A letter to Don J. O'Donoju (vol. x. p. 430), on the subject of a general amnesty, written during the advance of the army towards Vittoria, bears testimony in the strongest manner to the liberality and humanity with which Lord Wellington was disposed to view such questions. It is full of sound arguments in favour of the measure it recommends; and it anticipates all the objections that could be offered to it, by judicious suggestions with regard to the exceptions to be made.* But enlarged and statesmanlike views, adapted to the existing situation of the country, or energetic measures, calculated to give vigour to operations in the field, and to uphold the military character of Spain, were, unfortunately, much less objects of attention at Cadiz than political theories and personal jealousies and cabals. And, whilst Lord Wellington was achieving victories for the cause of Spain, the Spanish troops were often left by their Government without the means of being efficient in the field; and the minister of war was every day openly violating or indirectly infringing upon the stipulations agreed to when Lord Wellington assented to the proposal of accepting the chief command. But although the treatment he experienced from the government at Cadiz, and particularly from the war minister, was such as to compel him to think seriously of relinquishing that command, he expresses himself, in writing to the British ambassador on the subject, in the most moderate and becoming manner (24 July 1813); placing, as he uniformly does, his duty as a public servant before his personal feelings, and above every other consideration whatsoever.

The vexations and disappointments which Lord Wellington had to undergo so frequently, through the bad working of the legislative and executive machinery at Cadiz, and occasionally, also, from the inefficiency of the Portuguese regency, must have reminded him often of similar annoyances experienced during his earlier campaigns, from the caprices, weaknesses, and jealousies which prevailed in the courts of his Eastern allies. But the analogy between the war in the Spanish peninsula and that which he had carried on in India, was, unfortunately, not limited to general features of resemblance. The particular transactions on the eastern coast of Spain, assimilated themselves closely to those which had taken place in Guzzerat; and, instead of supplying a seasonable and useful diversion in favour of the operations

*The subject is again alluded to in a letter to Lord Holland (vol. xii. p. 54).

on the side of Portugal, they tended sometimes to impede and to thwart them. The whole of his behaviour, however, in regard to these matters, reflects upon him the greatest credit; for he appears to have treated the frequent mismanagement of affairs on the eastern side of the Peninsula, in such a manner, as to reconcile the exact discharge of his public duties with much delicate consideration for the feelings and the interests of individuals.

After having spoken, as we have been obliged to do sometimes, of the governments which held successively a temporary and precarious authority in Spain during the war, it is pleasing to be able to advert to the sentiments expressed by Lord Wellington, and the conduct observed by him towards some of those individuals whose public and private worth, and faithful and useful services to their country, came more particularly under his notice. The just and feeling tribute paid to the memory of the Marques de la Romana (vol. vii. pp. 183 and 196), does honour to the writer of it; and will long be cherished, we doubt not, as a valuable testimony to the merits of that amiable, accomplished, and patriotic Spanish nobleman, both by his family and by his country. Several letters also attest Lord Wellington's regard and friendship for Castanos. One may in particular be referred to (vol. x. p. 602), in which the most judicious and friendly advice is given to that general officer, with respect to the way in which he should conduct himself under a gross act of injustice experienced by him on the part of his government. General Alava's name is so honourably associated throughout with that of the Duke of Wellington, that it is hardly necessary to mention it. A letter to the King of Spain (vol. xii. p. 153) shows at once the importance of that officer's services, and the warm interest felt by the Duke of Wellington in his welfare. Many other individuals also, both Spanish and Portuguese, some of whose names have been less familiar to the public in this country than those above mentioned, will find in these volumes an honourable and a lasting memorial of their zeal and their merits in the cause of the Peninsula.

There are, in the tenth volume, two letters to Lord Bathurst particularly deserving of attention. The one contains some excellent practical observations respecting the condition of the army, and the suitableness or unsuitableness of entering immediately upon further military operations; and exhibits, also, very just views with regard to the internal affairs of France. The other is full of judicious remarks on the proceedings of the allied powers in the north of Europe, and of observations with respect to the

principles to be attended to in negotiating a general peace. But besides the sound reasoning, both military and political, which is to be found in these letters, we trace also in them Lord Wellington's constant attachment to a straightforward and definite mode of acting.

'I have received your letter of the 5th instant, enclosing Lord Cathcart's despatch of the 12th July, and one from Mr Hamilton of the same date, with the copy of Mr Thornton's letter of the 12th of July.

I confess that I am not satisfied with the state of affairs in the north of Germany, which, however, is probably owing to my not knowing what has passed between the King's Government and the Allies on the Continent, in regard either to peace or to carrying on the war.’— There appears, therefore, no concert or common cause in the negotiations for peace; and as for the operations of the war, there may be something better, as Lord Cathcart has not gone into details at all; but there does not appear to exist any thing, in writing or any where, excepting in loose conversations among princes. For my part, I would not march even a corporal's guard upon such a system.'

In the Peninsula, notwithstanding the comparative inefficiency of the two governments Lord Wellington had to act with, and in spite of the want of good management, and of energy on their part in military affairs, there was one great object constantly aimed at the expulsion of a foreign invader. In the first despatch addressed to Lord Castlereagh by Sir Arthur Wellesley, he says 'The difference between any two men here is, whether the one is a better or a worse Spaniard; and the better Spa'niard is the one who detests the French most heartily.' Independently, therefore, of other considerations in favour of continuing to direct the efforts of the British forces against France from the side of Spain, there was in the Peninsula a broad, clear, just, and uniform ground of war, very different from the system in the north of Europe, upon which Lord Wellington declared that he 'would not march even a corporal's guard.'

Having reached the frontiers of France after a triumphant campaign, he found himself now called upon to withstand the urgency of his Government to enter prematurely on further enterprises, with the same firmness with which, when driven almost to the sea in Portugal, he had withstood and calmed their alarms lest it should be his desire and intention to fight desperate battles. In a letter to Lord Bathurst, dated 23d August 1813, he says:

-'s scheme.

'I have received your letter of the 14th, with It is like all those which I have received from French officers, and might answer well enough if I could afford, or the British Government or nation

would allow, of my being as prodigal of men as every French general is. They forget, however, that we have but one army, and that the same men who fought at Vimeira and Talavera fought the other day at Sorauren; and that, if I am to preserve that army, I must proceed with caution.'Your Lordship may depend upon it that I am by no means tired of success; and that I shall do every thing in my power to draw the attention of the enemy to this quarter, as soon as I shall know that hostilities are really renewed in Germany.'-Vol. xi. p. 35.

When, therefore, after defeating Soult in two vigorous attempts made by him for the relief of the fortresses of St. Sebastian and of Pampeluna, Lord Wellington had gained possession of both these places-of the former on the 8th of September, and of the latter on the 31st of October-he attacked and forced (10th November) the formidable line of works which the French had been employed in constructing for the defence of their frontier ever since the beginning of August. And all the offensive operations ofthe allied army, in the south of France, were thenceforward as remarkable for their boldness, as the defensive measures in Portugal, in 1810, had been for the prudence and caution with which they were conducted. The fortress of Bayonne presented, however, an obstacle which, in the winter, it was impossible either to pass by, or to overcome. But at the very commencement of the spring, Lord Wellington entered upon that series of able and daring enterprises which mark his campaign of 1814 in the south of France. In his plan was included one of those undertakings which it requires the union of genius and strength of mind to project; and the success of which must be the result of implicit confidence and undaunted courage on the part of those by whom it is to be carried into effect. We allude to the passage of the river Adour, between Bayonne and the sea. This large river, fed by numerous tributaries from the Pyrenees, runs with great impetuosity in the part of its course above mentioned. But, besides the natural current of the river, acted upon here by the flowing and ebbing of the tide, the force of the stream has been further increased to an extraordinary degree, by the construction of strong walls upon either bank, built for the purpose of narrowing the channel; and with the expectation that the violence of the thus artificially augmented impetus, might serve to sweep away the bar at the mouth of the river. In constructing the proposed bridge, therefore, the great force of the stream, flowing alternately in opposite directions, formed a natural obstacle, most difficult to be overcome; besides which there were other impediments at the command of the enemy-consisting of armed vessels and various floating means of annoyance; whilst, by the bridge of

Bayonne, troops could also be sent to defend the bank opposite the point whence the bridge of boats was to be thrown across by the Allies;-a point in respect to which no room for selection was left, in consequence of the limited extent of space between the harbour of Bayonne and the sea. But, formidable as the above obstacles were, there remains yet another to be mentioned. This consisted in the difficulty of bringing into the river, especially at so boisterous a season of the year (the month of February), the small craft necessary for the formation of the bridge, together with the materials for its construction; for to have conveyed these by land, through the loose sand-hills on the coast, would have been an endless labour; besides being liable to be obstructed by sallies from the enemy's intrenched camp, in front of that side of the fortress. The violence of the surf, caused by the conflict between the swell of the ocean and the force of the current upon the bar of the Adour, seemed to interdict all entrance to the river; but the skill and courage of British seamen triumphed even over this obstacle, and the seemingly impossible enterprise was boldly undertaken and successfully achieved. A letter to Admiral Penrose (vol. xi. p. 505),stating the motives for it, explaining the mode in which it should be effected, and enumerating the means necessary for the purpose, -presents a striking example of the largeness of Lord Wellington's conceptions, the clearness of his explanations, and that minute knowledge of practical details to which we have already so often adverted.

Whilst operations were thus carrying on in the neighbourhood of Bayonne by the left of the army, placed under the immediate direction of Sir John Hope, Lord Wellington conducted the right and centre, through difficult roads, and a country intersected by numerous rivers, which flow from the Pyrenees into the Adour above Bayonne. The enemy being successively manœuvred out of the several lines of defence which the features of this difficult country presents, Marshal Soult attempted at last to make a stand at Orthes, but being defeated there, in a pitched battle, he was forced to fall back to St. Sever, on the Adour.

The main principle by which Lord Wellington guided his operations in the campaign of 1814, was that of causing an effective diversion in favour of the armies carrying on the war against Napoleon from the side of Germany and Italy. Advancing, therefore, immediately after his victory at Orthes, he dislodged the enemy from St. Sever, and detached thence a body of troops towards Bordeaux. On their approach, the inhabitants of that important city promptly declared themselves against Na