ant had simply copied them, his copyright would have failed through want of originality. But, as the statute gave simply directions, it was an act of authorship to prepare the forms pursuant to such directions.1

So a good title to copyright is acquired by representing on a map boundaries of townships which are fixed by statute.2

Works alike may be Original. It is not essential that any production, to be original or new within the meaning of the law of copyright, shall be different from another. Whether the composition for which copyright is claimed is the same as or different from, whether it is like or unlike, an existing one, are matters of which the law takes no cognizance, except to determine whether the production is the result of independent labor or of copying. There cannot be exclusive property in a general subject, or in the method of treating it; nor in the mere plan of a work; nor in common materials, or the manner or purpose for which they are used. The rights of any

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19 Sc. Sess. Cas. 2d ser. 748. "It is said," remarked Lord Fullerton, "that owing to the particular nature of the styles they cannot be the subject of copyright, because they are drawn up precisely after the form prescribed in the statute, and because any styles relating to the same subjects as those given by the complainer must, if the directions of the statutes and phraseology of conveyances were used, be expressed in the same manner exactly as those compared by the complainer. Now it may be quite true, that if the statute had supplied certain forms, by which the operations intended to be thereby regulated were to be done, if the statute had contained, as such statutes sometimes do, an appendix exhibiting certain schedules of forms which it was only necessary for any one to copy in order to avail himself of the provisions of the act, then I hold that the reprinting of such forms in a separate publication would not give him a copyright in those forms. But the case here is different, for the statute only gives very general directions and descriptions of the styles that are to be used. The schedules

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are very general in their terms, and it is no doubt of great practical importance to suit these general directions to each case falling under the statute as it may arise. The preparing and adjusting of such writings require much care and exertion of mind. As to invention that is a different thing. It does not require the exercise of original or creative genius, but it requires industry and knowledge." Ibid. 754.

2 Farmer v. Calvert Lithographing, Engraving, & Map-Publishing Co., Am. L. T. R. 168.

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3 Matthewson v. Stockdale, 12 Ves. 270; Longman v. Winchester, 16 Id. 269; Lewis v. Fullarton, 2 Beav. 6; Blunt v. Patten, 2 Paine, 393, 397; Banks v. McDivitt, 13 Blatchf. 163.

Mack v. Petter, Law Rep. 14 Eq. 431; Lawrence v. Cupples, 9 U. S. Pat. Off. Gaz. 254.

5 Barfield v. Nicholson, 2 Sim. & St. 1; Murray v. Bogue, 1 Drew. 353; Spiers v. Brown, 6 W. R. 352; Pike v. Nicholas, Law Rep. 5 Ch. 251; Cox v. Land & Water Journal Co., Law Rep. 9 Eq. 324; Farmer v. Calvert Lithographing, Engraving, & Map-Publishing Co., supra. Section 2 of 25 &

person are restricted to his own individual production. There is nothing in the letter or the spirit of the law of copyright to prevent or to discourage any number of persons from honestly laboring in the same field. Two or more authors may write on the same subject, treat it similarly, and use the same common materials in like manner and for one purpose. Their productions may contain the same thoughts, sentiments, ideas; they may be identical. Such resemblance or identity is material only as showing whether there has been unlawful copying.1 In many cases, the natural or necessary resemblance between two productions, which are the result of independent labor, will amount to substantial identity. Thus, the differences will be often slight, and sometimes immaterial, between two descriptions of a common object; two compilations of like materials; two maps, charts, or road-books of a common region; two directories of one city; two photographs of the same scene; two engravings of the same painting. But, notwithstanding their likeness to one another, any number of productions of the same kind may be original within the meaning of the law; and no conditions as to originality are imposed on the makers, except that each shall be the producer of that for which he claims protection.2

26 Vict. c. 68, which secures copyright in paintings, drawings, and photographs, declares that "nothing herein contained shall prejudice the right of any person to copy or use any work in which there shall be no copyright, or to represent any scene or object, not withstanding there may be copyright in some representation of such scene or object."

1 Br. Roworth v. Wilkes, 1 Camp. 94; De Berenger v. Wheble, 2 Stark. 548; Barfield v. Nicholson, 2 Sim. & St. 1; Nichols v. Loder, 2 Coop. (temp. Cottenham) 217. Am. Blunt v. Patten, 2 Paine, 393, 397; Reed v. Carusi, Tan. Dec. 72; Benn v. Le Clercq, 18 Int. Rev. Rec. 94. In Wood v. Boosey, as reported 18 L. T. N. s. 108, Kelly, C. B., said: "After the original opera there may be an arrangement of it for the piano-forte by one author or composer, and there may be another ar

rangement of it for the piano by another author and composer. If the copyright in the original opera be expired, a copyright might exist in the composers of both of those arrangements; each would be a new substantive work entitled to the benefit of any existing law of copyright, and one might or might not be a piracy of the other."

2 "A copyright cannot subsist in a chart, as a general subject, although it may in the individual work, and others may be restrained from copying such work. But the natural objects from which the charts are made are open to the examination of all, and any one has a right to survey and make a chart. And if such surveys and charts are all correct, all will be alike, but no one would complain of his rights having been infringed, and each one may be considered an original chart. A right in such a subject is violated only when

Tables of figures have been held to be a proper subject of copyright. The copyright is not in the mode or rules of computation, but in the results. Of course, the same calculations, when correctly made, must produce the same results; and the test of originality is simply whether the person claiming protection has himself performed the operations, or has copied the results.1 Where it was shown that, of thirteen tables in which copyright was claimed, at least seven had been published in different works long before the plaintiff's publication appeared, Vice-Chancellor Leach said: "I am not of opinion that the plaintiff ceases to be entitled to protection, though the tables in respect of which his complaint is made, may have been preexisting. He has a right to protection, if they were original calculations of his own; and such he swears them to have been. ... The plaintiff's title to the tables is that he calculated them; the defendant, by calculating them on his part, acquires the same right.” 2

There can be no monopoly in the plan of a directory, and the same sources of information are common to all persons. All that is required of each compiler is, that he shall prepare his own publication without copying from that of his rival.3 So in the case of compilations consisting of matter taken from other publications. Any number of persons may use the same common materials, in like manner and for a similar purpose.1 Each compilation must be original, in the sense that it is a work materially different from its component parts taken sepa

another copies from the chart of him who has secured the copyright and thereby availing himself of his labor and skill. And in all such cases it is a proper question for a jury, whether the one is a copy of the other or not. If the two are in all respects alike, the prima facie presumption probably would be, that one was a copy of the other, yet both might be originals; and if there was some small variance, it would be a proper subject of inquiry whether the alteration was not merely colorable and that the one was in substance a mere transcript of the other." Thompson, J., Blunt v. Patten, 2 Paine, 400.

2 Baily v. Taylor, 3 L. J. (Ch.) 66.

3 Kelly v. Morris, Law Rep. 1 Eq. 697; Morris v. Ashbee, 7 Id. 34; Morris v. Wright, Law Rep. 5 Ch. 279.

4 "No compiler of such a book has a monopoly of the subject of which the book treats. Any other person is permitted to enter that department of literature and make a similar book. But the subsequent investigator must investigate for himself from the original sources which are open to all." Shipman, J., Banks v. McDivitt, 13 Blatchf. 166.

rately; that it is not a mere reprint of what the compiler is in no sense the author. It must also be original in the sense that the compiler has obtained the materials from the common sources, and has arranged and combined them by his own labor and skill. But the originality of a compilation is not affected by the fact that the same materials have been used before for the same purpose and in the same order; in other words, that the work is not different from one previously published.1

The principle is the same in the case of original compositions. It is not probable that two authors, working independently of each other, will produce two poems, novels, essays, &c., which will be precisely alike. But, if such a case should arise, each author would be entitled to copyright in his own production.2

Test of Originality. In all cases, whatever may be the kind or the character of the work for which protection is claimed, the true test of originality is whether the production is the result of independent labor or of copying. A close resemblance between two publications may afford strong evidence of copying; and in some cases, especially when the similarity is not explained, it may amount to conclusive proof of piracy. But, when it is established that a work is the result of honest authorship, its likeness to another publication is immaterial.

LITERARY MERIT AND QUALITY.

Literary Merit. When a production meets the requirements of the law as to innocence and originality, the only inquiry relating to its character is, whether it is a material contribution to useful knowledge. This raises the question, whether literary merit, in the common meaning of that expression, is essential

1 Br. Barfield v. Nicholson, 2 Sim. & St. 1; Murray v. Bogue, 1 Drew. 353; Spiers v. Brown, 6 W. R. 352; Pike v. Nicholas, Law Rep. 5 Ch. 251. Am. Gray v. Russell, 1 Story, 11; Webb v. Powers, 2 Woodb. & M. 497; Law rence v. Dana, 2 Am. L. T. R. N. s. 402; Lawrence v. Cupples, 9 U. S. Pat. Off. Gaz. 254; Banks v. McDivitt, 13 Blatchf. 163.

2 'The order of each man's words," said Mr. Justice Erle, "is as singular as his countenance, and although if two authors composed originally with the same order of words each would have a property therein, still the probability of such an occurrence is less than that there should be two countenances that could not be discriminated." Jefferys v. Boosey, 4 H. L. C. 869.

to copyright in a composition. On this point the statute contains no express provision. The only guide from this source is that afforded by the avowed purpose of the legislature. The statute of Anne, entitled An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, was declared in the preamble to be "for the encouragement of learned men to compose and write useful. books." The object of the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, as expressed in the preamble, is "to afford greater encouragement to the production of literary works of lasting benefit to mankind." The first American statute was entitled An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, and was passed pursuant to that provision of the Constitution which empowers Congress "to promote the progress of science" by securing to authors the exclusive right to their writings.2

To the object of copyright legislation, as thus indicated, the courts have given a most liberal interpretation. They have declared that the law cannot be restricted to the protection of "literary works of lasting benefit to mankind," according to a strict interpretation of the preamble of 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45; but that its true scope and spirit are to encourage the production of "useful books," as avowed by the statute of Anne, which is the foundation of all English and American copyright legisla tion. Many productions without literary or scientific merit are valuable additions to useful knowledge; and such works, not less than those of learning, in the strict meaning of that expression, are within the scope of the copyright law as judicially construed. A directory, a calendar or catalogue of names, a compilation of statistics, a table of figures, a collection of legal forms, an abstract of titles to lands, a list of hounds, are productions which may be regarded as void of literary or scientific qualities. Yet they are contributions to the general fund of knowledge, and are sources of information useful to the public. Hence, they have been judicially recognized as proper subjects of copyright.3

In an early case in the United States Circuit Court, Mr.