resisting a bankruptcy, and bringing wanton and injurious actions justified on no honest or legal principle, and, failing in them, was in custody for costs, he was considered to have incurred that debt unnecessarily. Having so referred to that construction about "incurring a debt," I gave my opinion in the case citedby Mr. Cooke that the insolvent had there also incurred and contracted his debt for costs unnecessarily, and worse than unnecessarily. He had brought the action in the mere spirit of wrong. The debt for costs was the fruit of an unjust and vicious attempt to obtain money through an abuse of the law. I may refer also to the case of Jacobs, where a man, having been defeated in an unjust claim from mere malice and revenge, instituted a qui tam action for penalties, having no just ground for so doing, and no chance nor intention of paying costs. It was held that he contracted a debt for costs without any intention of paying it. There was a much earlier case, of Gomm, in which I find myself to have made these observations-that the case was open to a judgment for withholding books, or for an undue preference, but that I should record, as the ground of adjudication, the fraud in which the debt was contracted; that an argument had very properly been raised against so dealing with the subject, and that it ought to be a very clear and strong case to justify it; that, in the case before the court, the insolvent had been paid and overpaid; that he knew it, and, in the pure spirit of fraud, invented a false claim as surviving out of his dealing with the defendant, and endeavoured to make the law an instrument of his fraud. The result was that he contracted a debt for costs; that to contract debt does not necessarily import bargain or agreement; it is to bring yourself into the state of debt, which an unsuccessful plaintiff does when he becomes liable for costs. The question therefore was, whether the insolvent had done that fraudulently; on which point it was clearly established that his fraud was the sole spring and cause of the debt in question. I shall follow the principle of these decisions. I consider that Mr. Dunn has contracted a debt, for which he is detained, and the question will be whether his claim in the action ought or ought not to be considered as resting upon false pretences. It professes to rest on an authority contained in a communication received by him through the post on the 3rd Dec. 1844, when he had been three years and a half in the Fleet prison, at the suit of Miss Coutts's friend, Mr. Alexander. He says that he at first refused to receive the letter, and pay twopence; but the postman said, "You had better take it. It is from a lady. Here are three seals on the back of it." The letter contained a

poetical address; and, upon the authority of one of the stanzas, Mr. Dunn drew a bill for 100,0001. fifteen months afterwards. It would be an insult to common sense were I gravely to discuss the question, whether Miss Coutts wrote this absurd epistle. The question to be discussed is, whether Mr. Dunn believed it when he brought the action in Nov. 1851. The learned Commissioner then went through the evidence, and declared that he could not find anything calculated to produce such belief in Mr. Dunn's mind. His elaim was confounded by a conviction for perjury. The verdict of a jury found that the claim was not only not based in truth, but was asserted without belief in its truth; and I find no fact or circumstance

to shake it.

The insolvent was remanded for ten calendar months, at the suit of Miss Coutts, for contracting a debt by means of false pretence.

The insolvent then applied for the return to him of the alleged written authority to draw upon Coutts's bank, and still contended that he could enforce it in law. He also applied that the opposing and detaining creditor might be ordered to pay him the sum of four shillings per week, according to the terms of the 86th section, or that he should at once be discharged from custody.

The CHIEF COMMISSIONER declined to order the redelivery of the authority; but any one who desired it could have an office copy. He also refused the application for the "sixpences," observing that such an order was never made at the time of the adjudica

tion..

(Before Mr. Commissioner MURPHY.) Monday Dec. 19.

Re CHARLES ELSWORTH.
Revesting order-Practice.

unless he was made."

Bicker Caarten submitted, that there was abundant evidence to show the brother's debt had been satisfied; there was no denial by him of the receipt of the goods, no assertion they had ever been paid for; and the statement of the brother, that "he owed him nothing," only corroborated the insolvent's assertion, that one debt had been set off against the other; and it was for the court alone to say, under the 92nd sect. of the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, without reference to a creditor's giving or refusing to give a discharge, whether or not an insolvent's debts had been discharged and satisfied.

Mr Commissioner MURPHY said, the insolvent was not to be prejudiced by the fact of the brother's refusing to sign the release, and made out the order accordingly.

PROTECTION CASE.

Wednesday Dec. 7.

(Before Mr. Commissioner MURPHY.)
Re WILLIAM JAMES JOHNS.

Final order-Vexatious defence of an action. Held, that the vexatious defence of an action is a ground of opposition upon the day for granting a final order. This insolvent had vexatiously defended an action, thereby causing the plaintiff, the opposing creditor, extra costs. He had been opposed upon this ground upon the first examination; but, that offence being omitted in the enumeration of specific grounds of opposition in the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 96, s. 24, and 5 & 6 Vict. c. 116, s. 4., the learned Commissioner doubted his power to decline naming a day for granting the final order under these clauses of the statutes upon the interim order. It being, however, suggested that his powers were not limited by any specific catalogue of offences upon the day for granting the final order, he

intimated that he would not be indisposed to hear an argument as to his power to visit for this offence upon that occasion. To-day, accordingly,

Sargood appeared for the opposing creditor.-The vexatious defence of an action by the insolvent had been proved, and the question to be argued was, how far the court could go in holding it a ground of opposition upon the second examination. In a neighbouring court (that of Mr. Commissioner Phillips) the learned Commissioner regarded this offence as a casus omissus, and he did not hold it to be a ground of opposition, as it was named eo nomine in the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, and altogether omitted in the Protection Statutes. That omission, he thought, could not be by accident. They could not have been unmindful of this offence, because, in making out the category under the one statute, they could not have avoided referring to the category of grounds of opposition under the other Act. That was the grounds of the opinion of Mr. Commissioner Phillips and of the practice in his court. But he had to submit with great deference, in opposition to that view, that persons guilty of this

offence came within the express words of the preamble of the first statute, which recited that the benefit of this Act was intended for persons becoming indebted without fraud or gross culpable negligence. He submitted that a man who became indebted in

costs by vexatiously defending an action not only committed a species of fraud upon the plaintiff in the action, but became indebted by gross and culpable negligence. Considering the class of persons for whose benefit the Act was intended, and the simple mode of process by which protection could be obtained, it was clear, he thought, that it was never contemplated that a man who defended an action should walk into that court and take out a protection as a man who had done no wrong. A man who had no reasonable ground to dispute an action, and who, nevertheless, did dispute it, and thereby put the plaintiff to unnecessary costs, was guilty of unfair conduct, and a species of fraud, which the court should visit by refusing to grant the final order.

Bicker Caarten, for the insolvent, submitted that there were statutable grounds of opposition upon the interim order, and a more vague and general power to be exercised by the court upon the day for granting the final order. He was sure this latter power would not be wantonly exercised. The intention of the Legislature should be judged by their acts, and by the language used to express their intention; and, as they had nowhere specified this as a ground of opposition, it was a straining of the Act to hold it a ground of opposition upon this occasion.

Mr. Commissioner MURPHY said, that upon looking into Mr. Macrae's very excellent book on the Practice of Protection Insolvency-which appeared to him compiled with great care, and in which the learned author not only gave past cases decided, but his own views upon various questions arising under these statutes, from which he had derived great assistance-he found it stated (p. 416) that, this question having been frequently raised in the Courts of Bankruptcy, the learned Commissioners had a meeting to determine the practice; and they came to a determination to hold a vexatious defence of an action to be a ground of opposition. [Sargood said he could confirm that statement from his own experience of the practice in those courts]. He found also, that there was a conflicting practice upon this point, both in the Insolvency Courts in London and the Co. Courts-the late respected Chief Commissioner in Insolvency Phillips), that it was holding, with another learned Commissioner (Mr. no ground of opposition; while the present learned Chief Commissioner Law held a contrary doctrine. It was, therefore, a very difficult thing for him to say which were right and which were wrong, and he did not mean to set up his judgment. It was, therefore, with the greatest humility that he threw out an opinion. There were two principles which he thought should be acted upon in construing Acts of Parliament, namely, first, to take the words of the statutes, and give them their fair meaning; and secondly, when doubts arose upon any point, to ascertain the motive of the Legislature in passing them, and, upon comparing the two together, to put that construction upon the language of

was

the statute which seemed to be most consonant with the intention of the Legislature. He rather thought the omission of a vexatious defence of an action as a ground of opposition was done advisedly, because it thought when so simple a remedy for inability to pay debts was given, no man would stave off the evil day by defending actions. In deciding this question, he should be guided by the principles of construction he had alluded to. He regarded the two statutes, 5 & 6 Vict. c. 116, and 7 & 8 Vict. c. 96, as a consolidation; and, upon looking at their provisions as a whole, it appeared that the Legislature imposed upon the court two duties-first, that of inquiring into the specific matters enumerated in the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 116, s. 4, and 7 & 8 Vict. c. 96, s. 24, upon the interim order; and secondly, that of exercising an after-discretion upon a subsequent period, upon a review of the whole case, and as to the principle upon which this after-discretion was to be exercised, he should take the words in section 24, "that the Commissioner should then proceed to make such final order, unless cause be shown to the contrary," and read ss. 27

and 28 together. He then thought, upon a fair construction of the language used by the Legislature, that the Commissioner was to exercise his judgment upon all the circumstances of the insolvency, and either grant or adjourn the final order sine die, in the same way that he was required either to grant or withhold the protecting order upon applications, under s. 28. This latter section contemplated the exercise by the Commissioner of the functions referable to naming a day in s. 24, as well as an after-discretion upon any other misconduct in contracting debts, or dealing with property. He thought the court should be guided by similar principles upon the day for granting or adjourning the final order sine die. And in this sense he should discriminate, upon these subsequent examinations, upon the broad ground of whether an insolvent had been guilty of "any manner of fraud." Any act distorting the law for an unjust purpose-and thereby causing unnecessary costs, was in the case of an insolvent, contracting a debt unfairly and by a species of fraud. He thought that the vexatious defence of an action ranged itself under that constructive legal fraud, which brought it within the words "cause shown," and for which there might be an adjournment sine die.

(Before the Chief Commissioner Law.)
Re CHARLES HATCHER.
Vexatious defence of an action.

Held, that if the full amount sued for in an action for debt be not recovered, that will be evidence to show that the plea was justifiable; but it will not, per se, be an answer to the charge of vexatiously defending an action.

Bicker Caarten opposed, for Mr. Goose, an attorney of Croydon, who complained that the insolvent had put him to unnecessary expense by the vexatious defence of an action. Mr. Goose had acted as insolvent's attorney in an action brought against him, and in which there was a verdict for the plaintiff. After the trial the insolvent borrowed of Mr. Goose 74%., in order to pay the amount of the debt and costs recovered against him. A part of this only having been repaid, Mr. Goose commenced an action against the insolvent to recover 113., being the balance of the money advanced and the amount of the bill of costs in defending the previous action. To this action insolvent pleaded, first, never indebted; secondly, payment; and thirdly, a set-off. Issue was joined on the first two pleas, with replication of never indebted to the third. Particulars of the defendant's set-off were obtained under a judge's order. On the trial, which was undefended, Mr. Goose admitted the defendant's particulars to the amount of 274., and took

a verdict for 811. Costs were taxed at 281. Sargood, for insolvent.

The Chief Commissioner LAW held that, under these circumstances, the insolvent's conduct in defending the action was vexatious; and he ordered him to be discharged at the expiration of five months from the date of the vesting order.

PROTECTION CASE.

Wednesday, Jan. 4.

Re RICHARD WADE.

Trader debtor-Debts under three hundred pounds by composition.

1

The payment and acceptance by a creditor of a small sum in discharge of a debt due to a larger amount, does not constitute a legal discharge of the debt. Quære, in cases of compositions effected, will the court exercise its equitable powers to mitigate the strict rules of law in favour of the debtor ? Held, that it will not, in a case where, upon the merits, a petitioner does not stand favourably before the

to rebuild them, in order to prevent a forfeiture of the estate; and the present application was made for an order under the above section, "directing the assignee. not to sell, and for leave to use part of the funds in his hands for that purpose." It appearing, however, that the assignee had not yet filed his account, three.. months not having elapsed since his appointment. :

The Chief Commissioner LAW refused to make any order upon the subject, or to entertain the application until he should have done so.

Application refused.

BRISTOL September, 1853.

(Before ARTHUR PALMER, Esq.)

Re ALEXANDER HALCOMB.

The Chief Commissioner LAW said, that, as to the particular point taken, it was perfectly clear that a mere payment of a small sum was no discharge of a larger; and there might be cases of honest composition, where one might regret to apply the strict principles of law; but this was not such a case, as the composition was not untouched by what the law deemed fraudulent-one creditor having been inserted

money.-1 & 2 Vict. c. 78. The trustee of an assignment by a debtor for the benefit of creditors, who receives assets thereunder, and invests them in his own business, instead of dividing the funds among the creditors pursuant to the trusts. of the deed, does not, when such a retention of the funds is permitted by the creditors for a long period of time, thereby commit a breach of trust, under the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 78, which makes the constructing of a debt fraudulently, or "by means of a breach of trust,” punishable with two years' imprisonment. Such a transaction by a trustee, who becomes insolvent, and petitions this Court for relief,

section of the Act; but a non-payment of money only, coming within the cases of defaulters, against whom, to sustain the opposition for a remand under the sta tute on this ground, something must be proved more than a deficiency of accounts; something to evince a guilty mind in the person whose deficiency of account is charged as an offence.

Petition dismissed.

Re Rev. JAMES BROTHERS.
Opposition-Creditor releasing debt.

Held, that a creditor whose debt is inserted as admitted in the schedule, is not precluded from opposing, notwithstanding that he has executed an instrument containing a release, whereby a third party is appointed trustee of the effects of the insolvent for the benefit of the creditors.

This insolvent was indebted to a considerable amount, and he had executed a deed of arrangement for the benefit of his creditors, appointing a Mr. Dangerfield trustee for their benefit, with their concurrence. It appeared that a warrant of attorney was given to Dangerfield, to secure him against liability. Judgment was entered up on this warrant of attorney, and upon it sequestration issued. At the hearing, a creditor who had signed the deed appeared to oppose.

Sargood, for the insolvent, submitted that the creditor, having executed an instrument which contained a release, could not now oppose.

The CHIEF COMMISSIONER LAW said that the insolvent had inserted him in his schedule as an admitted creditor, and that would entitle him to ask any reasonable question. Objection overruled.

Friday, Jan. 6.

court.

The insolvent had been a tavern-keeper, and came up from the gaol for his discharge. He was opposed on behalf of Sir Robert Burnett and Co., the distillers, of London, who were creditors.

Edlin, opposed the discharge: first, on the ground that the insolvent had not given a full description of debts due from him; secondly, that he had not given a true account of his estate and effects; thirdly, that he had not given a true account of the debts due to him; fourthly, that he had fraudulently concealed property; fifthly, that he had contracted debts fraudulently; and sixthly, and the great cause of opposition, that he had contracted certain debts by means of a breach of trust. The latter ground, which was the most material, would be first proceeded with,

The insolvent was then examined, and deposed that he had been trustee, under a deed of assignment, to the estate of Mr. Simeon Perry. He had received 3981. 13s. 8d. on account of that estate, 2301. odd of which had been spent in carrying on the business till disposed of. The balance, 1674, 158, 5d., was put into his business. He had been repeatedly asked by Messrs. Burnett, the opposing creditors, to divide the assets under this estate, but had not done so for reas sons assigned at the time. He did not tell Messrs. Burnett he had invested the money in his business, presuming they were acquainted with the fact, he never having told them to the contrary. He had never told them he had separately invested the money received under Perry's estate in the bank. He had received the money in March, 1847. He might have been asked to pay Messrs. Burnett a dozen times since then. He generally had a balance in his favour at his banker's; he had lately overdrawn his banker's account, and was now indebted to the bank. He had never paid any dividend under Perry's estate; he had been asked to do so by a portion of the creditors, besides the Messrs. Burnett. The creditors knew the reason why he had not done so, as he had told them. He had been acting under advice of counsel. In March last he made an assignment for the benefit of his creditors to Messrs. William Iles and Charles Tovey. He did not pay them over any money, but merely assigned to them his personal effects.

Nash, who supported, elicited from the insolvent that he had been advised by counsel, when one creditor stood out, that he could not divide; Messrs. Sandford and Co., of Chepstow, were the creditors who refused to receive the composition offered under the estate of Perry. In August, 1851, insolvent ceased to deal with Messrs. Burnett, through Mr. Lynn, their agent; he had never known the Messrs. Burnett except through Mr. Lynn. In 1852 Mr. Lynn requested insolvent to give him an order, and he did so; he was supplied with goods under that order.

own house; but that he had the use and possession of the property by consent of the mortgagee, and he afterwards refused to give up this property to his assignee: the Court will not attach him for such refusal-the proper remedy being an action of trover by the assignee against the mortgagee.

The insolvent was rector of a parish near Banaghar, in the King's county, and resided in his glebe-house at the time of his arrest; he was committed to the county prison, but subsequently removed to Dublin by habeas corpus, where he was discharged on the 2nd of March last. In his schedule he alleged that his property was to be sold in the Incumbered Estates

Edlin, on further cross-examination, elicited that counsel did not advise insolvent to invest the money he received under Perry's assignment in his own busi-Court, and that there would be a surplus to pay all ness, and strongly urged that this was sufficient to his simple contract creditors in full, after payment of show that the insolvent had committed a clear breach his specialty debts. With regard to his chattels he of trust. The insolvent, by his own account, had re- made the following return: "Schedule of property ceived certain money in trust, to divide amongst the set out in deed of the 1st of December 1849, mortcreditors of Perry, but instead of doing that he had gaged to Mrs. Martha Bolton, as a security for the applied it to his own use, by investing it in his own sum of 2421., and now in the possession of the insolbusiness. A stronger case of breach of trust than the vent by her permission." This property consisted of present was hardly to be contemplated. the entire furniture of the glebe-house, in which Mrs. Bolton resided with the insolvent. The assignee, upon finding that the property in the Incumbered Estates Court was not likely to realise any assets for the present, demanded this chattel property from the insolvent, as vesting in him under the reputed ownership clause of the Insolvent Act; and, the insolvent having refused, a conditional order for an attachment was obtained against him for not delivering it up.

His HONOUR did not think there was any breach of frust proved, but simply a non-payment of money.

Nash. It is in evidence that the insolvent accounted by calling a meeting of the creditors, and laying before them a statement of the accounts of Mr. Perry's estate.

Edlin replied:-it could hardly be contended that his saying he had spent the money could be called accounting for it. There was no evidence whatever that he had told any creditor he had invested the money received in trust in his own business. He had received the money, to be divided rateably amongst the creditors, but he had concealed from them to what purpose he had applied it; he had spent all the money; and now came before the Court without a shilling. Under the deed of trust the insolvent was bound to divide between all those creditors who came in at the end of two calendar months; he had not done so; he had never given any account of the moneys; and he contended that this was a most gross breach of trust.

Sydney now showed cause against the order, and relied upon an affidavit made by the insolvent, and another by Mrs. Bolton. The insolvent swore it was by mistake he stated that the property was in his possession by permission of the mortgagee; that, on the contrary, she had taken possession of it, and still held that possession; and that upon the occasion of an execution having been sent down against it, an inquiry was held by the county sheriff and a jury, when it was decided that Mrs. Bolton was the owner of it, and the execution was accordingly withdrawn. This lady made a similar affidavit, and added that, immediately after the finding of the sheriff's jury, she took actual possession of all the furniture in the glebe-house, merely permitting the insolvent to use it as if he had been a lodger.

His HONOUR said, although by the terms of the deed the property of Mr. Perry's estate ought to have been divided within two months after the deed was executed, yet having been permitted by the creditors Levy, for the assignee.-The doctrine propounded to go on for six years (it appeared that the Messrs. could not be listened to in a court administering the Burnett were parties to the arrangement, and sanc-mercantile law of the country. Wherever the tioned the money remaining in the insolvent's hands, in more ways than one). Such an arrangement having been permitted by the creditors, it could not be said now, after the expiration of six years, that the deed had not been executed. He therefore overruled the learned counsel's opposition respecting the breach of trust; but the insolvent was remanded to make cerfain amendments in his schedule.

On a subsequent day the opposition on the other grounds was proceeded with, but the explanations satisfied the Court, and in discharging the insolvent His HONOUR said, as there was no proof of wilfulness he should allow the insolvent to amend; indeed, he stood in a favourable position; and, unless the opposing counsel could prove some moral or statutable fraud, to render it compulsory on the Court to send him back, he should order his discharge. Here was a man owing some 22007., who gave up everything. Thirty-eight of his creditors, to the amount of 15371, had signed a deed of release under an assignment, while others, to whom he owed about 6007., because they did not choose to come in under the deed, wished to keep him in gaol for ever.

possession continued by consent of the owner, the law presumed the property to be in the order and disposition of the bankrupt or insolvent: (Knowles v. Horsfall and others, assignees of Dixon, 5 B. & Ald. 134; Hickman v. Groves, 2 Car. & P. 492; Re Curry, 1 Craw. & Dix. 30.

The COMMISSIONER thought the affidavits made by the insolvent and the lady who claimed the furniture anything but creditable to the parties-instead of dealing with facts, they swore positively to conclusions of law. But the difficulty which stood in the way of his issuing an attachment was, that it was a case for a jury, and not for a summary application to that court. It was a case for an action of trover against the mortgagee on the part of the assignee, and if he were a juror he could not hesitate for a moment as to the verdict he would give. He thought the assignee ought to bring his action; and if the insolvent offered any improper resistance to it, the court would find a means of dealing with him.

Re ARMSTRONG.

No rule.

A party becoming surety for another when unable to meet his own liabilities-Fraudulent mortgage of property. An insolvent will not be remanded for becoming security for another when unable to meet his own liabilities, where he is never questioned as to his solvency, and where there are means of ascertaining from the public records how his property is circumstanced. Where an insolvent executes a fraudulent mortgage of his property, he will not be discharged until an assignee is appointed and that property handed over to him.

The insolvent was opposed by Levy on two grounds first, for having gone security for another at a time when he was in a state of embarrassment and unable

to pay his own debts; and, secondly, for having made^ away with the remnant of his property by having mortgaged it to a person named Lynch, who was his own brother-in-law. It appeared that the insol-" vent had been a builder and contractor in rather extensive business, and was supposed to have been possessed of considerable house property in Dublin; and in 1850 he became security in a sum of one thousand pounds for a person named Grimwood, who had" been appointed to collect the grand jury cess of the county of Dublin. Grimwood became a defaulter to a large amount, and had passed through the Insolvent Court some months previously, having returned no property whatever. His sureties, one of whom Armstrong was, were sued upon their recognisance, and the insolvent now sought his discharge-he, too, returning no property whatever. He had been the owner of several houses in Dublin, which were of considerable value; but, long before he had entered into the security for Grimwood, he had mortgaged some of them, and a receiver had been appointed over others on foot of certain judgment debts. Subsequently the whole property was sold in the Incumbered Estates Court, leaving a large deficiency on foot of the incumbrances. He was thus circumstanced when applied to for the amount of his recognisance for Grimwood; and after that he mortgaged the entire furniture of a house in Baggot-street, where he resided, and some building ground near Rathmines, which were the only property he had, to Lynch, as security for a debt which he had owed him for some four or five years.

Creighten, for the insolvent.

INTELLIGENCE.

COUNTY COURT INVESTIGATION AT

OXFORD.

December 6, 9, 10, 13, 17, and 23.

(Before J. B. PARRY, Esq.)

An inquiry took place before the judge of the County Court, relative to certain irregularities which were alleged to have taken place in the office of the court.

Mr. J. C. Dudley, clerk of the court, and late mayor of the city, was the party against whom the charges were made. Mr. Lewis, of the firm of Harrison and Lewis, of New Boswell-court, London, appeared for the High Bailiff, and Mr. Montague Chambers, Q.C. for Captain Dalton.

The inquiry took place on the 1st, 9th, 10th, 13th, 17th, and 23rd, lasting six days, and excited the greatest interest in the city of Oxford, the court being excessively crowded.

The following were the charges delivered in by the high bailiff :

1st. That a system of persecution, injustice, and annoyance, has long been practised against me in the office.

tality or connivance of the office, been conveyed to 2nd. That information has, through the instrumenparties against whom fi. fa.'s were bespoken, with a view to defeat or intercept the execution of such processes, and deprive me of my just emoluments.

3rd. That parties against whom I have laid complaints before the court have had information conveyed to them through the connivance or at the instigation of the office, with a view to prevent the caption of such parties, and defeat the orders of the court.

4th. That various obstacles have been thrown in my way so as to impede, and also to put me to additional expense, in the discharge of my duties, and in particular by the issue of numerous summonses at a late period of the last day of service.

5th. That parties who have been desirous of having warrants of execution issued against defendants have been dissuaded in the office from having recourse to such remedy, with a view to injure me, and deprive me of the just emoluments of my office.

6th. That ever since my appointment to office, I have been deprived of numerous fees, legally due to me by act of Parliament.

7th. That malpractices have prevailed in the office, and in particular by the demand and receipt of fees, which have not been entered in the books or accounted for to the treasurer; and I can have no confidence in the accounts through which my income is chiefly derived..

Mr. Lewis, in opening the case, stated that these charges resolved themselves into two heads-the first, of a personal nature with regard to the clerk's conduct to the bailiff-and the second with reference to conducting the business respecting suitors themselves. He

then referred to the 116th and 117th sections of the act of Parliament, under which the seventh charge was made, and expressed his regret that he had not been consulted before the charges were sent in, as he thought the seventh was of so serious a nature as to stand alone, and the other matters might well have been left for another occasion, though, doubtless, there was good ground of complaint. With regard to the seventh charge he stated that he should show the practice in the office to be to take the debt and costs, after the five days prescribed by the rule had begun to run, and having committed this irregularity, the additional error was made of charging the defendant hearing fees, as if an actual hearing took place. As to some fees thus taken they were duly entered in the books of the court; but from October, 1849, to August, 1851, during which period he should show a continuous practice to charge and take these fees, no one hearing fee was accounted for in the books in the cases alluded to, although there were upwards of 170 cases so settled within the five days. It had appeared so long back as December, 1852, complaints had been made by Mr. Dalton, and an inquiry was resolved upon by the judge; but no steps were then taken in the matter, until things got from bad to worse. He had no wish whatever, he said, to charge Mr. Dudley personally in the transactions he had named; but he should prove the facts, which would be brought home to some one, and for whose conduct Mr. Dudley was legally responsible. If he had not taken care to protect the suitors, whose interests were committed to his care; or there had been an improper performance of the business of his office; or, the suitors were in any way defrauded, then, as Mr. Dudley was the only person responsible for these acts, it would be for him to answer the charge as best he could. In case these practices should be proved he would beg to ask whether they did not form a serious charge against the persons who conducted the business of the office of the court. At all events, these fees were not entered in the books where they ought to be entered. He purposed calling before the Court a clerk of Mr. Dudley's who had assisted in keeping the books; and he would prove that Mr. Dudley and Mr. John Richard Carr received the fees, or rather the latter, on the part of Mr. Dudley, and that they were not accounted for was proved by the books. If these facts were proved, there would be a clear case of fraud; but even if the fees had been taken improperly through mistake, why were they not boldly accounted for? In the division of these fees, nineteen-fortieths went to Mr. Dudley, nineteen-fortieths to the Treasury, and two-fortieths to the High Bailiff, so that the Government had in fact been defrauded. The facts alluded to would be proved, also, by an investigation of the books; and unless they were forged documents, there could be no doubt that a continuous system of fraud had been carried on up to the end of the year 1851.

Mr. Chambers said no hearing fee had been taken after the Judge of the Court had said that no hearing fee should be taken. What was done was with the knowledge of the Judge of the Court.

His Honour-I utterly deny having given any order that the hearing fee should be taken, but at the same time there was nothing to preclude the plaintiff and defendant from settling the action out of court.

Mr. Lewis said that in looking over the fee-book he found entries made of "hearing without a jury," and 'hearing with a jury," where they should clearly have been entered whether rightly or wrongly taken. Into whose pockets, he would ask, had they gone? It seemed to be admitted that these fees were charged. Mr. W. Powell, who said—I was clerk in Mr. Dudley's office about five years, and left in March, 1852; I have a letter which caused me to leave Mr. Dudley's service; I was examined by the Judge before leaving Mr. Dudley; it was in Mr. Dudley's office; it was on March 27; I was asked a few questions by the Judge, and Mr. Carr called me in, and I answered all the questions put to me. (The letter from Mr. Dudley, giving notice to witness to quit, was here put in and read by Mr. Sedgefield, the officiating Clerk of the Court.) On the following Monday morning, the 29th March, I was suddenly dismissed; I took instructions for summonses, and received money and instructions for executions; Mr. Carr had the management of the office under Mr. Dudley; to Mr. John Richard Carr I accounted daily for moneys received; I received instructions to take the hearing fee in all cases paid into court within the five days before hearing; I was to take it just as if there had been a hearing; I was there two years after Mr. Gardner left; it was customary for defendants to come and tender debts and costs within five days; I took the hearing fees, with few exceptions, if they were tendered within five days; Carr said sometimes, as regards particular persons "Oh! never mind, let them off the fees." He told me not to take them on those occasions; the daily accounts myself and Carr kept were on slips of paper; there was no daily cash-book kept.

By Mr. Chambers-The receipts on slips of paper were sometimes torn up, and the fees of hearing were

on them; they were merely memoranda; I have seen them torn up, and sometimes Mr. Carr has taken them up stairs.

Mr. Powell continued-I put the fees on slips of paper, showing what I had in hand at the close of the day. I never accounted to Mr. Dudley for the fees, nor, in fact, for any other. It was my duty to receive money, and I had instructions from Mr. Carr to receive these hearing fees. I took the hearing fees unless Mr. Carr gave me instructions not to do so. In nearly all these cases, in the list supplied by Mr. Lewis, I took the hearing fees; there were some exceptions. I accounted for the hearing fees to Mr. Carr, and did not put them into my own pocket; I paid them to Mr. Carr on behalf of Mr. Dudley. Mr. Carr said I was not to receive any more hearing fees after May or June, 1851.

Mrs. Mary Prior sworn.-I live at Summerstown; my husband, James Prior, is a wheelright; I cannot read; my husband was sued in this court, by Mr. Silman, for about 16s.; I went to the court, and took a sovereign; they took the money, and I paid 28. 3d., besides the summons and debt. Young Mr. Carr said I must pay it, because it was only three days before the hearing day; he did not put the 2s. 3d. on my paper; my husband commissioned me to pay the money. Mr. Lewis said the hearing fee was exactly 2s. 3d. The entry in the cash-book, in Mr. Carr's handwriting, was 17s. 7d., and 2d, making 17s. 9d., and the same sum was entered in the fee-book, but no entry anywhere of the hearing fee.

Mrs. Prior cross-examined-Can't remember what change I got, whether any or not; I might not have had any change; but what I paid, except 2s. 3d., was put on the summons.

Mr. Wm. Lambourne and Mr. Richard Lambourne, his son, proved settling a debt of 201. at the County Court Office, and paying 21. 5s. extra expenses for costs of hearing because it was within the five days.

Mr. Lewis turned to the fee-book, and found the sum entered there in the case of Chillingworth v. Lambourn was 21l. 17s. 6d., but no hearing fee was entered.

Harriet Bradfield, wife of Mr. Charles Bradfield, was sworn-My husband was sued for 198. 6d. by Mr. Hambidge; I took the exact sum mentioned on the summons, but had not enough to pay the court fees; I spoke to Mr. Powell first, and then Mr. Carr said I must go back for the fee of 28. 3d.; I did go back; I paid it into Mr. Powell's hands, Mr. Carr being in the office.

Mr. Lewis said that in this instance, also, no hearing fee was accounted for.

Robert Hartley, bookbinder, of 37, St. Giles's, was sued and went and paid Mr. George Carr. He said I had not taken money enough, and I paid 2s. 3d. more. I saw Mrs. Prior, the first witness, in the court, who complained loudly of the injustice practised upon her, and I paid 15s. 10d., and 2s. 3d. the hearing fee. Mr. Lewis said both debt and costs were paid, and entered both in the cash-book and fee-book, but no hearing fee was entered.

Wm. Plaister sworn-Was sued in 1851 by Mr. Elliott, and paid the money into court, and saw Mr. Carr, and told him I had come to pay the money. He said I was too late, and I went back and fetched some more, and paid it to a young man at the office for the hearing fee.

Mr Lewis said in this case, also, no hearing fee had been accounted for.

Mr. George Richmond-I was defendant in the case of Howland v. Richmond; the summons produced was served on me; the debt was 21. 9s. and cost of summons 4s. 8d., making altogether 21. 13s. 8d.; I paid the money into court myself, and saw Mr. Powell and Mr. Carr; I tendered the 21. 138. 8d., and George Carr said it was 63. 6d. more for a "hearing fee," and I said that was very hard, when the case had never been heard; he gave me a receipt for the 6s. 6d. as well as the debt. This was on the 13th of September, 1851, I afterwards saw Mr. Powell, and he asked me if I had been robbed of 68. 6d., and I said then Mr. George Carr was a pretty fellow; I went to the office about three or four months after I had paid the debt, aud saw Mr. Carr, and he referred to a book, and said it was a mistake; he then paid me the 6s. 6d. back, and I gave him a receipt for it, and he erased the charge from the paper.

Mr. Lewis here called for the receipt, but it could uot be produced.

Cross-examined-Ryman was not present, and did not tell me the hearing fee ought not to be received; Ryman did not tell me to call again after I complained about the hearing fee; I did not tell Powell that he was a pretty fellow for not pointing it out, and preventing it; I saw the high bailiff at his own house, and he asked me about this fee,

Mr. Lewis said those were all the witnesses he should call in under the seventh charge; and he then proceeded to examine several witnesses on the other matters

of which complaint was made, which our space will not allow us to insert.

The case for the complainant having lasted two whole days, was then concluded.

Mr. Chambers said, that he had attended to the case with the greatest possible anxiety, not only because it was a question of the deepest importance to their com→ mon profession (the law) but also on account of Mr. Dudley, from the highly respectable and honourable situation which he had occupied for so many years in the estimation of numerous gentlemen in the neigh bourhood. Having, therefore, had confidence placed in him, to conduct the defence, he had watched the case with two views-one was, to see that the administration of justice in the County Court on Mr. Dudley's part, was pure and free from suspicion; and, secondly, to relieve that gentleman's character, and keep him in the position he had honourably filled for so many years. And first, he must express his surprise at the conduct of the high bailiff; although he himself wished to be a peacemaker. For nothing could be more important than that there should be a good understanding amongst the different officers, in assisting in the administration of justice in that most important, but newly established court. It was also equally important that suitors should feel a high respect and veneration for that court, whether they had been successful or not, and should depart from it under the impression that ample justice had been done, and that the process of the court had not been abused, but had been used most successfully. He thought that in this matter the high bailiff had acted most injudiciously, and under a total delusion, and in the spirit of disappointment. In fact, the high bailiff had confessed that he expected to receive a much larger salary than he had received since he came into the office; and, labouring under that impression, he came to the conclusion that there must be some mismanagement on the part of the county court clerk, and on that supposition, had framed a set of charges as frivolous as they were unfounded. That gentleman had evidently founded his calculation on erroneous principles. It was a perfectly clear and proper principle, laid down by Mr. Lewis, when he said that it was of the deepest importance that suitors should meet with no impediment in seeking justice from that source. If there had been a single suitor who had complained of such a thing, there would have been some ground for Mr. Dalton's course, but the opposite principle applied to the entire extenuation of Mr. Dudley. suitor had come forward to complain of the manner in which business had been conducted in the County Court office. There was not one, out of the thousands of suitors who had applied to the court who had complained that they had been unfairly dealt with, except Mr. Richmond, who said he had been robbed. Suitors were therefore perfectly satisfied with the justice they had obtained in that court. The complaints were the stalest of the stale, going back as far as 1851. With respect to the seventh ground of complaint he was doubting whether it could be maintained or not. If the judge were to draw up his resolutious in the form which Mr. Lewis had penned, he would condemn the parties most unjustly. The indictment showed a malignity of mind, and littleness of spirit in desiring to destroy and crush s deserving man, which was most unfair, after the evidence that had been given. With respect to Mr. Carr, he was not an assistant clerk, and he could not deal with him, the indictment having been preferred agaidst Mr. Dudley; and it was therefore the first time that he had ever heard that "A" was to be charged with an offence, and "B" found guilty of it. But that was the proposed state of things, if Mr. Lewis's proposition was to be carried out. He would next direct the attention of His Honour to section 116, and to the penalties against other officers for misconduct.

But no

The judge said he felt quite clear that Mr. Dudley was the only person he could deal with; and the only thing would be that Mr. Dudley had not personally, but through his clerk, employed improper persons.

Mr. Chambers added, that lie was desirous to remove the supposition that Mr. Carr could be dealt with as a clerk by the judge of the court. Looking, then, to Mr. Dudley as the only party accused, he found the clause run thus:-"If any clerk, bailiff, or officer of the court should be charged with extortion or misconduct, or not accounting for money, or not paying it when required, it shall be lawful for the judge to inquire into the matter in a summary way, and to make such order for repayment, and also for the payment of such damages and costs; and also, if he shall think fit, a fine of not exceeding 10%., the payment of which shall be enforced by such means as are ordered in enforcing judgment in that court." Supposing, therefore, that Mr. Dudley had not kept those accounts, it would be lawful for the judge to inquire into the matter, and direct the repayment of the money extorted to such an amount as the judge should think fit. But he denounced the attempt to charge with corruption a sensitive and honourable man like Mr. Dudley. The 117th section said " that if any