copyright in his annotations to Wheaton's International Law, the notes consisted chiefly of materials taken from common sources. But to gather this matter from other works on international law, public documents, pamphlets, newspapers, magazines, &c., arrange, digest, and combine it with Wheaton's text, required research, expense, learning, and judgment. The result was a work of great value, due to the labors of the editor, and as such was entitled to copyright not less than is a production wholly original.1 So in Black v. Murray, protection was claimed for Lockhart's annotated edition of Scott's Minstrelsy of the Scottish Border. The copyright in the text had expired. Of the two hundred 'notes added by the editor, it appeared that only fifteen were original, while the rest were quotations. But the court placed a high value on the work of the editor, who with great literary research and judgment had made apt selections, and skilfully applied them to illustrate Scott's ballads.2 So, in Banks v. McDivitt, the compilation consisted of notes and citations of authorities appended to statutes. The statutes were public property, and the use of the authorities cited was open to all persons. But the com in the manner in which the plaintiff has united and connected them. No person had a right to borrow the same plan and arrangement and illustrations and servilely to copy them into any other work. The same materials were certainly open to be used by any other author, and he would be at liberty to use unit marks and gradations of examples and tables and illustrations of the lessons and to place them in the same page. But he could not be at liberty to transcribe the very lessons and pages and examples and illustrations of the plaintiff, and thus to rob him of the fruits of his industry, his skill, and his expenditures of time and money." Story, J., Emerson v. Davies, 3 Story, 782. 1 2 Am. L. T. R. N. s. 402. 29 Sc. Sess. Cas. 3d ser. 341. Lord President Inglis said: "It seems to me that notes of this kind are almost chiefly valuable in bringing together and in combination, the thoughts of the same author in differ- bination of the citations with the statutes was a valuable and useful work, in which copyright was held to vest. But a mere copy or reprint of common materials, without novelty or value in their arrangement or combination, is not entitled to copyright as a compilation; for in such case there is nothing to represent authorship on the part of the compiler.1 Copyright is in Arrangement and Combination of Materials. No protection is given to the component parts of a compilation independently of their arrangement and combination. Of these, the compiler is not the author, and he can have no exclusive property in what is common and open to all. Nor is the arrangement and combination, independently of the materials themselves, a proper subject of copyright. It would be a monopoly harmful to learning, and therefore opposed to the purpose of copyright laws, to give to any one the right to say that his mode of using common materials, his arrangement or combination or plan of treatment, shall not be followed in any subsequent publication. The copyright vests in the materials as combined and arranged; in the union of form and substance. Any one may use the same materials in a different combination, or adopt a similar arrangement for different selections. But no person can copy both the substance and the arrangement of a compilation, and use the same materials in the same form, without committing piracy.3 1 Hedderwick v. Griffin, 3 Sc. Sess. 402; Banks v. McDivitt, 13 Blatchf. Cas. 2d ser. 383. See also Rundell v. 163. Murray, Jac. 311; Jollie v. Jaques, 1 Blatchf. 618. 2 Pike v. Nicholas, Law Rep. 5 Ch. 251; Mack v. Petter, Law Rep. 14 Eq. 431; Webb v. Powers, 2 Woodb. & M. 497; Farmer v. Calvert Lithographing, Engraving, & Map-Publishing Co., 5 Am. L. T. R. 168; Lawrence v. Cupples, 9 U. S. Pat. Off. Gaz. 254. 3 Br. Barfield v. Nicholson, 2 Sim. & St. 1; Murray v. Bogue, 1 Drew. 353; Jarrold v. Houlston, 3 Kay & J. 708; Spiers v. Brown, 6 W. R. 352. Am. Gray v. Russell, 1 Story, 11; Emerson v. Davies, 3 Id. 768; Greene v. Bishop, 1 Cliff. 186; Lawrence v. Dana, 2 Am. L. T. R. N. s. In Lawrence v. Dana, supra, 429, Mr. Justice Clifford said : "Judge Story held, in the case of Emerson v. Davies, 3 Story, 780, that every author had a copyright in the plan, arrangement, and combination of his materials, and in his mode of illustrating his subject, if it be new and original; and it was also held, in Greene v. Bishop, 1 Cliff. 199, that there may be a valid copyright in the plan of a book, as connected with the arrangement and combination of the materials; and no doubt is entertained that both those decisions were correct; but it is a mistake to suppose that a subsequent writer can be held to have But when the compiler does not use the common matter in the exact form in which he finds it, but gives its substance in his own language, -translates, abridges, revises, or otherwise changes its form,-he performs an act of authorship which gives to the matter so used the character of an original composition. Thus, in Lawrence v. Dana,1 it appeared that some of the notes in which copyright was claimed consisted of verbatim quotations; and in these the compiler had no exclusive property apart from their arrangement and combination with Wheaton's text. But, in preparing others, he had rewritten, digested, or abridged the original; and, in some instances, he had made translations from foreign languages. Such notes were his own productions, within the meaning of the law; and no one had a right to appropriate them, with or without their arrangement and combination. In the cases wherein copyright has been recognized in compilations of matter taken from published works, such matter has been more or less elaborated by the compiler, so as to create in him some title to authorship; or it has been combined with some other composition in the form of annotations. But the principle which has governed in these cases must extend to a compilation of literary selections whose language is not changed by the compiler, and which are not used for purposes of annotation. Thus, valuable selections of poems, or prose compositions, are sometimes made and arranged with reference to their subject-matter; proverbs, quotations, &c., may be compiled so as to form useful collections; hymns may be selected. and classified with a view to their use on appropriate occasions.2 Compilations of this kind may have a material value, infringed a book where he has not borrowed any of the materials of which the book is composed. New materials are certainly the proper objects of copyright; and old materials, when subsequently collected, arranged, and combined in a new and original form, are equally so; and in either case the plan, arrangement, and combination of the materials are as fully protected by the copyright fringement of the property protected by the copyright; but the property in the latter case consists chiefly, if not entirely, in the plan, arrangement, and combination of the materials collected and presented in the book, as any other person may collect from the original sources the same materials, and arrange and combine them in any other manner not substantially the as the materials embodied same as that of the antecedent author." 1 2 Am. L. T. R. N. s. 402. in the plan, arrangement, and combination. Damages may be recovered in either of the supposed cases for the in 2 Marzials v. Gibbons, Law Rep. 9 Ch. 518. due to the choice and arrangement of the selections; and, in such case, there seems to be no reason why they may not be proper subjects of copyright.1 ABRIDGMENTS, DIGESTS, TRANSLATIONS, AND DRAMATIZATIONS. The law is well settled that productions of these kinds are proper subjects of copyright, and all are governed by the same principle. He who honestly abridges, translates, or dramatizes, reproduces a work in a new and useful form; and for the results of his labor, skill, and learning he will be entitled to the same protection extended to original compositions. But, to be entitled to copyright, the production must be something more than a mere copy of the whole or parts of the original. It must be the result of independent labor other than that of copying, and there must be substantial and valuable fruits of authorship on the part of the maker. A genuine abridgment is a reproduction of the matter or substance of a larger work in a condensed form, and in language which is not a mere transcript of that of the original. But to reduce the size of a work by copying some of its parts and omitting others creates no title to authorship; and the result will not be an abridgment entitled to protection, within the meaning of the law.2 A digest is governed by the same principle. The title of a translator is founded on the simple fact that he has made the translation. He is not required to make any other change in the original than to reproduce it in other language.1 Whether the translation or abridgment has been made with learning and skill, or otherwise, is a matter of which the law 1 In Rundell v. Murray, where a collection of recipes for cookery and other domestic purposes was in controversy, Lord Eldon said: "If the plaintiff had composed these receipts, or embodied and arranged them in a book she would have a copyright in it; but if she had only collected them and handed them over to Mr. Murray, I do not apprehend that they would be the subject of copyright." Jac. 314. som v. Marsh, 2 Id. 100; Story's Executors v. Holcombe, 4 McLean, 306; Lawrence v. Dana, 2 Am. L. T. R. N. s. 402. Other cases relating to abridg ments are cited in Chap. IX. 3 Sweet v. Benning, 16 C. B. 459. 4 Wyatt v. Barnard, 3 Ves. & B. 77; Rooney v. Kelly, 14 Ir. Law Rep. N. S. 158; Emerson v. Davies, 3 Story, 768; Shook v. Rankin, 6 Biss. 477; Shook v. Rankin, 3 Cent. Law Jour. 2 Gray v. Russell, 1 Story, 11; Fol- 210. takes no cognizance. The question is, whether there has been real abridging or translating, or mere copying. Nor is it material how closely two rival productions may resemble each other, provided each is the result of independent labor. Protection may be secured for an abridgment or translation of any work not protected by copyright. Any number of persons may make a similar use of a common original, and each will be entitled to copyright in his own production. So any one may acquire copyright for an abridgment or translation of a copyrighted work, provided he has the consent of the owner so to use it. But it is maintained elsewhere that, to make such use of a copyrighted work, without due authority, is piracy.1 The above principles apply equally to dramatizations, which are considered in another part of this work." LAW REPORTS. The report of a law case generally consists of two parts: 1, the opinion delivered by the court; 2, the matter prepared by the reporter. The latter usually comprises the head-notes, giving a digest of the decision, a statement of the facts of the case, a synopsis of the arguments of the counsel, and such other matters as are sometimes added to make the report complete. Matter Prepared by Reporter. It is settled, both in England and in the United States, that valid copyright may be acquired by a reporter for those parts of a report of which he is the author or compiler. The head-notes, additional citations in 1 See Chap. IX. 2 See dramatizations considered in Chap. XIV.; also, Chap. IX. Br. Butterworth v. Robinson, 5 Ves. 709; Saunders v. Smith, 3 My. & Cr. 711; Sweet v. Shaw, 3 Jur. 217; Sweet v. Maugham, 11 Sim. 51; Hodges v. Welsh, 2 Ir. Eq. 266; Sweet v. Benning, 16 C. B. 459. Am. Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591, 654; Backus v. Gould, 7 How. 798; Little v. Gould, 2 Blatchf. 165, 362; Little v. Hall, 18 How. 165; Cowen v. Banks, 24 How. Pr. 72; Paige v. Banks, 7 Blatchf. 152, on ap. 13 Wall. 608; Chase v. Sanborn, 6 U. S. Pat. Off. Gaz. 932; Banks v. McDivitt, 13 Blatchf. 163. Referring to the decision in Wheaton v. Peters, Mr. Justice Story, who was one of the judges who concurred in it, said: "It was held that the opinions of the court, being published under the authority of Congress, were not the proper subject of private copyright. But it was as little doubted by the court that Mr. Wheaton had a copyright in his own marginal notes, and in the arguments of counsel as prepared and arranged in his work. The cause went back to the Circuit Court for the purpose of further inquiries as to the fact, whether the requisites of the act of Congress had been complied with or not by Mr. Wheaton. |