S e SENATOR SHERMAN'S PROPOSED RELIEF אן N a carefully prepared speech in the United States Senate last week, Senator Sherman supported the following resolution introduced by him: "Resolved, That, by injurious legislation by the Fifty-third Congress, the revenues of the Government were reduced below its necessary expenditures, and the fund, created by law, for the redemption of United States notes has been invaded to supply such deficiencies of reserve; that such a misapplication of the resumption fund is of doubtful legality, and is greatly injurious to the public credit and should be prevented by restoring said fund to the sums of not less than $100,000,000 in gold coin or bullion (to be segregated from all other funds), to be paid out only in the redemption of United States notes; and such notes when redeemed to be reissued only in exchange for gold coin and bullion." After assigning the Wilson tariff law as the cause of a continual reduction of revenues below expenditures, and referring to the issue of $162,315,400 in bonds to meet current expenses during this Administration, Senator Sherman declared that the true remedy for the supposed financial distress "is to supply by taxation in some form additional revenue, and, until this can be effected, to borrow from the people of the United States enough money to cover past and future deficiencies. This done, gold will be readily exchanged for United States notes, as was done from January, 1879. to the election of Mr. Cleveland." Mr. Sherman took direct issue with the President for attributing all our financial difficulties to the continued circulation of United States notes and Treasury notes-"debts bearing no interest, amounting to only $500,000,000." "The right to reissue," Mr. Sherman asserted, “is a necessary incident to a circulating note. The United States does what every bank does, and by this provision furnishes a note for circulation better than any yet devised by mortal man. Regarding the preservation of the gold reserve, he said: "The two defects in existing law relating to redemption are mentioned by the President. First, that the notes presented for redemption must be reissued. (It seems from the newspapers that he has found the power to hold notes redeemed until they can be exchanged for coin, a discovery that he should have made sooner.) Second, that the resumption fund is a part of the general balance in the Treasury, and may be applied to current expenditures. Congress neglected to cure the defects pointed out by me as Secretary of the Treasury in 1880, but I hope will correct them now at the request of the President. It was not then anticipated that a deficiency of revenue would occur, or that if it did occur the Government would use a fund specifically pledged for another purpose to meet current liabilities. Notes once redeemed should only be reissued for gold coin, and such reissue should be mandatory when coin is deposited in the Treasury. With this provision of law the scarcity of currency would create such a demand for it that gold will be freely deposited in exchange for the more portable and convenient notes of the United States. The resumption fund should be segregated from all other moneys of the United States and paid out only in redemption of United States notes. With such provisions in the law the resumption fund could not be invaded to meet deficiencies in the revenue. They should be provided for by bonds or certificates of indebtedness of small denominations at a low rate of interest, which would be readily taken by the people through national banks, sub-treasuries, and post-offices." Treasury notes only, in order to prevent timid banks from con- "National banks are the creation and instruments of the Government, and ought not to be allowed to discredit the money with which they can redeem their own notes. "Nor should the Government itself be permitted in any way to weaken the credit and confidence of the people in their paper money by using it for current expenses in excess of current revenues. It is a practical fraud for the Government to use these notes for such purposes, and it never has been done except during this Administration. Every dollar thus taken is an impairment of the redemption fund. It is the misapplication of a fund specially created by law for another purpose. The effect is to destroy confidence in the credit and safety of our paper currency." Since silver certificates are in express terms redeemable in silver dollars, Mr. Sherman thinks that "while the silver dollars are maintained at par with gold it would seem that there was no injustice in paying the silver dollars for silver certificates." Republican papers are by no means unanimously in favor of Mr. Sherman's proposition regarding greenbacks and Treasury notes. A Sound Financial Proposition.-"Since Mr. Cleveland's inauguration $103,000,000 in gold-more than the entire amount regarded as necessary for a reserve fund-have been paid into the Treasury for greenbacks. This process would be as regular and as constant as the withdrawal of gold if the Government would provide sufficient revenue to meet current expenses, instead of periodically rushing into the market in a panic to borrow money at ruinous rates of interest. Senator Sherman's resolution proposes to restrict the reissue of greenbacks and Treasury notes to exchanging them for gold coin or bullion. This is a sound financial proposition. When distrust is not active gold is readily exchanged for greenbacks, and they will thus be kept in circulation. The way to allay distrust is to provide sufficient revenue to meet the current expenses of the Government. Borrowing money has never been conducive to confidence either in private or public affairs. It has to be done sometimes, but it is not a blessing, as the Administration seems to think, but an unmistakable misfortune." The American (Rep.), Baltimore. ... 1 The People Have Had Enough Demonetization on the Sly. "It will be observed that in place of "coin,' the word used in the resumption act which was passed twenty years ago and has now been in actual operation sixteen years, this resolution would substitute not simply gold coin but gold coin and bullion. The great blunder of the Sherman act of 1890 was its bullion feature. One would suppose that Senator Sherman would have had enough of the bullion policy. But now he would discredit not only all the silver dollars and bullion in the Treasury but monetize gold bars. Does John Sherman really think the country would tamely submit to such a radical monetary revolution? The hook is baited with a merited attack on the Democratic revenue law, but its barb is none the less plainly visible. The American people have had enough demonetization on the sly. "As for the wiping out of United States notes and Treasury. notes, that could be easily accomplished under the resolution. The present Administration could proceed at once to the carrying out of the Cleveland-Carlisle policy. A bond issue of $500,000,ooo could be placed in a very short time, and that would just about cover all of both kinds of notes. There is a little less than $350,000,000 of the United States notes and a little more than $150,000,000 of Treasury notes. The resolution fixes a minimum limit, but makes no maximum, and in view of the President's message and the last report of Secretary Carlisle, it is obvious that the adoption by Congress of the Sherman resolution would be speedily followed by the substitution of bonds for both kinds of notes."-The Inter Ocean (Rep.), Chicago. "When every note is either exchangeable for gold that is actually in the Treasury or is itself in the Treasury and can not be got out except in exchange for gold, the notes are the equivalent of gold in our circulation. If we start with $100,000,000 gold which is paid out only for notes, and replenished to that limit as fast as it is paid out, and if the notes thus redeemed are paid out only for gold, the notes must gradually either be all in the Treas. ury or be represented by gold that is there. This is turning about face on everything the Ohio Senator has ever said on this question. Why he has changed we can not say. Whatever his motive, we welcome his action. He has deserted the 'bloodstained' greenback. He is committed to the direct and practical and unqualified application of the gold standard.”—The Times (Dem.), New York. "To make greenbacks in the Treasury exchangeable-issuable -only for gold is to discredit silver; and that is to make a mockery of the 'parity' which the Republican Party has declared its purpose to preserve."—The Recorder (Rep.); New York. CAUSES OF TROUBLE IN THE TRANSVAAL. DR. R. JAMESON, an administrator for the British South African Chartered Company in Mashonaland, recently led a band of about 800 men into the Transvaal against the Dutch 'Boers," who politically control that South African Republic. Ostensibly the expedition was in behalf of the Uitlanders, the foreign residents who are forbidden rights of citizenship by the Boers. In an engagement the expedition was defeated, Dr. Jameson and many of his followers being made prisoners by the Boers. The British Colonial Office ordered the expedition recalled. Emperor William of Germany cabled congratulations to President Krüger of the Transvaal on his success, and English papers are greatly exercised over the complications of the situation. Germany has neighboring colonial possessions in Africa and the Boers defer to her, while they are hostile to Great Britain. The Boers left the Cape of Good Hope for Natal, and Natal for the Transvaal as each passed under British control. They have now become outnumbered in the Transvaal, and troubles appear to have culminated in the Jameson expedition. Some German papers declare that this invasion has violated the treaty of 1884, which defined the suzerainty of Great Britain in the Transvaal, and that the Transvaal will thus regain independence in international relations. We quote American journals on the causes of the trouble. The The Transvaal is Guilty of Having Gold-Mines.-"That an attempt should be made by the English to extinguish the independence of the South African Republic is not surprising. far-reaching project of Cecil Rhodes, the premier of the Cape Colony, must long have included British control of the Dutch state known as the South African Republic. Queen Victoria is nominally suzerain of the South African Republic, whose foreign relations are managed by Great Britain, but the actual administration of its internal affairs is kept jealously in the hands of the 'Boers,' as colonists of Dutch blood are called. The immediate occasion of the present trouble is the demand of the English settled in the South African Republic for representation in its legislature. This demand is said to have been met with an offer of concession entirely unsatisfactory to the English, whose pretensions Rhodes is anxious to back up with a force supplied by the chartered company of which he is 'boss.' Mr. Chamberlain, colonial secretary in Lord Salisbury's Cabinet, is reported to have ordered this expedition to be recalled, but Rhodes has a way of dragging the home Government after him. "While the occasion of the crisis is the claim of the British to a share in the government of the republic, the cause is undoubt course the English miner was foremost. The city of Johannesburg has boomed almost to greatness, for it now has with its suburbs not far from fifty thousand inhabitants, or ten times as many as Pretoria, the Boer capital. "The mines are mainly owned in London, which has thus obtained great influence in the Republic by means of an army that can be maneuvered from the stock exchange. Against such an army the Boers would doubtless make a defense as gallant as their tacit resistance has been obstinate, but in the end they would have to yield to the inevitable, and purchase peace at the price of what independence is now left to them. The South African Republic is guilty of having within its borders gold-mines yielding from $25,000,000 to $35,000,000 a year, a circumstance which, together with its resistance to British influence, may cost it dear. The republic is supposed to have between 500,000 and 600,000 inhabitants, of whom about two thirds are blacks."—The Transcript, Boston. The "Uitlanders" are in the Right.-"As for the causes of the trouble, it may be said frankly that the 'Uitlanders' are in the right and the Boers in the wrong. The former have been treated by the latter in a scandalous manner.- They have a right to demand redress for their grievances; and if they do not get it, they will have the sympathy of the civilized world in any efforts they may make for their own protection and welfare. It is entirely true that the Boers own the country. It is equally true that they opened it to immigration, and invited settlers to come in. The settlers did go in, by the thousand, from the United States and the British Empire and from Germany. They literally saved the Republic from bankruptcy, and made it rich and prosperous beyond all dreams of its founders. They have fought its battles against the native tribes. They have built its railroads. They pay nine tenths of all its taxes. And what do they get in return? "They are denied all rights of citizenship. Neither they nor their children who are born on Transvaal soil are allowed to become citizens, to hold office, to vote, or even to gather together in public meetings. They are taxed, and heavily taxed, but have no representation in the Government. They are taxed for the support of Dutch schools, but no English schools, nor even English instruction, are granted to their children. They are not even permitted to conduct private schools for their children, at their own expense, except on condition that in them they will teach their children to speak Dutch. In such towns as Johannesburg, which has 60,000 inhabitants, they are not allowed to have a municipal government or an adequate police force. Some 300 Boer laborers are the only persons in all Johannesburg who are permitted to vote, and they send just one of their number to the national legislature ! The 50,000 intelligent Americans and English, who built the city and pay the expenses of the Government, are of no more account than so many sticks of wood."-The Tribune, New York. Characteristic English Enterprise.-"Dr. Jameson's march into the Transvaal was a characteristically English stroke of enterprise. He was not a reckless adventurer, not a filibusterer with a great deal to gain and nothing to lose; he took a great risk, and he knew it; but it was one of those occasions when, like Nelson's refusal to see the signal of recall which would have lost a victory, success would atone for all shortcomings and insure a brave reward. Jameson's career as a wise, prudent, and successful administrator in England's African's colonies shows that he probably organized his expedition against Johannesburg after coolly calculating the chances and deciding that they were in favor of success. Had he not been disappointed in his expectations, had the 'Uitlanders' in Johannesburg risen as planned, and had not a stern word from the German Emperor scared the home Government into sudden repudiation of his enterprise, Dr. Jameson might be to-day the most famous man in South Africajust as Napoleon might have been the arbiter of Europe if his plans had not miscarried at Waterloo. It is not certain, however, that Jameson's star has set as completely as did Napoleon's. England has use for men who can take desperate chances on her account, and while it may not be considered safe to give Jameson a position of prominence again, nobody need be surprised if, when the excitement dies away, he is quietly transferred to some inconspicuous but lucrative post, of which there are many in the colonial department of her Majesty's Government." Ledger, Philadelphia. -The THE SELECTIONS FOR THE BOUNDARY COMMISSION. PRESIDENT CLEVELAND last week appointed a Vene zuelan Boundary Commission of five members. The law authorizing their appointment appropriates $100,000 for the expenses of a Commission "to investigate and report upon the true divisional line between the Republic of Venezuela and British Guiana." The members of the Commission are David J. Brewer, of Kansas, associate-justice of the Supreme Court of the United States; Richard H. Alvey, of Maryland, chief-justice of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia; Andrew D. White, expresident of Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y.; Frederic R. Coudert, a leading lawyer of New York city, and Daniel C. DAVID J. BREWER. Gilman, president of the Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md. Justice Brewer and ex-President White are Republicans, Judge Alvey and Mr. Coudert Democrats; President Gilman is said to be independent in politics. Justice Brewer is a graduate of Yale, served as judge of the Kansas Supreme Court 18701881, was appointed circuit judge of the Eighth Circuit in 1889, and Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court by President Harrison in 1889. Judge Alvey served on the judiciary committee of the Maryland Constitutional Convention in 1867, as chief judge of the Fourth Circuit, as chief-justice of the State Court of Appeals, resigning the last office to accept that of chiefjustice of the Federal Court of Appeals in the District of Columbia. Ex-President White was a member of the San Domingo Commission in 1871, was appointed Minister to Germany by President Hayes and Minister to Russia by President Harrison. President Gilman is an eminent historian, and was elected first president of the Johns Hopkins University in 1875. He is the author of a biography of James Monroe, American Statesman series. Mr. Coudert was one of the counsel for the United States before the Bering Sea Commission. The commissioners have elected Justice Brewer chairman. The personnel of the Commission finds much favor with the press, with some notable exceptions. The functions of the Commission, and the possible effects of its findings, have occupied a large share of press. attention. A Fair and Authoritative Commission.-"The excellence of the Commission named by the President for investigating and reporting upon the boundary line between Venezuela and British Guiana will do more than anything else could to produce, both here and in Europe, the conviction that whatever the United States may do further in the dispute will be done with circumspection, care, and a full sense of responsibility. Two of our most eminent judges, two men who have been at the head of great institutions of learning and whose chief intellectual interests have lain in the direction of historical and geographical study, and one distinguished lawyer who (as well as one of the college presidents) has had experience in international affairs— such a constitution of the Commission is, on its face, a most None of the members, we believe, entertains any political aspirations, and all of them can be counted on to do their utmost to make their investigation as fair and their conclusions as authoritative as possible."-The News (Dem.), Baltimore. desirable one. The Commissioners Command Respect and Confidence.-"The character and standing of the commissioners are such that there can be little doubt that they will try to be impartial and thorough in their investigations and discreet and even judicial in their findings. They are men who, if not in every instance of the very highest grade of American citizenship, nevertheless command respect and confidence, and whatever decision they may reach will, if unanimous, carry weight with it. They are men of mature years, of experience in affairs, accustomed to careful study and to the analysis and sifting of evidence, legal, historical, and political. Until compelled to take a different view the country will have confidence in their ability to acquire from original study the information necessary to the formation of a fair opinion and confidence also in the discretion and good sense of the report they will make."-The Journal (Ind.), Providence. Not an Ideal Commission.-"It may be said without a trace of ill-will toward any individual that it is not an ideal Commission, or at least that it is not likely so to impress at once the country and the world. To compare a great affair with one of minor importance, the committee which is considering the Dunraven charges is universally recognized as an extraordinarily sagacious and fortunate combination of all the elements essential to the purpose of that investigation. Such is not the case with the Venezuela Commission, perhaps because it does not fully represent the President's original intentions. And yet it is not open to harsh criticism, so far as its mental and moral qualities are concerned. Its members are men of serious character and ANDREW D. WHITE. of much experience in weighty matters, and as a whole it seems to comprise all the talents necessary for a just solution of a difficult problem. . . . The country will confidently expect a Commission so constituted to manifest at every stage of its undertaking a deep sense of the responsibility which it has assumed. For the present this is all that it is either possible or needful to predict concerning its momentous proceedings."-The Tribune (Rep.), New York. Diversion of the Judiciary is Deplored.-"Judge Brewer is able, judicious, and wise. His career on the bench has stamped him as a strong, clear-headed jurist who unites good sense with large legal learning. Tho he is not personally much known in England, the Supreme Court as a tribunal has high repute there, and an appointment from its ranks will make a favorable impression. In this country there are many who deplore the frequent diversion of the judiciary to other service."-The Press (Rep.), Philadelphia. Cabled English Comments. Excepting Mr. Coudert, all that can be said for the nominees is that, while they are reputable and may be absolutely fair-minded men, they have no such weight as will command for their conclusions any recognition outside of the United States. Unfortunately, even if the nominees were more impressive, their value would be impaired by the addition of Mr. Coudert, whose offensive prejudgment of the matters in controversy is not only insulting, but is manifestly actuated by a bias that is entirely incompatible with the judicial spirit President Cleveland professed to contemplate in his message."-The Times. "It would not be for Englishmen to criticize the gentlemen who have consented to assist the President's studies of political geography. If their names command the confidence of the American people, that is all that can be expected or desired, tho we shall watch their doings with curiosity, and even respect. That will be the beginning and end of our interest."-The Standard. "The nominations will win general respect in England, where public opinion will readily recognize a Commission which diplomacy must necessarily ignore. Its report can not fail to be instructive to both sides. During the interval of the inquiry the jingoes of both countries will confer the greatest possible benefit on humanity by not making a noise."- The Daily News. TWO EMINENT HISTORIANS ON THE MEAN- PPOSITE views of the meaning of the Monroe doctrine and its applicability to the Venezuelan controversy are held by two recognized authorities on American history-Prof. J. B. McMaster, of the University of Pennsylvania, and Prof. von Holst, of the Chicago University. Expressions from each were briefly quoted in these columns two weeks ago. Since then each has given forth a more careful and elaborate statement of his views. Dr. von Holst, who occupies the chair of Constitutional Law at the Chicago University and is author of the well-known "Constitutional and Political History of the United States,” in a signed article in the Chicago Times-Herald, December 28, takes the position that the Monroe doctrine does not apply to the Venezuelan dispute, because that doctrine is "not what Cleveland and Olney tell us it ought to be, but solely what its authors understood and intended it to be." Possibly, he says, the people ought to indorse the Cleveland-Olney policy unanimously and with the greatest enthusiasm; "but not because of the Monroe doctrine; it would have to be done on the strength of other reasons." Professor von Holst quotes this paragraph from President Monroe's message of December 2, 1823, as comprising "what is usually termed 'The Monroe Doctrine"": "In the wars of European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy to do so. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective governments. And to the defense of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure and matured by the wisdom of the most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it and whose independence we have on great consideration and on just principles acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them or controlling in any other manner their destiny by any European power in any other light than as a manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. In the war between those new governments and Spain, we declared our neutrality at the time of their organization, and to this we have adhered and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur which in the judgment of the competent authorities of this Government shall make a corresponding change on the part of the United States indispensable to their security." From the diary of John Quincy Adams, President Monroe's Secretary of State, Professor von Holst concludes that Mr. Adams is the real author of the doctrine, and therefore the primary and principal authority in regard to it. He quotes from the diary entries showing that the first impulse to the announcement of the policy was given by England, and that its point was turned against the Holy Alliance. Mr. Adams wrote, November 7, 1823: "Cabinet meeting at the President's from half-past one to four. Mr. Calhoun, Secretary of War, Mr. Southart, Secretary of the Navy, present. The subject for consideration was the confidential proposals of the British Secretary of State, George Canning, to R. Rush (the American representative at the Court of St. James) and the correspondence between them relating to the products of the Holy Alliance upon South America. There was much conversation without coming to any definite point. The object of Canning appears to have been to obtain some public pledge from the Government of the United States ostensibly against the forcible interference of the Holy Alliance between Spain and South America, but really or especially against the acquisition to the United States themselves of any part of the Spanish-American possessions. "Mr. Calhoun inclined to giving a discretionary power to Mr. Rush to join in a declaration against the interference of the Holy Allies if necessary, even if it should pledge us not to take Cuba or the province of Texas; because the power of Great Britain being greater than ours to seize upon them, we should get the advantage of obtaining from her the same declaration we should make ourselves. "I thought the cases not parallel. We have no intention of seizing either Texas or Cuba. But the inhabitants of either or both may exercise their primitive rights and solicit a union with us. They will certainly do no such thing to Great Britain. By joining with her, therefore, in her proposed declaration we give her a substantial and perhaps inconvenient pledge against ourselves and really obtain nothing in return. Without entering now into the inquiry of the expediency of our annexing Texas or Cuba to our Union, we should at least keep ourselves free to act as emergencies may arise and not tie ourselves down to any principle which immediately afterward may be brought to bear against ourselves. "Mr. Southart inclined much to the same opinion. "The President was averse to any course which should have the appearance of taking a position subordinate to that of Great Britain." And again Adams wrote, November 13: "I find him (the President) yet altogether unsettled in his own mind as to the answer to be given to Mr. Canning's proposals, and alarmed far beyond anything that I could have conceived. possible with a fear that the Holy Alliance are about to restore immediately all South America to Spain. "On the 21st of November, I mentioned also my wish to prepare a paper to be delivered confidentially to Baron Tuyl (the Russian ambassador). My purpose would be in a moderate and conciliatory manner, but with a firm and determined spirit, to declare our dissent from the principles avowed in these communications (from the Russian Government in regard to the questions of the Spanish Colonies on America); to assert those upon which our own Government is founded, and while disclaiming all intention of attempting to propagate them by force and all interference with the political affairs of Europe, to declare our expectation and hope that the European powers will abstain from the attempt to spread their principles in the American hemisphere or to subjugate by force any part of these continents to their will." November 22: "I spoke to him (the President) again, urging him to abstain from everything in his message which the Holy Allies could make a pretext for construing into aggression upon them. . . . If the Holy Alliance were determined to make up an issue with us it was our policy to meet and not to make it. We should retreat to the wall before taking to arms, and be sure at every step to put them as much as possible in the wrong. I said if the Holy Alliance really intended to restore by force the Colonies of Spain to her dominion it was questionable to me whether we had not after all been over-hasty in acknowledging the South American independence." Dr. von Holst says that the President, after much vacillation, adopted Mr. Adams's views, which, furthermore, coincided with those he supposed Mr. Canning to hold, one object being merely concerted expression of sentiment that should avert the necessity. of war. Dr. von Holst quotes Mr. Jefferson's opinions without comment, and turns to "the interpretation given to the Monroe doctrine right on the heels of its promulgation by the principal authors of it." He writes: "John Quincy Adams, now President of the United States, said in his message to the Senate concerning the proposed Congress of American States at Panama in 1826: 'An agreement between all the parties represented at the meeting that each will guard BY ITS OWN MEANS against the establishment of any future European colony within its borders may be found advisable. This (!) was more than two years since announced by my A T he predecessor to the world as a principle resulting from the emancipation of both the American continents. It may be so developed to the new Southern nations that they may feel it as an essential appendage to their own independence.' "Mr. Benton, from whom I take this quotation (Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, vol. vii., p. 471, footnote) adds: The circumstances of this communication render it incredible that he (Adams) could be deceived in his understanding of this comprehensive doctrine; and according to him this Monroe Doctrine-(under which it has been of late supposed that the United States were to stand guard over the two Americas and repulse all intrusive European colonies from their shores) WAS ENTIRELY CONFINED TO OUR OWN BORDERS; that it was ONLY proposed to get the other states of the new world to agree that EACH FOR ITSELF AND BY ITS OWN MEANS SHOULD GUARD ITS OWN TERRITORIES; and consequently that the United States SO FAR FROM EXTENDING GRATUITOUS PROTECTION TO THE TERRITORIES OF OTHER STATES WOULD NOT COMMIT ITSELF EITHER TO GIVE OR RECEIVE AID IN ANY SUCH ENTERPRISE, BUT, THAT EACH SHOULD USE ITS OWN MEANS WITHIN ITS OWN BORDERS FOR ITS OWN EXEMPTION FROM EUROPEAN COLONIAL INTRUSION. And this was in exact conformity to an earlier and cherished policy enunciated by Washington and sanctioned by the public sentiments of two generations: "No entangling alliances." Dr. von Holst cites a special message from President Adams March 15, 1826, regarding the Panama Congress, and cites in addition the report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs. He refers also to the withdrawal of Henry Clay's resolution against "any forcible interposition by the allied powers of Europe," and the conservative McLain resolution passed by a vote of 99 to 95 in the House in 1826. Concerning this last resolution Daniel Webster, tho strongly opposing it, said: "As to all that part of the amendment indeed which asserts the neutral policy of the United States and the inexpediency of forming alliances, no man assents to these sentiments more readily or more entirely than myself. On these points we are all agreed. Such is our opinion; such the President assures us in terms is his opinion; such we know to be the opinion of the country." . And finally : "It is not a slight injury to our interest; it is not even a great inconvenience that makes out a case (for interference by the United States). There must be danger to our security, MANIFEST AND IMMINENT DANGER TO OUR ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND OUR ESSENTIAL INTERESTS." Quotations are then made from Mr. Calhoun's speech on the proposed occupation of Yucatan, May 14, 1848, in which he said: "All this has passed away. That very movement on the part of England, sustained by this declaration, gave a blow to the celebrated alliance (Holy Alliance) from which it never recovered.... The President [Polk] has quoted that very declaration in support of his recommendation; but in a manner changing entirely its meaning, by separating it from the context as it stood in the message and which referred it to the allied powers; and placing it in connection with a portion of his message which made it refer to Great Britain, Spain, or other European powers. change has made the declaration so inconsistent and absurd that bad it been made by Mr. Monroe as it stands in the President's message it would have been the subject of the animadversion and ridicule, instead of receiving as it did the approbation and applause, of the whole country. . . It would have involved the absurdity of asserting that the attempt of any European state to extend its system of government to this continent, the smallest as well as the greatest, would endanger the peace and the safety of our country. The 44 ... BUT NO GENERAL RULE CAN BE LAID DOWN TO GUIDE US IN SUCH A QUESTION. EVERY CASE MUST SPEAK FOR ITSELF. EVERY CASE MUST BE DECIDED ON ITS OWN MERITS. WHETHER YOU WILL RESIST OR NOT AND THE MEASURE OF YOUR RESISTANCE-WHETHER IT SHALL BE BY NEGOTIATION, REMONSTRANCE, OR SOME INTERMEDIATE MEASURE OR BY A RESORT TO ARMS; ALL THIS MUST BE DETERMINED AND DECIDED ON THE MERITS OF THE QUESTION ITSELF. THIS IS THE ONLY WISE COURSE. WE ARE NOT TO HAVE QUOTED ON US ON EVERY OCCASION GENERAL DECLARATIONS TO WHICH ANY AND EVERY . MEANING MAY BE ATTACHED." [The capitalization is by Professor von Holst.] On the other hand, John Bach McMaster, professor of history in the University of Pennsylvania and author of "History of the People of the United States," gives in a signed article in The Times, New York, January 1, the following exposition of the Monroe doctrine : "When Monroe received the letters of Rush he seems to have been greatly puzzled how to act. The suggestion of England that the time had come to make a declaration of some sort admitted of no dispute. But how was it to be made? If he joined with Great Britain, would he not be forming one of the 'political connections' Washington had denounced in his 'Farewell Address;' one of the 'entangling alliances' of which Jefferson had given warning in his first inaugural speech? Should he make it alone, would he not be violating that policy of non-interference in the affairs of the colonies which he had himself advised in six messages and two inaugural speeches? Uncertain what to do, he turned to Jefferson for advice, and sent the letters of Rush to Monticello, and late in October received a reply: 'The question presented by the letters you have sent me is the most momentous which has ever been offered to my contemplation since that of Independence. That made us a nation; this sets our compass and points the course which we are to steer through the ocean of time opening on us. And never could we embark upon it under circumstances more auspicious. Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe; our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cisatlantic affairs. America, North and South, has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe, and peculiarly her own. She should, therefore, have a system of her own, separate and apart from that of Europe. While the last is laboring to become the domicile of despotism, our endeavor should surely be to make our hemisphere that of freedom.' "Thus encouraged, not simply to meet an emergency, but to 'point the course which we are to steer through the ocean of time opening on us,' Monroe consulted his Secretaries, and, with their approval, announced the new policy of our country. Professor McMaster begins his quotation of the "Monroe doctrine" with the words "The political system of the allied powers is essentially different," etc., omits the last sentence of the paragraph quoted by Professor von Holst, and quotes further from President Monroe's message: "Our policy in regard to Europe [says President Monroe], which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the Government de facto as the legitimate Government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy; meeting in all instances the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none. But, in regard to these continents, circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different. It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can any one believe that our Southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition, in any form, with indifference." Professor McMaster comments as follows: "The doctrine was for all time, and, put in plain language, was this: 1. The United States will 'not interfere in the internal concerns' of any European power. 2. 'But in regard to these continents [North and South America] circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different,' and if any European power attempts at any future time to extend its political system to any part of this hemisphere 'for the purpose of oppressing' the nations or 'CONTROLLING IN ANY OTHER MANNER THEIR DESTINY' the United States will interfere. "Of this doctrine an immediate application was made to the Holy Allies. It might have been conveyed to each of them under cover of an official note. But Monroe preferred to announce it before the world, and in his message warned them that any attempt on their part to violate the doctrine would be 'dangerous |