3. SALE-VENDOR, WHETHER ACTS AS AGENT OF THE VENDEE IN MAKING A RESALE.-Though it has sometimes been said that a vendor, in making a resale of the property when the vendee does not take and pay for it, acts as agent for the latter, this does not accurately describe their relations. The vendor is really acting for himself in disposing of the property for the purpose of ascertaining the actual damages he may sustain. He owes to the vendee, in making this sale, duties which, in some respect, resemble those of an agent in so far as he is required to exercise the same good faith which would be required of him as agent, in obtaining the best price, and in following any proper instructions which the vendee may give as to the time and manner in which the sale shall be made. (Moore v. Potter, 692.) See Receivers, 5, 18. SCHOLARSHIP. See Execution, 6. SHERIFFS. See Attachment, 2, 4; Execution; Mortgage, 13. SHORTHAND NOTES. SLANDER. 1. SLANDER-WORDS ACTIONABLE PER SE.-To say of the plaintiff that he swore to a lie before the aldermen is actionable per se. (McGaw v. Hamilton, 786.) 2. SLANDER BY REMARKS BEFORE A LEGISLATIVE BODY.-A member of a legislative body who, upon a judgment in favor of the plaintiff being referred to, without any motion being made respecting it, says the plaintiff swore to a lie in the course of the trial which resulted in the judgment, is liable for slander. The remark, under the circumstances, is not privileged, or at all events, it should be left to the jury to determine whether the utterance was malicious, wanton, and designed to injure plaintiff under the color of a privileged communication. (McGaw v. Hamilton, 786.) COMMUNICATIONS 3. SLANDER-PRIVILEGED OR REMARKS IN THE LEGISLATIVE BODY, WHAT ARE.-A member of a legislative body cannot take advantage of his official position to give expression to private slanders against others and then claim that his words were privileged. (McGaw v. Hamilton, 786.) 4. SLANDER-PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION, WHAT IS NOT.-A communication to be privileged must be made upon a proper occasion from a proper motive, and must be based upon a reasonable and proper cause. (McGaw v. Hamilton, 786.) 5. SLANDER-WORDS NOT ACTIONABLE PER SE-COLLOQUIUM-INNUENDO.-The words "I know Sheets took wheat that did not belong to him" are not actionable per se, but are sufficient where there is a colloquium and innuendo averring that appellee was guilty of larceny, and that parties so understood appellant to mean. (Hinesley v. Sheets, 356.) SPIRITUALISM. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. See Limitations of Actions. STATUTES. 1. STATUTES ADOPTED FROM ANOTHER STATE-CONBTRUCTION.-If a statute of one state is adopted by another, the construction put upon the statute in the former will be adopted in the latter. (Cowhick v. Shingle, 17.) 2. STATUTES-CONSTRUCTION OF, WHEN TAKEN FROM ANOTHER STATE.-Although the construction put upon statutes by the courts of the state from which they are borrowed is entitled to respectful consideration, yet such construction is not permitted to prevail when not in harmony with the spirit and policy of the legislation and decisions of the borrowing state. (Oleson v. Wilson, €39.) 3. STATUTES - REPEAL-NO SAVING CLAUSE-EFFECT OF.-It is a general rule that, after a statute is repealed, without a saving clause, the former repealed statute, in regard to its operative effect, is considered as if it had never existed, except as to matters and transactions past and closed. (Mahoney v. State, 64.) 4. STATUTES · REPEAL-NO SAVING CLAUSE-EFFECT OF, AS TO PENDING PROSECUTION.-If a statute repealing a former act does not contain a substantial re-enactment of the provisions of the old act, so that a suit or prosecution brought under the old statute may be finished under the new act, and such repeal takes place before the final action of the appellate court, pending proceedings in error therein from a judgment of conviction, the prosecution must be dismissed, or the judgment reversed. (Mahoney v. State, 64.) 5. STATUTES-REPEAL-NO SAVING CLAUSE EFFECT OF, AS TO PENDING PROSECUTION.-If a statute permitting seabby sheep to be removed from point to point, with the permission of the sheep inspector, or without it, to a dipping corral, with the written consent of all sheep owners along the route, is repealed, without any re-enactment of the provisions of the old statute, and without any clause saving prosecutions under the former act, by a statute which permits no removal of diseased sheep at all, except upon the permission of the sheep inspector, and then only for the purpose of treatment for the disease, a new and distinct offense is created, the old statute is no longer in force, and, if such repeal takes place while a proceeding in error to reverse a judgment of conviction under the former act is pending before the appellate court, the judgment will, on motion, be set aside, and the defendant dicharged. (Mahoney v. State, 64.) 6. STATUTES-CONSTRUCTION-INVALID PROVISIONS. To arrive at the correct interpretation of an act claimed to be unConstitutional, the invalid portions of the act may be considered in construing its other provisions which are confessedly good. (Swift . Calnan, 443.) See Attachment, 1; Contracts, 1; Equity, 2; Insurance, 1; Judgment, 4; Mechanic's Lien, 1; Officers, 8; Party-walls; Railroad Companies, 1. STOCKHOLDERS. See Banks and Banking, 26, 27; Husband and Wife, &. SUNDAY. See Judgment, 2. SUPERSTITIOUS USES. See Charities, 3. SURETYSHIP. 1. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-ABSENCE OF SIGNATURE BY PRINCIPAL.-The mere fact that the surety alone signed a note does not release him. (Fassnacht v. Emsing Gagen Co., 322.) 2. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-CONCEALMENT OF FACTS BY PAYEE-FRAUD.-If the surety signed as security, not knowing the exact amount, but supposing it was for the purchase price of certain goods, and the payee knew this to be the belief of the surety, but also knew that the amount included a pre-existing debt, his failure to inform the surety was in law a fraud that would release the surety from the entire contract. (Fassnacht v. Emsing Gagen Co., 322.) AS TO 3. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-INSTRUCTION FACTS.-It is error for the court to instruct the jury that the note in case "is a perfect note on its face, that it is a strong inference that the party signing the same did so as principal, and not otherwise." (Fassnacht v. Emsing Gagen Co., 322.) See Officers, 16-20. SURVIVORSHIP. See Executors and Administrators, 4. TAXES. 1. TAXATION-ASSESSMENT, WHO MAY MAKE.-It is essential to the validity of a tax that the assessment be made by the officer authorized by law to make it. He must be either an officer de jure or de facto. (City of Tampa v. Kaunitz, 202.) 2. ASSESSMENT-ILLEGAL ACT-FRAUD-GOOD FAITH. An illegal act done with a fraudulent purpose avoids an assessment. An illegal act committed in good faith will not avoid an assessment. A legal assessinent with an improper motive is not an assessment unlawfully made. (City of Tampa v. Kaunitz, 202.) 3. TAXES-SPECIAL ASSESSMENT AND ORDINARY TAXDISTINCTION.-A special assessment for a local and permanent improvement, such as the construction of a large ditch for drainage purposes, though levied through the exercise of the taxing power, is not regarded as an annual or ordinary tax, but as an equivalent for benefits in the increased value of the property. (Huston v. Tribbetts, 275.) 4. TAX TITLE, WHO MAY NOT ACQUIRE AND ASSERT.— Where land is devised to A for life with remainder to B for life, and after B's death, the property to go to his heirs, and B accepts the devise, he cannot, by purchasing the property at a tax sale during the life of A, acquire any title which he can assert for the purpose of cutting off the interest of his heirs as remaindermen. It would be otherwise if he never accepted the devise. (Defreese v. Lake, 584.) See Estates, 3-5; Interstate Commerce, 1; Mortgage, 18; Municipal Corporations, 10. TAX SALE. TAX TITLE. See Taxes, 4. TELEPHONE MESSAGE. See Evidence, 4. TRIAL. 1. JURY TRIAL.-A COURT IS NOT BOUND TO SUBMIT TO 2. JURY TRIAL.-A COURT MAY PROPERLY REFUSE TO 3. JURY TRIAL-COERCING A VERDICT.-Though, after the 4. TRIAL, CHANGE OF PLACE OF BECAUSE OF LOCAL TRIAL-CRIMINAL 5. 6. APPELLATE PRACTICE-CRIMINAL TRIALS.-The fail- 7. TRIAL-CRIMINAL CASES-COMPELLING WITNESS TO 8. TRIAL-CRIMINAL CASES-RIGHT OF ACCUSED TO AP- 9. TRIAL-OBJECTION TO INCOMPETENT WITNESS.-If a 10. JURY TRIAL-SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.-The jury was improperly influenced, the court will not reverse the decision 11. TRIAL-DEPOSITION.-AN OBJECTION TO THE COM- 12. TRIAL-DEPOSITION-OBJECTION TO COMPETENCY 13. PRACTICE.-AFTER FINDINGS HAVE BEEN FILED TRUSTS. 1. A TRUST TO MANAGE PROPERTY and to pay over and LIABILITY 2. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT-TRUSTEE'S 3. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.-THE FACT THAT THE 4. A NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT made in favor of A. B., 5. TRUSTEES, POWER OF TO DISPOSE OF PROPERTY.— 6. TRUSTS-REMEDY WHERE TRUST FUNDS ARE IN- |