Justice Thompson held that a daily price current, or review of the market, was not within the purview of the copyright statute.1 But a more liberal doctrine now prevails. The importance and value of the information often contained in prices current, trade circulars, market reports, &c., are well recognized in the commercial world; and such publications are clearly within the principle on which copyright has been declared to vest in directories, calendars, statistical reports, &c.2 In Drury v. Ewing, it was held that a chart or diagram, with directions for cutting garments, was entitled to protection as a book. "It is clearly no objection to the validity of her copyright," said Mr. Justice Leavitt, "that her production does not claim a standing as a work of great literary merit. The statute does not make this a necessary element of a legal copyright, and it is well known that there are works of great practical utility, having no pretension to literary merit, which are yet within, not only the words, but the scope and design of the statute."3

The material inquiry, then, is not whether a production has literary or scientific merit, but whether it may be regarded as a material addition to useful knowledge, a source of general information. If it be of substantial importance, and have a material value in this respect, the law does not inquire into the degree of its usefulness or of its merits. Whether one production is more or less useful, meritorious, or popular than another, is of no concern to the court, which exercises no functions of criticism.4

1 Clayton v. Stone, 2 Paine, 382, 392. "The act in question," said Mr. Justice Thompson, was passed in execution of the power here given [by the Constitution], and the object therefore was the promotion of science; and it would certainly be a pretty extraordinary view of the sciences to consider a daily or weekly publication of the state of the market as falling within any class of them. They are of a more fixed, permanent, and durable character. The term science, cannot, with any propriety, be applied to a work of so fluctuating and fugitive a form as that of a newspaper or price current the subject-matter of which is daily changing, and is of mere temporary

use.

...

The title of the act of Congress is for the encouragement of learning, and was not intended for the encouragement of mere industry, unconnected with learning and the sciences."

2 See Kiernan v. Manhattan Quotation Telegraph Co., 50 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 194.

8 1 Bond, 540, 548. See also Folsom v. Marsh, 2 Story, 109; Lawrence v. Cupples, 9 U. S. Pat. Off. Gaz. 254; Richardson v. Miller, 3 L. & Eq. Reporter, 614.

4 For a consideration of the question of literary value in unpublished works, see ante, p. 111.

While the requirements of the law as to the importance or value of a production are so slight that valid copyright will attach to almost any publication, and to many that appear to be of little or no consequence, not every collection of printed words or sentences is entitled to protection. To be worthy of copyright, a thing must have some value as a composition sufficiently material to lift it above utter insignificance and worthlessness. A title of a book, a mere label,2 an advertisement 3 which serves no higher purpose than to make known the place and kind of business of the advertiser, are not proper subjects of copyright.

In a recent English case, copyright was claimed in a scoringsheet or "tablet" used in the game of cricket. The tablet consisted of two lines ruled at the foot of the sheet, with spaces in which were marked the totals or number of the runs obtained in the game at the fall of each wicket. At the head of the tablet were the words "Runs at the fall of each wicket." It appeared that this was not original, having long been in common use. Vice-Chancellor Malins held that, even if original, it was not a proper object of copyright. He was of opinion that "to say that the particular mode of ruling a book constituted an object for copyright is absurd. A solicitor's bill is made out in that way, by casting up the totals; and what more is this? It is below all protection, being a mere arithmetical

1 See cases cited ante, p. 145, the almost numberless labels attached

note 1.

2 Scoville v. Toland, 6 West. Law Jour. 84; Coffeen v. Brunton, 4 McLean, 516. In the former case, Mr. Justice McLean, said: "The label which the complainant claims to be a book refers to a certain medicinal preparation and was designed to be an accompaniment of it. Like other labels, it was intended for no other use than to be pasted on the vials or bottles which contained the medicine. As a composition distinct from the medicine it can be of no value. It asserts a fact that Dr. Rodgers' Compound Syrup of Liverwort and Tar is a certain cure for many diseases; but it does not inform us how the compound is made. In no respect does this label differ from

to bottles and vials containing medicines and directions how they shall be taken. Now these are only valuable when connected with the medicine. As labels they are useful, but as mere compositions, distinct from the medicine, they are never used or designed to be used. This is not the case with other compositions which are intended to instruct and amuse the reader, though limited to a single sheet or page. Of this character would be lunar tables, sonatas, music, and other mental labors concentrated on a single page."

3 Collender v. Griffith, 11 Blatchf. 211. See the consideration of the question of copyright in advertisements, ante, p. 164.

operation, which must have been done over and over again."

Quantity. How short a composition may be, and still be a subject of copyright when published alone, has not been definitely determined by the legislature or the courts. We have seen that productions written on a single page have been protected as books. In a recent English case, a passage of about sixty words was held to be entitled to protection by injunction.2 The question is to be determined rather by the worth and importance of the production than by its length. It would seem that, however small the piece may be, if it has merit and value enough to be published alone, and to be an object of piracy, it should also be of sufficient importance to be entitled to protection. A gem of literature may be contained in a couplet of poetry or in a sentence of prose. Mr. Lincoln's words at Gettysburg rank with the highest productions of oratory; yet they may be read in less than two minutes.

The same general test is to be applied in determining the validity of copyright in a compilation of old materials, or a new edition of a work previously published. The controlling question is whether the results due to the labor or skill of the compiler, or the author of the new edition, are of material consequence and value. Has the compilation a substantial worth not found in the materials uncombined? Is the new edition. materially different from the old? In Black v. Murray,3 copyright was claimed in a new edition of one of Scott's ballads which differed in but one word from the original edition in which the copyright had expired. Lord Deas earnestly contended that the change wrought in the author's meaning by this substitution of a single word, and the force and beauty thereby given to the poem, were so great as to afford a basis for a new copyright in the revised edition. The other judges did not attach so much importance to the force of the revision, but regarded the new edition as a substantial reprint of the old.

1 Page v. Wisden, 20 L. T. N. s. 435. 2 Cobbett v. Woodward, Law Rep. 14 Eq. 407. See the question of quantity and value considered in Chaps. VIII., XI.

89 Sc. Sess. Cas. 3d ser. 341. For a fuller consideration of this case, see ante, p. 149. See also Hedderwick v. Griffin, 3 Sc. Sess. Cas. 2d ser. 883.

The judgment of the court, therefore, was that there was not sufficient basis for a renewed term of protection. But the principle was evidently recognized, that the claim for copyright in such cases is to be tested by the change wrought in the meaning of a composition, rather than by the extent of the verbal alterations.

CHAPTER IV.

IN WHOM COPYRIGHT WILL VEST.

ONE of the first questions which arise in connection with this subject is, whether the copyright legislation of Great Britain, or that of the United States, is for the benefit of native authors alone, or of all authors without distinction as to nationality. The general copyright statutes of England grant protection to "authors," without declaring whether native or foreign authors are meant. By the International Copyright Acts, special provision is made for extending copyright to foreigners; but such protection is given only to those authors whose country extends reciprocal privileges to English authors. A noticeable feature of these acts is that they extend protection to works first published abroad, while first publication in the United Kingdom is essential to secure copyright under the general statutes.

INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT.- GREAT BRITAIN.

The first International Copyright Act was passed in 1838.1 This was repealed in 1844 by the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 12, which, with the 15 & 16 Vict. c. 12, and the 38 & 39 Vict. c. 12, now governs the law of international copyright.

Foreign Works in Original Language. By these acts, the Queen is empowered to direct by an Order in Council that authors, inventors, designers, engravers, and makers of books, prints, articles of sculpture and other works of art, to be defined in such order, which shall be first published in any foreign country to be named in the order, shall have copyright therein during a specified period; not exceeding, however, the duration of English copyright. In a similar manner, provision

1 1 & 2 Vict. c. 59.