must be considered a difficult question, since eminent courts are in conflict in their views of contracts of insurance similar to the one under consideration. These conditions require a careful consideration of the question and a careful scrutiny and weighing of the authorities on both sides. The main contention of plaintiff seems to be that the limitation of the time for bringing suit to "one year from the date of the happening of the alleged injury" shall be held to mean one year from the date when the cause of action accrues. The doctrine upon which the contention is based is stated in Wood on Insurance, second edition, changing the language used in the first edition to these words: "Sec. 469. It is held in some of the cases that when a policy stipulates that no action shall be brought unless commenced within a certain time after loss or damage shall accrue, and there is a provision in the policy that the company will pay in thirty, sixty, ninety, or any other number of days after proofs of the loss have been served, the limitation does not attach until after the period which the company has in which to pay the loss has expired. The limitation does not apply until the right of action has accrued, and until the period has expired which the company has to pay the loss in, no right of action exists." Cases from New York, Michigan, and West Virginia are cited in a note to support this view. The note continues: "But a contrary doctrine is held in some of the states": Citing cases from New Hampshire, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Vermont, and Illinois. The exhaustive researches of counsel have resulted in the collection of a large number of cases from nearly half of the states in the Union, as bearing more or less directly upon the question under discussion. It is admitted by plaintiff that it is lawful for the parties to a contract of insurance to limit the time within which an action may be brought upon such contract by a provision inserted therein; so cases cited to establish this proposition will not be mentioned in this discussion. It is only necessary 132 to consider cases which hold that provisions for occupying a portion of the time limited in the performance of conditions precedent to the right of action do or do not extend this time beyond the limit specified. It is admitted by the defendant that if the time allowed for, or necessarily occupied by, the claimant, under contract of insurance, in performing such conditions precedent should include all the time specified within which suit must be brought, or should not leave a reasonable time for that purpose, the right of action would not be lost by the lapse of the time specified. Neither if the bringing of the action was delayed beyond the time limited by the conduct of the insurer. So, cases cited to these propositions will be eliminated from this discussion. The most of the cases bearing upon the question of extending the time limited for commencing suit by holding the limitation to run from a later date than that specified in the policy are cases of fire insurance which limit the time to a certain number of months after the loss or after the fire, and further require proofs of loss to be furnished, or other conditions precedent to the right of action to be performed for which time is allowed, or which necessarily consume time. So far as the question has been before the federal court, the decisions are conflicting. Judges Thayer, Bunn, Hawley, and Gilbert have held in favor of the position of the plaintiff, that the limitation runs only from the time the cause of action accrues, although the policy reads a certain number of months after the loss or after the fire. Judges Deady and McKenna and the court of appeals of the District of Columbia hold directly the reverse: See Steel v. Phenix Ins. Co., 51 Fed. Rep. 715; Vette v. Clinton Fire Ins. Co., 30 Fed. Rep. 668; Friezen v. Allemania Ins. Co., 30 Fed. Rep. 352; McElhone v. Benefit Assn., 22 Wash. L. Rep. 157. Coming to the states, we find five states and one territory holding by their courts of last resort that a limitation of a certain time for beginning action after the loss or after the fire shall not run from the date of the loss or of the fire, but from the 133 time the cause of action accrues. We find a considerably larger number where the decisions are directly to the contrary effect, and a number where they are somewhat equivocal, and claimed by both parties, and some make a distinction between the meaning of the phrases "after the loss," and "after the fire." So if we were to decide this case according to the number of authorities, we should be compelled to decide it in favor of the defendant. But this is not a satisfactory way of determining the question of the construction of the language either of a contract or of the statute. An examination of the decisions with the reasons assigned for them is preferable. The case of Barber v. Fire etc. Ins. Co., 16 W. Va. 658, 37 Am. Rep. 800, was an action on a policy of fire insurance which made the loss payable sixty days "after due notice and proof of the same," but specifying no time within which such notice and AM. ST. REP. VOL. LXIII.-3. proof should be made, and limiting the time for bringing action to "six months next after the loss should occur." The court calls the time which must elapse before suit can be brought an indefinite time, because the claimant was not required to furnish his proofs of loss within a specified time, and holds that, in such cases, the six months' limitation runs from the time when the cause of action accrues and not before, and expires in this instance six months and sixty days after proofs of loss were furnished and finds that this was "the intent of the parties." The later case of Murdock v. Franklin Ins. Co., 33 W. Va. 407, was an action on a policy of insurance which limited the time for bringing action to six months from the date of the loss, and requiring proofs of the loss within thirty days thereafter, and allowing the insurer sixty days after proof of loss in which to make payment. The court quotes from Barber v. Fire etc. Ins. Co., 16 W. Va. 658, 37 Am. Rep. 800, that the "intent of the parties to the contract was that the six months' limitation should commence to run when the cause of action accrued and not before." And the court concludes: "So that case is authority for the position: 1. That the limitation does not begin until the cause of action accrues; and 2. That it 134 does not begin from the actual loss-thus departing from the letter of the policy." In Iowa, the doctrine is firmly established that under a policy of insurance, limiting the time for bringing action upon it, and requiring the performance of conditions precedent which must occupy a portion of that time, the limitation does not commence to run until the right of action accrues: See Matt v. Iowa Mut. etc. Assn., 81 Iowa, 135; 25 Am. St. Rep. 483; McConnell v. Iowa Mut. etc. Assn., 79 Iowa, 757; Ellis v. Council Bluffs Ins. Co., 64 Iowa, 507; Miller v. Hartford etc. Ins. Co., 70 Iowa, 701; Eggleston v. Council Bluffs Ins. Co., 65 Iowa, 308; Quinn v. Capital Ins. Co., 71 Iowa, 615. Two reasons for this line of decisions are given in the different cases in Iowa. One reason is the assumption made in the West Virginia cases, that such was the intent of the parties, and a statement of it is found in Ellis v. Council Bluffs Ins. Co., 64 Iowa, 507, a case of fire insurance, in these words: "Now it is apparent that if the literal construction of the provision in question contended for by defendant obtains, it might frequently happen that the right of action. would be barred by it before such right had accrued to the assured under the other provision. It is very clear that the parties never intended that such a result should be accomplished." The time limited in this case was "six months next after the loss shall occur." The other reason, as held in Iowa, is that there is a rule of construction of limitations, both by statute and by contract, that the limitation runs only from the time when the right of action accrues. It is stated in McConnell v. Iowa Mut. etc. Assn., 79 Iowa, 757, a case of life insurance, in these words: "It is a familiar and just rule, recognized by the courts, that a bar created by statute or by contract, to an action for a breach of its conditions, by reason of the lapse of time, will not commence to run until the right of action accrues; that is, the plaintiff must have the full time given by the statute or contract after his right of action arises in which to commence his suit." The limitation in this case was six months after the death of the assured. As to this case, it is sufficient to say that no case has been cited by counsel and none has occurred to us which holds 185 that a period of limitation fixed by statute has ever been changed by a court by construction. And by all the authorities. the rule of construction is the same for contracts as for statutes, that the true meaning and intent of the language is to be Bought. The authority of the supreme court of Nebraska is in favor of plaintiff. German Ins. Co. v. Fairbank, 32 Neb. 750, 29 Am. St. Rep. 459, was an action on a policy of fire insurance limiting the time for bringing action to "six months after the loss or damage shall occur," and requiring proofs to be made in thirty days after such loss or damage, and payment to be made within ninety days after proofs furnished. The court says: "The fair and reasonable interpretation of the provisions of the policy, when construed together, is that the limitation did not begin to run from the date of the loss, but from the time the suit could have been brought." This case is followed up by the same court in German-American Ins. Co. v. Buckstaff, 38 Neb. 135. The case of Hong Sling v. Royal Ins. Co., 8 Utah, 135, is in favor of the plaintiff's theory of construction. It is an action on a policy of fire insurance, limiting the time for bringing action for loss or damage by fire to "twelve months from the date of said fire," and requiring proofs of loss within thirty days after, and payment within sixty days after proof, and requiring arbitration before suit. The court holds that the action may be brought within twelve months after the cause of action accrues, and that this is what the parties intended and under stood by the words "within twelve months from the date of said fire," because all that time might be necessarily consumed by plaintiff in performing the conditions precedent to the right of action. The court of appeals of New York holds that the word "loss" in the limitation clause of a policy of fire insurance has reference to the time when the loss becomes payable by the insurer and when the right of action accrues: Hay v. Star Fire Ins. Co., 77 N. Y. 235; 33 Am. Rep. 607. The supreme court of Arkansas also takes this view: Sun Ins. Co. v. Jones, 54 Ark. 376. 136 These are all the states, so far as we are at present advised, that hold unequivocally in favor of plaintiff. There are a few others whose courts have used language claimed by plaintiff to favor this view, but which is at least doubtful, which will be considered presently. As already stated, the great preponderance in numbers of decisions is against this view. But the courts taking this view are courts of eminence, and they are entitled to respect, and if their position is sustained by convincing reasons, mere numbers should not be allowed to prevail against them. Their number is sufficient to make a very respectable array. But the weight of these decisions as authority is greatly reduced by the fact that they do not agree as to the basis or reason upon which they rest. All of the courts which we have mentioned cite New York cases as sustaining them, so it is somewhat important to determine just how far the New York cases do sustain them. Hay v. Star Fire Ins. Co., 77 N. Y. 235, 33 Am. Rep. 607, was a suit upon a policy of fire insurance requiring proofs of loss to be furnished as soon as possible after the fire, providing that the loss should be paid within sixty days after proof, and limiting the time for commencing action to twelve months. The court, one judge dissenting, says: "The loss should be deemed to occur when the company pays it, or may be lawfully called upon to pay it. The loss then, and not until then, practically occurs to it. These words may in some clauses refer to the destruction of the property, but it does not necessarily follow that they do in this." It is to be remarked that of the states we have mentioned as citing New York cases as authority for their decisions none but Arkansas adopts this reason for a decision. The West Virginia court makes a similar decision under a similar policy, but characterizes its decision expressly as "departing from the letter of the policy." If the word "loss" in the limitation clause meant the loss to the company by its |