of the Publications of the Selden Society. Edited by Reginald G. Marsden. London: Bernard Quaritch. 1894.

After a delay of more than two years the publications of the Selden Society are continued, and the series will, we are assured, within a few months be brought up to date. The present volume, while less interesting perhaps to American lawyers than the preceding publications, or those immediately to follow, nevertheless contains much of value. An elaborate introduction discusses satisfactorily the origin of the Admiral's jurisdiction. It appears to have arisen out of the inability of the common law to deal with matters which happened beyond the knowledge of "the country." That jurors could not usually pass on facts happening out

side their county was held for centuries after the Admiral's court had been established. Piracy, for instance, was anciently tried by the common law; but in 1429, according to Mr. Marsden, the jurisdiction of the common law fell into desuetude. The reason given by Lord Coke for this fact was that just indicated, that no jury could be found which knew of the piracy (Co. Lit. 391a; 13 Co. 51). The Admiral, sitting without a jury, could find the truth of facts wherever they happened. In view of this reason for the establishment of a court of Admiralty, it is curious to notice that in a few instances a jury was summoned into the court (pp. 35, 89, 122).

The series of records of the court does not begin till 1524, though its establishment was as early as the middle of the 14th century.

There were at first several courts, there being an Admiral of the West, an Admiral of the North, etc. Two records from the Court of Admiralty of the West (of the years 1390 and 1404) are here printed, having been removed by Certiorari into Chancery, and there preserved. Both records deal with alleged unlawful acts of the officers of the court. The other records here printed fall between the years 1527 and 1545.

As was natural, the jurisdiction of the Admiral was not at first sharply defined, and proceedings in Admiralty for, contempt in suing in other courts, and writs of prohibition to the Admiral, were common pastime. The bulk of business was like that at present. Cases involving the law of shipping were much the most frequent; and there were many prosecutions for piracy, and disputes as to the title to vessels. Torts also were commonly dealt with; not exclusively what we should now regard as maritime torts. One is surprised, for instance, to find between 1527 and 1541 two actions of slander, - jurisdiction apparently being taken. because the words were spoken on shipboard.

Several interesting documents are printed, bills of lading, charterparties, bills of sale, and bottomry bonds, or bills obligatory. An analogy between the bottomry bond and the policy of insurance is suggested by the case of The George Duffield (p. 106). Money having been lent on bottomry, the vessel was cast away at St. Michael's, not having completed the voyage. Recovery was nevertheless claimed on the bond upon two grounds, that the vessel was unseaworthy when she sailed, ana that the master had abandoned her rather than repair and complete the voyage.

The editor mentions a libel upon a policy of insurance in the year 1550, a very early example of such a suit. It is a pity that the printing of the records is not brought down far enough to include the case. An excellent and artistic reproduction, in copper, of the seal of the Court of Admiralty accompanies the volume.

THE ELEMENTS OF JURISPrudence.

By Thomas Erskine Holland. D.C.L. Seventh Edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1895. 8vo.

pp. xx, 402.

Mr. Holland's book, first published in 1882, has never gone four years without a new edition, and as a treatise on Jurisprudence deserves the popularity which the new editions show that it has enjoyed. Eminently readable, never digressing, as Austin does, to wrestle with giants which do not lie in its path, it furnishes a compact view of the essentials of law from an Anglo-Saxon standpoint. It is never to be forgotten, however,

that Mr. Holland frankly stays at this standpoint. He digresses, when he does digress, into saying that the English law on this point is so-and-so: and those digressions, while they cannot injure, mar the otherwise straightforward consistency of his attachment to his plan.

One point in his classification seems not so good as it might be. Mr. Holland includes in rights in personam those legal phenomena which occur when a carrier or an innkeeper is bound by his calling to certain relations with travellers. Now, it is absurd, or at least useless, to discuss the right which all the world have to the service of an innkeeper as the right of special persons. It serves no purpose to say that Mr. Holland has a right to be carried on the Central Pacific Railway. The relation which that phrase expresses is better to be spoken of as the railway's duty than as the right of any member of the public. It is therefore submitted that a better classification than

This last class includes such duties as a carrier's, a public official's, &c. Sir Frederick Pollock has spoken of this as a defect in classification. It is more than merely that. It has led Mr. Holland to neglect the very important third class.

As one turns over the pages and sees the apt use which is made of American authorities, one is led to a regret, which cannot include blame, that Mr. Holland has not gone farther in our field. The criticism of Coke's phrase about "An Act . . . against Common Right" (and therefore void) might well be illustrated with Mr. Justice Gray's learned note to Paxton's Case, Quincy (Mass.) 51, which treats of the American cases on that point. Some mention of the rout of the Illinois notion of degrees of negligence in the recent reports would seem worth while. So also Mr. Holland's point on page 116 about the rights of the State as such, which he illustrates by the form of prosecution. The Queen v. A. B., and People v. A. B., would be more neatly illustrated by the far more common American form, The State v. A. B., of which he seems to be unaware. And other illustrations might be multiplied if there were not a fear that they might be thought to indicate something wanting. The book is not wanting in good illustrations. Indeed, it is their aptness and number which make one wish that little points like those just mentioned could have been looked on with the aid of every American doctrine or practice which could help on the good work.

R. W. H.

DES CONTRATS PAR CORRESPONDANCE. Par Jules Valery. Paris: Thorin et Fils, 1895. pp. xvi, 461.

It is very refreshing to find some of the subjects which are well threshed out in our common law jurisdictions discussed by a foreigner in the lights in which the needs of his law present them to him.

In the first place the question of the time of acceptance and offer is thoroughly discussed, with a good bibliography; and the respective the