lic buildings or works, or otherwise lessening the burdens of government. Any trust, coming within this definition, for the benent of an indefinite class of persons, sufficiently designated to indicate the intention of the donor, and constituting some portion or class of the public, is a charitable trust. (Hoeffer v. Clogan, 241.) 2. CHARITIES-NAME IS NOT MATERIAL, BUT PURPOSE IS.-In determining what is to be regarded as a charitable gift, it is immaterial whether the purpose is called "charitable" in the gift itself, if it is so described as to show that it is charitable in its nature. (Hoeffer v. Ciogan, 241.) 3. CHARITIES—SŪPERSTITIOUS USES-MASSES FOR REPOSE OF SOULS.-The doctrine of superstitious uses arising from the statute, 1 Edward VI, chapter 14, under which devises for procuring masses were held to be void, is not in force in the state of Illinois, and has never obtained in the United States. (Hoeffer v. Clogan, 241.) 4. CHARITIES-MASSES FOR REPOSE OF SOULS-VALID BEQUEST.—A devise of real estate to an unincorporated religious society, in trust, the property to be sold, and the proceeds expended for saying masses for the repose of the testator's soul, and the souls of his relatives, is a valid charitable bequest. (Hoeffer v. Clogan, 241.) 5. CHARITABLE USE, BEQUEST FOR, WHEN NOT VOID FOR UNCERTAINTY.—A devise or bequest of the balance of the testator's estate to be divided among such benevolent, charitable, and religious institutions as his executors or their successors shall select, is not void for uncertainty. (Murphy's Estate, 802.) 6. CHARITABLE USE-WHAT MAY BE SUSTAINED AS.A bequest for benevolent, charitable, and religious institutions or associations to be selected by the testator's executors is sustainable as a charitable bequest. (Murphy's Estate, 802.) 7. CHARITABLE USES.-A bequest of property to trustees to pay such worthy poor girls to aid in their education as the judgment of the trustees shall have dictated, they having full power as to the amounts to be paid and the times of payment, is ineffective and must fail. (Wheelock v. American Tract Soc., 578.) 8. CHARITABLE USES-DISCRETION OF THE TRUSTEES, WHEN AVOIDS.-A bequest to trustees to be applied to useful and charitable purposes, that is to say, they are to dispose of the property in such sums as in their discretion they shall think proper and right, that is, to pay to four associations, naming them, expressing also a desire to aid worthy poor girls in their education and giving the trustees authority to devote to that purpose sums not turned over to such associations, is void under the statutes of Michigan, because the trust is not fully and clearly expressed. (Wheelock v. American Tract Soc., 578.) 9. CHARITIES-JURISDICTION OF EQUITY-STATUTE OF CHARITABLE USES.-The jurisdiction of equity over charitab'e uses was not derived from the statute of charitable uses, 43 Elizabeth, chapter 4. Prior to, and independently of, that statute, charities were sustained, irrespective of indefiniteness of the beneficiaries, or the lack of trustees, or the fact that the trustees appointed were not competent to take. (Hoeffer v. Clogan, 241.) 10. CHARITIES-STATUTE OF CHARITABLE USES-LAW OF ILLINOIS.--The doctrine of charitable uses is a part of the law of the state of Illinois, and the statute of charitable uses, 43 Elizabeth, chapter 4, is a part of the common law of the state. (Hoeffer v. Clogan, 241.) 11. CHARITIES "CHARITABLE" PURPOSE-HOW DETERMINED.-In the state of Illinois, the statute of charitable uses, 43 Elizabeth, chapter 4, is considered in determining the general spirit and intent of the term, "charitable," and the objects which are to be regarded as charitable. (Hoeffer v. Clogan, 241.) 12. CHARITIES-SUITS-PROPER PARTIES DEFENDANT. In a suit brought to construe a will and to determine the validity of a charitable bequest and devise therein contained, made to the officers and trustees of an unincorporated religious society, such officers and trustees are proper parties defendant, and may appeal from a decree holding the bequest and devise to be invalid. (Hoeffer v. Clogan, 241.) 13. CHARITIES-TRUST WILL NOT FAIL FOR WANT OF TRUSTEE.-A devise of real estate and bequest of money to an unincorporated religious society, in trust, for a charitable purpose, such as saying masses for the repose of souls, will not be allowed to fail for want of a competent trustee, for the court will appoint ene to take the gifts and apply them to the purposes of the trust. (Hoeffer v. Clogan, 241.) 14. CHARITABLE USES - DISCRETIONARY POWERS IN TRUSTEES.-In the case of a will making a charitable bequest, it is immaterial how vague, indefinite, and uncertain the objects of the testator's bounty may be, provided there is a discretionary power vested in some one over its application to those objects. (Murphy's Estate, 802.) CHATTEL MORTGAGE. A MORTGAGE OR ASSIGNMENT OF GOODS AS A SECURITY IS VOID even as against creditors having notice thereof if it is neither acknowledged, recorded, nor accompanied by a delivery to the mortgagee or the pledgee of the property subject thereto. (Franklin Nat. Bank v. Whitehead, 302.) CHECKS. 1. BANKS-CHECKS-DISHONOR OF, BY DIRECTION OF DRAWER.-The drawer of a check cannot stop payment of it after it has passed into the hands of a bona fide holder. (Gage Hotel Co. . Union Nat. Bank, 270.) 2. A DRAWER OF A CHECK IS NOT ESTOPPED from recovering moneys paid on a forged indorsement thereof, and wrongfully charged to his account, by the fact that he had stated to the person thus paying the check that he had made a loan to the payee, if, at the time of making such statement, he believed it to be true. (German Sav. Bank v. Citizens' Nat. Bank, 399.) 3. BANKS CHECKS DRAWING ON ANTICIPATED FUNDS-EFFECT OF.—A depositor in a bank has a right to draw his check in the reasonable expectation that he will have sufficient funds, at the time of presentment, to meet it. Hence, inadequacy of funds, at the time the check is drawn, does not affect the holder's right to payment, if there are sufficient funds on hand when the check is presented. (Gage Hotel Co. v. Union Nat. Bank, 270.) See Banks and Banking. COLLATERAL SECURITY. COLLOQUIUM. See Slander, 5. COMMODITY. See Definitions, 1; Insurance, 1. COMMON LAW. 1. COMMON LAW, WHAT IS.-As a rule, the term "common law" means both the common law of England, as opposed to statute or written law, and the statutes passed before the emigration of the first settlers of America. (Cowhick v. Shingle, 17.) 2. COMMON LAW-EXISTENCE OF, IN WYOMING.-The common law is in force in the state of Wyoming only to the extent that it has been adopted by statute. (State v. Foster, 47.) See Charities, 10; Copyright, 1, 3; Limitations of Actions, 1; PartyWalls, 1. CONDITIONS. See Contracts, 2; Conveyances, 2, 3. CONFLICT OF LAWS. See Marriage and Divorce, 2-4, 9; Mechanic's Lien, 3; Mortgage, 1; Usury, 1. 1. CONSPIRACY AS A SUBJECT OF CIVIL ACTION.-A conspiracy cannot be made the subject of a civil action, unless something is done which, without the conspiracy, would give the right of action. (Beechley v. Mulville, 479.) 2. CONSPIRACY TO FIX RATES OF INSURANCE-FORBIDDEN COMBINATIONS.-A compact between local insurance agents of different cities to fix the rates upon all risks therein, and which imposes certain penalties for the taking of risks at less rates than those fixed by the compact, comes within the prohibition of a statute which forbids the formation of combinations or confederations to regulate or fix the price of any commodity. (Beechley v. Mulville, 479.) 3. CONSPIRACY-FIXING RATES OF INSURANCE-UNLAWFUL TRANSACTION.-If local insurance agents form an unlawful combination or compact to regulate and fix rates of insurance, with certain rules, regulations, and penalties, an agent, who is a member of the compact, and who represents companies, not members of it, but which have a right to discharge him at pleasure, cannot, after his violation of the terms of the compact, and the revocation of his agencies, by the compact and companies represented by him, because of his refusal to observe the terms of the combination, recover damages, either from the members of the compact or from such insurance companies, for the loss occasioned to him by such revocation, especially where the agencies came to him as a member of the compact, upon an agreement to do business under its rules; and it makes no difference that the mem bers of the compact and such insurance companies acted together to enforce the rules and regulations of the combination. The transaction, in its entirety, is unlawful. (Beechley v. Mulville, 479.) CONSTITUTIONS. - 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, INTERPRETATION OF. Words or terms used in a constitution, which is dependent upon ratification by the people, must be understood in the sense most obvious to the common understanding at the time of its adoption. (Bishop v. State, 279.) 2. STATES - DEBTS - PREFERENCE OR PRIORITY. - A CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION that no liability or obligation owned or held by the state, or any of its municipalities, shall be extinguished, except by payment thereof into the proper treasury, gives no preference or priority to the state, or a municipality thereof, over a citizen, in the payment of debts, owed by a common debtor. It has no reference to the question of such preference or priority. (State v. Foster, 47.) 1. CONTRACTS See Municipal Corporations, 3. CONTRACTS. - MEANING AND INTENT.-The rule of construction is the same for contracts as for statutes. The object to be attained in construing a contract is to ascertain the meaning and intent of the parties as expressed in the language used. (McFarland v. Railway Officials' etc. Assn., 29.) 2. CONDITIONS PRECEDENT NONPERFORMANCE OF CONDITIONS PRECEDENT-EXCUSE.-An allegation that the opposite party refuses to permit performance of conditions precedent is not equivalent to an allegation of performance, nor can the repudiation of a contract by one party be held equivalent to performance, or a legal excuse for nonperformance, by the other, of conditions precedent so as to authorize recovery as for performance of such conditions precedent. (Thomson v. Kyle, 193.) 3. CONTRACTS CREATING A MONOPOLY, OR PREVENTING COMPETITION-INVALIDITY OF.-All contracts in which the public are interested, and which tend to prevent competition required by statute, or some known rule of law, or which tend to create a monopoly, are void. (Fishburn v. Chicago, 236.) 4. CONTRACTS-RESTRAINT OF TRADE.-All agreements in general restraint of trade are against public policy and void, but agreements that only impose a partial restraint made in connection with the purchase of a business that are reasonably necessary to make available the goodwill purchased with the business, and are reasonable and not oppressive, may be enforced. (Lufkin Rule Co. v. Fringeli, 736.) 5. CONTRACTS - RESTRAINT OF TRADE. An agreement entered into at the time that a business with the goodwill thereof is sold, not to engage directly or indirectly in the same business again in the same state for the period of twenty-five years, is in general restraint of trade, tends to create a monopoly, and is void. (Lufkin Rule Co. v. Fringeli, 736.) 6. CONTRACTS - RESTRAINT OF TRADE. - An agreement entered into at the time that a business with the goodwill thereof is sold, not to engage in the same business, directly or indirectly, in that state, or in the United States, for a period of twenty-five years, is in restraint of trade and void as tending to create a monopoly, whether or not such restraint is necessary to the reasonable enjoyment of the goodwill so purchased. (Lufkin Rule Co. v. Fringeli, 736.) 7. CONTRACTS-RESTRAINT OF TRADE.-Contracts whereby men are purchased out of business, and restrained from carrying it on any where else, tend to create a monopoly, and are void. (Lufkin Rule Co. v. Fringeli, 736.) 8. ACTION ON IMPLIED CONTRACT-AMOUNT TO BE RECOVERED.-In an action on an implied contract for wheat sold, plaintiff can recover not the value of the wheat, but the price received. (Drudge v. Leiter, 359.) See Municipal Corporations, 1, 2. CONVEYANCES. 1. A CONVEYANCE by the heirs of C made in his lifetime 2. CONDITION SUBSEQUENT, WHAT IS NOT.-A conveyance 3. CONDITIONS SUBSEQUENT ARE NOT FAVORED in law, 4. EVIDENCE-BURDEN OF PROOF RESPECTING TIME See Covenants; Notice. COPYRIGHT. 1. A COPYRIGHT AND THE COMMON-LAW RIGHT of an 2. COPYRIGHT, PUBLICATION SUFFICIENT TO SECURE. 3. THE PUBLICATION OF A BOOK DEFEATS THE COM- 4. BOOK, PUBLICATION OF, WHAT IS AND WHAT IS CORPORATIONS. 1. A CORPORATION POSSESSES ONLY SUCH POWERS as 2. LAW, KNOWLEDGE OF.-ONE DEALING WITH A COR- |