and to secure and protect him in their own camp. It was the repugnance of the Scots to act in open violation of their engagements, that created the difficulties Montrevil had to encounter at Newark, before he could obtain an escort from their army for the protection of the King's person in his escape from Oxford. It was the same unwillingness to avow the machinations in which they had been engaged, that dictated the disingenuous language which was to have been used when he met the party sent to escort him. It was the hope of concealing the part they had secretly acted, that occasioned their affected surprise when the King appeared amongst them; and it was the fear of detection that led to the studied ambiguity of their expressions when they communicated to Parliament that event. When they pronounced the King's letter to Ormond, assuring him that the Scots were under engagements to join their forces to his, to be 'a damnable ' untruth,' they said, though in somewhat uncourteous terms, what was perfectly true. When they professed that the only use they intended to make of his arrival in their army, was to promote uniformity in religion-to consolidate the Covenant-and to strengthen the union and confidence of the two kingdomsthey were probably sincere. But, when they asserted that his coming to their army was accidental and unexpected—that it had filled them with amazement-that it was a matter of astonishment he should have come to any place under their power we are indignant and ashamed at such unblushing falsehood and hypocrisy. We know nothing parallel to it, except the king's solemn declaration to the speaker, that in going to the Scottish army, he had no intention to disunité the two kingdoms or to prolong the war; when we know, from his letter to Ormond, and from the engagement he accepted from Montrevil, that it was his hope and expectation to do both. It was his knowledge of the secret dealings between Newark and Oxford that emboldened Hudson to write, what has been called his cunning let'ter' to Lord Dunfermline. It was the fear he might divulge the secret communications, of which he had been the bearer, that procured his liberation from Newcastle. It is not probable that the Scoutmaster-general was privy to the secret negotiations that passed,―from the knowledge of which even Ashburnham was excluded; or that he was consulted on any matters of greater importance than the position of the Parliamentary posts, and the course of the bye-roads that might be used to avoid them.

We cannot quit the subject without remarking the contrast between the secret dealing of the Scots, and the open straightforward conduct of Ireton, and other English officers, when overtures were made to them by the king, before he quitted Ox

ford. To these insidious applications they uniformly replied, that they would lay his majesty's propositions before their superior officers, or before the committee of estates.

To understand how the Scots came in this manner to act in violation of the engagements they had contracted, we must recollect, that, though the security of their civil rights was reason sufficient to have justified their active concurrence with the English Parliament as soon as they perceived the popular cause to be in danger; the chief reason that moved them to take part in the contest, was the desire of extending their Covenant, and the hope of introducing their Church government into England. These hopes had been for some time on the decline. Since the new model was established, a sectarian army had been formed by the English, better disciplined and more effective than theirs. The Scotch troops, neglected, ill paid, and ill officered, had been more noted of late for the contributions they had levied than for the military services they had performed. The repeated defeats and humiliations they had sustained from Montrose had lowered their character as a nation. Their friends, the English Presbyterians, still formed a majority in the House of Commons; but the Independents and Erastians were powerful enough to prevent the Presbyterian government from being definitively established in England; or invested with the inquisitorial and uncontrolled authority which the zeal and fanaticism of the clergy demanded. In this declining posture of their affairs, the Scots flattered themselves that, if they could get the King on their side, a complete victory might be obtained over their enemies; and being warmly attached to kingly government, provided they had a covenanted king, they were alarmed at the disloyal language and republican tendencies of the sec

tarians.

Through the whole of the negotiations that followed, it is apparent that the King and the Scots were equally deluded by the over-sanguine expectations they had formed. Though the King had refused to establish Presbytery in England, the Scots persuaded themselves that, once in their army, separated from his Episcopalian counsellors, and instructed by their ministers in the purity and excellence of the Presbyterian worship, the same truth which had convinced them would prevail with him—that a new convert and a new triumph would be obtained for the Presbytery they adored; and an insuperable obstacle opposed to the progress of the sectaries they detested, and to the establishment of the religious liberty they abhorred. The king hoped that, when once in the midst of his countrymen, if he could silence or satisfy the zealots with general professions, in which, however,

with casuistical ingenuity, he was careful always to provide himself with a loophole for escape, he should be able to gain over the needy and ambitious with honours and employments, for which Montrevil had a carte blanche to be used at his discretion. Both parties were mistaken. Neither had calculated on the tenacity with which men adhere to the most trifling differences in matters of religion. The King was more obstinate, and the Scots more vigilant and less pliable than had been expected. The disappointment fell, in the first instance, most heavily on the King; but, after all, he was only left at Newcastle in the state to which he must have been reduced some months before, if he had staid longer at Oxford.

Though we have blamed the conduct of the Scots towards their English allies, we must confess there are not wanting reasons to believe that the Presbyterians in England, though less bigoted than the Scots, were not altogether strangers to these clandestine negotiations. Alarmed at the progress of the sectaries and at the influence they had acquired in the army, the English Presbyterians were desirous of an accommodation with the King, which might secure their liberties and establish the church government they preferred. It appears, from a letter of Secretary Nicholas, that the Presbyterians in London and its vicinity were most anxious that the King should take refuge in the Scottish camp.*

At what time, by whose authority, and through what medium a communication was opened between the Scots and the King's friends, has not, so far as we know, been exactly ascertained. It is evident, from Baillie's Correspondence, that, long before the battle of Naseby, the influence and reputation of the Scots had declined in England-that one of the causes of the new model had been the inefficiency of their army-that their jealousy of the sectaries had increased, and was increasing-and that suspicions had often crossed their minds of secret dealings between the Independents and the Court of France. In August, 1645, Montrevil arrived in London, with the ostensible object of obtaining permission to make levies in Scotland for the King of France; but most probably with a secret mission to bring the King and the Scots to a good understanding. In his first despatch to Brienne, the French secretary of state, he represents the Scotch Commissioners as well disposed towards the King, provided he will establish their religion in England; and having met the Earl of Holland, soon after the defeat of the Royalists

* Clarendon State Papers, II. 228.

at Chester, which destroyed the last army the King had in the field, that nobleman mentioned to him the Scottish camp before Newark, as the only place of refuge that remained for his Majesty. Montrevil communicated this suggestion to Balmerino, who approved of it, promised to mention it to Lord Loudon, Chancellor of Scotland, and requested Montrevil to convey it to his court. Montrevil declined to send an Express with the proposition; but, finding Sir Robert Murray was going to Paris in order to solicit a command in the Scotch Guards, which had become vacant by the death of Lord Irvine, he entrusted that gentleman with the commission; recommending him strongly to Brienne as one who enjoyed in a high degree the confidence of his countrymen."

*

Sir Robert Murray was a man of good family in Scotland, and, like many of his countrymen at that period, he had entered early in life into foreign service. Burnet, who knew him intimately, tells us that he rose to great favour with Richelieu;—no bad test of his capacity and talents. Whether he had come to London at that time in order to get permission to recruit in Scotland for the French army, or with a view to sound the inclinations of his countrymen towards the King, is not clear; but he accepted the commission offered him, and, having received ample instructions, he went to Paris in October or November, 1645; and, after communicating with the Queen and Queen Regent of France, he returned, in January, with letters to the King, which Montrevil conveyed in person to Oxford.†

From the results of Sir Robert Murray's negotiation, it appears that he had proposed to the Queen, and even signed a promise to this effect, that, if the King would consent to the establishment of the Presbyterian Church in England, the Scots would not only declare for him, but draw over to his side the city of London and the English Presbyterians. There were other articles in the proposed agreement, which are not specified; but they were probably the same with those demanded by the Parliament at Uxbridge. The Queen, who considered Episcopalians and Presbyterians with equal indifference, seems to have entered

* Thurloe State Papers, I. 71. Carte, England, IV. 546.

† All historians, even Laing, have been misled by a misprint in Thurloe's State Papers, (i. 73,) where the date of a despatch is marked (N. S.) when it ought to have been (o. s.), from which they have inferred that Montrevil was at Edinburgh in January, 1646. If they had read the despatch, and bestowed the slightest reflection on its contents, they must have seen that it relates to transactions which must have taken place in December, 1646.

readily into this scheme, and to have recommended it to the King. When submitted to Charles, he agreed to all the articles, those concerning religion alone excepted; which were either rejected or modified to such a degree as to be no longer satisfactory to the Scots. An active correspondence followed, which left matters as they were. Fresh letters were brought by William Murray, of the bedchamber, from the Queen and from the QueenRegent of France, which were equally ineffectual with the preceding ones; for on this point, and on this point only, was the influence of the Queen on her husband of no avail. Montrevil's letters are frequent and urgent. He blames the King, while treating with the Scots, for negotiating in secret with the Independents, who were sworn foes to the monarchy; and repeats, what he hears from others, that, by trying to gain both, his Majesty may chance to lose both. Conclude, he says, without haggling, on the terms proposed by the Scots-cito, cito, citono time is to be lost. In excuse for his importunity, he assures the King that he had employed every argument to convince the Scots, that they would do better to mind their own rights and liberties, than to meddle with the consciences of their neighbours; but that his exhortation had been in vain. They had told him plainly, that, independent of other objections, they could not relax from their demands on the subject of religion without the previous consent of the whole Scottish nation and of part of the English, which they knew it would be impossible to obtain. How the King, after these declarations, could flatter himself that his presence in their army would alter their resolutions, it is not easy to explain;-except from his sanguine temper and exaggerated. notions of his own importance. He had, at all events, no right to complain that those with whom he negotiated had deceived him.*

At Newcastle, to the last moment of the King's residence in the Scottish army, it was in his power to have secured the support of his Scottish subjects, by acceding to their terms on religion. Before the surrender of his person to the English commissioners, the Earls of Lauderdade and Traquair came to Newcastle on a mission from the Scottish Parliament, and most earnestly urged on him to establish Presbytery, and approve of the Covenant; offering, in that case, to conduct him to Berwick and to persuade the English Parliament to be content with the conditions which William Murray had proposed to them on the part of his Majesty. He lent a deaf ear to their application, as he had done to all former solicitations on the subject-partly, as he alleged, from conscience, and partly from pride, lest he should