pliance with section 5 of the act which required such notice "to be imprinted on the face" of the work. The name of the publishers and the date and place of publication were held not to be a part of the title of a map to be recorded.2 The delivery of a copy of the book to the Smithsonian Institution, and one to the library of Congress, pursuant to section 10 of the act of 18463 establishing that institution, was not essential to copyright.1 What must be done to Secure Copyright under Statute now in Force. Whatever grounds there may have been for doubt concerning the meaning of the earlier acts on the points under consideration are removed by the language used in the statute now in force, which grants copyright to such persons only as shall comply with its provisions, and expressly declares that no person shall be entitled to copyright or maintain an action for infringement unless he shall first do three things: 1, before publication mail to the Librarian of Congress, a printed copy of the title of the book, map, chart, dramatic or musical composition, engraving, cut, print, or photograph, or a description of the painting, drawing, chromo, statue, statuary, or model or design for a work of the fine arts; 6 2, within ten days after publication, deliver or mail to the same officer two copies of such book or other article, or a photograph of the painting, drawing, statue, statuary, model or design;7 3, print on the title-page, or the page next following, of every copy of a book, or in the case of a map, chart, musical composition, print, cut, engraving, photograph, painting, drawing, chromo, statue, statuary, model or design, inscribe on some visible part of it, or on the substance on which it is mounted, the notice of entry of copyright in the prescribed form.8 Compliance with Statutory Requisites Essential to Copyright. — "There is," said Mr. Justice Sawyer, "no possible room for 1 Rossiter v. Hall, 5 Blatchf. 362. * Farmer v. Calvert Lithographing, Engraving & Map Publishing Co., 5 Am. L. T. R. 168. 39 U. S. St. at L. 106. 4 Jollie v. Jaques, 1 Blatchf. 618. 5 U. S. Rev. St. ss. 4948-4971. 6 s. 4956. 7 Id. 8 s. 4962. Two forms are prescribed, either of which may be used: 1. "Entered according to act of Congress in the year-, by A. B., in the office of the Librarian of Congress at Washington." U. S. Rev. St. s. 4962. 2. " Copyright 18-, by A. B." Act of June 18, 1874, s. 1; 18 U. S. St. at L. 78. construction here. The statute says no right shall attach until these acts have been performed; and the court cannot say, in the face of this express negative provision, that a right shall attach unless they are performed. Until the performance as prescribed, there is no right acquired under the statute that can be violated." 1 1 Parkinson v. Laselle, 3 Sawyer, 333. To the same effect are Boucicault v. Hart, 13 Blatchf. 47; Carillo v. Shook, 22 Int. Rev. Rec. 152; Marsh v. Warren, 4 Am. L. T. N. 8. 126; s. c. 9 Chic. Leg. News, 395; Centennial Catalogue Co. v. Porter, 2 Weekly Notes of Cases, 601; Benn v. LeClercq, 18 Int. Rev. Rec. 94. In Parkinson v. Laselle, Sawyer, J., said: "It is settled by the Supreme Court in Wheaton v. Peters, that every act required by the act of Congress of May 3, 1790, and of April 29, 1802, relative to copyright, is essential to the title derived under those acts. Unless he performs every act required by these statutes, the author acquires no exclusive right. See also Jollie v. Jaques, 1 Blatchf. 618, and Baker v. Taylor, 2 Id. 82. The authority of these decisions is not questioned by complainant, but it is insisted that the present statute is different and requires a different construction. On the contrary, it appears to me to be more difficult under the present statute to escape the construction adopted by the Supreme Court in Wheaton v. Peters than under the former acts. "Under section 3 of the act of 1790, there was some ground for claiming that it was only necessary to deposit a printed copy of the title to a book or map, in order to secure a copyright; and that the provisions of the latter part of this section, and in section 4, for publication of a copy of the record, and the delivery of the copy of the work, were merely directory, or at most conditions subsequent. But there is no ground for such claim under the present act. Under section 4952 of the Revised Statutes, an author of a book or map is to have the sole liberty of printing. . . and vending the same,' only 'upon complying with the provisions of this chapter;' that is to say, all the provisions, for no exception is made. No one provision is referred to rather than another. As the statute has not limited the acts to be performed to any one provision less than the whole, the courts have no authority to say that any one rather than another, less than the whole is sufficient. Section 4956 in express terms declares that no person shall be entitled to a copyright unless he shall before publication deliver at the office of the Librarian of Congress, or deposit in the mail addressed to the Librarian of Congress, at Washington, District of Columbia, a printed copy of the title of the book or other article, &c.; nor unless he shall also, within ten days from the publication thereof, deliver at the office of the Librarian of Congress, or deposit in the mail addressed to the Librarian of Congress, at Washington, District of Columbia, two copies of such book, or other article,' &c. There is no possible room for construction here. The statute says no right shall attach until these acts have been performed; and the court cannot say, in the face of this express negative provision, that a right shall attach unless they are performed. Until the performance as prescribed, there is no right acquired under the statute that can be violated. "It is claimed by the complainant that section 4962 prescribes the essentials necessary to authorize the maintenance of the action; and that the court cannot add others. It is upon this section that it is sought to distinguish this case from those arising under former acts, which did not contain the provision. The provision relied on is, that no person shall maintain an action for the infringement of his copyright, unless he Section 4953 of the existing statute grants copyright for twenty-eight years "from the time of recording the title," and section 4964 gives the owner of the copyright a right of action against every person who, "after the recording of the title of any book," shall without authority publish or sell copies. Similar provisions were contained in the earlier statutes. They do not, as has been erroneously held,1 enable a person to maintain an action at law for the violation of copyright before that right has been completely secured by performance of all the statutory requisites. The right which accrues to the author on recording the title has been described as an incomplete one which becomes perfect when the other acts prescribed by the statute are performed. "The right," said Mr. Justice McLean, in pronouncing the judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States, " undoubtedly accrues on the record being made with the clerk, and the printing of it as required; but what is the nature of that right? Is it perfect? If so, the other two requisites are wholly useless." 2 shall give notice thereof by inserting the other provisions of the act, and then, in order to enforce his right against infringers, he must also give notice of his right by the means prescribed by section 4962, so that other parties may not copy his work in ignorance of his rights. This seems to be the object of the provision. An analogous provision, and for a similar purpose, copied from previous acts, is found in section 4900, relating to patent rights. "The complainant's claim can derive no argumentative support against the express negative provisions of the statute already cited and discussed, from section 4960, providing for a penalty to be recovered from the author on failure to perform all the conditions prescribed. This seems to be intended to furnish additional guarantees against attempts of parties to avail themselves of the benefits of a copyright without first performing all the conditions prescribed in order to confer the right." 3 Sawyer, 832. 1 Boucicault v. Wood, 2 Biss. 34. See this case criticised in Chap. XV. 2 Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 664. Not until all the acts prescribed by the statute are performed is the copyright perfected, and not until then can an action at law be maintained for its violation. But the copyright, when completed, dates from the time of recording the title, and from that time the work is under the protection of the law. Otherwise, there might be a period between the first and the last acts necessary to perfect the copyright, during which the author's property would be exposed to piracy without any present or future remedy. Hence, a wrong-doer is made liable for a wrongful act done at any time after the recording of the title. But the remedy at law for such wrongful act does not exist until the copyright is perfected.2 In equity, however, the author may be "Although a printed copy of the title of such book is required before the publication to be sent to the Librarian of Congress, yet this is only as a designation of the book to be copyrighted; and the right is not perfected under the statute until the required copies of such copyright book are after publication also sent." Shepley, J., Osgood v. Allen, 1 Holmes, 192. 1 Concerning one of the prescribed requisites, viz., printing the copyright notice in the book, the statute expressly declares that, unless this is done, no person shall maintain an action for infringement. 8. 4962. 2 "The acts required to be done by an author to secure his right, are in the order in which they most naturally transpire. First, the title of the book is to be deposited with the clerk, and the record he makes must be inserted in the first or second page; then the public notice in the newspapers is to be given; and, within six months after the publication of the book, a copy must be deposited in the Department of State. "A right undoubtedly accrues on the record being made with the clerk, and the printing of it as required; but what is the nature of that right? Is it perfect? If so, the other two requisites are wholly useless. How can the author be compelled either to give notice in the newspaper, or deposit a copy in the State Department? The statute affixes no penalty for a failure to perform either of these acts; and it provides no means by which it may be enforced. But we are told they are unimportant acts. If they are indeed wholly unimportant, Congress acted unwisely in requiring them to be done. But whether they are important or not is not for the court to determine, but the legislature; and in what light they were considered by the legislature, we can learn only by their official acts. Judging then of these acts by this rule, we are not at liberty to say they are unimportant, and may be dispensed with. They are acts which the law requires to be done, and may this court dispense with their performance? But the inquiry is made, Shall the non-performance of these subsequent conditions operate as a forfeiture of the right? The answer is, that this is not a technical grant of precedent and subsequent conditions. All the conditions are important; the law requires them to be performed, and consequently their performance is essential to a perfect title. On the performance of a part of them the right vests, and this was essential to its protection under the statute; but other acts are to be done, unless Congress have legislated in vain, to render the right perfect. The notice could not be published until after the entry with the clerk, nor could the book be deposited with the Secretary of State until it was published. But these are acts not less important than those which are re entitled to protection as soon as the title-page is recorded, and before the copyright is completely secured, provided he has not been guilty of negligence in completing his title.1 It was held under the act of 1790, that the copyright was not defeated by failure to deliver a copy of the book within the time prescribed, provided such delivery was made before the beginning of the action. This doctrine is clearly wrong. The statutes have expressly named the time within which copies shall be delivered, and the courts have repeatedly held that a strict compliance with the statutory requirements is essential. In the recent case of Chase v. Sanborn, the Circuit Court of the United States held that it was not enough, under the act of 1831, to show that a copy of the work had been delivered to the clerk of the District Court, but that it must appear that such delivery had been made within the prescribed time of three months.8 Requisites in Case of New Editions.—Successive editions of a book which are mere reprints of the first edition will be protected by the copyright obtained for the first edition without the title being recorded anew or additional copies delivered. The original copyright notice, however, must appear in each copy of every edition. But if a subsequent edition contains new matter, or substantial changes in the old, it will be necessary, in order to protect such additions or alterations, to obtain a new copyright; in which case all the requirements of the statutes must be observed, including a notice of the new entry of copyright to be printed in such edition.5 protect until the other acts may be done." Ibid. 332. 2 Dwight v. Appleton, 1 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 195. The work was in five volumes; the first and third, but not the others, had been delivered to the Secretary of State within the prescribed time. See also opinion of AttorneyGeneral Wirt, in Daboll's Case, 1 Op. Atty.-Gen. 532. 8 6 U. S. Pat. Off. Gaz. 932. 4 U. $. Rev. St. s. 4962; act of June 18, 1874, 18 U. S. St. at L. 78. 5 Lawrence v. Dana, 2 Am. L. T. R. N. s. 402, 417-418; Farmer v. Calvert Lithographing, Engraving, & Map |