the State, and are performing State functions as the agents of a State board. Why should it not be said that the entire State is 'the district affected' by the act? County agents, under the provisions of Act No. 6 of the Public Acts of 1907 (Extra Session) (2 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] § 3458), are charged with numerous duties relating to the care, investigation, and supervision of dependent, neglected, and delinquent children. It is a well-known fact that the problem of dependency, neglect, and delinquency of children is practically limited to communities with congested population. Counties having 150,000 inhabitants or more must have congestion of population, and must, by virtue of that fact, have numerous cases of children requiring the services of a county agent. Clearly the county agent in a county containing a large urban population will have much more to do, and should therefore be paid more, than in a small rural community, where the problem of delinquency is almost unknown. But it is said that the previous act, being based upon a per diem of service, gave ample recognition to the difference in the amount of work done, and that, if a county agent devoted his entire time to the work, he received $939 per annum under the old act, but that the agent in Kent or Wayne, who can devote no more than his entire time, will receive $1,800 under the act in question. Is not that a matter of legislative discretion rather than of judicial determination? The legislature undoubtedly had in mind the fact that, on account of the number of cases, their complexity, and the added responsibility entailed thereby, the counties with congested population demanded the services and therefore the pay of an efficient, high-grade officer with more or less expert knowledge and training, and that the amount of time devoted to the work was not necessarily the only criterion to measure the compensation.

We all know it costs much more to live in a large town than in the smaller counties, and it is very likely the legislature also took this fact into consideration in passing the law. It is not a new thing in this State to base the salary of an officer upon the population of the county where the service is to be rendered. The amount of the salaries paid the judges of probate depends upon the population of the counties. The more populous the county the larger the salary. 2 Comp. Laws, § 2552. Section 14454, 5 How. Stat. (2d Ed.), and notes thereto. A case not on all fours, but involving the same principle, is the case of the People v. Brazee, 183 Mich. 259 (149 N. W. 1053). Justice BROOKE, speaking for the court, said:

"The contention of the respondent that the act in question violates article 5, § 30, of the State Constitution, in that, under the guise of a general act, it is really local legislation, is, in our opinion, untenable. It is true that it provides for a license fee of $100 in cities containing over 200,000 population, and but $25 in other cities, and it is likewise true that at the present time there is but one city in the State of Michigan which has a population of more than 200,000. This fact, however, is not necessarily controlling. The act operates upon all citizens alike, except that a larger sum is charged for the license in larger cities than in smaller ones. Wherever the fee for the license is charged primarily for the purpose of regulation and not for the purpose of revenue, a variable sum may be fixed to meet the varying conditions under which the licensee operates. 25 Cyc. p. 608, and cases cited in note 74. It may well be that the legislature appreciated the fact that inspection for the purpose of proper regulation in large cities would be much more expensive than such inspection in smaller cities, and that the larger sum was fixed for the purpose of meeting such added expense of administration."

See, also, State v. Sullivan, 72 Minn. 126 (75 N. W. 8). The legislation was within the legislative discretion.

The writ will issue as prayed, but without costs. KUHN, STONE, OSTRANDER, BIRD, and STEERE, JJ., concurred with MOORE, J.

MCALVAY, J. I cannot agree with the foregoing opinion. The act in question does not make a constitutional classification.

BROOKE, C. J., concurred with MCALVAY, J.

CALLING WITNESS-DISCRETION OF TRIAL COURT.

In the course of the trial of an action of slander, after plaintiff had been examined, and defendant had waived cross-examination, and following the testimony of another witness, it was within the discretion of the trial court to permit plaintiff's attorney to recall and re-examine the plaintiff.

2. LIBEL AND SLANDER-EVIDENCE-DAMAGES-FEELINGS.

Plaintiff, in a slander suit, who alleged damages to her feelings, was not improperly permitted to describe the effect of alleged slanderous statements upon her feelings.

3. SAME-EVIDENCE-MALICE.

Counsel for plaintiff was also correctly permitted to offer in evidence other slanderous statements made about the time of the alleged wrongful acts, as tending to show the malice of the defendant.

4. SAME-EVIDENCE-TESTIMONY AS TO WEALTH OF DEFENDANT. Where a witness for the plaintiff testified in relation to

the reputed wealth of defendant, and his testimony tended

to show what the reputation of defendant was in this particular, the objection that certain of the questions and answers, disconnected from the remaining testimony of the witness, related to the defendant's actual wealth rather than his reputation therefor was not tenable as ground for reversal.

5. SAME DISPUTE IMMATERIAL EVIDENCE.

nder a plea of the general issue, the defendant was not authorized, in attempting to show that the subject-matter of dispute between himself and plaintiff, at the time the alleged slanderous words were uttered, lay on his property and that it belonged to him; the evidence was also inadmissible for the purpose of mitigating damages, defendant having testified on his examination relative to the ownership and status of the property.

Error to Livingston; Miner, J. Submitted October 12, 1914. (Docket No. 72.) Decided January 4,

1915.

Case by Mildred Sanford against James Houghton for slander. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings error. Affirmed.

W. P. Van Winkle & Son and A. L. Chandler, for appellant.

Louis E. Howlett and E. A. & L. E. Stowe, for appellee.

MOORE, J. This is an action of trespass on the case to recover damages for slander. The case was tried by a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $325. A motion was made for a new trial, which motion was overruled; the trial court filing written reasons for so doing. The case is brought here by writ of error.

The only errors relied upon which call for discussion are grouped by counsel for appellant as follows:

"(1) Error in permitting the plaintiff to be recalled for further direct examination after cross-ex

amination had been waived and in refusing to strike out this evidence.

"(2) Error in permitting the plaintiff to describe how the alleged slanderous words affected her feelings.

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'(3) Error in the admission of testimony relative to alleged statements of the defendant showing malice.

"(4) Error in the admission of evidence relative to the financial standing of the defendant."

(5) Rulings in relation to testimony.

Taking these up in the order presented:

1. The plaintiff was a witness in her own behalf. She was examined in chief. Counsel for defendant waived cross-examination. Albert Tumser was next called as a witness. He gave his version of the conversation which is the basis of the suit. After he left the stand counsel for plaintiff recalled the plaintiff for further examination. This is said to be error. We think this well within the discretion of the trial judge. Green's Michigan Practice, § 897.

2. This group of assignments of error is not well taken. Farrand v. Aldrich, 85 Mich. 593 (48 N. W. 628); Cribbs v. Yore, 119 Mich. 237 (77 N. W. 927); McArthur v. Sault News Co., 148 Mich. 556 (112 N. W. 126).

3. Relates to the testimony of witnesses Cole and Hoyt of prior statements made by defendant concerning plaintiff, bearing upon the question of malice. Counsel say:

"In the present case the words admitted to show malice were not a part of the res gesta; they were not a part of the same transaction; they did not lead up to the words charged in the declaration, and we maintain were incompetent in the case."

The ruling of the court was justified by Randall v. News Association, 97 Mich. 136 (56 N. W. 361); 25 Cyc. p. 396, and notes; Newell on Slander and Libel, p. 331.