lug and nining is bound to know that it had no power to carry on
the business of a public or private warehouseman or to issue ware-
house receipts, and that a public warehouseman has no authority
to issue receipts on his own property in his public warehouse as
security for his own debt or the debts of others. (Franklin Nat.
Bank v. Whitehead, 302.)

3. A CORPORATION MAY URGE THE DEFENSE OF UL-
TRA VIRES as against its contract forbidden by statute or con-
trary to public policy, though it has received the benefit thereof.
(Franklin Nat. Bank v. Whitehead, 302.)

4. CORPORATIONS-STOCKHOLDER'S LIABILITY AS DE-
PENDENT UPON BOOKS OF.-If, upon the books of a national
banking corporation, one appears to be the owner of stock therein,
he cannot escape liability by proving that he held it as trustee for
some other person whose name and interests do not appear from
such books. (Kerr v. Crie, 493.)

5. PROMISSORY NOTE-CORPORATION-SIGNATURE OF
PRESIDENT AND DIRECTORS.-Where a corporation is bound
by the signature of its president as such, the signing of the names
of the directors as such binds the directors as individuals, the word
“director" being merely descriptio personae. (Taylor v. Reger, 352.)
6. CORPORATIONS, DISSOLUTION OF, JURISDICTION OF
EQUITY TO ENFORCE.-Courts of equity do not possess jurisdic-
tion over corporate bodies to such an extent as to justify them
in dissolving corporations, or in winding up their affairs and
sequestrating their property. (Wallace v. Pierce-Wallace Pub. Co.,
389.)
7. CORPORATIONS INSOLVENCY PREFERENCES.-All
property of an insolvent corporation is a trust fund for the bene-
fit of all its creditors. (Cook v. Moody, 872.)

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8. CORPORATIONS INSOLVENCY PREFERENCES. — A
mortgage executed by an insolvent corporation to a creditor with
knowledge of such insolvency, to enable the corporation to con-
tinue business and pay its debts by means of the extension of time
of payment thus secured, constitutes a preference which may be
avoided by either prior or subsequent creditors of such corporation.
(Cook v. Moody, 872.)

9.

CORPORATION-TRUST FUNDS.-The assets of an insol-
vent corporation become, from the date of its assured insolvency.
a trust fund for equal distribution among its creditors. Afterward
none of them can obtain priority by recovering a judgment and
levying an execution against the corporation. (Memphis Barrel etc.
Co. v. Ward, 825.)

10. CORPORATIONS-EXECUTIONS AGAINST INSOLVENT,
NO PREFERENCE CAN BE GAINED BY.-The levy of an execu-
tion upon the property of an insolvent corporation after it has sus-
pended business and moved to file a bill in equity for the distribu-
tion of its assets, does not create any preference in favor of the
judgment creditor over other creditors who have not obtained any
judgment nor levied any writ. (Memphis Barrel etc. Co. v. Ward,
825.)

11. CORPORATIONS FORMED BY PARTNERS-FRAUD Up-
ON CREDITORS-LIABILITY ON SUBSCRIPTIONS.-If part-
ners, under agreement, capitalize their partnership property at twice
its value, organize a corporation with a capital stock of that amount,
transfer such property to it at this estimated value, and, in pay-
ment of the property, issue to themselves paid-up corporate stock
to an amount equal to such estimated value, make themselves offi-
cers of the corporation, continue the partnership business in the

corporate name, and subsequently become insolvent, such transaction is a fraud on subsequent innocent creditors of the corporation, although no evil intent accompanied the transaction, and the difference between the actual and inflated value of the property so conveyed must be deemed unpaid subscriptions upon the stock issued in this way whenever necessary to protect the rights of such corporate creditors. (Gates v. Tippecanoe Stone Co., 705.)

12.

CORPORATIONS-PUBLIC DUTIES-BILL TO ENFORCE. A bill in equity to enforce the performance of public duties by a corporation cannot be maintained by a private party in the absence of a special right or authority. (Saylor v. Pennsylvania Canal Co., 749.)

13. CORPORATIONS-RIGHT OF PRIVATE PARTY TO ENFORCE PUBLIC DUTIES.-A private party cannot maintain an action to recover damages from a canal company for failure to reconstruct part of its canal destroyed by flood, on the ground that he is thus prevented from using his canal boat at a profit. The right to demand and compel the canal company to reconstruct its canal is a public right alone, and no private citizen can enforce it without especial injury to himself. (Saylor v. Pennsylvania Canał Co., 749.)

14. CORPORATIONS, FOREIGN SERVICE OF PROCESS UPON.-Service of process upon an officer of a foreign corporation while he is casually or temporarily found within the jurisdic tion does not give jurisdiction to render judgment in personam against the corporation which has no place of business or agent within the state, and has never done any business therein. (Carstens v. Leidigh etc. Lumber Co., 906.)

See Agency, 6; Assignment for Benefit of Creditors, 5; Interstate Commerce, 2-4; Receivers; Warehousemen, 2, 4, 5; Water Companies, 11.

COTENANCY.

1. MINGLED GRAIN-OWNERSHIP-CONTINUANCE OF.-A depositor of grain in a common receptacle until he withdraws or transfers his grain, is a tenant in common, not only while his grain is in the common store, but also as long as any grain is in the common store. (Drudge v. Leiter, 359.)

2.

MINGLED GRAIN-PROPORTIONATE SHARE OF TENANTS IN COMMON.-The share of each tenant in common of the mingled grain on hand, at any time, will be a proportionate part of the amount on hand in the proportion which his deposit bears to the aggregate of the other deposits. (Drudge v. Leiter, 359.)

3. COTENANTS. LEASE BY, TO WHOM RENT MAY BE PAID.--If cotenants join in a lease reserving a common rent payable to them jointly, either may receive and give a valid receipt for the entire rent until the other gives notice that his share must be paid to him personally. (Swint v. McCalmont Oil Co., 791.)

4. COTENANCY.-AN ASSIGNMENT OR GRANT BY ONE OF TWO OR MORE colessors gives to his assignee or grantee the same right which he had to receive and receipt for the entire rents reserved by a lease. (Swint v. McCalmont Oil Co., 791.)

See Partition; Warehousemen, 11.

COUNTERCLAIM.

COUNTERCLAIM-DEATH OF ONE OF THE PARTIES. In an action brought by an administrator of a decedent, the defendant may assert a counterclaim based upon a demand in his favor against the decedent, though it did not become due until

after the latter's death, if it was due when the action was com menced. (Ainsworth v. Bank of California, 135.)

See Executors and Administrators, 6.

COUNTIES.

OFFICERS-AUTHORITY OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS.-County commissioners have only special powers and represent the county in respect to its financial affairs, only in such matters as are distinctly provided by statute. They may pass upon claims, which for some amount are the subject of legal demand against the county, but their finding of jurisdiction is not conclusive of the fact, and they are wholly without authority to allow or sanctify an illegal demand upon the county, and such allowance is not binding thereon. (Jones v. Commissioners of Lucas Co., 710.)

COVENANTS.

COVENANT. WHEN DOES NOT RUN WITH THE LAND, The covenant implied in a deed of grant does not run with the land, nor impress it with any equity which will pass to the grantee. Hence, if the purchaser by a grant deed of land which is subject to a mortgage subsequently conveys it, his conveyance does not operate as an assignment to his grantee of any cause of action which he had against his grantor because of such mortgage. (Woodward v. Brown, 108.)

1.

CREDITORS' BILL.

CREDITORS' BILL-EXECUTION, ISSUE, AND RETURN OF, WHEN NOT NECESSARY.-In suits to subject lands to the payment of judgments, where it is shown that the judgment debtor is insolvent, the creditor is not compelled to incur the expense and delay incident to the issuing and return of an execution nulla bona as a condition precedent to the right to maintain his suit. (O'Brien v. Stambach, 368.)

2. A CREDITORS' BILL ALLEGING that the judgment debtor conveyed all the property therein described to his wife, to be held in trust for himself, is sufficient. Under such circumstances, he would remain the real owner, and his creditors, whether existing or subsequent, would be entitled to have the conveyance set aside and the lands subjected to their claims. (Brundage v. Cheneworth, 382.)

3. PRACTICE.-It is error to strike out an amendment to a creditor's bill alleging an agreement between the judgment debtor and his grantee that the latter is to hold the property conveyed to him in trust for the former. (Brundage v. Cheneworth, 382.)

4. CREDITOR'S BILL-PERSONAL PROPERTY.-While it is not usual to do so, a creditor's bill may be maintained to reach personal property which the judgment debtor has transferred for the purpose of hindering and defrauding creditors. (O'Brien v. Stambach, 368.)

5. CREDITORS' BILLS-FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS-SUBSEQUENT CREDITORS.-Where a conveyance is set aside as fraudulent at the instance of creditors existing when it was made, subsequent creditors may also share in the fruits of the litigation. (O'Brien v. Stambach, 368.)

6. CREDITOR'S BILLS - STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. — Technically speaking, a cause of action does not accrue in favor of one who files a creditors' bill until the recovery of a judgment, and

the statute of limitations does not, therefore, commence to run un-
till that time. (Brundage v. Cheneworth, 382.)

7. LACHES.-A CREDITORS' BILL CANNOT BE REGARD-
ED AS BARRED BY LACHES where it does not appear how long
the plaintiff's debt had existed before the recovery of judgment
thereon, if the bill was filed within a few days after the entry of
the judgment. (Brundage v. Cheneworth, 382.)

CRIMINAL LAW.

1. INSANE DELUSIONS AS AN EXCUSE FOR CRIME.-If
an accused had certain delusions which completely possessed him,
but was perfectly sane on other subjects, he must be judged as
though the facts with respect to which the delusion existed were
real, and, if being real, they would not have constituted any de-
fense, the delusions cannot amount to such defense. (People v.
Hubert, 72.)

2. INSANE DELUSION AS A JUSTIFICATION OF CRIME.-
An insane irresistible impulse is not a defense to a criminal charge.
Though the criminal act is the offspring of an irresistible impulse,
and the impulse was irresistible because of mental disease, still
defendant must be held responsible if he, at the time, had the requi-
site knowledge of the nature and quality of the act and its wrong-
fulness. (People v. Hubert. 72.)

3. INSANITY-EVIDENCE IN REBUTTAL.-Though the only
evidence offered on behalf of an accused was that he was insane
as to certain matters, persons, and things, evidence in rebuttal,
given by certain of his intimate acquaintances, that they knew
nothing of his insanity is properly received, as, if he had such de-
lusions, it is probable that they would have heard or known of
them. (People v. Hubert, 72.)

4.

INSANITY-EVIDENCE, WHAT ADMISSIBLE.-A witness
who had a business acquaintance and conversation with the ac-
cused may be permitted to testify that he was sane as a business
man. Upon the question of admitting evidence of this character
a very large discretion is usually allowed to the trial court. (Peo-
ple v. Hubert, 72.)

CUSTODY OF LAW.
See Execution, 12.

CUSTOM.

1. A CUSTOM CANNOT BE GOOD unless it is reasonable.
(Dempsey v. Dobson, 809.)

2. CUSTOM, WHEN UNREASONABLE AND THEREFORE
VOID.-A custom or usage prevailing in the business of carpet
making by which the result of a color mixer's skill and labor in the
service of his employer are recognized as belonging exclusively to
the employé, is unreasonable, and therefore void. (Dempsey v.
Dobson, 809.)

DAMAGES.

1. WILLFUL INJURY-COMPLAINT-NECESSARY AVER-
MENT.-A complaint cannot proceed both as a complaint for negli-
gence, and a complaint for willful injury. To be good for willful
injury it must aver that the act was willfully and purposely done.
(Kalen v. Terre Haute etc. R. R. Co., 343.)

2. DAMAGES MENTAL ANGUISH-POLICY OF THE LAW.
While mental sufferings may be real, and the injuries resulting
AM. ST. REP., VOL. LXIII.-60

therefrom be properly regarded as naturally or directly resulting
from the act causing the suffering as their proximate cause, stil
every injurious effect of wrong cannot form the basis of damages,
and claims for redress on such grounds seem to be out of the wise
policy of the law. (Kalen v. Terre Haute etc. R. R. Co., 343.)

See Appeal, 18; Municipal Corporations, 11.

DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

1. DEBTOR AND CREDITOR-PREFERENCES-CONFES-
SION OF JUDGMENT.-A debtor may secure his creditor by
confession of judgment in his favor. (Braden v. O'Neil, 761.)

2. DEBTOR AND CREDITOR-PREFERENCES-CONFES-
SION OF JUDGMENT-FRAUD.-Confession of judgment by a
debtor to secure a contingent liability to his creditor is not a fraud
in law, and whether a fraud in fact depends on the surrounding
circumstances. (Braden v. O'Neil, 761.)

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3. DEBTOR AND CREDITOR – PREFERENCES-CONTIN-
GENT LIABILITY-CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT.-An indorser
of a note is contingently liable to the holder thereof and may secure
him by a confession of judgment. (Braden v. O'Neil, 761.)
See Fraudulent Conveyances; Partnership, 4-6; Receivers, 13.

DEEDS.
See Conveyances.

DEFINITIONS.

1. DEFINITION.-"COMMODITY IS THAT which affords
advantage or profit. (Beechley v. Mulville, 479.)

2. DEFINITIONS.-PERPETUITY is a limitation, in an instru-
ment, taking the subject matter of the perpetuity out of commerce
for a period of time greater than a life or lives in being and twenty-
one years thereafter. (Bigelow v. Cady, 230.)

Charitable Trust. (Hoeffer v. Clogan, 241.)

Charity. (Hoeffer v. Clogan, 241.)

Common Law. (Cowhick v. Shingle, 17.)

"Debts." (Snyder v. State, 160.)

General Agent. (Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Keating, 499.)

Office. (State v. Hocker, 174.

Prepay Station. (Bird v. Railroads, 856.)

"Publication of Book." (Jewelers' Mercantile Agency v. Jewelers
etc. Co., 666.)

Public Office. (State v. Jennings, 723.)

Warehouseman. (Franklin Nat. Bank v. Whitehead, 302.)

DELIVERY BOND.

See Attachment, 3, 4.

DEPOSITIONS.

See Appeal, 6; Trial, 12.

DEVISE.

1. DEVISE-CLAUSE SHOWING AN INTENT TO CREATE A
PERPETUITY.-An intent to create a perpetuity is manifested by
a clause of a devise in trust, which provides for the appointment of
trustees "for all time to come." (Bigelow v. Cady, 230.)

2. PERPETUITIES--A devise of an estate to A for life with re-
mainder to B does not suspend the power of alienation for a period