veyance as to existing creditors would be set aside at the instance of subsequent creditors, if it was made with a fraudulent view to future indebtedness. In Rollins v. Shaver etc. Carriage Co., 80 Iowa, 380, 20 Am. St. Rep. 427, it was held that subsequent creditors cannot complain of a conveyance fraudulent in fact as to prior creditors. We think the correct rule is: 1. A conveyance which is merely voluntary, and when the grantor had no fraudulent view or intent, cannot be impeached by a subsequent creditor; 2. A conveyance actually and intentionally fraudulent as to existing creditors, as a general rule, cannot be impeached by subsequent creditors; 3. If a conveyance is actually fraudulent as to existing creditors, and merely colorable, and the property is held in secret trust for the grantor, who is permitted to use it as his own, it will be set aside at the instance of 264 subsequent creditors. The second rule above laid down is subject to some exceptions, among which may be mentioned cases in which the conveyance is made by the grantor with the express intent and view of defrauding those who may thereafter become his creditors; cases wherein the grantor makes the conveyance with the express intent of becoming thereafter indebted; cases of voluntary conveyances, when the grantor pays existing creditors by contracting other indebtedness in a like amount, and wherein the subsequent creditors are subrogated to the rights of the creditor whose debts their means have been used to pay; cases in which one makes a conveyance to avoid the risks, or losses, likely to result from new business ventures, or speculations. The following authorities will be found to support the above rules and exceptions: Wait on Fraudulent Conveyances, secs. 96, 97, 98, 100; Bump on Fraudulent Conveyances, 4th ed., secs. 290, 293, 296, 300; 2 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, secs. 971-973; 1 Am. Lead. Cas., 5th ed., 42, notes. We have not overlooked the fact that there are respectable authorities holding that a conveyance actually fraudulent as to the existing creditors may for that reason alone be avoided by subsequent creditors. We are not, however, prepared to assent to the correctness of such a doctrine. Under our holding, the petition stated a good cause of action under the third rule above stated, and hence the demurrer was improperly sustained. 5. It is claimed that the petition shows upon its face that the plaintiff's cause of action is barred. The conveyance of Solomon Percey to his wife was made in 1878. The plaintiff received his judgment in 1894. The conveyance to Lionel Per cey was made in October, 1883, and as it is alleged it was placed upon record, and no date given, we may presume that it was recorded soon after the execution. 265 There is nothing in the petition showing when the deed to the wife was filed for record, nor is there anything to show when the plaintiff obtained actual knowledge of the execution of these deeds. For aught that appears, the fraud in the conveyance of the property may have been known to the plaintiff for ten years before he took any steps to recover his judgment. Technically speaking, his cause of action did not accrue until the recovery of his judgment, in 1894, at which time the statute would begin to run. As this suit was commenced a few days after the judgment was recovered, the action was not barred. Nor do we think it can be said that the case comes within the rule stated in Mickel v. Walraven, 92 Iowa, 423, and other like cases, because it does not appear how long the plaintiff's debt had been in existence prior to the time it was reduced to judgment. It is not therefore a case where we can say that the plaintiff has been guilty of such laches as should prevent a court of equity from affording him relief. For the reasons above given, the judgment of the district court must be reversed. APPELLATE PROCEDURE-FAILURE TO SERVE NOTICE.An appeal will not be dismissed because the statement on a motion for a new trial was not served on certain parties to the action not interested in the appeal: Dore v. Dougherty, 72 Cal. 232; 1 Am. St. Rep. 48. The failure to serve a notice of appeal on one of the parties is not jurisdictional to the extent of depriving the court of the power to consider and determine such questions in the case as may be decided without affecting his rights: Soukup v. Union Ins. Co., 84 Iowa, 448; 35 Am. St. Rep. 317. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES-VOLUNTARY TRANSFERS -ATTACK BY SUBSEQUENT CREDITORS.-A voluntary conveyance is not fraudulent or void as against subsequent creditors, though the grantor was indebted at the time it was executed. To make it fraudulent, proof of actual or intentional fraud is required: Rudy v. Austin. 56 Ark. 73; 35 Am. St. Rep. 85, and note. A voluntary conveyance, made with intent to hinder, delay, and defraud creditors, is void as against subsequent as well as prior creditors, though the grantee did not know of nor participate in the fraudulent intent of the grantor: Gilliland v. Jones, 144 Ind. 662; 55 Am. St. Rep. 210, and note. CREDITOR'S BILL-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-WHEN BEGINS TO RUN AGAINST.-A judgment creditor's cause of action to set aside a transfer as fraudulent as against him, does not accrue until he has recovered judgment, and execution has issued thereon and been returned unsatisfied. Therefore, until such judgment and return, the statute of limitations applicable to his action does not begin to run: Weaver v. Haviland, 142 N. Y. 534; 40 Am. St. Rep. 631, and note; Brown. Campbell, 100 Cal. 635; 38 Am. St. Rep. 314. WALLACE V. PIERCE-WALLACE PUBLISHING COMPANY. [101 IOWA, 313.] CORPORATIONS, DISSOLUTION OF, JURISDICTION OF EQUITY TO ENFORCE.-Courts of equity do not possess jurisdiction over corporate bodies to such an extent as to justify them in dissolving corporations, or in winding up their affairs and sequestrating their property. CORPORATIONS, RECEIVERS, APPOINTMENT OF.-A receiver of a corporation may be appointed at the instance of one who brings himself within the provisions of section 2903 of the Civil Code of Iowa, declaring that a receiver may be appointed on the petition of either party to a civil action or proceeding, who shows he has a probable right to, or an interest in, any property which is the subject of the controversy, and that such property or its rents or profits are in danger of being lest or fatally injured or impaired, if the court is satisfied that the interest of one or both parties will be thereby promoted, and the substantial rights of neither unduly infringed. A RECEIVER OF A CORPORATION WILL NOT BE APPOINTED on the ground that it has but two stockholders owning an equal uumber of shares of stock, and owns stock in another corporation, respecting the management of which there is such disagreement between the stockholders in the first-named corporation that they cannot agree in any measures for the voting of such stock, or for the management of the second corporation, nor will a receiver be appointed of such stock alone. A RECEIVER WILL NOT BE APPOINTED of a corporation on account of disputes among its stockholders or the members of its board of directors or governing body, where the disagreement between its officers is not such as to render it impossible to carry on the business for which it was organized. CORPORATIONS, RECEIVERS.-A STOCKHOLDER WHO IS A CREDITOR OF A CORPORATION has no right, on that ground, to have a receiver appointed where it is solvent and able to meet its obligations. CORPORATIONS.-WHEN A COURT APPOINTS A RECEIVER OF A CORPORATION ON ACCOUNT OF DISSENSIONS in the governing body it will interfere for a limited time only, and to as small an extent as possible. Guernsey & Bailey, for the appellants. Dudley & Coffin, and Bishop, Bowen & Fleming, for the appellees. 320 DEEMER, J. The Pierce-Wallace Publishing Company is a corporation organized under the laws of this state, having its principal place of business in the city of Des Moines. The stock is owned in equal shares by plaintiff and the defendant J. M. Pierce, and these parties are the sole directors and officers of the corporation; Pierce being the president and business manager, and Wallace the secretary and treasurer and 321 editor. This corporation owns one hundred and eighteen shares of the capital stock of another corporation known as the Homestead Company, and also owns and conducts two newspapers-one known as the "Wisconsin Farmer," conducted and carried on at Madison, Wisconsin, and another known as the "Live Stock Indicator," published at Kansas City, in the state of Missouri. The one hundred and eighteen shares of stock owned by the Pierce-Wallace company in the Homestead Company, is a majority of the stock in the latter company. The other stock is owned by S. F. Stewart, Frank Dunning, A. G. Lucas, and Pierce and Wallace, in their individual capacity. In his original petition the appellee asked for a dissolution of the corporation and a distribution of its assets, but this he afterward amended by striking out the prayer for dissolution, and the relief asked when the case was tried was the appointment of a receiver, and such equitable relief as the facts would warrant. His claim in this court is (using the language of his counsel): "1. That Pierce and Wallace were the sole and equal owners of the stock in the Pierce-Wallace Publishing Company; 2. That between these two men differences of a personal nature had arisen, and from an accumulation of causes had become so intensified that nothing in the way of conference or communication between them was possible; 3. That in consequence, no meeting of the board of directors or stockholders could be had, and no authoritative direction could be given in the affairs of the corporation; 4. That Pierce had taken possession of, and assumed control over, the affairs and property of the corporation, and by one means and another, was excluding Wallace therefrom; 5. That in many respects, the management by Pierce was not only contrary to the views of Wallace, but, having taken sole possession, 322 and maintaining it by such means as might be required, he was manipulating matters in his own interest, and utterly disregarding the rights and wishes of Wallace." And he contends that the order appointing the receiver, should be sustained. We are at a loss to know whether or not appellee is asking for the dissolution of the Pierce-Wallace corporation. He struck out this part of the prayer from his original petition, and does not expressly insist upon this relief, although his contention seems to be that at the final hearing he should have such a decree as would practically amount to a dissolution of the corporation. It may be that the reason why he does not ask that the corporation be dissolved is to be found in the fact that his counsel are of the opinion that such relief cannot be had under the facts as they are disclosed by this record. But, whether this be the fact or not, it is certainly true that, in the absence of express statutory authority, jurisdiction of courts of equity does not exist over corporate bodies to such an extent as to justify them in dissolving corporations, or of winding up their affairs and sequestrating their property. This seems to be so well settled that there is scarcely a dissenting voice in authority: See High on Receivers, 3d ed., secs. 288, 289; Beach on Receivers, sec. 403; 20 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 57; Morawetz on Private Corporations, secs. 282, 283; French v. Gifford, 30 Iowa, 153; Thompson on Corporations, secs. 4538, 4539, 6703. Our statutes do not, in terms, authorize the appointment of a receiver for the purpose of winding up a going corporation. The only provision we have is general in character, and does not relate to any specific class of cases. It is as follows: "On the petition of either party to a civil action or proceeding, wherein he shows he has a probable right to, or interest in, any property which is the subject of the controversy, and that such property or its 323 rents or profits are in danger of being lost or materially injured or impaired, . . . the court, ... if satisfied that the interests of one or both parties will be thereby promoted, and the substantial rights of neither unduly infringed, may appoint a receiver to take charge of and control such property under its direction during the pendency of the action, and may order and coerce the delivery of it to him": Code, sec. 2903. We have heretofore held that this section does not authorize the dissolution of the corporation by a court of equity, nor the placing of its property in the hands of a receiver which practically accomplishes the same purpose: French v. Gifford, 30 Iowa, 153. We have also held, however, that one who brings himself within the provisions of section 2903, may have a receiver appointed as well of the effects of a corporation as of an individual or copartnership: Dickerson v. Cass County Bank, 95 Iowa, 392. And we also said in French v. Gifford, 30 Iowa, 153, that there are cases in which a receiver will be appointed for the property of a corporation, as, for instance, where the officers have been guilty of a misappropriation of the funds or a breach of trust in the discharge of official duties. Turning now to the record, to discover the facts upon which appellee relies for the appointment of a receiver, we find that his complaints are: 1. That Pierce had arrogated to himself the active management of the corporation, and excluded appellee therefrom, and withheld and refused to give appellee any satis |