The claim that the act deprives a parent of right of action for injury to his minor child is not tenable, even if open to plaintiff in this case. He is not a minor. His parents are not complaining. The act provides for the damages of the minor. It does not indicate that the parent's action for loss of services is affected. But whether this act "may or may not deprive parties to supposititious cases of constitutional rights has no bearing upon the present case, if it appears that the parties before the court are not deprived of constitutional rights by the proceeding under review." Sexton v. Telegraph Co., 84 N. J. Law, 85 (86 Atl. 451).

It is urged that the clause of the act making attorneys' and physicians' fees in accident claims adjusted under its provisions subject to the approval of the Industrial Accident Board, and providing that no payment under this act shall be assignable or subject to attachment or garnishment, or be held in any way for any debts, is unconstitutional as limiting the right of contract, preventing the injured party from employing an attorney of his choosing. In support of this contention, section 12, art. 2, of the Constitution is cited, which is as follows:

"Any suitor in any court in this State shall have the right to prosecute or defend his suit, either in his own proper person or by an attorney or agent of his choice."

The Industrial Accident Board is not, in contemplation of law, a court, and a claimant before it for damages resulting from personal injuries is not strictly a "suitor in any court," but the right of a claimant to select and employ an attorney or agent to represent him in the matter is recognized by the provision referred to. These restrictions in the act, as applied to those who submit to its provisions by election, certainly cannot be held unconstitutional. They were

deemed by the legislature proper and necessary to safeguard the interests of the class for whose benefit largely this act to "promote the welfare of the people of the State" was passed; they are germane to the purpose of the act, and in the light of conditions previously existing in litigation over personal injuries to workmen, of which courts of last resort have taken judicial notice in construing workmen's compensation acts, are beneficial and appropriate, if not essential, to an efficient administration of the law.

We do not deem it necessary to review in detail the underlying reasons which are recognized as fully justifying and sustaining these special provisions, but those interested in that particular will find them graphically elaborated by Judge McPherson in Hawkins v. Bleakley, supra, and discussed in detail in Cunningham v. Improvement Co., supra, and also pertinent reflections. by Justice Sterling in Ayers v. Buckeridge [1902], 48 K. B. 57.

The policy, importance, and propriety of this legislation, in its general plan and purpose, are not open to question, and we do not find it subject to the constitutional objections urged in this record. No attack is made here upon that portion of the act relating to municipalities, and therefore no question which might arise in that connection is considered or decided.

The judgment is affirmed.

BROOKE, C. J., and MCALVAY, KUHN, STONE, OSTRANDER, BIRD, and MOORE, JJ., concurred.

LINDERMAN MACHINE CO. v. SHAW-WALKER CO.

1. SALES CONTRACT.

BREACH OF WARRANTY

-PAROL WARRANTY

- WRITTEN

Where the agent of the seller of a machine known as a dovetail glue jointer represented that it would save defendant over $3,000 a year, and that certain lumber or material could be put in the machine without other process, and that the rip saw of the defendant buyer could be used in connection with the machine, evidence of the oral representations, claimed to have been false and fraudulent, was not admissible to change a written contract containing guaranties and other details of the agreement of the parties; the trial court properly 'di

rected a verdict for the plaintiff as against such objections.1

2. SAME-CONTRACTS-ELECTION OF REMEDY-RESCISSION OF CON

TRACT-ESTOPPEL.

Where defendant kept the machine which it bought and used it during a considerable period of time, down to the trial of the case, it was estopped from setting up a rescission of the contract, as a defense to an action for the price.

3. SAME-EVIDENCE-PLEADING.

Plaintiff was not required to plead the conduct of the defendant in retaining and in making use of the machine; the evidence was admissible in rebuttal of or on crossexamination of defendant's witnesses and was proper rebuttal to the defense that the buyer had rescinded the transaction.

Error to Muskegon; Sullivan, J. Submitted April 13, 1915. (Docket No. 74.) Decided June 14, 1915.

Assumpsit by the Linderman Machine Company against the Shaw-Walker Company for the value of

'As to right to show parol warranty in connection with contract for sale of personalty, see note in 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1183.

certain machinery. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings error. Affirmed.

Clink & Farmer, for appellant.

Cross, Vanderwerp, Foote & Ross, for appellee.

STONE J. Action of assumpsit to recover the price and value of a machine known as a standard five-foot Linderman automatic dovetail glue jointer, sold by the plaintiff to the defendant in the summer of 1912. The plaintiff is a corporation located in the city of Muskegon, whose business consisted wholly, or in part, of the manufacture of wood-working machinery. The defendant was engaged in the manufacture of various classes of woodwork, such as filing cabinets, bookcases, desks, etc. The declaration was upon the common counts in assumpsit; the plea was the general issue, with a notice: That upon the trial of the case the defendant would insist in its defense that, for the purpose of making the sale of the jointer to the said defendant, for the recovery of the value of which this suit was brought, and with intent to induce said defendant to purchase said machine, the said plaintiff falsely, fraudulently, and deceitfully stated and represented to the said defendant:

(1) That there would be a saving to defendant of over $3,000 a year by the installation of the said machine; (2) that five-eighths inch beech, and other lumber could be taken from the crosscut saw and placed in the machine directly, without edging or other process; (3) that the ripsaw then in use by the defendant could be used with said machine; which statements and representations were wholly false and deceitful, and were known by the plaintiff so to be at the time of the making thereof, and were made for the purpose of deceiving and defrauding said defendant by falsely and fraudulently inducing it to purchase said Linderman machine, which said defendant, believing and relying upon, did purchase.

It concluded as follows:

"That the said defendant will insist, upon the trial of said cause, that by reason of the facts set forth said defendant is absolutely released from any liability for the value of the said standard five-foot Linderman automatic dovetail glue jointer, and that the contract for the sale thereof was and is void."

The contract was offered in evidence by the plaintiff, and, among other things, contained the following clauses:

"Guarantee. We guarantee the workmanship and material on this machine to be of suitable quality, and will agree to furnish without charge new parts to replace any which shall prove defective in material or workmanship within one year of putting this machine in operation."

"Price and Terms. The price at which we will furnish this machine is $3,750 f. o. b. cars Muskegon, Michigan, payable in sixty day installments covering a period of twelve or fifteen months."

Upon introduction of the contract in evidence, and evidence showing the installation of the machine and the nonpayment of the purchase price, the plaintiff rested its case. The defendant, not claiming any breach of warranty, placed its defense upon the ground that the plaintiff made false and fraudulent representations, as set forth in the notice attached to the plea. The evidence of the defendant tended to show that, from time to time, complaints were made by the defendant to the plaintiff of the work done by the machine, and that it did not accomplish the savings to the defendant which the plaintiff represented it would, and that the plaintiff, until some time in the spring of 1913, assisted in operating the machine to demonstrate that it would accomplish all that was recommended, and that these trials of the machine continued until shortly before suit was brought. It appears undisputed that certain correspondence took place be