attach to it without giving to the statutes of Ohio an extraterritorial effect. In confirmation of this view of the subject counsel cite a decision of this court: Beckel v. Petticrew, 6 Ohio St. 247. was there held that: "The lien authorized by the act to create a lien in favor of mechanics and others in certain cases will extend to all materials, in good faith furnished for the purpose of erecting, or repairing a house in pursuance of a contract with the owner notwithstanding a portion of such material may subsequently be otherwise appropriated without the consent of the party furnishing them." This decision, it is claimed, vests the lien of the materialman upon the contract and not upon the use to which the materials furnished by him were devoted. It is quite correct to say that this decision holds that if the contract, under which materials have been furnished for constructing, etc., any building, etc., within the statute, discloses that such materials were furnished for the purpose of being used in the performance of the work of construction, etc., that this purpose is enough to create the lien, even if the materials should be diverted from such 480 use, provided the materialman did not consent to such diversion. Our attention also, might have been called to a still earlier case decided by this court: That of Choteau v. Thompson, 2 Ohio St. 114, when it was held: "If work be done or materials furnished, without a contract that they shall be put to the particular use of erecting, altering, or repairing a craft or building, no lien can be asserted upon the building or vessel in which they may be placed. The contract intended by the statute is one that has reference to the purpose for which the work is done or the materials furnished." These two decisions establish both the necessity of a contract prescribing the purpose to which the materials are to be devoted, and its sufficiency to create the lien, although the material should be diverted from the use agreed upon; the lienor not assenting thereto. Notwithstanding the stress placed upon the contract by these decisions, we do not think it follows from them as a necessary sequence that the lien of the mechanic and materialmen is a mere incident of such contracts, attaching only where the contracts are Ohio contracts, that is, where they are to be executed within this state. The lien is a creature of our statutes, and whoever falls within the descriptive words of the statute may rightfully claim its benefit, wherever our statutes may be enforced. This court, in the cases of Choteau v. Thompson, 2 Ohio St. 114, and Beckel v. Petticrew, 6 Ohio St. 247, was not dealing with the question now under consideration; it was not then concerned about the nativity of the contract; it was construing the statute respecting the matters then in hand, in order 481 to arrive at the legislative intention respecting them. In the first case it held, among other things, that a sale of materials, without any reference to the use to which they should be put, would not afford a ground to assert a lien, because the contract referred to by the statute required that the materials should be sold for the purpose of being used for the construction, etc., of the house, etc., upon which the lien was to be asserted. In the second case it held that the statute, when fairly construed, did not require that all the materials furnished under the contract should have been used in the structure for which they were furnished and on which the lien was asserted. In those cases our predecessors were seeking to ascertain, and to declare the intention of the legislature, and for that purpose they looked to the language which that body had employed. We are required not only to ascertain the legislative intention, but also to determine whether the subject over which they attempted to legislate was within their authority. 482 To ascertain the legislative intention we must look to the language it employed to express it. When this is done, we find the language employed, when construed according to its natural import, will clearly embrace all contracts to furnish materials for the purposes named in the statute, regardless of the place where the contract was made or the materials to be delivered. The words are “any . . . . materialman," etc, "who has furnished material . . for the construction . . . . of an improvement," more comprehensive language could not have been used. No other words appear that tend to establish an intention to narrow the scope of those recited, or that indicate a purpose to limit the benefits of the statute to vendors, who bring within the state the materials they furnish. The defendants in error, therefore, are plainly within the terms of the statute. This construction finds support in Sproul v. McCoy, 26 Ohio St. 577, where this court held that the statutes of this state allowing exemptions from execution and sale to "every person who has a family," may be invoked by "any debtor against whom an action is prosecuted in the courts of this state, whether such debtor be or be not a resident of this state." The language of the statute granting the exemption is no more comprehensive than that employed by the mechanics' lien statutes in giving a lien to subcontractors and materialmen. We now come to the question of the power of the legislature to dispose of the fund, or create a lien, in favor of a vendor who sells and delivers materials in another state. That the statutes of Ohio cannot operate, propria vigore, beyond the boundaries of the state, is a settled rule of law, and therefore, notwithstanding the intention of the legislature to embrace within the beneficial provisions of the statute all persons who should sell and deliver, in another state, materials to be brought here and used for the purposes designated by the statute, yet the statute could not be applied to such transactions, if thereby its operation was extraterritorial. Remedial laws, however, whether written or unwritten, do not operate extraterritorially, on account of being applied by the courts of the state in which they are in force, to actions pending in such courts on contracts made and to be performed 483 in another state or country. Remedies will be administered according to the law of the place where the action is instituted, without regard to the law of the place where the right arose: Heaton v. Eldridge, 56 Ohio St. 87; 60 Am. St. Rep. 737; Andrews v. Herriott, 4 Cow. 508; Robinson v. Bland, 2 Burr. 1084; De La Vega v. Vianna, 1 Barn. & Adol. 284; Trasher v. Everhart, 3 Gill & J. 234; Hyde v. Goodnow, 3 N. Y. 270; Bank v. Donnally, 8 Pet. 361. This principle is illustrated and enforced by a large array of authorities, that are practically unanimous, but it is not necessary to refer to them further. By the great weight of authority statutes that relate to liens of mechanics and materialmen are remedial; instead of creating new and substantive rights, they simply afford new and cumulative remedies to enforce obligations previously recognized: Hanes v. Wadey, 73 Mich. 178; Best v. Baumgardner, 122 Pa. St. 17; Martin v. Hewitt, 44 Ala. 419; Hall v. Bunte, 20 Ind. 304; Bangor v. Goding, 35 Me. 73; 56 Am. Dec. 688; Frost v. Ilsley, 54 Me. 345; Woodbury v. Grimes, 1 Colo. 100. These principles would seem to settle the question in favor of the operation of the statute in the case of material delivered in another state. However, should the rule in reference to the nature of mechanics' lien laws be otherwise, and those laws held to create substantive rights, which, when once vested, are placed beyond legislative interference, nevertheless as the fund in controversy originated under our laws, was actually within our borders, and was in the custody and subject to the orders of one of our courts, it would 484 seem to naturally follow that its disposition should follow the course prescribed by our legislature. To thus dispose of the fund is to assert the dominion of our own statutes, while to distribute it according to the statutes or decisions of another state would be to acknowledge their superiority. The case docs not fall within the reasons of those rules which induce the court of one state or country to construe the rights of parties arising under a contract, made and to be executed in another state, according to the laws of the latter. In the case before us the material was furnished for the purpose of being used in an improvement to be made in this state; under such circumstances how can it be said that the parties did not contemplate the laws of Ohio in reference to rights which thus arise? Surely if the question related to a lien upon real estate, such as the mechanics' lien laws of this state create, its existence and its terms would depend upon our statutes; the laws of New York could place no burden upon land situated in Ohio. True, a lien upon real estate was not asserted nor involved in the case before us, but there was involved the distribution of a fund created and set aside by a statute of this state for the benefit of persons who might fall within the class declared by that statute to have a right to share in its distribution. The statute in conferring this benefit made no distinction between a fund raised by a sale of real estate upon which a lien was given, and a fund in the possession of some public agency. In each case the distribution was to be made according to the same rule. We think the right of the parties in either case was determinable according to the laws of this state. 485 This view of the question is strongly supported by the decisions of this court in respect of the water craft statutes: Schooner Aurora Borealis v. Dobbie, 17 Ohio, 125; Steamboat Ohio v. Stunt, 10 Ohio St. 582; Steamboat Messenger v. Pressler, 13 Ohio St. 255. It also finds support in the following cases: St. Louis Bridge etc. Co. v. Memphis etc. R. R. Co., 72 Mo. 661; Thompson v. St. Paul etc. Ry. Co., 45 Minn. 13, 15; Great Western Mfg. Co. v. Hunter, 15 Neb. 33, 37; Fagan v. Boyle Ice Machine Co., 65 Tex. 324; Gaty v. Casey, 15 Ill. 189. The defendant in error, The De Graff & Roberts Quarries, was, by the court of common pleas, made a party to the action on the application of the city of Cleveland. This action of that court is attacked as erroneous by counsel for plaintiff in error, but as the question does not arise on the records, it has not been considered in this opinion. Judgment affirmed. MECHANICS' LIENS-CONFLICT OF LAWS-EXTRATERRITORIAL EFFECT. The laws of a state can have no force proprio vigore outside of that state: Falls v. United States Sav. etc. Co., 97 Ala. 417; 38 Am. St. Rep. 194; Sneed v. Ewing, 5 J. J. Marsh. 460; 22 Am. Dec. 41. The lex fori prevails in questions concerning the remedy: Note to Hamilton v. Cooper, 12 Am. Dec. 591. The New York mechanic's lien statute, similar to that construed in the principal case, was held to have no extraterritorial force, being merely intended for those who performed labor or furnished materials within the state of New York: Birmingham Iron Foundry v. Glen Cove etc. Mfg. Co., 78 N. Y. 30. See Phillips on Mechanics' Liens, 3d ed., secs. 34, 112, 491. The place of the contract is not important as the lien arises not from the contract, but from the use of the materials furnished upon the premises, the putting them into the building, and attaching them to the freehold: Gaty v. Casey, 15 Ill. 190. See Fagan v. Boyle Ice Machine Co., 65 Tex. 324. LUFKIN RULE COMPANY V. FRINGELI. [57 OHIO STATE, 596.] CONTRACTS-RESTRAINT OF TRADE.-All agreements in general restraint of trade are against public policy and void, but agreements that only impose a partial restraint made in connection with the purchase of a business that are reasonably necessary to make available the goodwill purchased with the business, and are reasonable and not oppressive, may be enforced. CONTRACTS - RESTRAINT OF TRADE.-An agreement entered into at the time that a business with the goodwill thereof is sold, not to engage in the same business, directly or indirectly, in that state, or in the United States, for a period of twenty-five years, is in restraint of trade and void as tending to create a monopoly, whether or not such restraint is necessary to the reasonable enjoyment of the goodwill so purchased. CONTRACTS RESTRAINT OF TRADE.-An agreement entered into at the time that a business with the goodwill thereof is sold, not to engage directly or indirectly in the same business again in the same state for the period of twenty-five years, is in general restraint of trade, tends to create a monopoly, and is void. CONTRACTS-RESTRAINT OF TRADE.-Contracts whereby men are purchased out of business, and restrained from carry. ing it on anywhere else, tend to create a monopoly, and are void. Dickey, Brewer & McGowan, for the plaintiff in error. A. T. Brinsmade, for the defendants in error. 601 MINSHALL, J. The question in this case arises on a demurrer to the petition, which was sustained in the common pleas, and the judgment was affirmed in the circuit court. From the petition and the agreement annexed to it, it appears that Xavier and Lucas Fringeli, as partners under the name of the Fringeli Rule Company, were carrying on the business at Cleveland, Ohio, of manufacturing and selling rules and other instruments used principally in measuring lumber; and that the plain |