plaintiff sudden fright and a reasonable fear of immediate death or great bodily harm, and that the shock thus caused threw her into violent convulsions and caused her a miscarriage and subsequent illness. The court, remarking that it might be conceded that any effect of a wrongful act or neglect on the mind alone will not furnish a ground of action, held that the complaint showed a physical injury, of which the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause.

In Fitzpatrick v. Great Western etc. Co., 12 U. C. Q. B. 645, the complaint showing a negligent collision stated, as the dam-age suffered by the plaintiff, a passenger, 208 that thereby the plaintiff "was much affrighted, terrified, and alarmed, whereby she became sick, sore, and disordered, and so continued from thence hitherto; during which time she suffered great pain and anguish, insomuch that her life was endangered, and thereby also, by reason of the terror and alarm occasioned to her by the said collision, and of such sickness caused thereby, she had a premature labor, and bore a stillborn child." The complaint was held sufficient on demurrer. The court said: "The only difficulty suggested is the introduction of the statement of alarm and affright, as if preceding and occasioning the sickness and disorder. But, in our opinion, we are not bound to read the declaration in that manner. We may, we think, consider the fright and commencement of the sickness, etc., to be alleged as simultaneous; and if, as we do not doubt, the declaration would be good without stating the affright, but stating only the sickness, etc., as the result of the defendant's negligence, we do not see that the addition of this statement makes it demurrable."

In Victorian Ry. Commrs. v. Coultas, L. R. 13 App. C. 222, before the privy council, on appeal from the supreme court of the colony of Victoria, the action was one to recover for injuries sustained by Mary Coultas through the negligence of the appellant and expenses incurred by her husband through her illness. The husband and wife, with a brother of the latter, were driving in a buggy, and had to cross a level crossing on the line of the railway. When they came to the railway the gates were closed, and the gatekeeper opened the one nearest them and went across to the opposite gate, they following him. When they were partly on the farther line of railway a train was seen approaching on it. The gatekeeper directed them to go back, but the husband, who was driving, 209 shouted to the gatekeeper to open the opposite gate, and went on. He got the buggy across the line, so that the train did not touch it.

But as the train approached the wife fainted. The evidence showed that she received a serious nervous shock from the fright, and that illness from which she afterward suffered was the consequence of the fright. It was held on appeal, reversing the judgment below, that the damages recoverable for negligence must be the result of the defendant's act, such a consequence as in the ordinary course of things would flow from the act; and that damages arising from the mere sudden terror, unaccompanied by any actual physical injury, but occasioning a nervous or mental shock, cannot under such circumstances, be considered a consequence which in the ordinary course of things. would flow from the negligence of the gatekeeper. It was accordingly held that the damages were too remote.

In the opinion in the last-mentioned case it is observed that the decision of the supreme court of New York in Vandenburgh v. Truax, 4 Denio, 464, 47 Am. Dec. 268, was a case of palpable injury caused by a boy who was frightened by the defendant's violence, seeking to escape from it.

The decision of the privy council in the Victorian Ry. Commrs. v. Coultas, L. R. 13 App. C. 222, has been regarded with disfavor by several eminent textwriters, and there has been great variety and contrariety in the views taken upon the subject by the courts. A forcible criticism upon the case is to be found in 1 Beven on Negligence, second edition, page 76. Among the remarks there made, it is said that it is undoubted law that mental pain or anxiety alone, unattended by any injury to the person, cannot sustain an action. It is also said, on page 83: "The chief objection in principle to a recovery for injuries occasioned, without physical impact, seems to be the 210 difficulty of testing the statements of the sufferer alleging them. An allowance of recovery of damages in respect of such nervous injuries affords opportunities for simulation very difficult to be dealt with, and considerations of policy may well disallow any claim in respect of injury purely subjective. When the physical frame is visibly affected, considerations of this kind are no longer paramount. The objection goes rather to the proof of the injuries than to the legal appraisement of damages in respect of them when proved. A sufficient safeguard in this case against imposition seems to be the bearing steadily in view the elementary rule that before a plaintiff can recover he must show a damage naturally and reasonably arising from the negligent act."

In Bell v. Great Northern etc. Co., L. R. 26 Ir. 428, the

court followed an unreported case in the court of appeal, Ireland, in preference to Victorian Ry. Commrs. v. Coultas, L. R. 13 App. C. 222, and it was held, in effect, that if the plaintiff's fright caused through the defendant's negligence as a reasonable and natural consequence thereof, actually occasioned injury to the plaintiff's health as a reasonable and natural consequence of the fright, damages for such injury would not be too remote.

In Warren v. Boston etc. R. R. Co., 163 Mass. 484, the plaintiff, with his wife, was driving in a buggy across railway tracks, when the gates were lowered by the gateman, and the buggy was hit by the train running on one of the tracks, and the plaintiff was thrown out, or he jumped out. The supreme court refused to treat as error an instruction to the effect that if the defendant's train struck the carriage of the plaintiff, and he was thrown out upon the ground, this would be a tortuous act if the result solely of the defendant's negligence; and if this act resulted 211 in damage to the plaintiff, the defendant would be liable; and that in estimating this damage, the jury might take into account the fright and nervous shock.

In Spade v. Lynn etc. R. R. Co., 168 Mass. 285, 60 Am. St. Rep. 393, the supreme court of Massachusetts recently had before it the question, as stated in the opinion of the court, "whether in an action to recover damages for an injury sustained through the negligence of another, there can be a recovery for a bodily injury caused by mere fright and mental disturbance"; and the court expressed satisfaction with the rule that there can be no recovery for fright, terror, alarm, anxiety, or distress of mind, if these are unaccompanied by some physical injury, and thought it should also be held that there can be no recovery for such physical injuries caused solely by such mental disturbance, where there is no injury to the person from without.

In Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 4 Misc. (N. Y.) 575, 25 N. Y. Supp. 744, the negligence of the driver of a street railway car caused the plaintiff, through fright and excitement thereby occasioned, to become unconscious, and as a result of the shock she then sustained she suffered a miscarriage and was sick for a long time, the "mental shock" which she then received being, according to the evidence, a sufficient cause for all the "physical ailments" from which she subsequently suffered. It was said: "It is not intended here to impugn the wellsettled and wholesome rule that no damages can be recovered

against a negligent person for purely mental suffering, unaccompanied by any physical injury. It is decided simply that where a physical injury is the natural result of the negligence, although it proceeds from a mental shock caused directly by the negligent act, the defendant is liable if the jury might find from the evidence that the 212 shock caused the injury." The case of Victorian Ry. Commrs. v. Coultas, L. R. 13 App. C. 222, is criticised as not well reasoned and as not being based upon authority.

In Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N. Y. 107, 56 Am. St. Rep. 604, the decision last above mentioned of the supreme court was reversed by the court of appeals, and it was held that not only can no recovery be had for mere fright, but also no recovery can be had for injuries which are the direct consequences of it. It was said: "Assuming that fright cannot form the basis of an action, it is obvious that no recovery can be had for injuries resulting therefrom. That the result may be nervous disease, blindness, insanity, or even a miscarriage, in no way changes the principle. These results merely show the degree of the fright, or the extent of the damages. . . . . Moreover, it cannot be properly said that the plaintiff's miscarriage was the proximate result of the defendant's negligence. Proximate damages are such as are the ordinary and natural results of the negligence charged, and those that are usual and may, therefore, be expected"; and it was held that her damages were too remote. The conclusion was stated that no recovery can be had for injuries sustained by fright occasioned by the negligence of another, where there is no immediate personal injury.

In the case before us for decision it is alleged, by way of showing damages arising from the wrongful act of causing the horse attached to the buggy in which the appellant was riding to take fright and run away, that the appellant received a severe nervous shock, was greatly frightened, and her life was put in great and imminent peril, danger, jeopardy, and, further, she has suffered great mental pain and anxiety.

It is not shown that any physical ailment or distress 213 followed as a consequence of the shock, which is not described as enduring, if that would make any difference in the case.

We think it cannot properly be said that such injuries are imaginary or conjectural, or that the sufferings described are not real. Nor does it seem to us proper to say that they cannot be regarded as directly and naturally resulting from the act of the defendant as their proximate cause.

But not every injurious effect of wrong can form the basis of damages. Many ill consequences follow from wrongs as proximate effects for which the law cannot afford redress, because of the inadequacy of the methods and means of courts to reach just and adequate results with sufficient certainty.

The evidence of such injuries is so much within the control of the person claiming to be so injured, and there is so little opportunity for subjecting the fact to the tests which may be and are applied in courts of justice for the ascertainment. of the truth to the appreciation of the triers, that besides the encouragement that would be given to increase of litigation, there would be much danger of frequent injustice in allowing such claims to be presented for trial. It would seem that such injuries are among those which courts cannot remedy by means of any practicable methods at their command which can be applied generally so as to secure justice to both the plaintiffs and defendants, and so as best to subserve the interests of the community, whose instruments the courts are in the administration of justice. Such claims for redress seem to be outside the wise policy of the law.

If it may be said that the complaint shows the appellant entitled to recover nominal damages, yet this court will not reverse a judgment for the purpose merely of enabling a party to recover such damages.

The judgment is affirmed.

NEGLIGENCE-WILLFUL INJURY-WHAT CONSTITUTES.To constitute willful injury there must be design, purpose, and intent to do wrong and inflict injury: Louisville etc. R. R. Co. v. Anchors, 114 Ala. 492; 62 Am. St. Rep. 116, and note. Gross negligence includes all lesser degrees of negligence, and when plaintiff's petition charges that an act was done through gross negligence, this does not preclude evidence entitling him to recover for a lesser de gree: Hayes v. Gainesville Street Ry. Co., 70 Tex. 602; 8 Am. St. Rep. 624.

DAMAGES FOR MENTAL ANGUISH.-Damages for mental suffering alone cannot be recovered as a general rule: Chapman v. Western Union Tel. Co., 88 Ga. 763; 30 Am. St. Rep. 183; Connell v. Western Union Tel. Co., 116 Mo. 34; 38 Am. St. Rep. 575; Ewing v. Pittsburgh etc. Ry. Co., 147 Pa. St. 40; 30 Am. St. Rep. 709, and notes thereto. But the cases are in conflict upon this question: Head v. Georgia Pac. Ry. Co., 79 Ga. 358; 11 Am. St. Rep. 434; Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307; 28 Am. St. Rep. 370; note to Western Union Tel. Co. v. Carter, 34 Am. St. Rep. 831, 832. See Spade v. Lynn, etc. R. R. Co., 168 Mass. 285; 60 Am. St. Rep. 393. APPEAL-REVERSAL OF JUDGMENT-NOMINAL DAMAGES.-Judgment for the defendant will not be reversed where the plaintiff would be entitled to no more than nominal damages; Mecklem v. Blake, 22 Wis. 495; 99 Am. Dec. 68. The maxim, De minimis non curat lex, is properly applied to such a case: McConibe v. New York etc. R. R. Co., 20 N. Y. 495; 75 Am. Dec. 420, and note.