not secured by the statute. The copyright in a book secured by the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, is the exclusive right of printing or otherwise multiplying copies; and the penalties, forfeitures, and remedies provided by that statute are directed against the printing, importing, and selling of piratical copies. Hence, the unauthorized public reading, representation, or performance of any composition is not a violation of the copyright therein; and, in such case, the person injured is not entitled to the remedies provided for the infringement of copyright. In the case of a dramatic or musical composition, such wrong is an invasion of playright which is expressly secured by statute, and for which specific remedies are provided. The law on this subject is considered under the head of playright.2 So the unauthorized public exhibition of a copy of an engraving was held not to be a violation of 17 Geo. III. c. 57.3 But in the case of paintings, drawings, and photographs, the statute expressly prohibits the exhibition of piratical copies. In the case of sculpture, models, and casts, the statute gives to the owner of any such article "the sole right and property" therein for fourteen years" from first putting forth or publishing the same." The right thus secured is not restricted to printing or the circulation of copies; but is coextensive with the common-law property, which embraces the exclusive right of publicly exhibiting the work. Hence, although the statute does not expressly provide a remedy against unlawful exhibition, the common-law remedy may be held to be available, on the principle that when a right is secured the legislature is presumed to have intended complete remedies for its protection. Limitation of Actions. Section 26 of 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, prescribes that "all actions, suits, bills, indictments, or informations for any offence that shall be committed against this act, shall be brought, sued, and commenced within twelve calendar months next after such offence committed, or else the same 1 Coleman v. Wathen, 5 T. R. 245; Reade v. Conquest, 9 C. B. N. s. 775; Tinsley v. Lacy, 1 Hem. & M. 747; Clark v. Bishop, 25 L. T. N. s. 908. See also Murray v. Elliston, 5 Barn. & Ald. 657; Martin v. Wright, infra. 2 See Chap. XVI. 3 Martin v. Wright, 6 Sim. 297. shall be void and of none effect;" but provides that this limitation shall not apply to actions respecting copies of books required to be delivered to the British Museum and the four other libraries. The question has been raised, whether the limitation here prescribed applies only in the case of penalties and forfeitures, or extends also to actions for damages. The doubt relates to the sense in which the word offence is used. The language of section 26, above quoted, is copied verbatim from section 10 of 8 Anne, c. 19, except that the limitation is changed from three to twelve months. But the statute of Anne imposed penalties and forfeitures, without providing an action for damages; hence, in an early Scotch case, it was held that the limitation clause of the act applied only to the penalties and forfeitures, and not to actions for damages or injunctions.1 The same view of the statute of Victoria was taken in a more recent case by the Court of Session in Scotland.2 In Hogg v. Scott, it appeared that the defendant had published, in 1868, the first, and in the latter part of 1862, the second, edition of a book containing matter pirated from the plaintiff's works. He also intended to publish a third edition. In August, 1873, the plaintiff applied for an injunction to restrain the defendant from further publishing or selling any copies of such piratical work. One of the defences set up was that the statutory limitation applied to all actions and suits, whether for the penalties or damages or injunctions, and hence that the plaintiff's suit was barred by lapse of time. Vice-Chancellor Hall expressed the opinion, that the word offence was not used in section 26 in the same sense as in section 15, which gives an action on the case for damages; that the limitation prescribed was intended to apply only in cases of penalties and forfeitures; that it could not operate to destroy the property secured; and that an action for damages, or a suit for an injunction, might be maintained, although more than a year had passed since the wrong was done. But, however this might be, he had no doubt that the defendant could not go on committing new wrongs or offences by continually publishing and selling the piratical work, in violation of the 1 Clark v. Bell, 10 Mor. Dict. of Dec. Lit. Prop. App. p. 9. 2 Stewart v. Black, 9 Sc. Sess. Cas. 2d ser. 1026. plaintiff's right of property. granted.1 The injunction was therefore 1 Law Rep. 18 Eq. 444. The Vice- suing in respect of his copyright; that Chancellor said : - "I cannot allow the objection taken to the plaintiff's right to sue, because more than twelve months elapsed before he filed a bill in this court. By the 3d section of the statute, a property is created in an author's work which prima facie is to endure for a term certain, and that property will remain in the author or his representatives, as owners of it, till it be taken away from him or them. The argument that, if a case arises for a suit in respect of the author's right to his property, and the author does not commence his suit within twelve months, that therefore his property is gone, I do not agree with. I do not find that clearly expressed in the statute, and I cannot put such a construction upon the 26th section. The 15th section gives to an owner of copyright a special action on the case in respect of any piracy. The remedy so provided is apparently a cumulative one; but whether it be so or not is not very important. The remedy is given against the person who is called the offender,' and the act spoken of as the 'offence' is the printing for sale or exportation of any book in which there shall be subsisting copyright. Mr. Morgan, in his argument, contended that the court ought to put upon the word offence in the 26th section the same construction as it bears in the 15th section of the statute. If that were a reasonable construction, it might be adopted; but, looking at the other sections in the statute which refer to penalties, I do not think it would be reasonable. There is nothing to be found in them about any 'offence' in the sense contended for on the part of the defendant. If the book which has been improperly published by the defendant contains property belonging to the plaintiff, the owner of copyright, I do not see how it can be successfully contended that he is suing in respect of an offence in the sense urged on the part of the defendant. The plaintiff is is his property. The 26th section is no doubt not very happily framed; but I am of opinion that, on the true construction of that and the other sections of the statute, the 'offence' contemplated by it must be the doing, in contravention of its provisions, of something expressly prohibited by them. "The real question is, What is the 'offence' intended by the statute? It is the printing for sale or exportation of any work or part of a work, by a person who is not the owner of the copyright of that work, and without the consent of the owner. The nonsuing by the owner of the copyright in respect of a particular edition, or part of an edition, of the defendant's work, is one thing; and even if it could be said that so far the owner's remedy was barred by his own neglect, still I find nothing in the statute which states that the person who has already published the edition, or part of the edition, complained of, may go on doing so, and that, if he does, the owner has then no remedy for such further offence.' In reference to this question, I may add that the Scotch cases referred to by Mr. Fischer are not to be disregarded. They were, no doubt, decisions in reference to books published before the passing of the statute; still they seem to me to be quite consistent with good sense and the reasonable interpretation of the statute. The right of the owner of the copyright to his property in it is not to cease because one copy of the work, which without his sanction contains the piracies, has been sold and disposed of without any complaint on his part. He is not on that account to lose all his property in his copyright; therefore I hold, in accordance with the decisions referred to, and on the construction of the statute, that the plaintiff has not lost his right to sue." Ibid. 450. "The offence is committed every time a copy is sold." James, V. C., Jarrold v. Heywood, 18 W. R. 281. ENGRAVINGS AND PRINTS. Penalties and Forfeitures. For piracy of engravings and prints, penalties and forfeitures are prescribed by 8 Geo. II. c. 13, and an action for damages is given by 17 Geo. III. c. 57. The former act declares, that if any person shall engrave, etch, or work, or in any other manner copy and sell," in the whole or in part, by varying, adding to, or diminishing from the main design," or shall print or import for sale a print, without the written consent of the owner of the copyright signed in presence of two witnesses, or shall sell or expose to sale a print knowing it to have been so unlawfully printed or imported, such offender shall forfeit the plates and the prints to the owner, to be by him destroyed, and shall further pay five shillings for every print found in his custody; the penalty recovered to be equally divided between the king and the informer.1 Action for Damages. The 17 Geo. III. c. 57, provides that every person shall be liable to an action for damages who shall engrave, etch, or work, or in any other manner copy, in the whole or in part, by varying, adding to, or diminishing from the main design, or shall print or import for sale, or shall publish, sell, or otherwise dispose of any copy or copies of a print or prints "which hath or have been or shall be engraved, etched, or drawn or designed in any part of Great Britain, without the express consent of the proprietor or proprietors thereof first had and obtained in writing" signed in presence of two witnesses.2 When Seller is Liable. The former statute imposes penalties and forfeitures on such seller only who sells or exposes to sale copies which he knows to have been unlawfully printed or imported. The meaning of 17 Geo. III. c. 57, is not satisfactorily clear on this point. There is little doubt that the seller is made liable to an action for damages although he is ignorant of the piracy; and the statute has been so construed. But the question has been raised, whether a seller is liable for the unauthorized sale of copies which have not been unlawfully printed or imported. In Murray v. Heath, it appeared that the plaintiff had employed the defendant to engrave plates from certain drawings. The drawings were the property of the plaintiff, and the plates had been prepared for his exclusive use; but he permitted the defendant to retain one hundred copies of the prints, on the express condition that he was not to sell them. Afterward, the defendant became bankrupt, and the copies passed to his assignees, who advertised them for sale. In the action for damages, wherein the assignees were codefendants, the defence was set up, that the copies had not been unlawfully printed or imported, and therefore their sale was not piracy. The court thought that "reading the statute 17 Geo. III. c. 57, alone, it would be very difficult to answer the argument urged on behalf of the plaintiff;" but construing that act in connection with the two statutes, 8 Geo. II. c. 13, and 7 Geo. III. c. 38, which it recited, it was held that the sale complained of, though a breach of contract, was not a violation of copyright.1 1 1 Barn. & Ad. 804. It is not satisfactorily clear, from the opinions of the judges, on what ground this decision was based. Lord Tenterden, C. J., interrupting counsel, who had referred to the clause of 17 Geo. III. c. 57, directed against piracy, said: “Can the clause be understood to apply to prints taken from the original plate? The prints were not engraved without the consent of the proprietor." Ibid. 808. In delivering his opinion, the same judge, after referring to 8 Geo. II. c. 13, and 7 Geo. III. c. 38, continued: The question therefore is, whether the act imputed to the defendant be one for which he would have been liable to the forfeiture imposed by either of the recited statutes. If it be not, he is not liable to the action on the case given by 17 Geo. III. c. 57. Now, both the recited statutes are manifestly confined to prints struck off from engravings pirated from other engravings. The present case, therefore, is not within either; for here the first engraver took a certain number of impressions from a plate engraved by himself, but which he had contracted to engrave for the use of another." Ibid. 810. "Taking the statute 17 Geo. III. c. 57," said Littledale, J., "in conjunction with the other statutes which it recites, and whereby a print-seller, or other person selling pirated prints, is made liable to forfeit the plates on which they are copied, to the proprietor of the originals, I think it is manifest that the last statute does not apply to the case of taking a print unlawfully from a lawful plate." Ibid. 811. The 17 Geo. III. c. 57, taken in connection with the prior acts, may admit of the construction that a seller is not liable to an action for damages, unless the copies sold were unlawfully printed or imported. This is the only ground on which the above decision can be sustained. If the court intended to hold that the defendants were not guilty of piracy, because the copies had been printed from the original |