86 Am. Dec. 362; Georgia Home Ins. Co. v. Kinnier, 28 Gratt. 88; Little v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 123 Mass. 380; 25 Am. Rep. 96; Eastern R. R. Co. v. Relief etc. Ins. Co., 105 Mass. 570. The proof shows that shortly after the fire, Catanach, a special agent of the appellants, went to Centreville to view the ruins of the property, and investigate all the circumstances attending the loss. While there he had a conversation with Thomas J. Keating, one of the appellees. After some general talk about the fire, the latter said to him, "When you send the money for the loss of this property, I want you to send us a separate check for our interest in the matter"; Catanach replied, "No, I cannot do that"; Keating asked, "What will you do"; the reply was "send a joint check to you gentlemen as attorneys and to Mr. Draper." Keating then explained to him, he was afraid he would have trouble with Draper about getting him to sign a joint check. Later on Keating, Jr., the agent, wrote to Catanach that Draper was inquiring about his loss, and that he (the agent), simply tells him it is "in the hands of the company"; and two days later, on the 20th of February, he again writes to Catanach, this time to say, "the attorneys for the mortgagee in the Draper matter have requested me to write and ask you to send a proof of loss, so that they could make it out and get Draper to make oath to it. I told them that you usually attended to the making out of the proof, but that I would write you about it." On the 23d of February, 1895, Catanach replies; he writes: "Inasmuch as we have notice of attachment proceedings at Baltimore in regard to this loss, it is important that great care should be exercised in the matter on this account; while I have at times made up proofs of loss, it is not customary to do so, 151 and in all cases of litigation I decline to do so, or allow the agent to take any part in furnishing or making up proofs of loss, but that no obstacle may be thrown in the way of the assured," he directs the agent to inform him where printed blanks can be had, etc. There was evidence tending to show that the request for "the proof" of loss "to be made out," was made by Palmer Keating, who did not have charge of the business and had no knowledge of the previous conversations of Catanach with his brother Thomas, who testified that after his conversation with. Catanach he did not think it was necessary to file proofs of loss, but that afterward he had done so because he thought it would do no harm, and Catanach had desired it to be done. In the first prayer of the appellees the jury were required to find as one of the conditions of the right of the plaintiffs to recover: That after the fire, "Catanach went to Centreville, examined into the circumstances of said fire, and the value of said dwelling, and that after having done so had a conversation with Thomas J. Keating, one of the plaintiffs, in which he stated that the dwelling was a total loss, and in answer to a request of the said plaintiff that the check for the plaintiffs' interest in said loss should be payable to the plaintiffs' order, stated that the said check could not be made payable to the plaintiffs' order, but would be made payable to the order of Frank W. Draper, and the plaintiffs jointly; and further find that from such conversation the said plaintiff's believed that the defendant's agent had waived formal proofs of loss, and that the said Catanach did intend thereby to waive such proofs of loss, etc." Now if Catanach stated to the appellees that he would send a joint check, it was a recognition of the liability of the company, and wholly inconsistent with an intention to contest the plaintiffs' right of recovery. And if the jury found the appellees so understood it, and Catanach so intended it, and the acts of the plaintiffs were thereby influenced by it, the legal conclusion of the court, that the facts so put to the jury, constituted a waiver, was entirely warranted. In reply to the objection that there is no proof 15% of Catanach's power or authority to waive this condition, all we have to say is, it was at least within the scope of his apparent authority. He was a special agent of the company sent by it to view the ruins, investigate the loss, and find out as much about it as he could. Mr. Keating, the agent, when asked about the policy and when it will be paid, consults Mr. Catanach, who replies authoritatively in his letter of 23d of February. And when finally proofs of loss are made, they pass to Mr. Bond, an agent, who testifies he sent them to Catanach, and the matter was then turned over to him for such action as he should see proper in the premises. These facts, we think, clearly show that he held the actual, or at least the apparent, authority to examine into and adjust the circumstances of the loss and the liability of the company. think the defendant's 7th, 9th, 10th and 11th prayers ought not to have been granted. The defendant's 6th prayer was properly rejected because there was no evidence of a change in the title of possession: Washington Fire Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 32 Md. 446; 3 Am. Rep. 149. Of the defendant's 8th prayer it is only necessary to say there is no condition in the policy against encumbrances: Bowman v. Franklin Fire Ins. Co., 40 Md. 620. There were other points raised and discussed at the argument, but in asmuch as what has been said practically disposes of all the questions in the case, we will not prolong this opinion by adverting to them. We find no error in any of the rulings of the court and the judgment will therefore be affirmed. INSURANCE-CONDITION AS TO OWNERSHIP-WAIVER OF.-The condition in a policy of insurance that it shall be void in case the interest of the assured be other than "unconditional and sole ownership" refers only to the quality of the estate or interest: Phenix Ins. Co. v. Bowdre, 67 Miss. 620; 19 Am. St. Rep. 326; Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Bohn, 48 Neb. 743; 58 Am. St. Rep. 719, and note; Loventhal v. Home Ins. Co., 112 Ala. 108; 57 Am. St. Rep. 17, and note. An insurer may be estopped to declare a forfeiture for breach of this condition where he fails to make any inquiries concerning the insured's title: Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Bohn, 48 Neb. 743; 58 Am. St. Rep. 719; or where the insurer's agent, before completing the insurance, had notice that the insured's interest was not such as the policy required: Graham v. Fire Ins. Co., 48 S. C. 195; 59 Am. St. Rep. 707, and note. INSURANCE COMPANIES-WHO ARE GENERAL AGENTS AND THEIR POWERS.-One constituted the agent of an insurance company to accept risks, to agree upon and settle terms of insurance, and to carry them into effect by issuing and renewing policies, must be regarded as a general agent: Goode v. Georgia Home Ins. Co., 92 Va. 392; 53 Am. St. Rep. 817, and note. Such general agents may waive stipulations and conditions contained in a policy of insurance with respect to the conditions upon which it shall go into operation, by delivering it with knowledge of the facts and accepting the premium: Wood v. American Fire Ins. Co., 149 N. Y. 382; 52 Am. St. Rep. 733, and note. See Taylor v. State Ins. Co., 98 Iowa, 521; 60 Am. St. Rep. 210, and note. INSURANCE INSURABLE INTEREST WHAT CONSTITUTES.-Even one who has no title, legal or equitable, in property, and no present possession or right of possession thereof, has an insurable interest therein if he will derive benefit from its continuing to exist, or will suffer loss by its destruction: Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Bohn, 48 Neb. 743; 58 Am. St: Rep. 719, and note; Graham v. Fire Ins. Co., 48 S. C. 195; 59 Am. St. Rep. 707, and note. It may be a special or limited ownership, disconnected from any title, lien, or possession: Rochester Loan etc. Co. v. Liberty Ins. Co., 44 Neb. 537; 48 Am. St. Rep. 745, and note. INSURANCE-PROOFS OF LOSS-WAIVER OF.-Although the insured, after a loss has occurred, fails to comply with the stipulation in the policy requiring proofs of loss, the insurer may be estopped to set up such failure as a ground of forfeiture, where defective proofs are accepted without objection: Morotock Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 93 Va. 8; 57 Am. St. Rep. 782, and note; or the insurer refuses to pay upon other grounds: Lumbermen's Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bell, 166 Ill. 400; 57 Am. St. Rep. 140, and note; or where proofs are orally waived: Burlington Ins. Co. v. Lowery, 61 Ark. 108; 54 Am. St. Rep. 196, and note: or where the insurer by his own conduct leads the insured to believe that a performance of the condition is unnecessary: Graves v. Merchants' etc. Ins. Co., 82 Iowa, 637; 31 Am. St. Rep. 507. ROYSTON V. HORNER. [86 MARYLAND, 249.] RES JUDICATA-FAILURE TO INTERPOSE DEFENSE OF DURESS OR FRAUD.-If a decree dismissing a bill is pleaded in a second suit as res judicata, and the party against whom it is so pleaded claims that it was procured by duress or fraud, he must assert that defense in reply, and after the decision that such first decree is res judicata, he cannot maintaiu a third suit for relief from it on the ground of fraud or duress, and that because of his failure to before plead it, it has not become res judicata. It was his duty to plead it in the second suit. Richard S. Culbreth, for the appellant. John Prentiss Poe and Edgar Allen Poe, for the appellee. 250 FOWLER, J. On the 6th of April, 1888, John W. Royston filed his bill in the circuit court of Baltimore City against the same appellee against whom the bill in this case was filed by him and his committee. In the first bill he alleged his own imbecility and unfitness to attend to business; that he could be easily influenced; that whilst in this condition of mind he had been induced to sell to the appellee certain valuable property for an insignificant sum; that another and the appellee combined and conspired to cheat him; that they, through fraudulent statements and promises, induced him also to execute a deed to the appellee of all his contingent interests in the estates of his brothers and sisters which he would own in the event of their dying without issue. In the bill of 1888 Royston prayed that all these deeds might be set aside; that a receiver might be appointed to collect rents, etc. Answers were promptly filed by the appellee and his alleged coconspirators, and in January, 1889, the plaintiff began to take testimony and continued at intervals until the 15th of July of the same year. None appears to have been taken on his behalf thereafter. The defendants took no testimony whatever. The next step taken under the bill of 1888 was a decree dated August 28, 1889, which was passed with the consent of all the parties, that the bill be dismissed. Presently, when we have occasion to consider the facts set forth in the bill in this case it will fully appear what induced, or at least what is alleged to have induced, the parties to take this course. The bill of 1888 having been 251 thus dismissed, as appears by the evidence in this case, after a settlement of the controversy, the plaintiff named in the bill, John W. Royston, was, without any notice to him, not only found to be a lunatic at that time, but it was adjudged that he had been so for twenty years without lucid intervals, and incapable of the management of his person or property. Campbell B. Royston was appointed the committee of his person and estate. In less than a month thereafter the bill which resulted in the appeal reported in Royston v. Horner, 75 Md. 559, was filed. In this last-named bill filed by the alleged lunatic and his committee, it is alleged that the various conveyances therein named, being the same mentioned in the bill of 1888, were made by said Royston when he was in an unsound condition of mind, and that the defendant Horner had within the short time he held and enjoyed the property so con'veyed to him, received in rent the sum of four thousand three hundred and fifteen dollars or nearly three times as much as he had paid said Royston for it. And the prayer is that the deeds be set aside because of the lunacy of Royston, and that Horner may be required to account for the rents which he has received, anl that a receiver may be appointed, etc. To this bill Horner pleaded res adjudicata based upon the consent decree of August 28, 1889. After a most careful and elaborate examination of the authorities and of the decree itself, we held in Royston v. Horner, 75 Md. 559, that that decree was a flat bar to the second bill, which, as we have seen, was the first attempt to get rid of the decree of 1889. The bill in this case, which may be called the third of the series, and the second vain endeavor to avoid the binding force of the decree of 1889, was filed within a few months after the case of Royston v. Horner, 75 Md. 559, was decided. In the opinion in that case it is said that there was in the bill no allegation of fraud in obtaining the decree of 1889, and that without such allegation and proof, the decree must stand. Hence, in the bill now before us, the allegation on which the appellant bases his claim to be again heard is that the decree of 1889 was obtained by means of certain threats made to the sister of Royston to have him arrested on the charge of forging 252 certain promissory notes. It is to be noticed that it appears to be conceded that Royston had signed the names of the makers of the notes in question without authority. Claiming that these threats amount to fraud and imposition, the plaintiff again asks us to set aside the decree of 1889. But the plea of res adjudicata is again interposed as it was in the former case, and must, we think, again prevail as it did there. When, in the former case, the decree of 1889 was pleaded, the opportunity was presented to show what now is alleged to be true, namely, that that decree was obtained by duress or fraud. The alleged facts upon |