GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES SUBCOMMITTEE

1. "Problems Confronting the FAA in the Development of an Air Traffic Control System for the 1970's." House Report No. 91-1308, July 16, 1970. Twenty-Ninth Report by the Committee on Government Operations.

(a) Summary.-A hearing was held on January 27, 1970, for the purpose of considering the problems confronting the Federal Aviation Administration in the development of an air traffic control system for the 1970's. An in-depth analysis of the testimony presented at the hearing, along with other information available to the subcommittee, resulted in a report issued on July 16, 1970.

In its review, the subcommittee investigated the status of the development of the National Airspace System, a concept for air traffic control emanating from a scientific study called for by President Kennedy in March 1961. This 1961 study gave birth to the "Project Beacon" report which set out the general guidelines for a modern air traffic control system designed to meet the Nation's air traffic control needs through the 1970's.

The subcommittee found that by the 10th anniversary of the "Project Beacon" report in 1971, no significant element of the new air traffic control system recommended in that report will be in operation. The FAA's present estimate for completion of the system is mid-1974, a 6-year program schedule slippage.

During that 10 years, the growth in air travel will have exceeded all predictions. The increases in the capacity of FAA's air traffic control system have not kept pace with that growth. There has been no significant technical improvement in the equipment available to the air traffic controller, and the Nation's construction program has continued to fall behind. The Nation is now witnessing, at times, the complete saturation of some of our larger airports.

An equally serious problem discovered by the subcommittee was the total lack of air traffic control facilities in scores of airports across the Nation with regularly scheduled commercial traffic. A disproportionate number of disasters have occurred in and around airports with no towers, no surveillance radars, and no instrument landing systems.

The subcommittee found that the deficiencies in the air traffic control system and the excessive delays in the implementation of the National Airspace System have been primarily caused by a gross lack of funds during the past 10 years. The subcommittee also found that many deficiencies were symptomatic of poor administration and management, that the FAA lacked adequate in-house research and development facilities, and that the FAA and its predecessor organization, the CAA, did not have full responsibility for air traffic control design and improvements after 1955, but had "farmed out" these responsibilities to outside groups of experts, resulting in the development of faulty and deficient air traffic control systems and seriously diminish

ing FAA's ability to develop and maintain essential systems and planning capacity as well as the general morale of agency personnel. The subcommittee recommended that

(1) Full responsibility for air traffic control developments and improvements be resumed by FAA;

(2) FAA reappraise its estimate of the funding requirements for air traffic control;

(3) FAA renew efforts to develop within the agency an adequate systems design and planning capability;

(4) FAA make full use of the research center at Cambridge, Mass.;

(5) FAA develop an effective plan for the separation of controlled and uncontrolled aircraft; and,

(6) FAA undertake whatever action is necessary to avoid the management and administrative deficiencies which have compromised air traffic control development in the past, as discussed in the report.

(b) Benefits. The subcommittee's in-depth study points out areas of significant deficiencies in the development of an adequate air traffic control system. The failures of the past have been thoroughly documented and studied. As a result of this study, the Congress and other responsible public officials can, hopefully, take appropriate action to forestall the presently impending failure of the National Airspace System, the concept designed for the 1970's.

The report singles out specific areas that require attention. General areas of concern, such as lack of adequate funding, were also dealt with at length. The subcommittee's study should give the President, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Appropriations Committees of the Congress greater insight into the needs of the FAA if an acceptable air traffic control system is to be available during the decade of the seventies.

The most important benefit of the study is the ominous alarm it sounds as to the grave consequences we face if our progress in modernizing our air traffic control system continues at its present pace. The system is already straining at its limits of capacity and will become woefully inadequate as faster and larger aircraft fly into and out of more and more air terminals. The subcommittee considers this matter to be most serious and will continue its investigations into air traffic control problems and developments.

(c) Hearings.-A hearing was held on January 27, 1970. The transcript has been printed.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

1. "Deficiencies in Administration of Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act." House Report No. 91-637, November 13, 1969. Eleventh Report by the Committee on Government Operations.

(a) Summary. This report examined administration by the Department of Agriculture of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). The act, which provides for regulation of pesticides by the Department of Agriculture (USDA), was enacted in 1947. The act prohibits shipment of pesticides in interstate commerce unless they are registered by the Department: pesticide products may not be registered unless there is adequate evidence they are safe and effective when used as directed. The law authorizes seizure and removal from the market of products which are not registered or are otherwise in violation of the act, and provides criminal penalties for persons responsible for interstate shipment of such products.

Primary responsibility for administration of the act, at the time of the investigation, was assigned to the Pesticides Regulation Division (PRD) of USDA's Agricultural Research Service. PRD had separate branches for registration and enforcement activities.

The report concludes that the Pesticides Regulation Division had "failed almost completely" until mid-1967 to enforce provisions of FIFRA intended to protect the public from illegal marketing of hazardous and ineffective pesticides. Prior to mid-1967, the report found, no attempt was made to systematically remove illegal pesticides from marketing channels when PRD inspectors located samples of such products. Despite evidence of repeated violations by some shippers, not one criminal prosecution had been initiated for more than 10 years.

The report found that significant improvements in enforcement procedures had been made since the appointment in 1967 of Lowell E. Miller as PRD's Assistant Director for Enforcement. These included establishment of procedures for recall action and multiple seizures to remove illegal products from marketing channels and adoption of operating guidelines for initiation of criminal prosecution. While enforcement procedures had been improved, the report found that serious deficiencies in registration procedures and related activities still existed. Specific findings included the following:

Numerous pesticide products were approved for sale by PRD over unresolved safety objections of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. The exact number of such products on the market was not known because PRD kept no record and failed or even refused to inform HEW of the action taken on objections. Although an interdepartmental agreement provided for unresolved objections by HEW to be referred to the Secretary of Agriculture before the product involved was registered, not one of more than 1,600 such objections over a 5-year period was so referred.

PRD had approved pesticide products for uses which it knew or should have known were practically certain to result in illegal adulteration of food.

Pesticide products had been approved for marketing with inadequate labeling; in some instances, directions for using pesticide products directly contradicted warning notices on the same label. Although PRD regarded its arrangements for obtaining information on pesticide poisonings as working well, it received reports on only 163 pesticide poisonings in 1968. Other Federal agencies received about 5,000 such reports and the total number of pesticide poisonings is estimated to be as high as 40,000 or 50,000 annually.

PRD had specific authority for more than 5 years to cancel registrations of pesticides believed to be unsafe or ineffective, but had never secured cancellation of a registration in a contested case. Until late 1969 PRD did not even have procedures for conducting hearings in cancellation proceedings; when registrants receiving cancellation notices requested hearings, cancellation action was halted indefinitely and the product left on the market.

In some instances, PRD knowingly left illegal and potentially hazardous products on the market.

PRD had no procedures for warning the public when it learned of possible hazards relating to particular pesticide products. In addition to serious deficiencies in procedures for regulation of pesticides, the report found that the Agricultural Research Service had failed to take proper precautions to prevent possible conflicts of interest. It gives details of three separate situations disclosed by the subcommittee investigation involving possible violations of Federal conflict of interest laws. All three situations involve persons affiliated with the same private firm, and all three were referred by the Department of Agriculture to the Department of Justice.

The report makes detailed recommendations for action by the Department of Agriculture to correct the deficiencies disclosed by the subcommittee investigation.

(b) Benefits. The report has resulted in significant improvement in administration of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, and is expected to bring about further improvement, thereby providing the public with substantially greater protection against hazardous and ineffective pesticides. The following specific changes are among those reported:

A new interdepartmental agreement between the Departments of Agriculture, Health, Education, and Welfare, and Interior in January 1970. The agreement defined more clearly the responsibilities of each of the Departments and provided a formal procedure for resolving any difference that might arise in connection with the registration of economic poisons.

Since the beginning of the subcommittee investigation, several hundred recalls of products that were mislabeled, ineffective, or contaminated have been initiated and seven cases have been referred to the Department of Justice for criminal prosecution. Manpower and resources available for pesticides regulation have been substantially increased.

Procedures for conducting cancellation proceedings have been established and a substantial number of cancellation actions have been initiated.

(c) Hearings.-Public hearings were held on May 7 and June 24, 1969. Transcript has been printed.

2. "Accident and Injury Data." House Report No. 91-775, December 19, 1969. Nineteenth Report by the Committee on Government Operations.

(a) Summary.-This report examines the adequacy of arrangements by Federal departments and agencies for collecting and utilizing accident and injury data.

Almost all accidents or injuries can logically be classified in one of three broad categories: (1) those occurring in or around the home or involving recreational activities; (2) industrial or occupational accidents or injuries; and (3) accidents or injuries involving various forms of transportation. Because of legal reporting requirements, Federal and State regulatory activities, insurance and workmen's compensation claims, information available in the second and third categories is far more complete than that available for the first category. Consequently, the subcommittee concentrated its inquiry on arrangements for collecting data relating to the first category of accidents and injuries.

The subcommittee found that adequate information concerning household accidents and injuries, although essential for the proper implementation of Federal programs intended to protect the public from hazardous substances and to help prevent avoidable accidents, was not available. It found, moreover, that there was no coordinated system in existence within the Federal Government for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating such information. While some potentially useful information about household accidents and injuries was being collected by Federal agencies, the subcommittee found that much of it was not being used advantageously because it was not reaching the agencies which should have it or was not in usable form. The subcommittee also concluded that it would be possible to obtain valuable additional data with very little added cost or effort through minor modifications of existing programs.

The subcommittee found that in too many instances responsible Federal agencies had failed to take appropriate corrective action even after receiving information concerning hazardous products and substances. It concluded that fragmented and overlapping jurisdiction had undoubtedly aggravated this problem.

The subcommittee concluded that the National Commission on Product Safety, in sharp contrast to the performance of some other agencies, had done an outstanding job, both in obtaining accident and injury data and in initiating remedial action when the information obtained indicated it was needed.

The report recommended that the Bureau of the Budget, which has legal responsibility for developing programs and issuing regulations and orders for improved Federal statistical information activities, act promptly to establish a coordinated system for collection, analysis, and dissemination by Federal agencies of data relating to household accidents and injuries. The report indicated that it would be inappropriate to establish such a system on a permanent basis before conclu