16. At the time of Mr. Valenti's intercession, the Navy operating elements had decided that use of a carrier for filming scenes was feasible, and Public Affairs was awaiting a formal Navy decision in writing as a basis for reconsidering its adverse decision, which Twentieth CenturyFox had reclamaed. Mr. Valenti's intercession had the effect of bringing the decision to the level of the Secretary of Defense, who passed it on to the Deputy Secretary, Paul H. Nitze, a former Secretary of the Navy. The outcome was to get top-level endorsement of what the Navy wanted to do all along.

17. Twentieth Century-Fox was permitted to use the carrier Yorktown for filming take-off but not landing operations of company-owned aircraft, simulating Japanese Zeros and flown by Navy or Marine pilots on leave for this purpose and made up as Japanese flyers. The Yorktown commanding officer did permit, on his own responsibility, "touch and go" landings, in which the pilot dips down to the deck but does not actually land; then a separate film sequence shows an aircraft rolling along the deck as if the landing actually were made. No accident occurred during the carrier filming scenes. Other accidents, in which seven men received burns on the deck of a ship and two pilots were killed by prefilming flight crashes, were not connected with the carrier operations.

18. The military pilots who flew the aircraft, and the enlisted men who performed as extras, did so voluntarily, on leave status, and were compensated for their participation. Granting of concerted leave was an accommodation to the film project which the Navy viewed as permissible within the context of officially-approved cooperation and within the laws and regulations relating to off-duty employment of military personnel.

19. Twentieth Century-Fox appeared responsive in complying with official requests or otherwise taking steps to protect Government personnel and equipment in the conduct of filming operations and to save the Government harmless from liability in appropriate circumstances. In the case of the six enlisted men who required hospitalization for burns, the company bore their medical and hospital expenses.

20. We have seen no evidence which indicates that Government assistance to Twentieth Century-Fox caused significant interference with normal military operations or operational readiness. Such assistance is approved in the first instance with a "no interference" restriction, and compliance rests with the operating elements. The Navy extended a large amount of cooperative effort, reimbursable or otherwise, and Navy ships were held up for varying brief periods to accommodate filming requirements, but we cannot say that these exceeded permissible bounds in the context of DOD policy and Navy cooperation.

21. There was some unfavorable public comment regarding use of American military men and equipment to portray Japanese attackers in the film. The Navy has pointed out that such use is not unprecedented. The earlier (1954) directive on Government assistance to audiovisual projects barred "the use of Department of Defense personnel or materiel to depict personnel or action of other nations except in extraordinary circumstances." The current directives do not carry this limitation.

ISSUE OF CARRIER USE

Since Mr. Valenti's intercession has been highlighted in the Reasoner-Wallace program, newspaper articles, and various congressional correspondence and remarks, and is the most controversial issue, we will now examine it in some detail. This issue goes only to the use of a Navy aircraft carrier, not to other assistance. The Department of Defense had agreed to extend cooperation long before Mr. Valenti came on the scene. However, the issue of carrier use, a sensitive one which caused divided opinion within the Defense establishment, was left for later resolution.

The immediate Government parties in conflict were the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), which is charged by DOD Instruction 5410.15 with approving and implementing all DOD assistance to outside persons or agencies in the production of audiovisual materials, and the Office of the Chief of Information, Department of the Navy, which department in this film project would be the major source and means of Government assistance.

When the "Tora" project was broached to the Government, Arthur Sylvester was the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. He was succeeded by Phil G. Goulding, who was in office when Mr. Valenti wrote about the use of the carrier. Daniel Z. Henkin now holds the office, within which a Directorate for Defense Information headed by Col. Rodger R. Bankson, and the Audio-Visual Division headed by Norman T. Hatch, handle the matter of assistance to motion picture companies and other media. Hereafter we will refer to Assistant Secretary Henkin's office and sub-offices as Public Affairs.

Within the Navy the Office of Information has counterpart responsibilities for dealing with the media. During the period of the film project, that office was headed, respectively, by Rear Admiral Henry L. Miller and the incumbent, Rear Admiral Lawrence R. Geis. Their deputies, respectively, were Captains Pickett Lumpkin and K. W. Wade (incumbent). The Media Relations Division and the AudioVisual Branch are the sub-offices directly concerned with the film project. Operational aspects of Government assistance are within the jurisdiction of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and the theater and fleet commanders, in this case primarily the Commander-in-Chief Pacific (CincPac) and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. The Navy project officer assigned to the film was Commander Edward P. Stafford. By DOD instruction the project officer represents Public Affairs at the DOD level.

After DOD assistance in the filming of "Tora! Tora! Tora!" was requested in September 1966, copies of the script were submitted and reviewed by all the military services. The Navy Chief of Information (Rear Admiral Miller) in a memorandum dated August 28, 1967 recommended to Public Affairs that Navy cooperation with the film maker be approved after historical accuracy was achieved within the script. The Navy memorandum pointed out that because of the extensive nature of the project, Navy assistance would extend only to those sequences portraying American naval forces and should remain within reasonable limits to avoid the impairment of operational efficiency. Public Affairs adopted the sense of this recommendation and advised Twentieth Century-Fox that if the company would accept DOD sug

gested changes and agree to abide by applicable directives, the script would be acceptable. The company was asked to submit a requirements list. It is this list which sets forth what specific kinds of assistance from the Government will be needed.

The requirements list was submitted on September 20, 1967 by producer Elmo Williams. It included a request for use of an aircraft carrier to film take-offs and landings of planes (not military but separately to be acquired by the company) made up as Japanese aircraft. This requirements list was circulated within the Defense Department and among affected commands. A message of September 28, 1967 from Public Affairs to CincPac observed that the film would be a major and complicated production involving extensive DOD assistance, mainly through CincPac. The message recommended careful analysis of the requirements list by all concerned and a response by October 18,

1967.

After a visit to CincPac during October 16-18, 1967, Mr. Hatch of the Audio-Visual Division in Public Affairs prepared a trip report dated October 27, in which he noted that the problem to be resolved by headquarters higher than CincPac was whether the Navy would make exception to regulations and allow the film company to land and launch planes from a carrier deck. The regulations were not identified, but Navy regulations made the CNO responsible for deciding who can come aboard and depart from a naval vessel. The trip report also noted that the Deputy Commander of the Pacific Fleet (Vice Adm. Baumberg) "had read the script and thought it was well prepared. He indicated that he had told his people in operations to assist in whatever way they could as long as operations were not interfered with." CincPac made it clear to Public Affairs that the command would defer to the CNO regarding take-offs and landing of civilian aircraft from a carrier. A CincPac message of November 16, 1967 stated that support of the requirements for the film project was feasible and recommended military cooperation, providing the military departments approved the authenticity of the film. CincPac noted that the question of carrier use was still unresolved but said that the Pacific Fleet Commander foresaw no difficulty in obtaining experienced Naval aviators who could become current (in the operation of the older aircraft envisioned for use), providing the CNO granted the necessary authority to operate from a carrier. A copy of the CincPac message was transmitted to the Office of the Navy Chief of Information with a request that Public Affairs be advised of Navy wishes and specifically in the matter of approval by the CNO of carrier use.

The Navy Chief of Information (through Capt. R. M. Koontz) responded to this request by a memorandum to Public Affairs dated December 18, 1967. He said that the problems of obtaining aircraft pilots and authority to operate aircraft from a carrier appeared feasible of solution. He believed there would be no trouble in finding a sufficient. number of volunteer flyers for this project, provided they received some compensation for the work. (At this point, the need was identified as eight SBD aircraft pilots, and the likely candidates to fly them were considered by the Navy to be A-1 pilots.) The basic problem, he pointed out, was to insure carrier suitability of the aircraft. The preparatory work and planning factors for these requirements were out

lined. The memorandum also reported that the Navy expected to formulate its position on the film script in the near future.

A CincPac message of the same date, December 18, to Mr. Hatch of the Audio-Visual Division commenting on the requirements list included this statement: "A carrier which could be utilized may not be available in Hawaii during regular filming time. During the 15-16 weeks it is anticipated that a carrier will be available either in Hawaii or in the San Diego area."

The Washington office of Twentieth Century-Fox was advised by Public Affairs, through letter dated February 2, 1968, that the film script was acceptable to the Department of Defense, providing certain stated revisions were satisfactorily made. The letter also stated certain. exceptions to the requirements list. It noted that the question of landing aircraft on a carrier was under advisement, but for planning purposes at this time, an alternate plan suggested by the Defense Department had best be considered. The alternate plan, we were advised, was conveyed as a verbal suggestion by Mr. Hatch of Public Affairs that a mockup carrier be constructed on the beach by Twentieth Century-Fox, with scenes filmed looking toward the water.

Apparently this suggestion was deemed not practical or not realistic enough, for the Washington office of Twentieth Century-Fox, on August 1, 1968, requested permission to use the U.S.S. Valley Forge for three film shooting days about the middle of November 1968. The ship was expected to arrive in San Diego within a few days and be in the area for several months. The Valley Forge was considered suitable because of its straight deck (the angled deck design for aircraft carriers post dates the Pearl Harbor episode). The company said that it had acquired 28 planes to use in carrier take-off and landing scenes. It also wanted to make preliminary tests of these operations at El Toro and North Island stations a week or ten days prior to shooting, using Naval Reserve and Marine Corps pilots who were qualified and who could be placed on leave for flying the aircraft on and off the carrier.

The Navy Chief of Information (through Captain Koontz) sent a memorandum dated August 2, 1968 to Public Affairs, which said, after suggesting some changes in the script: "The final script is considered acceptable and continued Navy cooperation with this production is recommended."

By memorandum dated August 6, Public Affairs asked the Navy for material to formulate a reply to the company request for the Valley Forge, noting that the issue of carrier use had been held under advisement since February 2.

At this point in time the apparent attitudes on the Government side were reluctance by Public Affairs but an inclination by Navy to approve the use of a carrier. There was some noticeable exasperation in Public Affairs that the Navy had not clearly stated that carrier landings would be allowed. The Navy had never said "no". It seemed to say "yes", but there was no clear-cut statement in writing.

The Navy was researching a number of legal questions: (1) Could Navy pilots be permitted to participate on a leave status? (2) Would they still be covered by Government insurance? (3) Would the Government be liable if they were killed or injured on leave status? (4) Would the Government be liable if civilian personnel were killed or

injured by flight deck incidents? (5) And, finally, what exempting action was required to permit FAA-licensed (civilian) aircraft to fly from a Navy ship?

The questions were placed before the Judge Advocate General (JAG) of the Navy (Rear Adm. Joseph B. McDevitt). His memorandum dated August 12, 1968, to the Navy Chief of Information, saw no legal obstacle to Navy pilots taking leave to fly aircraft for the filming scenes, but this legal answer was expressly distinguished from the policy question whether such use of military pilots was advisable in view of the stringent demands imposed on active duty flying personnel by the Vietnam war. (Public Affairs officials advised us that there was no real problem of competition with Vietnam requirements since qualified pilots could be found among older officers on desk jobs.) The JAG also expressed the opinion that leave status would not affect the insurance or other benefits protecting the military pilots. As for claims affecting civilian personnel, it was recommended that Twentieth Century-Fox get full insurance coverage to protect the United States (which the company proceeded to do).

Regarding civilian access to a carrier, the JAG pointed out that the CNO by article 0768 of Navy regulations was responsible for the "passage in and protracted visits to aircraft and vessels of the Navy." There was no law limiting the CNO in prescribing rules for this type of activity, other than supervisory authority through the normal chain of command. If Public Affairs fully approved the project, said the JAG, the CNO could legally authorize licensed FAA aircraft to fly from a Navy carrier, subject to restrictions against diversions of equipment. Thus, a carrier should not be diverted from its normal military locations, but if it were necessary to do so for filming purposes, diversions should be held to a minimum and the Government should be reimbursed for expenses incurred in the diversions (in accord with the applicable DOD Instruction).

The Navy JAG opinion was transmitted by the Navy Chief of Information to Public Affairs with a memorandum dated August 26, 1968. The memorandum, which was addressed from Rear Adm. Miller to Assistant Secretary Goulding, emphasized that the Navy had done a great deal of survey work in the past year to help Twentieth Century-Fox and to determine what was needed by the way of cooperation. Because of the reservations which Public Affairs seemed to have toward the use of an aircraft carrier, the Navy Chief of Information wanted to know what Public Affairs would approve, to preclude further time-consuming work by the Navy and pursuit of expensive plans by the film producer. The content and tone of this memorandum indicated the Navy belief that lack of a clear-cut position was the fault of Public Affairs, the reverse of the attitude indicated in Public Affairs toward the Navy.

On August 27, 1968, Col. Bankson, the Director of Defense Information in Public Affairs, advised the Washington office of Twentieth Century-Fox that an operational carrier could not be authorized under current DOD instructions. Since the carrier would represent a Japanese ship, assistance would have to be rendered on a courtesy basis, but in this instance it would involve improper utilization of manpower and equipment, even if the costs of the carrier and flight deck crews were paid for a two- or three-day period. More important-and this was the

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