cided January 21, 1913, Judge Amidon, of the District Court for North Dakota, held that hot boxes, loosened drawbars, etc., are matters which constantly arise in the operation of railroads and can not be accepted as excuses under the casualty proviso for the violation of the hours of service law.

In the case of United States v. Houston Belt & Terminal Railway Co. (205 Fed., 334), the court applied the proviso relating to telegraph and telephone operators to towermen operating signals and switches upon telephonic instructions. The court also held that the word "orders 99 as used in the statute was not limited to mean technical "train orders," but includes telephone communications between towermen by which switches are aligned to facilitate the movement of trains.

In a similar case in the District Court of Western Missouri, United States v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co., May 8, 1913, Judge Van Valkenberg decided that switch tenders operating signals and switches upon telephonic instructions received by them at switch shanties were within the provisions of this statute. The court ruled that the use of the words " or other employee " means that somebody besides an operator or train dispatcher was in contemplation of Congress, and that the word "orders" is not limited to technical "train orders." The appeal of the railroad is now pending on appeal in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeal.

In the case of United States v. Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Co., in the District Court for the District of Kansas, decided January 13, 1913, the day operator was on duty from 8 a. m. to 7 p. m., except one hour from 12 noon to 1 p. m., or 10 hours of service out of 11 consecutive hours. The night operator was on duty from 7 p. m. to 6 a. m., except one hour from 12 midnight to 1 a. m. The court held that this was a continuously operated day and night office within the statute, in which operators could not be required to serve more than 9 hours, and that the service in question was a violation of the act.

In the case of United States v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., in the District Court of South Carolina, the same result was reached where the office involved was closed from 1.30 a. m. to 6.30 a. m. In another case against the same defendant in the same court where the office was closed from 10.15 p. m. to 6.30 a. m. the court held that it was not one "continuously operated night and day," for the reason that it was not open for a substantial portion of the night. It was also held by the District Court for the Western District of Michigan, in the case of United States v. Grand Rapids & Indiana Railway Co., that offices closed from 9.30 p. m. to 4.30 a. m. and 11 p. m. to 6.30 a. m., respectively, were not day and night offices within the meaning

and intent of the statute. These three cases are now pending in the proper circuit court of appeal.

The question of permitting operators in a continuously operated office to work longer than nine hours in case of an emergency arose in the case of United States v. Southern Pacific Co., in the district court of Utah, where one of three regular operators became ill. Whereupon the remaining two were required to work 12 hours each, as defendant claimed it was unable to secure a relief operator. The court held such a condition constituted an emergency within the meaning of the statute. The case was appealed by the Government, has been argued, and is now pending decision by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

In a suit against the Denver & Rio Grande Railroad Co. in the district court of Colorado, for requiring operators to remain on duty longer than nine hours in a continuously operated office, the defense was that an emergency had arisen which excused the excess service. The office was one at which three operators are employed, working in shifts of eight hours each. One of the operators became involved in a heated controversy with one of his superiors, which resulted in his immediate dismissal. To fill the vacancy thus created, the two remaining operators were required to work 12 hours a day instead of eight as theretofore. The court refused to hold that this situation constituted an emergency within the contemplation of law. The defendants appealed the case to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. In a suit against the Missouri Pacific Railway Co., in the District Court of Kansas, for requiring an operator in a day office to remain on duty for more than 21 hours, defendant sought to excuse the excess service by reason of a derailment and the necessity for detouring trains via the office involved. The contention of the defendant was sustained on March 22, 1913, and the case is now in the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

In these cases, namely, United States v. Great Northern Railway Co., decided by the District Court for the District of Idaho, July 9, 1913; United States v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co. (206 Fed., 847), and United States v. San Pedro, Los Angeles & Salt Lake Railroad Co., decided by the District Court for the District of Utah, November 20, 1912, it was held that a railroad company requiring a locomotive fireman to remain on duty after 16 hours' train service for the purpose of watching an engine violates the law. The latter case was appealed by the defendant and is now pending decision by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

An order was issued by this Commission June 28, 1911, requiring all carriers subject to the hours of service law to report to it all instances of excess service within 30 days after the end of the month in which such excess service occurred. In a suit against the Yazoo &

Mississippi Valley Railroad Co., for failure to make report in accordance with this order, Judge McCall ruled that the imposition of a penalty of $100 for each day the carrier continued to be in default in making such report is mandatory. (203 Fed., 159.)

In four different districts it has been held in substance that even after unavoidable accident the carrier must relieve the train crew at expiration of 16 hours if possible under the circumstances of the case or at the first station thereafter available for their relief, and in one of these cases it was held that trackage facilities must be maintained at reasonable intervals where trains can be tied up to avoid violation of the 16-hour law. United States v. Southern Railway Co., District Court of South Carolina, October 31, 1913. United States v. Great Northern Railway Co., District Judge Willard, of the district of Minnesota. United States v. San Pedro, Los Angeles & Salt Lake Railroad Co., District Judge Wellborn, of Southern California. United States v. St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad, District Judge Grubb, district of Northern Alabama.

In the case of United States v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co., tried before District Judge Keller, of the southern district of West Virginia, on September 26, 1913, the court instructed the jury that the provisions of the Federal hours of service law are mandatory and that the exercise of diligence on the part of a carrier to prevent its employees working beyond the statutory limit would not serve as a defense.

INVESTIGATION OF ACCIDENTS.

Conditions disclosed by its investigation of train accidents have confirmed the conclusions stated by the Commission in its last annual report to the Congress and emphasized the need of further action by the Federal Government to provide greater safety for travelers and employees upon railroads.

During the year ending June 30, 1913, a total of 76 train accidents were investigated by the Commission. These accidents comprised 51 collisions and 25 derailments, and caused the death of 283 persons and the injury of 1,880 persons. The collisions investigated were responsible for 221 deaths and 1,174 injuries, and the derailments caused 62 deaths and 706 injuries.

The Commission again is compelled to note the exceedingly large proportion of train accidents due to dereliction of duty on the part of employees. Fifty-six of the accidents investigated during the year, or nearly 74 per cent of the whole number, were directly caused by mistakes of employees. These mistakes were of the same nature as those noted by the Commission in its last annual report, namely, disregard of fixed signals; improper flagging; failure to obey train

orders; improper checking of train register; misunderstanding of orders; occupying main track on time of superior train; block operator allowed train to enter occupied block; dispatcher gave lap order or used improper form of order; operator made mistake in copying order; switch left open in face of approaching train; excessive speed; failure to identify train that was met.

These errors are exactly the ones which figure in the causes of train accidents year after year. Their persistence, leading always to the same harrowing results, points inevitably to the truth of one or the other of the following alternatives: Either a great majority of these deplorable railroad disasters are unavoidable or there exists a widespread lack of intelligent and well-directed effort to minimize the mistakes of employees in the operation of trains. It is not believed that all those accidents which are caused by the mistakes of employees are unavoidable. It is quite true that man is prone to error, and as long as absolute reliance is placed upon the human element in the operation of trains accidents are bound to occur, but until it can be shown that all reasonable and proper measures have been taken for its prevention no accident can be classed as unavoidable.

All of the mistakes noted above are violations of simple rules, which should have been easily understood by men of sufficient intelligence to be entrusted with the operation of trains. The evidence is that in the main the rules are understood, but they are habitually violated by employees who are charged with responsibility for the safe movement of trains. The evidence also is that in many cases operating officers are cognizant of this habitual disregard of rules and no proper steps are taken to correct the evil. Many operating officers seem to proceed upon the theory that their responsibility ends with the promulgation of rules, apparently overlooking the fact that no matter how inherently good a'rule may be, it is of no force unless it is obeyed. On very many railroads there is little or no system of inspection or supervision of the work of train-service employees so far as pertains to those matters which vitally affect safety. Employees are not examined on the operating rules except at the time of their promotion, and only the most perfunctory efforts are made to determine their fitness to perform the duties assigned to them from time to time.

This lack of supervision and inspection with respect to matters affecting the safety of trains is unexplainable when the careful supervision of all matters directly affecting the revenue of the roads is considered. The auditing and checking systems used for detecting the dishonesty of employees are marvels of ingenuity and careful attention to detail, but means of determining whether trains are operated in accordance with the requirements of safety and in conformity with the rules are almost entirely lacking. Road foremen

are employed to supervise the work of enginemen and to instruct them in their duties, but such supervision and instruction pertain mainly to matters affecting the proper working of engines so as to economize in the use of fuel, oil, and other supplies; instruction on the rules is either entirely neglected or made secondary to matters of economy. Instruction in the use of the air brake is quite general, but this, again, is mainly for the purpose of improving practice in the direction of economy by eliminating shocks and break-in-twos in the handling of trains, thus reducing the money loss caused by damaged equipment and lading. The prevention of accidents by a strict observance of operating rules means not only the saving of human life but of large sums of money as well. It would seem, therefore, that adequate inspection and supervision of the work of employees to insure safety in operation would be amply justified from the standpoint of economy alone.

In previous reports the Commission has recommended legislation requiring the standardization of operating rules. It is vital to the safe movement of trains that rules should be explicit and uniform in character, so that they may be easily understood and that there may be no doubt as to their application. To this end Federal legislation is necessary. Such legislation also should require proper supervision of employees to insure that the rules are obeyed, as well as systematic instruction and examinations at stated intervals to make certain that no employee is permitted to be in a responsible position unless he is thoroughly familiar with his duties and competent to perform them. One of the prominent causes of rear-end collisions is improper flagging, many cases of which can be directly traced to the indefinite nature of the standard flagging rule in force on a majority of the roads. This rule leaves the matter of safe flagging entirely to the judgment of the flagman. Under such a rule, when men of slight experience are employed as flagmen, as is frequently the case, errors of judgment are bound to occur and collisions are likely to follow. Investigations into a number of collisions due to improper flagging have shown that the men at fault were so lacking in experience that they could not reasonably have been expected to exercise good judgment nor appreciate the full responsibility of their position. When such men are required to work under the direction of indefinite and ambiguous rules, it can not be said that proper measures have been taken to avoid accidents.

Seven of the collisions investigated during the year were caused by the failure of enginemen to obey the indications of block signals. One serious derailment also was due to this cause. In these 8 accidents 78 persons were killed and 205 were injured. Disobedience of signal indications on block-signaled railroads is one of the most serious phases of the accident situation. Such disobedience often