he says, 'When we get down town, we will stop in some place and write it.'

He says they stopped at a place where Helmer was acquainted. Van Wormer relates that he had a piece of paper in his pocket upon which he wrote this receipt, and Helmer then signed it.

During the trial objection was made by counsel for complainant to the testimony of the defendants as to all matters equally within the knowledge of the deceased, because incompetent under the statute. The only argument made by counsel for defendants against this objection is that it was waived by complainant in demanding in her sworn bill of complaint a sworn answer by defendants.

Chancery Rule 10, subd. "a," reads as follows:

"Whenever in a cause a sworn bill of complaint is filed and a sworn answer demanded, the defendant shall be required to file such sworn answer. But neither a sworn bill, nor a sworn answer, shall have the force of evidence, except as to admissions and except on the hearing of motions and petitions: Provided, however, that when a cause is heard on bill and answer the allegations of the answer shall be taken as true."

In the instant case the cause was heard upon an issue joined between the parties and the proofs were taken in open court. The rule provides in unambiguous terms:

"But neither a sworn bill, nor a sworn answer, shall have the force of evidence, except as to admissions."

To that extent and no further under this rule does a sworn answer have the force of evidence.

As to all other matters the ordinary rules of evidence must be applied in taking proofs in such a cause, and all evidence offered must be competent. The statute invoked (section 10212, 3 Comp. Laws; 5 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] § 12856), which is too familiar

to require quotation, makes both defendants incompetent to testify as to matters equally within the knowledge of Theodore Helmer, deceased. One of the most recent applications of this statute is found in the case of Shepard v. Shepard, 164 Mich. 183, 196 (129 N. W. 201), where the authorities are cited. This removes from our consideration in this case all of the testimony of defendants, Van Wormer and wife, relative to the so-called $1,000 agreement, wherein it is claimed that at the time of the execution of the note and mortgage Helmer orally agreed that, when defendants had paid $600 on the principal and all accumulated interest, he would cancel and surrender the note; also all testimony relative to the alleged consideration for said promise; also all of defendant Van Wormer's testimony as to the execution and delivery of the receipt for $1,000 claimed to have been signed and delivered to him March 9, 1911.

The elimination of this incompetent testimony leaves the case made by complainant undisputed. There was no competent evidence in the case to show that any part of the balance claimed to be due on this mortgage, with interest, had been paid. Complainant was entitled to recover the full amount of the balance of $1,100 due and unpaid on said mortgage, with interest at 5 per cent.

The decree of the circuit court will be modified to that extent, and the decree will be entered in this court for said full amount, with interest, and costs of both courts in favor of complainant.

BROOKE, C. J., and KUHN, STONE, OSTRANDER, BIRD, MOORE, and STEERE, JJ., concurred.

MACKIN v. DETROIT-TIMKIN AXLE CO.

1. MASTER AND SERVANT-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-VALIDITY-PERSONAL INJURIES.

The principle involved in the statute providing for compensation to injured workmen is based on the economic principle of trade risk, in that the losses resulting from personal injuries incident to industrial pursuits are treated like wages and breakage of machinery and as part of the cost of production, and the statute affects fundamental changes in the matter of rules governing the adoption of liability for negligence; but it by no means follows that there is any violation of the spirit of the Constitution in the enactment of such statute. Act No. 10, Extra Session 1912 (2 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] § 3939 et seq.).

2. SAME.

There is no vested right as to any remedy for a tort to happen in the future, that is protected by the Constitution, and except as to vested rights the legislature has power to change or abolish any existing statutory or common law remedy.

3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-ELECTION OF REMEDY-NOTICE-PRESUMPTIONS.

The objection that the statute deprives an injured employee of his right to resort to the courts for redress and to claim a jury trial, without waiver, consent or knowledge on his part, is untenable as a ground to declare the statute unconstitutional. Under the provisions of section 8 of pt. 1, the employee is charged with notice of the action of the employer in electing to become subject to the act whether or not the employee has actual notice, and employees come within its terms unless at the time of hiring notice in writing of an election not to be subject to the provisions of the law is served upon the employer.

4. SAME.

No provision of the Constitution prohibits the legislature from avoiding uncertainty by adopting a rule that the

employee shall be conclusively presumed to have notice of his master's election to become subject to the compensation act, unless he shall serve such notice as is provided by part 3, § 4, of Act No. 10, Extra Session 1912. 5. SAME-ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS-DEPARTMENT OF GOVERN

MENT.

The Industrial Accident Board is a purely administrative agency created to effect the purposes of the law; though some of its powers are quasi judicial (without that final authority to render enforceable judgments, which constitutes judicial power) it is a proper and constitutional body not open to the criticism that executive, administrative, and judicial functions are combined.

6. SAME JUDGMENT-SANCTION.

Judicial power involves a hearing and determination of a controversy and final disposition thereof by some order or judgment which needs no additional sanction to entitle it to be enforced.

7. SAME TITLE OF ACT.

Under article 5, § 21, of the Constitution, requiring that statutes shall embrace but one subject which shall be expressed in the title, it is not required that the title contain details or means of carrying out the object of the legislature; if it fairly indicates the general scope of the law, the title is sufficient, and the workmen's compensation law sufficiently complies with those provisions of the Constitution.

8. SAME-SUFFICIENCY.

Objections that the statute contains provisions for repealing an existing act relative to contracts of attorneys for services, and creates a right of action against a third party and subrogates the employer to the rights of the employee, also requiring the injured employee to obtain compensation from the insurance company, are not sufficient ground for declaring the law invalid.

9. SAME-CLASS LEGISLATION-FARM SERVANTS.

The provisions of the statute that exempt household servants, farm laborers and casual employees do not amount to class legislation or deprive employees of equal protection under the law. Appropriating money for the purpose of effecting the object of the act is not in violation of the State Constitution.

10. SAME-MINORS.

Where plaintiff was not a minor, his objection that the act deprives a parent of his right of action for injury to a child, was not proper ground for determining the statute to be unconstitutional, where the statute does not indicate that the parent's action for loss of services has been affected.

11. SAME-ATTORNEY'S FEES-GARNISHMENT RIGHT OF CONTRACT. The statutory clause making attorneys' and physicians' fees subject to the approval of the Industrial Accident Board, and the clause relating to the assignment, attachment or garnishment of sums due to an injured employee, relieving the award from his debts, is not unconstitutional for the alleged reason that he is thereby prevented or limited in his right of contract or in the hiring of an attorney of his own choice. Section 12, Art. 2, Constitution.

12. SAME.

Held, that the general plan, purpose, policy and propriety of this legislation is not open to question or subject to constitutional objections raised by claimant.

Error to Wayne; Hosmer, J. Submitted April 12, 1915. (Docket No. 44.) Decided June 14, 1915.

Case by Thomas Mackin against the Detroit-Timkin Axle Company for personal injuries. Judgment for defendant upon a verdict directed by the court. Plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

Dohany & Dohany, for appellant.

Fred L. Vandeveer (W. P. Belden and Hal H. Smith, of counsel), for appellee.

Grant Fellows, Attorney General, and L. W. Carr, Assistant Attorney General, amici curiæ.

STEERE, J. This case involves the constitutionality of Act No. 10, Extra Session 1912, known as the workmen's compensation law, entitled: