agement in a separate office in the Executive Office of the President, and take steps to insure that the office is adequately staffed. Results. The Office of Telecommunications Management has been strengthened with the addition of more staff, but has not yet completed its staffing to a level considered adequate to meet current needs. The administration considered, but took no action on, a reorganization plan which would have made this a separate office in the Executive Office of the President.

ROLE OF OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS MANAGEMENT (Recommendation 7):

The Office of the Director of Telecommunications Management, when reorganized and properly staffed, should undertake a study of the National Communications System and the longrange requirements and policies of the United States in the telecommunications field.

Results. While the staffing of the Office of the Director of Telecommunications has not reached a level adequate for full studies, certain actions were taken and studies made of the National Communications System and the long-range telecommunications requirements and policies of the United States. NCS plans were reviewed and guidance was provided. Guidance also was provided for the executive departments and agencies with respect to use of satellite systems, and to providing technical information and assistance to other countries. Other work has been accomplished on the problems of frequency management and specific new programs in telecommunications.

On January 4, 1965, the President issued Executive Order No. 11191, delegating his responsibilities under the communications management in the Office of Emergency Planning and to the Secretary of State. This order provides more adequately and formally for the full execution of the responsibilities under the act.

IMPROVE NASA/DOD COOPERATION (Recommendation 8):

Instead of the inadequate cooperation that has characterized the NASA/DOD efforts to date in communications satellite. research and development programs, we recommend that military and civil agency programs be defined and planned in complementary fashion. There are sufficient coordinating instruments to effect better integration of these activities.

Results. Both NASA and DOD reported efforts to improve cooperation in communications satellite research and development programs. However, the applications technology satellite program of NASA and the Defense communication satellite programs have been pursued with different objectives.

35-252-69- -3

[H. Rept. No. 445, 89th Cong., first sess.]

GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS IN SPACE (ANALYSIS OF CIVIL-MILITARY ROLES AND RELATIONSHIPS)

Thirteenth Report by the Committee on Government Operations

(Submitted to the Speaker June 4, 1965)

This report reviews Government space activities since their beginning and analyzes the major organizational and management issues in a field which occupies the attention of over 11 agencies. Considerable attention is given in the report to working relations and division of labor between Department of Defense and National Aeronautics and Space Administration which agencies account for almost all of the Federal space expenditures, currently running at approximately $7 billion annually.

The report explores in some detail the recent problem of determining the proper role of the military in manned space experimentation. The specific issues involved in this problem include delays in decisionmaking, potential duplication between DOD and NASA in programs for orbiting space laboratories, and the lack of centralized long-range planning for a national space program.

RECOMMENDATIONS

BEGIN WORK ON MANNED ORBITING LABORATORY PROJECT (Recommendation 1):

The committee believes that in the interest of national security, the potential manned military uses of space deserve immediate increased attention. As a large step forward in exploring potential military uses, the Department of Defense should, without further delay, commence full-scale development of a manned orbital laboratory (MOL) project.

Results. The President of the United States announced on August 25, 1965, that the Air Force had been directed to proceed with fullscale development of the manned orbital laboratory (MOL).1

NASA PARTICIPATION IN MOL PROJECT (Recommendation 2): Pending the development of NASA's future plans and projects, appropriate arrangements should be made for NASA participation, through funding and selected experiments, in the Defense Department MOL project. The committee makes the above recommendation for a MOL without prejudice to NASA's future requirements for manned space stations, fully recognizing that space stations or laboratories will serve important civilian as well as military space purposes. The compelling need of the moment is to overcome a military lag in space technology.

1 The information in this report was correct as of the end of the 90th Congress. Subsequently, in April 1969, the MOL project was cancelled.

Results.-NASA has continued to plan and fund for an advanced orbiting research laboratory, within the framework of somewhat reduced budgets. NASA is kept informed of scientific experiments through the National Aeronautics and Space Council, through the Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board, and by other forms of cooperation.

BOLSTER ROLE OF NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE COUNCIL (Recommendation 3):

A renewed attempt should be made at the presidential level to formulate specific long-range national space plans. The parallel studies, competitive maneuvering, confused pronouncements, and potentially overlapping or duplicating plans by NASA and DOD for manned orbital projects strongly suggest the need for more orderly, systematic planning of future space projects on a national basis. To this end, the National Aeronautics and Space Council, chaired by the Vice President, should be given the needed presidential support and staff resources which will enable it to exercise greater initiative and execute its duties in the full range and broad intent of the National Aeronautics and Space Act. Results. The problem of potential duplication of the MOL project is under active study in order that savings of considerable size can be realized in a field of experimentation useful both to the military and civil agencies. MOL experiments have been improved, changed, substituted, or cancelled in the course of the project, and one of the criteria for such action has been interagency comment and coordination. The Space Council has been an active forum for such coordination and control.

PLANNING FOR BROAD AND BALANCED SPACE PROGRAM (Recommendation 4):

Long-range planning for a balanced national space program must take account of these factors: (a) NASA will continue to be the leading agency for space exploration and development; (b) as space technology progresses, the military potentials will increasingly emerge and the military role will be correspondingly enlarged; and (c) other civilian agencies besides NASA, such as the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commerce Department, have important contributions to make to the national space effort. In assigning agency responsibilities, the Congress gave NASA a broad but not an exclusive responsibility in space research and development. It also gave full consideration to the fact that the Department of Defense would be actively involved and that other Government agencies would participate in space activities relevant to their missions and fields of interests. Results. The military space program has been carefully defined and funded. The AEC auxiliary power reactor program has continued to be very productive; however, the nuclear rocket program has continually stalled or stretched out. Planning appears to have taken these matters into account, but not to have made adequate provision for backups or alternatives.

RESTRICTIONS ON DEVELOPMENT (Recommendation 5):

The committee cautions against a too rigorous insistance that operational requirements be defined before permitting developments in new technological areas. These constraints tend to dry up initiative in the field, to inhibit new ideas at government and contractor sources, to create protracted uncertainties and delays, and to dissipate valuable technical resources. We cite military space development as a case in point, and we recommend that the Department of Defense take vigorous action to disassociate hard and fast military requirements from the new but rapidly growing area of space technology. Similar considerations should apply in the case of nuclear space developments. Results. Various types of DOD-supported space technology projects have continued, although certain inherent conflicts of operational systems and development persist. Currently, the Sentinel ABM system has been given a go-ahead; it is not yet clear how much of available technical resources the project will absorb, so as to affect the whole field of space technology.

INTERAGENCY USE OF FACILITIES (Recommendation 6):

In the interests of economy and efficiency, the committee urges that Government agencies involved in space, particularly NASA and DOD, use each other's facilities and resources to the greatest possible extent. Single management, standardization, and common use of ranges, control centers, tracking networks, and other ground support facilities and services should be encouraged in order to minimize costly duplication and the creation of separate additional facilities for each new program. Reimbursement principles should be clarified and updated.

Results. Certain NASA and Air Force facilities have been planned and operated for common use. Reimbursement regulations, as well as rules for specific operations, such as launchings, have been updated.

INCREASED ACTIVITY OF NATIONAL SPACE COUNCIL (Recommendation 7):

To promote and guide coordination among the agencies, the committee recommends that the National Aeronautics and Space Council, under the leadership of the Vice President, serve as the focal point in reconciling interagency conflicts and in harmonizing relationships. A current registry of all written agreements for interagency cooperation should be maintained by the

Council.

Results. The Space Council has taken a more active role in the planning and oversight of the national space program, particularly in the area of interagency relations.

INTERAGENCY USE OF PROCUREMENT AND MANAGEMENT EXPERIENCE (Recommendation 8):

The committee recommends that NASA give increased careful attention to management techniques that have been developed in the Department of Defense and draw freely upon the wealth of military experience in procurement and management of large resources and undertakings. The pursuit of economy and efficiency in Government operations in space involves internal management as well as interagency coordination. Each agency must have a zealous regard for careful procurement and good management, striving to insure timely performance, high reliability and reasonable costs.

Results.-NASA has continued to draw upon DOD experience in several ways: (1) DOD program management personnel are used where beneficial; (2) DOD regulations and handbooks are used interchangeably when possible; (3) NASA sometimes uses contract support developed by DOD. Examples are PERT/Cost, cost reduction program, incentive contracting, etc.

REUSABLE BOOSTERS AND SPACECRAFT (Recommendation 9): The committee recommends that careful and intensive consideration be given to achieving future economies in space operations with greater standardization of systems and subsystems and through such techniques as recoverable and reusable boosters and spacecraft. The United States is and will continue to be heavily committed to space exploration and development. It is not too early to be concerned with the large money-savings potentials in advanced space technology.

Results. Renewed attention is being given to the economic advantages over the long term of space exploration of reusable and recoverable space vehicles. DOD, for example, in the early stages of the MOL project used Gemini capsules already flown once by NASA in its program, at an estimated saving of over $15 million. These were heat shield qualifications tests.

Reusable booster programs have not yet been defined or funded.

SECURITY POLICY FOR DOD SPACE PROGRAMS (Recommendation 10):

The Department of Defense should pursue a more realistic security policy in its space program. The official public pretense that certain programs and requirements do not exist should be dropped. Normal classification standards should permit the identification of names and purposes of Defense space projects and launches. The need to restrict access to highly sensitive information should not affect aspects of the military space program not in that category. A broader dissemination of information on military space technology is necessary in the interests