one of the United States of America. The treaty of amity, settlement and limits, between the United States and Spain, was signed at Washington on the 22d day of February, 1819, but was not ratified by Spain till the 24th day of October, 1820; nor by the United States, until the 22d day of February 1821. So that Alabama was admitted into the union as an independent State, in virtue of the title acquired by the United States to her territory under the treaty of April, 1803.

After these acts of sovereign power over the territory in dispute, asserting the American construction of the treaty by which the government claims it, to maintain the opposite construction_in its own courts would certainly be an anomaly in the history and practice of nations. If those departments which are intrusted with the foreign intercourse of the nation, which assert and maintain its interests against foreign powers, have unequivocally asserted its rights of dominion over a country of which it is in possession, and which it claims under a treaty; if the legislature has acted on the construction thus asserted, it is not in its own courts that this construction is to be denied. A question like this, respecting the boundaries of nations, is, as has been truly said, more a political than a legal question; and in its discussion, the courts of every country must respect the pronounced will of the legislature.

We are of opinion, then, that the court committed no error in dismissing the petition of the plaintiff, and that the judgment ought to be affirmed with costs. . . .1

1 In Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 13 Pet. 415 (1839), the Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts having certified a difference of opinion on the question "whether, inasmuch as the American government has insisted, and does still insist, through its regular executive authority, that the Falkland islands do not constitute any part of the dominions within the sovereignty of the government of Buenos Ayres, and that the seal fishery at those islands is a trade free and lawful to the citizens of the United States . . . ; it is competent for the Circuit Court, in this cause, to inquire into and ascertain by other evidence the title of said government of Buenos Ayres to the sovereignty of the said Falkland islands; and if such evidence satisfies the court, to decide against the doctrines and claims set up and supported by the American government on this subject.”

The Supreme Court decided that it was impossible to go behind the position taken by the executive authority; and MCLEAN, J., for the court said:

"And can there be any doubt, that when the executive branch of the government, which is charged with our foreign relations, shall, in its correspondence with a foreign nation, assume a pact in regard to the sovereignty of any island or country, it is conclusive on the judicial department? And in this view, it is not material to inquire, nor is it the province of the court to determine,

aw act of congress ordening the Postmaster general to doce Jevely menisterial but was constitutional and has an interfrence with exclusive depts; and would be the enforced by

42

LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE, AND JUDICIAL POWERS.

KENDALL, Postmaster General of the United States,
Plaintiff in Error, v. UNITED STATES, on the
relation of Stokes et al.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. 1838.

[12 Peters, 524.]

ERROR to the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia, for the
County of Washington.

Key and Butler, A. G., for the plaintiff in error. Core and
Johnson, contra.

THOMPSON, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. . . This
case was brought before the court below, by petition, setting out
certain contracts made between the relators and the late post-
master general, upon which they claimed certain credits and
allowances upon their contracts for the transportation of the mail.
That credits and allowances were duly made by the late postmaster
general. That the present postmaster general when he came into
office re-examined the contracts entered into with his predecessor,
and the allowances made by him, and the credits and payments
which had been made; and directed that the allowances and
credits should be withdrawn, and the relators recharged with
divers payments they had received. That the relators presented
a memorial to congress on the subject, upon which a law was
passed on the 21st of July, 1836, for their relief; by which the
solicitor of the treasury was authorized and directed to settle and
adjust the claims of the relators for extra services performed by

whether the Executive be right or wrong. It is enough to know, that in the
exercise of his constitutional functions, he has decided the question. Having
done this, under the responsibilities which belong to him, it is obligatory on
the people and government of the Union.

"If this were not the rule, cases might often arise, in which, on the most
important questions of foreign jurisdiction, there would be an irreconcilable
difference between the executive and judicial departments. By one of these
departments, a foreign island or country might be considered as at peace with
the United States; whilst the other would consider it in a state of war. No
well-regulated government has ever sanctioned a principle so unwise, and so
destructive of national character. . . . As the Executive, in his message, and
in his correspondence with the government of Buenos Ayres, has denied the
jurisdiction which it has assumed to establish on the Falkland islands; the fact
must be taken and voted on by this court as thus asserted and maintained.”
See also Phillips v. Payne, 92 U. S. 130 (1875) (Alexandria County, Vir-
ginia); Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202 (1890) (Guano Islands); Pearcy
v. Stranahan, 205 U. S. 257 (1907) (Isle of Pines). ED.

them; to inquire into and determine the equity of such claims;
and to make the relators such allowance therefor, as upon full
examination of all the evidence may seem right, according to the
principles of equity. And that the postmaster general be, and
he is hereby directed to credit the relators with whatever sum or
sums of money, if any, the solicitor shall so decide to be due to
them, for and on account of any such service or contract.
And the petition prayed the court to award a mandamus directed
to the postmaster general, commanding him fully to comply with,
obey and execute the said act of congress, by crediting the relators
with the full and entire sum awarded in their favor by the solic-
itor of the treasury.

Such proceedings were afterwards had in the case, that a peremptory mandamus was ordered commanding the said Amos Kendall, postmaster general, forthwith to credit the relators with the full amount awarded and decided by the solicitor of the treasury to be due to the relators.

The questions arising upon this case may be considered under two general inquiries:

1. Does the record present a proper case for a mandamus; and if so, then,

2. Had the circuit court of this district jurisdiction of the case, and authority to issue the writ?

Under the first head of inquiry, it has been considered by the counsel on the part of the postmaster general, that this is a proceeding against him to enforce the performance of an official duty. And the proceeding has been treated as an infringement upon the executive department of the government; which has led to a very extended range of argument on the independence and duties of that department; but which, according to the view taken by the court of the case, is entirely misapplied. We do not think the proceeding in this case, interferes, in any respect whatever, with the rights or duties of the executive; or that it involves any conflict of powers between the executive and judicial departments of the government. The mandamus does not seek to direct or control the postmaster general in the discharge of any official duty, partaking in any respect of an executive character; but to enforce the performance of a mere ministerial act, which neither he nor the President had any authority to deny or control.

We shall not, therefore, enter into any particular examination of the line to be drawn between the powers of the executive and judicial departments of the government. The theory of the

For Relator

constitution undoubtedly is, that the great powers of the government are divided into separate departments; and so far as these powers are derived from the constitution, the departments may be regarded as independent of each other. But beyond that, all are subject to regulations by law, touching the discharge of the duties required to be performed.

The executive power is vested in a President; and as far as his powers are derived from the constitution, he is beyond the reach of any other department, except in the mode prescribed by the constitution through the impeaching power. But it by no means follows, that every officer in every branch of that department is under the exclusive direction of the President. Such a principle, we apprehend, is not, and certainly cannot be claimed by the President.

There are certain political duties imposed upon many officers in the executive department, the discharge of which is under the direction of the President. But it would be an alarming doctrine, that congress cannot impose upon any executive officer any duty they may think proper, which is not repugnant to any rights secured and protected by the constitution; and in such cases, the duty and responsibility grow out of and are subject to the control of the law, and not to the direction of the President. And this is emphatically the case, where the duty enjoined is of a mere ministerial character.

Let us proceed, then, to an examination of the act required by the mandamus to be performed by the postmaster general; and - his obligation to perform, or his right to resist the performance, must depend upon the act of congress of the 2d of July, 1836. . .

Under this law the postmaster general is vested with no discretion or control over the decisions of the solicitor; nor is any appeal or review of that decision provided for by the act. The terms of the submission was a matter resting entirely in the discretion of congress; and if they thought proper to vest such a power in any one, and especially as the arbitrator was an officer of the government, it did not rest with the postmaster general to control Congress or the solicitor, in that affair. . . .

...

It was urged at the bar, that the postmaster general was alone subject to the control and direction of the President, with respect to the execution of the duty imposed upon him by this law; and this right of the President is claimed, as growing out of the obligation imposed upon him by the constitution, to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. This is a doctrine that cannot

receive the sanction of this court. It would be vesting in the President a dispensing power, which has no countenance for its support in any part of the constitution; and is asserting a principle, which, if carried out in its results, to all cases falling within it, would be clothing the President with a power entirely to control the legislation of Congress, and paralyze the administration of justice.

To contend that the obligation imposed on the President to see the laws faithfully executed implies a power to forbid their execution, is a novel 'construction of the constitution, and entirely inadmissible. But although the argument necessarily leads to such a result, we do not perceive from the case that any such power has been claimed by the President. But, on the contrary, it is fairly to be inferred that such power was disclaimed. He did not forbid or advise the postmaster general to abstain from executing the law, and giving the credit thereby required; but submitted the matter, in a message to congress. . .

The right of the relators to the benefit of the award ought now to be considered as irreversibly established; and the question is whether they have any, and what remedy?

ever.

The act required by the law to be done by the postmaster general is simply to credit the relators with the full amount of the award of the solicitor. This is a precise, definite act, purely ministerial; and about which the postmaster general had no discretion whatThe law upon its face shows the existence of accounts between the relators and the post office department. No money was required to be paid; and none could have been drawn out of the treasury without further legislative provision, if this credit should overbalance the debit standing against the relators. But this was a matter with which the postmaster general had no concern. He was not called upon to furnish the means of paying such balance, if any should be found. He was simply required to give the credit. This was not an official act in any other sense than being a transaction in the department where the books and accounts were kept; and was an official act in the same sense that an entry in the minutes of a court, pursuant to an order of the court, is an official act. There is no room for the exercise of any discretion, official or otherwise: all that is shut out by the direct and positive command of the law, and the act required to be done is, in every just sense, a mere ministerial act.

And in this view of the case, the question arises, is the remedy by mandamus the fit and appropriate remedy? . . .